ARISTOTLES
ART
OF
POETRY.
Translated from the Original Greek, according to Mr. Theodore Goulston's Edition.

TOGETHER,
With Mr. D'ACIER's Notes Translated from the French.

Vero non sine pena
Non Honor est.
Ovid Metam. lib. 2.

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THE

PREFACE.

If I was to speak here of Aristotle's Merit only, the excellence of his Poetick Art, and the reasons I had to publish it, I need do no more than refer the Reader to that Work, to shew the disorders into which the Theatre is long since fallen, and to let him see, that at the Injustice of Men, gave occasion to the making of Laws; so the decay of Arts, and the Faults committed in them, oblig'd first to the making Rules, and the renewing them. But in order to prevent the Objections of some, who scorn to be bound to any Rules, only that of their own fancy; I think it necessary, to prove, not only, that Poetry is an Art, but that 'tis known, and its Rules so certainly those which Aristotle gives us, that 'tis impossible to succeed any other way. This being prov'd, I shall examine the two Consequences which naturally flow from thence: First, that the Rules; and what pleases, are never contrary to one another, and that you can never obtain the latter without the former. Secondly, That Poesie being an Art cannot...
The PREFACE.

ver be prejudicial to Mankind, and that 'twas invented and improv'd for their advantage only.

To follow this Method, 'tis necessary to trace Poetry from its Original, to shew that 'twas the Daughter of Religion, that at length 'twas vitiated, and debauch'd, and lastly, brought under the Rules of Art, which assisted, in Correcting the defaults of Nature.

God touch'd with Compassion for the Misery of Men, who were obliged to toil and labour, ordain'd Feasts to give them some rest; the offering of Sacrifices to himself, by way of Thanksgiving, for those Blessings they had received by his Bounty. This is a Truth which the Heathens themselves acknowledged; they not only imitated these Feasts, but spake of them as a Gift of the Gods, who having granted a time of Repose, requir'd some tokens of their grateful remembrance.

The first Feasts of the Ancients were thus: They assembled at certain times, especially in Autumn, after the gathering in their Fruits, for to rejoice, and to offer the choicest of them to God; and this 'tis, which first gave birth to Poetry: For Men, who are naturally inclined to the imitation of Musick, employ'd their Talents to sing the praises of the God they worshipp'd, and to celebrate his most remarkable Actions.

If they had always kept to that Primitive Simplicity, all the Poesie we should have had, would have been, only Thanksgivings, Hymns, and Songs, as amongst the Jews. But 'twas very difficult, or rather impossible, that Wisdom, and Purity, should reign long in the Heathen Assemblies; they soon mingl'd the Praisef of Men, with those of their Gods, and came at last, to the Licentiousness of filling their Poems with biting Satyrs, which they sung.
The PREFACE.

Sung to one another at their drunken Meetings; Thus Poetry was entirely Corrupted, and the present scarce retains any Mark of Religion.

The Poets which followed, and who were (properly speaking,) the Philosophers and Divines of those Times, seeing the desire the People had for those Feasts, and Shows, and impossibility of retrieving the first Simplicity; took another way to remedy this Disorder, and making an advantage of the Peoples Inclinations, gave them Instructions, disguis'd under the Charmes of Pleasure, as Physicians gild and sweeten the bitter Pills they administer to their Patients.

I shall not recount all the different Changes, which have happen'd in Poetry, and by what degrees it has arrived to the Perfection, we now find it; I have spoken of it already in my Commentaries on Horace's Art of Poetry, and shall say more in explaining, what Aristotle writes in this Treatise.

Homer was the first that invented, or finished, an Epick Poem, for he found out the Unity of the Subject, the Manners, the Characters, and the Fable. But this Poem could only affect Customes, and was not moving enough to Correct the Passions, there wanted a Poem, which by imitating our Actions, might work in our Spirits a more ready and sensible effect. 'Twas this, which gave occasion for Tragedy, and banished all Satyrs, by this means Poetry was entirely purg'd from all the disorders its Corruption had brought it into.

This is no proper place to shew, that Men who are quickly weary of regulated Pleasures, took pains to plunge themselves again into their former Licentiousness by the invention of Comedy. I shall keep my self to Tragedy, which is the most noble Imagination,
The PREFAE.

Imitation, and principal Subject of this Treatise, all the Parts of an Epick Poem are comprized in a Tragedy.

However short this account may be, it suffices to let you see that Poësie is an Art; for since it has a certain End, there must necessarily be some way to arrive there: No body doubts of this constant Truth, that in all Concerns where you may be in the right, or the wrong, there is an Art and Sure Rules to lead you to the one, and direct you, how to avoid the other.

The question then is, whether the Rules of this Art are known, and whether they are those which Aristotle gives us here? This question is no less doubtful, than the former, I must also confess that this cannot be determined, but by the unlearned; who because they are the greater number, I shall make my Examination in their favour. To do this with some sort of Method, there are four Things to be consider'd, who gives the Rules, the time when he gives them, the manner in which he gives them, and the effects they have in divers times wrought on different People: For I believe from these four Circumstances, I can draw such Conclusions, that the most obstinate shall not be able to gainsay.

He who gives these Rules, is one of the greatest Philosophers that ever was, his Genius was large, and of vast extent, the great Discoveries he made in all Sciences, and particularly in the Knowledge of Man, are certain Signs, that he had a sufficient insight into our Passions, to discover the Rules of the Art of Poetry, which is founded on them. But I shall suspend my Judgment, and pass on to the time in which he gave these Rules.
The PREFACE,

I find that he was born in the Age in which Tragedy first appeared, for he lived with the Disciples of Æschylus, who brought it out of Confusion; and he had the same Masters with Sophocles, and Euripides, who carried it to its utmost Perfection: Besides he was witness of the Opinion the most nice and knowing People of the World had of this Poem. 'Tis therefore impossible that Aristotle should be ignorant of the Origin, Progress, Design, and Effects of this Art; and consequently even before I examine these Rules, I am well assured upon his account who gives them, that they have all the Certainty, and Authority, that Rules can possibly have.

But when I come to examine the Manner in which Aristotle delivers them, I find them so evident and conformable to Nature, that I cannot but be sensible they are true; for what does Aristotle? He gives not his Rules as Legislators do their Laws, without any other reason than their Wills only; he advances nothing but what is accompanied with Reason, drawn from the common Sentiment of Mankind, insomuch that the Men themselves become the Rule and Measure of what he prescribes. Thus without considering that the Rules are of almost equal Date with the Art they Teach, or any prejudice, in favour of Aristotle's Name, (for 'tis the Work which ought to make the Name valued, and not the Name the Work,) I am forced to submit to all his Decisions, the Truth of which I am convinced of in myself, and whose Certainty I discover by Reason and Experience, which never yet deceived any body.

To this I shall add, the Effects which these Rules have produced in all Ages, on different sort of People, and I see, that as they made the Beauty of Homer's
The PREFACE.

Homer's Sophocles, and Euripides Poems in Greece, from which they were drawn; so four or five Hundred Years after, they adorn'd the Poems of Virgil and other famous Latin Poets, and that now after Two Thousand Years they make the best Tragedies we have, in which all that please, only does so, as 'tis conformable to these Rules, (and that too without our being aware of it,) and what is displeasing, is such, because it is contrary to them, for good Sense, and right Reason, is of all Countries and Places, the same Subjects which caus'd so many Tears to be shed in the Roman Theatre, produce the same Effects in ours, and those Things which gave disfavour then, do the same now, from whence I am convinced, that never any Laws had either so much Force, Authority, or Might. Humane Laws expire or Change very often after the Deaths of their Authors, because Circumstances Change, and the Interests of Men, whom they are made to serve, are different; but these still take new vigor, because they are the Laws of Nature, who always acts uniformly, renews them incessantly, and gives them a perpetual Existence.

I won't pretend nevertheless that the Rules of this Art, are so firmly established, that 'tis impossible to add any thing to them, for tho' Tragedy has all its proper Parts, 'tis probable one of those may yet arrive to greater Perfection. I am persuaded, that tho' we have been able to add nothing to the Subject, or Means, yet we have added something to the Manner, as you'll find in the Remarks, and all the new Discoveries are so far from destroying this Establishment, that they do nothing more than confirm it; for Nature is never contrary to herself, and one may apply to the Art of
The PREFACE.

Of Poetry, what Hippocrates says of Physick, (a) Physick is of long standing, hath sure Principles, and a certain way by which in the Course of many Ages, an Infinity of Things have been discovered, of which, Experience confirms the Goodness; All that is wanting, for the perfection of this Art, will without doubt be found out, by those Ingenious Men, who will search for it, according to the Instructions and Rules of the Ancients, and endeavour to arrive at what is unknown, by what is already plain: For whoever shall boast that he has obtained this Art by rejecting the ways of the Ancients, and taking a quite different one, deceives others, and is himself deceived; because that's absolutely impossible. This Truth extends it self to all Arts and Sciences, 'tis no difficult matter to find a proper Example in our Subject, there is no want of Tragedies, where the management is altogether opposite to that of the Ancients. According to the Rules of Aristotle, a Tragedy is the Imitation of an Allegorical and Universal Action, which by the means of Terror, and Compassion, moderates and corrects our Inclinations. But according to these new Tragedies 'tis an imitation of some particular Action, which affects no body, and is only invented to amuse the Spectators, by the Plot, and unravelling a vast Intrigue, which tends only to excite and satisfy their Curiosity, and stir up their Passions, instead of rendering them calm and quiet. This is not only not the same Art, but can be none at all, since it tends to no good, and 'tis a pure Lye without any mixture of Truth; what advantage can be drawn from this Falsity? In a word, 'tis not a Fable, and by con- (a) In his Treatise of Ancient Physick.
The PREFACE.

sequence, is in no wise a Tragedy, for a Tragedy cannot subsist without a Fable, (a) as you will see elsewhere.

We come now to the first Consequence, which we draw, from what we have Established, and shall endeavour to prove, that our Laws, and what pleases, can never be opposite, since the Rules were made only for what pleases, and tend only to show the way you must walk in, to do so. By this we shall destroy the false Maxim, That, all that pleases is good, and assert that we ought on the contrary to say, That, all that is good pleases, or ought to please. For the goodness of any Work whatsoever, does not proceed from this, that it gives us pleasure, but the pleasure that we have proceeds from its goodness, unless our deluded Eyes and corrupt Imaginations mislead us, for that which causes our mistakes, is not, where is, but what is not.

If the Rules, and what pleased, were things opposite, you would never arrive at the giving pleasure, but by mere chance, which is absurd: There must for that reason be a certain way, which leads thither, and that way is the Rule which we ought to learn; but what is that Rule? 'Tis a Precept, which being drawn from the Pleasant and Profitable, leads us to their source. Now what is the Pleasant and Profitable? 'Tis that which pleases naturally, in all Arts this we consult, 'tis the most sure and perfect Model we can imitate; in it we find perfect Unity and Order, for it self is Order, or to speak more properly, the effect of Order, and the Rule which conducts us thither; there is but one way to find Order, but a great many to fall into Confusion.

(a) Chap. 18. Part 2. civ.
The PREFACE.

There would be nothing bad in the world, if all that pleased were good; for there is nothing so ridiculous, but what will have its admirers. You may say indeed, tis no truer, that what is good pleases, because we see every day disputes about the good and pleasant, that the same thing pleases some, and displeases others; nay, it pleases and displeases the very same persons at different times. From whence then proceeds this difference? It comes either from an absolute ignorance of the rule, or that the passions alter it. Rightly to clear this truth, I believe I may lay down this maxim, that all sensible objects are of two sorts; some may be judged of, by sense independantly from reason. I call sense that impression which the animal spirits make on the soul, others can't be judged of but by reason exercised in science. Things simply agreeable, or disagreeable, are of the first sort; all the world may judge alike of these, for example the most ignorant in music, perceives very well, when a player on the lute strikes one string for another, because he judges by his sense, and that sense is the rule; in such occasions, we may therefore very well say, that all that pleases is good, because that which is good doth please, or that which is evil never fails to displease; for neither the passions, nor ignorance dull the senses, on the contrary they sharpen them. 'Tis not so in things which spring from reason; passions and ignorance alter very strongly on it, and oftentimes choke it, this is the reason, why we ordinarily judge so ill, and differently concerning those things, of which, that is the rule and the cause. Why, what is bad often pleases, and that which is good doth not always so, 'tis not the fault of the object, 'tis the fault of him who judges; but what is good will in all happily please.
The PREFACE.

please those who can judge, and that's sufficient. By this we may see, that a Play, that shall bring those Things which are to be judg'd of by Reason, within the Rules, as also what is to be judg'd of by the Sense, shall never fail to please, for it will please both the Learned, and Ignorant: Now this Conformity of suffrages is the most sure, (a) or according to Aristotle the only Mark of the Good, and Pleasant, as he proves in the following part of his Discourse. Now these Suffrages are not obtained, but by the observation of the Rules, and consequently, these Rules are the only Cause of the Good, and Pleasant, whether they are follow'd Methodically and with Design, or by Hazard only; for 'tis certain, there are many Persons who are entirely Ignorant of these Rules, and yet don't fail to succeed in several Affairs: This is far from destroying the Rules, and serves to shew their Beauty, and proves how far they are conformable to Nature, since those often follow them, who know nothing of 'em. In the Remarks you shall find many Examples of the vast difference, the observance or neglect of the Rules make in the same Subject, and by that be thoroughly convinc'd that they are the two only Causes of Good, or Bad Works, and that there can never be any occasion, where the perfect Harmony which is between the Rules, and what pleases, shou'd be broken.

'Tis true to come to the last Consequence, that Poetry is an Art, invented for the Instruction of Mankind, and consequently must be profitable: 'Tis a general Truth that ev'ry Art is a good Thing, because there is none whose End is not Good: But, as it is not less true, that Men ordinarily abuse the best Things, that which was design'd for an wholesome Remedy, may in time become a very

(a) Chap. 13. Rem. 25.
very dangerous Poison. I declare then that I don't speak of corrupted Tragedy, for 'tis not in vicious and depraved Works, that we must look for Reason, and the intent of Nature, but in those which are sound and perfect; I speak of Ancient Tragedy, that which is conform to Aristotle's Rules, and I dare say, 'tis the most profitable, and necessary of all Diversions.

If it was possible to oblige Men to follow the Precepts of the Gospel, nothing could be more happy, they would find there true Peace, solid Pleasure, and a Remedy for all their Infirmities, and would look on Tragedy as useless and below them. How could they do otherwise than have this opinion? since those Pagans who apply'd themselves to the Study of Wisdom, consider'd it with the same Genius. They themselves own, that could the People be always brought up in the solid Truths of Philosophy, the Philosophers need have no recourse to Fables, to give their Instrustions: But as so much Corruption was inconsistent with such Wisdom, they were forc'd to seek for a Remedy to the Disorders of their Pleasures; they then invented Tragedy, and inspir'd them with it, not as the best Employment Men could take up, but as a means, which was able to correct the excess, into which they plung'd themselves at their Feasts, and to render those amusements profitable, which Custom and their Infirmities had made necessary, and their Corruption very dangerous.

Men are the same now, they were then, they have the same Passions, and run with the same Eagerness after Pleasures. To endeavour to reclaim them from that State, by the severity of Precepts, is attempting to put a Bridle on an unruly Horse in the middle of his carrier, in the mean
while, there is no Medium, they run into the most criminal excesses, unless you afford them regular and sober Pleasures. 'Tis a great Happiness that their remaining Reason inclines them to love Dissensions, where there is Order, and Shows, where Truth is to be found, and I am persuaded, that Charity obliges us, to take advantage of this, and not to allow too much time for Debauchery, which would extinguish that Spark of Reason, which yet shines in them. Those People are distempered, and Tragedy is all the Remedy they are capable of receiving any advantage from; for it is the only Recreation in which they can find the agreeable and Profitable.

Tragedy does not only represent the Punishments, which voluntary Crimes always draw on their Authors, these are too common, and well known Truths, and leave too much liberty to our Passions; this is the meanest sort of Tragedy: But it sets forth the misfortunes, which even in voluntary Crimes, and those committed by Imprudence, draw on such as we are, and this is perfect Tragedy. It instructs us to stand on our guard, to refine and moderate our Passions, which alone occasion'd the loss of those unfortunate ones. Thus the aspiring may learn to give bounds to his Ambition; the Prophane to fear God: the Malicious to forget his Wrongs; the Passionate to restrain his Anger; the Tyrant to forsake his Violence and Injustice, &c. Those idle and infirm Men, who are not able to bear the Toak of Religion, and have need of a grosser sort of Instruction, which falls under the Senses, can never have more profitable amusements; twere to be wish'd, that they would renounce all other Pleasures, and love this only. If any shall now condemn Tragedy,
The PREFACE.

he must also condemn the use of Fables, which the most Holy Men have employ'd, and God himself has vouchsaf't to make use of: For Tragedy is only a Fable, and was invented as a Fable, to form the Manners, by Instrucions, disguis'd under the Allegory of an Action. He must also condemn History; for History is much less Grave and Moral than Fable, insomuch as it is particular, when a Fable is more general, and universal, and by consequence more profitable.

We may say too, that the only Aim of true Politicks, is to procure to the People Virtue, Peace and Pleasure, this Design cannot be contrary to Religion, because we chuse none of those Pleasures which destroy Virtue, or Peace. Tragedy is far from it, and endeavors only their preservation; for 'tis the only Pleasure, which disposes Men to endure their Passions, to a perfect Mediocrity, which contributes more to the maintaining of Peace, and acquisition of Virtue, than any thing else: I also believe that from this Truth, we might draw a sure Rule to judge of those Pleasures which might be permitted, and those which ought to be forbidden.

You may say, Tragedy is dangerous, by reason of the abuses which creep into it. Every Thing is dangerous, and may be condemn'd at this rate, for there is nothing so excellent where Abuses may not be committed, and of which a bad, or good use may not be made. We must remember this Truth, that all Arts and Sciences, by the Ignorance and Corruption of Men, ordinarily produce false Arts, and false Sciences; but these false Arts and false Sciences, are more opposite to what they Counterfeit than anything besides; for there is nothing more opposite to

what
The PRE FACE.
what is good, than what is bad in the same Kind. If that which is false, engages us to condemn what is true, it has gain'd its point, that's what it would have, and having thus Triumph'd over Truth, soon puts its self into its place, than which nothing can be more Per- nicious.

Since Tragedy has no defect, but what is external, it follows from thence, that 'tis good in its self, and consequently profitable; this cannot be contested, and those who condemn it, condemn, not only the most noble Diversion, but the most capable to raise the Courage, and form the Genius, and the only one, which can refine the Passions, and touch the most vicious and obdurate Souls. I could give many examples; but shall content my self with relating the Story of Alexander of (a) Pherea: This barbarous Man, having order'd the Hecuba of Euripides to be Acted before him, found himself so affected, that he went out before the end of the first Act, saying, That he was ashamed to be seen to weep, at the Misfortunes of Hecuba and Polyxena, when he daily imbru'd his Hands in the Blood of his Citizens; he was afraid that his Heart should be truly mollify'd, that the Spirit of Tyranny would now leave the possession of his Breast, and that he should come a private person out of that Theatre into which he enter'd Master. The Actor, who so sensibly touch'd him, difficultly escap'd with his Life, but was secure'd by some remains of that pity, which was the cause of his Crime.

(a) A Town in Thessaly.
A very grave Historian, makes reflection much to this purpose, and which seems to me, no indifferent one in Politicks; in speaking of the People of Arcadia, he says; That their Humanity, sweetness of Temper, respect for Religion, in a word, the Purity of their Manners, and all their Virtues proceeded chiefly from the Love they had to Musick, which by its Melody, corrected those ill Impressions, a thick and unwholesome Air, joyn'd to a hard, and laborious way of living, made on their Bodies and Minds. He says on the contrary, That the Cynecians fell into all sorts of Crimes and Impieties, because they despipted the wise Institutions of their Ancestors, and neglected this Art, which was so much the more necessary for them, as they liv'd in the coldest and worst place of Arcadia: There was scarcely any City in Greece, where wickedness was so great and frequent as here. If Polybius speaks thus of Musick, and accuses Ephorus, for having spoken a thing unworthy of himself, when he said, That 'twas invented to deceive Mankind; what ought we then to say of Tragedy, of which Musick is only a small part; and which is as much above it, as a Word is above an inarticulate Sound, which signifies nothing.

This is what, according to my Opinion, may be truly said of Tragedy, and the Mean we ought to keep. But to the end this may be justly said, the Parts must conform themselves entirely to the Rules of Ancient Tragedy, that
The PREFACE.

is to say, which endeavours rather to instruct than please, and regard the Agreeable, as a means only to make the Profitable more taking; they must paint the Disorders of the Passions, and the inevitable Mischief which arise from thence. 'Twas for this the Greek Tragedians were so much Honour'd in their own Age, and esteem'd in those which follow'd. Their Theatre was a School, where Virtue was generally better Taught, than in the Schools of their Philosophers, and at this very Day, the reading their Pieces will Inspire an Hatred to Vice, and a Love to Virtue. To Imitate them profitably, we should re-establish the Chorus, which establishing the veri-Similitude of the Tragedy, gives an Opportunity to set forth to the People, those particular Sentiments, you would inspire them with, and to let them know, what is Vicious or Laudable, in the Characters which are Introduce'd. Mr. Racine saw the necessity of this, and cannot be sufficiently praised, for having brought it, into his two last Pieces, which have happily reconcil'd Tragedy to its greatest Enemies. Those who have seen the effects of these Choruse's, cannot but be sensible of their Advantage, and by Consequence, must Consent to what I say in my Remarks. After Examples, and Authorities of this Nature, I have no Reason to fear my Arguments. But enough of this Matter, 'tis time to come to what respects my self, and to give some Account of this Work.

I have
The PREFACE.

I have endeavour'd to make the Translation as literal as possible, being persuaded, that I could not do better, than to stick close to the Words of a Man, who wrote with wonderful Exactness, and puts in nothing, but what is to the purpose. I have nevertheless taken the Liberty sometimes, to enlarge his Thoughts, for what was understood in his time, by half a Word, would hardly be Intelligible now, unless some Pains was taken to explain it.

A simple Translation of Aristotle, would be clear enough, and there would be no need of Commentaries, if we were well Instructed in those Poets, from whom he takes his Rules, but as almost all the World is Ignorant of them, and 'tis necessary to explain by Example, what is Obscure in the Rule. This is what I have endeavour'd to do in my Remarks, which will seem short, if you consider the many large Volumes which have been wrote on this little Treatise.

Of all the Latin Commentators, Victorius seems to me the most Wise, Knowing, and Exact, but his Assistance is not sufficient, to give us an Understanding of Poesse. The Italian Castelvetro, has a great deal of Wit, and Knowledge, if we may call that Wit, which is only Fancy, and before much Reading the name of Knowledge. If we recollect all the Qualities of a good Interpreter, we shall have an Idea just conce
The P R E F A C E.

An account of the Theatre, the Passions, nor the Characters; he understood neither Aristotle's Reasons, nor his Method, and strove rather to contradict, than explain him. On the other hand, he is so Infatuated with the Author's of his own Country, that he forgot how to Criticise well; he talks without Measure, like Homer's Thersites, and declares War to all that is fine. Indeed he has some good things, but 'tis not worth while to spend our time in looking after them. The French Art of Poetry by Menardiere, may pass for a Commentary on some Chapters of Aristotle, but that Work is of little value; for besides that Author's being no good Critick, and perpetually deceived, he did not penetrate into the Meaning of the Philosopher. The Practice of the Theatre by the Abbot D'Aubignac, is infinitely better, but is rather a Sequel and Supplement, than an Explanation of Aristotle; on which, a perfect Instruction in the Ancient Rules, will enable you to pass a Judgment. The Treatise of Epick Poem by Father Bosli, is above all the Moderns have done in that Kind, and is the best Commentary Extant, on what Aristotle has wrote concerning that sort of Poem; none ever penetrated deeper into the bottom of that Art, and set in a better Light (according to Aristotle's Rules) Homer's, and Virgil's Beauties, or the Solidity, and Beauty of Aristotle's Rules, by the marvellous Conduct of those two great Poets. If he had Touched of Tragedy, as thoroughly
The PREFACE.

throughly, as he has done of the Epopeia, he had left almost nothing for me to have done after him; but unfortunately, he omitted the most difficult, which he could have Explain'd much better than myself, had he had spare time. His Work however has done me great Service. I have profited by the good, which others have Wrote, and must confess, that their Faults have been useful to me. But after all, the most excellent Commentators on the Poetick Art, are the Ancient Poems, and as they gave the hint to make Rules, 'tis by them, that these ought to be Explain'd. I hope, I have not follow'd such good Guides in vain. If I have wander'd, by following them, without a true Understanding, I should be very well pleased to be put in the right way, by any, who would advise me of my Faults, or make them publickly known.

Perhaps some may Reproach me, as Mr. Corneille did all the precedent Commentators. They have Explain'd Aristotle (says that great Man) as Grammarians, or Philosophers, and not as Poets; because they had more of the Study, and Speculation, than Experience of the Theatre. The Reading them may make us more Learned, but can give us no further Insight, how we may succeed. This Reproach is founded on this general Maxim, That every one ought to be belief'd in his own Art. It seems then, that those should not pretend to explain the Rules of "
The PREFACE.

Poefie, who never yet made Poems. The Principle is true, but the Consequence is not so, for before that is drawn, we must see to whom the Art of Poetry, and what it produc'd, does properly belong. 'Tis not Poefie it self which is produced, for then it would have been, before it was. 'Tis Philosophy that brought it first into play, and consequently, it belongs to Philosophy, to give, and explain its Rules. This is so true, that Aristotle made not these Rules as a Poet, but as a Philosopher: And if he made them as such, why may they not be explain'd that way too? And as it was not necessary to make Dramatick Poems, to give Rules to that Art, so 'tis no more necessary that they should be made, to Explain those Rules.

I don't know indeed, whether he who has made Pieces for the Theatre, is so proper to explain the Rules of this Art, as he that never did; for 'twould be a Miracle if one was not biased by self-Love, when the other is a dis-interested Judge, who has no other Aim, than discovering the Truth, and making it known. Mr. Corneille himself may be an Example of this. All that he would Establish in his new Discourse of Dramatick Poetry, is less founded on Nature, than his own proper Interest. It appears by his own Words, that the design he had of defending what he had ventured on the Stage, was to make him to forget Aristotle's Rules, and to Establish new ones, which should be more
The PREFACE,

more favourable to himself; we shall see in the Remarks, whether they can bear the Test.
'Tis therefore no ways necessary to have made Poems, to prescribe Rules for Poesie, and yet much less to explain them. If it was so, I would say there were none, for of all those which have given any, I knew but one that was a Poet; Horace himself never made an Epick Poem or a Tragedy, but to prescribe Rules for Poesie, as also to explain them; it is sufficient to know the Origin, and Scope of the Art Treated of; to have examined those Poems, which are the Basis and Foundation, to have made Reflections on what is agreeable, and disagreeable, and rightly to discover the Causes; this is the only necessary Knowledge I have endeavoured to acquire, and Philosophy alone can lead me thither.

I shall add once more, that if we make a Man more Learned, by explaining the Rules as a Philosopher, 'tis Impossible, but he must attain a surer Knowledge, to succeed in this Art. 'Tis true, we can't give a Genius, that's not done by Art, but we can show the Path a Genius ought to Tread in, and that is the only Design of all Rules.

I have not made the Apology of Commentators, to praise myself, for although I am no Poet, it does not follow that I cannot be a good Philosopher; I leave it to the Publick, and time, to Judge of my Work, for I will neither Court, nor fling their Favours.
The PREFACE.

I have spoken very freely, in what I have past'd my Judgment on, and in so doing, Imitated the ancient Criticks, who spared neither Demosthenes, nor Thucidides, nor Plato, nor any that was Great, or Venerable in Antiquity. A flattering Criticism would be a pleasant sort of one; when we should seek to Applaud, and the Respect due to the Name, should check the Censure due to the Fault. I am not so scrupulous, and if any one be offended, I shall Answer him as Dionysius Halicarnassaeus answered Pompey the Great, who wrote to him, to complain, that he had tax'd Plato with some Faults. The Veneration you have for Plato is just, (says that excellent Critick,) but the Blame you lay on me, is not so. When any one writes on a Subject, to shew what is Good or Bad in it, he ought to discover, and mark very exactly all its Virtues, and Vices, for that is a sure way to find out the Truth, which is more valuable than all things else whatever. If I had written against Plato with a Design to Decry his Works, I should be as Impious as (**) Zoilus, but on the contrary, I would praise him, and if in doing so I have Improved any of his Defects, I have done nothing worthy of Complaint, and which was not

(*) Called Impious, because he wrote against Homer.
necessary for my Design. Notwithstanding this, I have put some Bounds to this Liberty, and if I have discovered some Faults, I have conceal'd some others, that seemed to me not so considerable. I had respect in them, to the Approbation of many Persons of Merit, for I would not run Counter to an almost Universal Consent, which always is of great Weight, and ought, at least to oblige us to be cautious. But that I might give to those Persons, an Opportunity of recollecting themselves, I have endeavoured to explain the Rule, in such a manner, that they may perceive those very Faults, if they will Read the Remarks with attention. As for the rest, I had no design to offend any Body; if there are some things which make them uneasie, 'tis impossible to write any Work of this nature, without disquieting some. 'Tis also the Mark of good Criticism, as well as good Philosophy. From hence it proceeded, that Plato was blamed for having taught his Philosophy a long time, without displeasing any one Person; and they pretended by that, to say, that either his Doctrine was not good, or his Method defective, since none had by Hearing him been made sensible of that Uneasiness, which People naturally have, when they perceive themselves to be Vicious.

It would be unjust to finish this Preface, without saying something of Aristotle's Life, that those who read his Work, may know

some
The PREFACE

something of him: He was the Son of Niccomachus, Physician of (a) Amyntas, and descended from Esculapius. His Mother was the Daughter of one of the Descendants of those, who Transplanted a Colony, from Chalcis to Stagira, in Macedonia; that is to say, she was of Noble Extraction, on both sides. He was born at Stagira, about four Hundred Years, before our Saviour. At Eighteen Years of Age, he went to Athens, and abode with Plato, he pass'd twenty Years in his School, and when his Master was dead, he went to Hermas the Tyrant of Atarnea, a City of Myidia; he went from thence to Mytelene, from whence he was call'd by Philip, to be his Son Alexander's Tutor; he was eight Years, with that Young Prince, and after Philip's Death, returned to Athens, where he Taught in the Lyceum twelve Years, till the Death of Alexander. For Antipater having carried the War into Greece, Aristotle, who fancied, the Athenians suspected him, by reason of the strict Friendship, which was betwixt him, and the Viceroy of Macedonia, retir'd to Calchis, where he died soon after, by a Fit of Sickness in the sixty third Year of his Age. He left one Son, and one Daughter, both young, and made Antipater Executor of his Will, and Administrator

(a) Grandfather to Alexander the Great.
The PREFACE.

of all his Goods, which were very considerable, if we may judge of them by Alexander's Liberality, who gave him eight Hundred Talents, for his History of Animals, that is according to the lesser Talent, one hundred and forty Thousand Pounds Sterling, or according to the greater, one Hundred eighty six Thousand, six Hundred, sixtyfive Pounds, thirteen Shillings and four Pence. The most precious of his Moveables was his Library, which was afterwards Sold to Ptolomy Philadelphus, and which he had Enrich'd with four Hundred Volumes, of his own making. In those of his Writings which now remain, and are happily a considerable Number, we find a very discerning Spirit, a solid Judgment, a wonderful Method, prodigious Knowledge, and an Eloquence both strong and sweet. He himself found out more than the most Knowing now, learn with a great deal of Labour and Pains, and as for those things which depended on the Vitality of the Spirit, no Man ever carried his Knowledge further, or Established more sure, or extensive Principles. In Dialectics, Logick, Rhetorick, Politicks, and Morality, we have little but what he taught us.

By making a proper use of his Informations, there have appear'd Works in some of these Sciences, preferable to his, but his Rhetorick is the most Preferable we as yet have. His Art of Poetry is more to be admir'd, for in his Rhetorick, he made use of
The PREFACE.

of the Precepts of those, who Wrote before him. But he is the first that discovered the Grounds, and Secrets of Poesie, and none since have undertaken to Write, but in Explication of his Thoughts, which have serv'd, and will always serve as the Rule. He alone has Reviv'd Tragedy more than once.

In effect after it was brought to its Perfection, under the Reign of Alexander, the Son of Amyntas, under the Reigns of Perdiccas, and Archelaus, and degenerated in those which follow'd, but under that of Philip, and Alexander, the Poets being Encourag'd by those Glorious Princes, and guided by Aristotle's Genius, made it flourish as before.

After the Death of Alexander, it began to languish, and never recover'd its entire Strength till the Reign of Augustus, in which the Rules of this Philosopher were Reviv'd.

Since the Death of Augustus, it has grown Feeble, for more than sixteen Hundred Years, till in this last Age 'twas recover'd out of its long Decay, by Mr. Corneille, and Mr. Racine, who upheld themselves by Aristotle's Rules. So true is it, that Time is the Faithful Guardian, not only of Great Men, as Pindar faith, but also of the Liberal Arts, which it revives as occasion offers, and always under the greatest Princes. For what a good Soil and Air, are to Seeds and Fruits, such is the Glory, Grandeur, Magnificence, and
The PREFACE.

and Liberality of Princes, to Arts, and Sciences, which do not so much flourish under them, as by them; and we may very properly apply to this Subject the following Verse of Agathon.

Art favours Fortune, Fortune favours Art.

If Tragedy shall some time hence suffer any sort of Eclipse, 'twill be by the Laziness, and Haste of those Poets, who Write without being rightly Instructed. Plato in his Phaedrus Introduces a young Poet seeking Sophocles and Euripides, and Accosting them thus. I can make Verses tolerably well; and I know how in my Descriptions to extend a mean Subject, and Contract a great one: I know how to excite Terror, and Compassion, and to make pitiful things appear Dreadful and Menacing. I will therefore go, and write Tragedies. Sophocles and Euripides answer'd him, Don't go so fast, Tragedy is not what you take it to be; 'tis a Body, composed of many different, and well-suited Parts, of which you will make a Monster, unless you know how to adjut them; you may know what is to be learn'd, before the Study of the Art of Tragedy; but you don't yet know that Art.

If there are Poets now, which don't know so much as the Young Man, of whom Plato speaks, these Rules can be of no Advantage to them; but those who are like him, and in the same Circumstances, need only keep to these Rules, which
The PREFACE.

which will teach them what they are Ignorant of, and the fourth time restore Tragedy to its first Lujive and Brightness. This is the most profitable Present, can be made them, if by Meditation and Practice they will endeavour to make a right use of it; for Precepts alone are not sufficient to make us Learned, the Advantage, and Profit of any Rules, depend on our Labour and Pains. If these Rules are not for them, they will be against them, and their Works shall be Judged by them.
NOTE.

The References in Aristotle's Text are to some Notes, in which the Translator thinks, he has kept nearer to the Greek than Mr. D'acier; and that they are as Expressive, tho' not so Paraphrastical, as his.

All that is found in Italick Letters, in the said Text, except proper Names, &c. is purely Mr. D'acier's Addition; there being not the least Word of it in the Original.

So that whether you read the said Notes according to the References (omitting what is Synonymous) or leave out the Italick; you will have Aristotle's Sense entire.
THE CONTENTS.

Chap. I. THE Design of our Author. All the different Sorts of Poetry, are only Imitations. The Differences that are between them; and the Means they use to obtain their end. The Extent of the Word Epicopeia, the Error into which we are fallen, in Characterizing Poets, according to their Verse. Page 1

Chap. II. The Subjects of Imitation; their Difference, and what they produce in those who Imitate; and in their Imitation, the different Character of Homer, Cleophon, Hegemon, Nuochares, Timotheus and Philoxenus. 16

Chap. III. The manner how Imitations are made. The difference it puts between the Subjects it treats of. How far Sophocles represented Homer and Aristophanes. The Pretences of the Doriens against the Athenians, on account of Tragedy and Comedy. 23

Chap. IV. The Causes of Poetry. Imitation is as Natural to Men, as Number and Harmony. Whence it proceeds, that Painting gives so much Pleasure. The First Essays of Poetry. How it chang'd its Form. Elegy of Homer. What Poem his Margites was. Poets divided into two Classes. Homer first made Dramatick Imitations for Tragick and Comick Poetry, and opened the way to all Poets. The Origine of Tragedy and Comedy. The encrease of the first, and by what degrees, it came to the Perfection it is now at. From whence it proceeded that 'twas so long e're it obtained the Loftiness which is proper to it. The first Verses

(a)
The CONTENTS.

which were made use of; and the reason they were afterwards chang'd.

Chap. V. The Definition of Comedy. What Ridicule is. Why Comedy was not cultivated so soon as Tragedy. The Magistrates ordered the Chorus's. Who were the Poets that first formed the Subjects of Comedy. The Conformity and Difference between Epic and Tragedy. How long the Duration of those Poems ought to be. Those who judge well of Tragedy, can judge well of an Epick Poem, but those who judge well of an Epick Poem, are not always capable of judging well of Tragedy; and why?

Chap. VI. The Definition of Tragedy. Its effect to refine the Passions. Its Style. The six parts which compose it. Manners are the Characters of Men, and the Source of their Actions. Why Tragedy is an imitation of Actions, and not of Men nor their Manners. The End Men propose to themselves, is always an Action, and not a Quality. Tragedy can subsist without Manners. What is of most Importance and difficulty in Tragedy. What Manners are, and the Discourses which have or have not Manners. The difference of the Ancient Orators, from those of Aristotle's Age. Of the Musick, and Decorations.

Chap. VII. Of the Constitution of the Subject. An Exact Definition of the Three Parts, of a Perfect, and Entire Whole. In what the Beauty of all Beings that have Parts doth Consist. What the Extent of Dramatick Pieces ought to be, and the length of their Representation.

Chap. VIII. The Unity of the Subject, and in what it Consists. The Errors of some Ancient Poets in that Unity. How Homer knew it. An Elogy of that Poet. The Integrity of the Action: And what ought to be the connexion between all its parts.

Chap. IX. The Poet ought to follow the Truth, or verisimilitude. The difference between a Poet and an Historian.
The CONTENTS.

The advantages Poetry has over History. If Tragedy may invent the Names of all the Persons. An example drawn from the Tragedy of Agathon. If we must always follow the Fables which are received. How a Poet is Master of his Subject. Whether a true History may be the Subject of Tragedy. What Epicodic Fables are. And why good Poets have sometimes been Guilty of that Error. Surprize is necessary to Tragedy. How the Fable ought to produce this Surprize. The History of the Statue of Mitys. Page 137

Chap. X. Division of Fable into Simple and Implex. Their Definition. The distance of Incidents which come one after another, or are produced one of another. 159

Chap. XI. Of Peripetie and Remembrance. There are many sorts of Remembrances which is the most perfect; and the Conditions it ought to have. It is single, or double. What Passion is in Fable. 162

Chap. XII. The Parts of Quantity, of Tragedy, and their Definition. 171

Chap. XIII. The Characters which Tragedy ought to chuse to be perfect, whether it ought to be simple, or double, and to have a Catastrophe Happy or Fatal. The different Relish of the first Athenians, and those of Aristotle's Time. From what Families the Subjects of the best Pieces were taken. Euripides is defended against the Ancients, who accuse him of being too Tragical. The Success of his Pieces. The Publick Disputes of the Poets. To be good, a Tragedy ought to have the Approbation, both of the Learned, and the Ignorant. Euripides his Faults. Double Tragedies more Comical than Tragical. Their Origine. 185

Chap. XIV. From whence the Terrible and the Pityful proceed. The Error of those who would excite them by Decoration, or by Monstrous Incidents. 234

Chap. XV. What Incidents are terrible and pitiful. How the Poet ought to behave himself, that he may not change the
The CONTENTS.

the commonly received Fables, in what is Principal and
most Affecting. Three sorts of cruel Actions, and which
of them agrees best with Tragedy. The defect of those
cruel Actions which are designedly begun, but not finis-
shed. The Rarity of the Subjects of Tragedy, and the cause
of that Rarity. The Slavery of the Poets. 240

Chap. XVI. What Manners are in Tragedy, and the four
Qualities they ought to have. How the goodness of the
Manners ought to be understood. Euripides's Transgres-
sions against the Manners; necessity and probability
must be followed in the Manners, as in the Subject; what
the unravelling ought to be. Of Machines, and when
they ought to be used. A Rule of Aristotle's which is
too rigorous. The Vicious unravelling of the Medea, and
the Nature of the Greeks. How Incidents without any
Cause may be permitted in Tragedy. How a Poet may
ought to keep the Resemblance in adorning it. When
and how the Verisimilitude ought to be preferred so the
Truth. The Ingenuity of Homer and Agathon in their
Character of Achilles. The Obligation the Poets lay
under to satisfy the two Sences, which are the only Judges
of Poetry. Chap. 249

Chap. XVII. The different sorts of Remembrances, of
those which are most perfect, and which the Poet ought
to prefer. 278

Chap. XVIII. What the Poet ought to observe for the
right management of his Subject. The bad success of a
Piece of Carcinus for not following this Rule. What
ought to be done to form the Characters and the Man-
ners aright. One must have an excellent Genius, or be
an Enthusiast to succeed in Poetry. The Fable ought to
be formed, and Names given to the Actors before the
Episodes are thought of. An Example taken from Iphi-
genia. The reason of that management. An Essential
condition of Episodes. The difference of the Episodes of
Tragedy and of those of Epopeia. The Subject of the
Odys-
The CONTENTS.

Odysseus made General and Universal. 221

Chap. XIX. Of the Plot and the unravelling. The four sorts of Tragedy. The Injustice of the Athenians. Tragic Poets excellent, in the several Sorts. How Plays may be alike, or different, whether by the management, or the Subject. Epick mixture is vicious in Tragedy; the reason, and Proof of this Truth. Praise of Æschylus and Euripides, the reason of the ill success of some of Agathon's Pieces. Simple unravellings may be Tragical and agreeable. Agathon's saying on the verisimilitude. What the Chorus is, and all it ought to do. 'Tis an essential part of Tragedy. Sophocles blamed, and Euripides praised, for their Chorus's Strange Songs introduced by Agathon. How those foreign Songs are vicious. page 311

Chap. XX. Of the Sentiments, and in what they consist. The Reasons, from whence the Poets ought do draw them, as the Orators do. The Difference between those things, which the Orators, and those things which the Poets treat of. Of the Action, which comprehends the Pronunciation, and the Gesture. To whom it belongs to treat of it. A Trifling Criticism of Protagoras on Homer. 242

Chap. XXI. The Parts of Diction, and their exact Definition. 347

Chap. XXII. Of Simple and compounded Nouns of the different sorts of Metaphors, and all other Qualities of Nouns. 359

Chap. XXIII. What 'tis that renders the expressions clear and noble: Of Barbarisms and Enigms. What 'tis that properly makes an Enigm. The Frivolous Criticism of the Ancient Euclid on Homer. The greatest Ornaments of Speech are Vitious, if they are used too often. The Advantage of figured Words, beyond those which are proper. A Verse of Æschylus, made Noble by Addition of a Word in Euripides. The ridiculous Criticism
The CONTENTS.

of Ariphrades on the Tragick Poets. The Division of all the Ornaments of Discourse, and to what Works each of them does particularly belong. 376

Chap. XXIV. The Application of the Rules of Tragedy to Epick Poem. The Difference of this Poem from History. The Art of Homer, in which he is wonderful. The defect of the Cypriacks, and the little Iliad. How many Subjects of Tragedy the Iliad and the Odysses can furnish, and how many have been taken from the little Iliad. 390

Chap. XXV. The different sorts of Epick Poem, the Parts of it, the same as those of Tragedy. The Character of the Iliad, and Odysses. The bounds of the length of an Epick Poem, and why it may be longer than a Tragedy. What Verse is most proper for it. What sort of Poem Cheremon's Centaur is. Elogy of Homer. He hath introduced nothing, that has not Manners. The Wonderful of an Epick Poem, goes as far as Extravagance, and why it does: An Example taken from Homer, how that Poet taught the others to Romance as they ought to do. A Paralogism which he used. The Impossible in some Cases, ought to be preferred to the Possible. All the Incidents of a Poem, ought to have their Causes and Reasons, and what must be done, if that be impossible. Sophocles's Fault in his Electra, and the Play of the Mylians. How an Absurdity may be admitted. Homer disguises his Absurdities admirably well. The meanest Parts require all the Ornaments of Discion. Place where these Ornaments of Discion are useless and vicious. Page 403

Chap. XXVI. Objections which are made to the Poets, and Answers to those Objections. Why we must not Judge of Poetry, as we do of Politicks, and other Arts. The Defects in Poetry are of two Sorts; those which may and those which may not be excused. The difference of the Heroes of Sophocles, and those of Euripides. How
The CONTENTS.

we may salve what Homer has said of the Gods. A Maxim of Xenophanes. What is customary and of common use, must not be condemned. A Maxim of Morality applied to Criticism. Justification of several Places of Homer, the unjust prejudice of those who censure him. The Manner of Zeuxis. An Inexcusable fault of Euripides in his Medea, and in his Orestes. 474

Chap. XXVII. Which Imitation is most perfect, Tragedy, or Epick Poem. Why Epick Poem is compared to the Excellent Players on the Flute, and good Actors, and Tragedy to the bad. The Difference between the Ancient Comedians, and those of Aristotle's Time. Rhapsodies, their Recitations, and Songs, Ridiculous and Lascivious Gestures condemned. The Care of the first Poets to direct the Gestures, and Motions of the Actors. The indissoluble Advantages of Tragedy over Epick Poem.

492

The End.
ERRATA.


"Daughter of Agamemnon I am come. Or else he would only say that 'twas the first Entrance of the Chorus: for the true Parodos is at the end of the first Act, and begins at the 432 Verfe.


Whatever fo incredible you show,

Shocks my belief, and ftraight does naufeous grow.


The Reader is defired to Correct those litteral Faults he shall meet with.
ARISTOTLE'S ART OF POETRY.

CHAP. I.

The Design of the Author. All the different Sorts of Poetry, are only Imitations. The Differences that are between them; and the Means they use to obtain their end. The Extent of the Word Epopœia, the Error into which we are fallen, in Characterizing Poets, according to their Verse.

HAVING a Design, to treat of Poesie in general, its different Sorts, and the Effects of each of them in particular; to explain the Number and Quality of all its Parts, and to shew in what manner a (a) Subject ought to

(a) Fable.
be Constituted, to make a good Poem (b), and to forget nothing which concerns that Art; I shall Imitate Nature, and begin with the first Strokes.

2. The Epopeia and (a) Tragedy, Comedy, and (b) Dithyrambicks, most part of the Airs for the Flute, and Lessons for the Harp, &c. are only pure Imitations. Nevertheless, (c) there are essential Differences betwixt these three Arts. The (d) first regards the Means, the (e) second the Subject, and the (f) third the Manner. For as (g) Painters imitate most things, with Figures and Colours, (b) either by the assistance of Art, or Custom only, or by joyning both together; (i) so the Masters in all the Arts I am about to treat of, make their imitation with Number, Discourse, and Harmony, either joyntly or separately.

3. The Playing on the Flute, the Harp, and if there be any other of the same nature, as the Pipe, do all employ Number, and Harmony.

4. Dancers make use of Number only, (a) for by the means of Numbers, or figur'd Cadences, they imitate Manners, Passions, and Actions.

5. The Epopeia makes use of Discourse, either in Prose or Verse, whether it mixes divers sorts

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(b) of how many and what sorts it consists.
(a) The Poety of Tragedy, (b) Dithyramboxia. (c) They differ in three things. (d) That they imitated with things of different sorts. (e) That those things are different. (f) And not after the same manner. (g) Many things are imitated. (b) To make them like. (i) So in the said Arts all of them make their imitation.
(a) Without Harmony.
of Verses, or is content with one only, as it has hitherto been.

6. I give to the Word \textit{Epopæia}, a very large signification; for otherwise we should have no general Term, which would comprehend the Farces of \textit{Sophron} and \textit{Xenarchus}; the Dialogues of \textit{Socrates}, and all other Imitations, which may be made in Jambick, Elegick, or any other sort of Verse. 'Tis true, Men ordinarily distinguish Poets, by the difference of their Verse only, in calling some Elegiack Poets, others Epick or Heroick Poets, without having any regard to the Nature of their Imitation. Nay, they give the Name of an Epick, or Heroick Poet, to him who treats of Natural Philosophy, or Physick, in Hexameters. Howbeit, there is nothing common to \textit{Homer}, and \textit{Empedocles}, but the Verse; for which reason, 'twould be more just, to call the first a Poet, and the second a Philosopher (a) in effect, if any one should think it adviseable, to make a (b) Poem of all the different sorts of Verse, as \textit{Cheremon} made his (c) \textit{Centaur}, you would be oblig'd, not to give him the Name of a Poet, (d) but enough of this.

7. \textit{Dithyrambicks, Nomes, Tragedy} and \textit{Comedy}, employ equally those three Means I have spoken of, \textit{viz.} Number, Discourse and Harmony; that is to say, Musick; with this difference, that some use them together, and others separately. (a) So much for the Means, these Arts use, to make their Imitation.

\begin{itemize}
\item[(a)] Rather than a Poet. Likewise (b) an Imitation. (c) Hippocentaur. (d) But this in what is necessary to explain that which is said.
\item[(a)] And these I call the Differences of the Arts in those things by which they make their Imitation.
\end{itemize}
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Remarks on Chap. I. Dacier.

1. Having a Design to treat of Poetic in general.] Aristotle never puts at the Head of his Dialectick Works, which he calls ἄραιτικας λόγους, any other Preface, than a simple Explanation of his Design; he reserved his Exordiums, for those Books which he called τεχνήτα, i.e. Foreign; because they were wrote for all the World, and more for Ostentation and Pomp, than for Instruction; whereas the Acroatick were made for the particular Instruction of his Disciples. Cicero in the 16th Letter of his Fifth Book to Atticus, Quoniam in singulis libris, utor Proemius, ut Aristoteles in iis, quos Exotericos vocat. Because I use Proems in all my Books, as Aristotle does in those he calls Exoteric. What he does in this Book of the Art of Poetry, he does also in his Morals, Dialecticks, Physicks, and in his Rhetorick; and consequently all those Books are Acroatick and not Foreign.

2. Of Poetic in general.] It is in the Greek: Of the Poetick it self. There is a Difference between Poem, Poetic, and Poetick; Poem is the Work, Poetic is the Art, and Poetick is that which explains and gives Rules to the Art. In the Title this Word contains both the Manner and Art; and when Aristotle says here, Poetick in it self, 'tis as much as to say, Poetick in general, he puts Poetick for Poetic; for in his Rhetorick, he quotes these Books of Poetick, under the Denomination of the Books of Poetic, εὖ ὅσι πειρατης ποιήσεως. Poetic is then the Genus. The Matter is comprised under the Species, for the Epopoeia, Tragedy, and Comedy, are so many different Species, which constitute the Matter of Poetic; but this deserves no further Consideration.

3. And the Effects of each of them.] The Greek says, And the force which each of them has; that is to say, The Effects which they ought to produce in our Minds.
Minds. For Example, Tragedy ought to refine the Passions, by the Means of Terror and Pity. Force doth signify in this place, Instrument or Means: These are comprised under the Name of Parts, in what follows.

4. To explain the Number and Quality of all its Parts.] As well the Parts of Quantity as Quality, for ev'ry sort of Poesie is compos'd of a certain Number of Parts, which are different, and distinguish'd from the rest. The Means which ev'ry Poem uses to arrive at its Aim, are contained under the parts of Quality.

5. To shew in what manner a Subject must be constituted to make a good Poem.] That is the Principal, and also the most Difficult.

6. To forget nothing which concerns this Art.] The Greek has it thus. Of all that which is of this Method. Method has often been used for Art, and with reason; for he that speaks of Method, speaks of establish'd Rules, and a way mark'd out, whereby we may certainly arrive at what we seek for, and this is, what we call Art.

7. I shall imitate Nature, and begin with the first strokes.] For Nature always begins with that which is the foundation of the rest, and postpones Effects to their Causes.

8. Epopeia and Tragedy.] According to the Plan he lays down, he first explains what Poesie is in general; that 'tis an Imitation. This is the Genus, which contains all the Species of what sort ever they be.

9. Dithyrambicks.] None can doubt that an Epick Poem, Tragedy and Comedy, are only pure Imitations. But what can be the reason that Aristotle takes in also Dithyrambick Poesie? Is it to Contra-dict Plato, who assures us, in his Third Book of a Common-wealth, That Dithyrambicks are without Imitation,
Imitation, because 'tis a simple Repetition of what the Poet sang, in Honour of Bacchus? What Expedient is there to reconcile these two differing Opinions? The Expedient is not so very difficult to be found. Plato speaks of an exact and strict Imitation, which sets forth, and exposes to the Eyes of the Spectators, the Subject which is treated of. For Example: All that Homer makes Chryses speak, in the First Book of his Iliads, is an exact Imitation, because he lays aside the Person of the Poet, and puts on that of an Actor, which he imitates, when he Acts and Speaks, But if instead of making Chryses appear, he had been pleased to relate only his Words, and tell us, That Chryses desired the Atrides to send back his Daughter, &c. It had been a simple Narration, without that exact Imitation, which is the Life of Tragedy. Notwithstanding, altho' this be a Narration, yet we fail not to find Imitation in it, since every Narration has always some Object in view, which it proposes to Imitate, and make known; and consequently is an Imitation indirectly indeed, but 'tis an Imitation, and this way are Dithyrambs contain'd under this Kind. Such was Plato's Opinion as well as Aristotle's, for they both agreed in this, That all Mens Actions were Imitations.

10. Most of the airs for the Flute, and Lessons for the Harp.] Aristotle has not only promised to treat of Poesy, and its different sorts; but is engaged also, to speak of whatever has relation to that Art; and by consequence, as Flutes and the Harp were used in Comedies, Tragedies, Odes, &c. they naturally fall under that Subject. Again, Mufick is a Species of Poetry, as Poetry is a sort of Mufick, and 'twas for this very Reason, that the Term Mufick, was a general one among the Greeks, which comprehended not only Eloquence and Poetry, but Mufick too. But this is not the chief Difficulty of this Passage. That consists, in finding the Reason, why Aristotle said, Most of the airs for the Flute and Harp? Was it because all the airs for these Instruments were not Imitations? No, without doubt.
doubt. The Players on the Flute and Harp, play often on those Instruments, without Imitating any thing; that is to say, without Imitating any Action or Passion, as in Preludes; for their Notes are then rambling, and indeterminate Sounds, which can no more be called Imitations, than an inarticulate Voice, by which you can understand nothing.

11. Are only pure Imitations.] Whatever employs means, to shew and represent any Subject, as naturally as may be, whether it does really exist, or no, is call'd Imitation. To the end therefore, that a thing may be call'd Imitation, 'tis necessary, that at the same time these four following things be seen: That which Imitates: that which is Imitated: the Instrument or Means which is made use of: and the Manner in which they are employ'd. 'Tis evident by this, that there is no Art or Trade whatsoever, which is not Imitation; since in all of them these four things are plainly distinguished. This may suffice, for the understanding Aristotle's meaning, into which I have seen many learned and Ingenious Men, who were not able to penetrate. Those who have read Plato's Sophist, and his Third Book of a Republick, will easily comprehend, how all the Actions, Passions, and Discourses of Men, are only Imitations, and learn the Difference, that Philosopher makes between the true and the false ones. But that is not our Business,

12. The first regards the Means.] For all Arts don't employ the same Means and Instruments, to make their Imitation: They Imitate, as Aristotle says, with things of different sorts.

13. The second the Subject.] For one Imitates one thing, and another another.

14. The third the Manner.] Ev'ry Art has its different manner of Imitating, they don't all Imitate after the same manner.
15. As Painters imitate most things with Figures and Colours.] Aristotle would explain the first of the three Differences, which he has established, viz. That of the Means or Instrument, and he renders it very plain, by a Comparison drawn from Painting, which uses Figures and Colours, to make its Imitation.

16. Either by the Assistance of Art, or by Custom only, or by joyning both together.] The Manner of Reading this Passage, had render'd it so obscure, and difficult, that we must not wonder, if so many learned Men have labour'd in vain to explain it; it was read thus. ὦ ὡς διὰ τέχνης, οὗ ὡς διὰ σωματικῶν, ἐτέχεσθαι δὲ διὰ τὰ γοῦν. These by the Assistance of Art, these by Custom, the rest by Voice. I know very well, that the Voice is an Instrument made use of for some sort of Imitation, but it can in no wise enter into Painting, or have any Connexion with it. Aristotle writ, as 'tis in some Copies, ἐτέχεσθαι δὲ διὰ ἀμαρόν, and the rest by them two; that is, by Art, and Custom. We will now explain the Philosophers thought. There are Painters which imitate by the Rules of Art alone, and neglect to joyn that which is Natural, to the Knowledge they have of the Rules; their Pieces are in truth very just and regular, but they are insipid and flat, there are no Masterly and Bold Strokes. There are others who Imitate by Custom only, and following their own Genius, have accustom'd themselves to draw Representations of whatever they have seen, without having the least Knowledge of the Rules of Art. To conclude, There are some which joyn Usage to Art, and they are those who having no less Genius than Science, acquire such an expertness in their Works, that they become Originals, and capable of working up to Nature, when others only work by their Copies. This is, in my Opinion, the way to explain Aristotle's Thoughts; notwithstanding which, I still find a very great difficulty; for I must confess, I don't apprehend, why this great Philosopher, who never writ any single Word unprofitably, should enter into the detail of these three
three Differences among Painters. I am willing to think, that the first Part, οἱ αὕτη ἐκ τεχνών, These by Art, may be corrupted; and that Aristotle writ, οἱ ἄνευ τεχνών, Those by Chance; after this manner, he would have explain'd the Origine, Progress, and entire Establishment of Painting, which arose as Poetry and Eloquence did: Chance produc'd it, Custom maintain'd and strengthen'd it; afterwards Men joyning both together, and comparing the Effects, discover'd the reason of it, and on that establish'd the Rules which constitute this Art.

17. With Number, Discourse and Harmony.] Number or Rythm, signifies properly, a measured Cadence, or a regulated Movement. Plato in his 11th Book of Laws, τοῦτο τὰς κινήσεις ταῖς ρυθμίτες οὐνομαί ἐκ... Rythm or Number, is called the Order of Movement. Discourse is a general Term, and comprehends either Prose or Verse. Harmony signifies in this Place, only Musick or Song. Plato says in the same Place, Τότε, αὐτὸς τοῦς ἄνευς τὰς ὑποκύπτες ὑμᾶς τῇ συμβολῇ... The Order of Sounds, which arises from the Mixture of sharp and grave Tones, is called Harmony.

18. The playing on the Flute, the Harp, and if there be any other of the same Nature, as the Pipe.] Aristotle would not put the Pipe in the same Rank with the Flute and Harp, because 'tis not so Noble: 'Tis for this Reason he uses this Modification; And if there be any other, of the same Nature as the Pipe. So Plato makes no mention of it, when he speaks of Imitation with the Flute and Harp, and Longinus has followed his Example in his 32d Chapter.

19. Of the same Nature.] That is to say, which hath the same Energy, and produces almost the same Effects; for as Longinus observes, all the different Sounds in the World, have almost the same Effect, tho' they signify nothing in themselves.
20. Do all employ Number and Harmony.] What Aristotle here calls Number and Harmony, Ἑμνοια, Longinus calls, ἡ καθιστα, καὶ μέλος, Number and Song; according to Plato, who sometimes uses ὑμνος, καὶ μέλος, and sometimes ἑμνοια, as in that fine Passage of the 11th Book of Laws, where he blames the Poets, and accuses the Clownishness of those who make Verses without Music, and use Music without Verses, in playing on the Flute and Lyre. ῾Ρυμόν ἐκ τῆς γόμοντα μέλος καὶ ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς μέλος τῆς τιθημείας: μέλος ἐκ τῆς μουσικῆς, ὑμνος ἀνεβαίνει τῆς καθιστας. They employ, says he, Number, and Figures without Music, who put Prose only into Verse; on the contrary they use Music and Number without Words, who play on the Flute and Lyre. He adds, That it is very difficult to distinguish the Number and Harmony, which are in Tunes without Words, to comprehend what they signify, and whether they imitate any thing that is worth the trouble to imitate. Plato condemns those Tunes without Words, for they leave the Understanding without Action, and 'tis to that the Poets ought to speak, to instruct, and reform: for 'tis the Understanding alone, can comprehend Truth, or Regulate the Manners.

21. Dancers make use of Number only.] For a Dance is properly Steps and Motions. Heinsius pretends, that instead of reading ὁ τῶν ὀρχυσσῶν, Dancers, it should be ὁ πολλοὶ τῶν ὀρχυσσῶν, the chiefest part of Dancers, without doubt, because there were thole which Danc'd to the Sound of Instruments, or the Voice, and by Consequence, made use of Number and Harmony; which made Plato say, That a Dance was a Composition of Tune and Motion; but this Learned Man did not take Aristotle's Thought right, who considers Dancers by themselves; for when Music and Dancing are found together, they are two different Arts, two different Imitations, and as Dancing doth not make a Musician, so Music will not make a Dancer.
22. **Epopeia makes use of this Discourse, either in Prose or Verse.** [All the Efforts which have hitherto been made, to prove that ὁμοία λογι, Plain Discourses, does not signify plain Prose, but Verse depriv’d of its Number and Harmony, are wholly in vain: These two Words are never used together by Aristotle or Plato, in any other Sense. As the Word ἔπος, signifies no less Prose than Verse, Aristotle could very properly comprehend under the Name of *Epopeia*, or Epick Poem, Discourses in Prose, since they might in reality, be Epick Poems. Are not our Romances such? Aristotle proceeds to explain himself, and to tell us, why he was oblig’d to use it thus.

23. **Or is content with one only, as it has hitherto been.**] Hexameter, or Heroick Verses, have been so much devoted to *Epopeia*, that from Homer down to Aristotle, and from him, down to us, there has not been any Poet, who has endeavoured to mix any other sort with it. In the mean while, Aristotle very well observes, that such a Mixture would not destroy, the Epick Poem, for it is the Invention and Imitation, and not the Verse which makes the Poem.

24. **I give to the word Epopeia, a very large Signification; for otherwise we should have no general Term, which would comprehend, &c.**] This is, what oblig’d Aristotle to comprehend under the general Name of *Epopeia*, all sorts of Poems, whether in Prose or Verse; and since all of them are only the same Imitations, ’tis proper to give them one and the same Name, by which, you may know their Nature, and that is what no other Name can ever do. This Reasoning is very Just, but ’twas not understood.

25. **Comprehend the Farces of Sophron and Xenarchus.**] Are Farces then declar’d to be Epick Poems? There is nothing strange in this, if we consider the Composition and Nature of this Poem, for ’tis an Imitation compounded of Narration and Action, and if we would
would rank this *Species* under its *Genus*, there is none will agree to it, but the general Name of *Epoptaia*.

26. Of Sophron.] This Poet liv'd in the time of *Xerxes* and *Euripides*; he made *Farces* of Men and Women: Of which *Plato* was so fond, that he was always reading them, and at Night laid them under his Pillow. *Suidas* writes that they were in *Prose*, but the Criticks know, that either *Suidas* is mistaken, or there is a fault in his *Text*; for the Fragments which are in *Demetrius*, and, *Athenaeus* manifestly prove, that they were in *Verse*, and *Aristotle* himself calls them εὐμετέρους λόγους, *Menstr'd Speeches*.

27. Xenarchus.] A Comic Poet often quoted by the Ancients: I don't know in what time he liv'd.

28. The Dialogues of Socrates.] *Σωκράτης λόγυς*. Those who pretend, that λόγοι, cannot be understood of *Prose*, and that *Plato* speaks here only of *Works* in *Verse*, persist in the same Error, by taking these Dialogues of *Socrates* for some of *Æsop's Fables*, which a little before his Death, he put into *Verse*. This Opinion can never be maintain'd. *Aristotle* certainly speaks here, of the Dialogues of *Plato*, which he calls *Socratick Discourses*, because it is *Socrates's Doctrine*, which is there explain'd; and *Socrates* is introduc'd almost every where. *Horace* hath mention'd *Socratica Charta*; but you may ask, Why *Aristotle* did not write *Σωκράτης διαλόγυς*, the *Dialogues* of *Socrates*, rather than *Σωκράτης λόγυς, the Discourses of Socrates*? Was λόγοι Discourse, never yet used to signify Dialogue? It is very plain, in a Passage of this same *Aristotle*, who in his Book of Poets has it thus: οί δ' εὖ · εὐμετέρας τὸν καλέσαντα Σάφερος μήκας, ἐν δὲ λόγοις καὶ εἰμικτέοι, ἤ τὸν Ἀλέξαμον ἢ τὸν τῆς πρώτας γεγονέν τάν Σωκρατικῶν Διαλογῶν: Shall we not then call the Farces of Sophron, which are in *Verse*, Discourses and Imitations, as well as the Dialogues of *Alexamenes* of *Teos*, which are the first *Socratick Dialogues*.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Dialogues that were wrote: On which Athenæus Comments thus. Aristotle informs us by these Words, That Alexamenes of Teos, made those Dialogues before Plato, and that he was the Inventor of 'em. There can be no further doubt then, but that these Dialogues were in Prose: That is without dispute. But may it not be objected, That these Dialogues are more like a Dramatick, than an Epick Poem? No surely; for according to Aristotle's Doctrine, Epopeia, or Epick Poem, imitates by Discourse; but Dramatick by Number, Discourse and Harmony; and 'tis for this reason, the Ancients never compar'd Plato with Sophocles, nor Euripides with Homer.

29. In Iambick, Elegiack, or any other sort of Verses.] For, once again, 'tis the Imitation, and not the Verse which makes the Poem.

30. 'Tis true, Men often distinguishing Poets by the difference of their Verse only.] This Passage has always appear'd very difficult, but I hope 'twill not be found so. Aristotle makes this Objection, as from those who would blame his Method, in comprehending under the general Name of Epopeia, Farces, and the Dialogues of Socrates. What necessity was there of running to the general Term? Might not Poets be distinguishing'd then, as they are now, by the Nature of their Verse, and some call'd Elegiack Poets, others Iambick Poets, and those who write Hexameters, Epick or Heroick Poets? Aristotle answers this Objection very well, and shews how ridiculous it is.

31. Nay, they give the Name of an Epick or Heroick Poet, to him who treats of Natural Philosophy, or Physick, in Hexameters.] This is the Inconvenience into which they must necessarily fall, who will distinguishing and characterize Poets by their Verses. They must be oblig'd to give the same Name to Empedocles and Homer, to Lucretius and Virgil; and certainly this Inconvenience is greater, than that which follows, by distinguishing them according to the Kinds of their Imitation.

32. Howbeit
32. Howbeit there is nothing common to Homer and Empedocles, but the Verse.] Empedocles was a Sicilian Poet, a great Naturalist and Physician. He wrote in Heroick Verse a Course of Natural Philosophy, a Treatise of Physick, and some Books of Expiations, in which he imitated Homer’s Stile. He was Contemporary with Sophocles; since therefore there is nothing but the Verse common to Homer and Empedocles, Aristotle had reason to say, That the latter ought rather to be called a Physician or Naturalist, than a Poet; and by consequence, whoever will Characterise a Poet by the Verse, and not Imitation, shall always be mistaken, nothing can be more clear than this reasoning; of which Plutarch understood the force, when he writ in his Treatise, How we ought to read the Poets: That there is no Poem, where there is no Fable: ’Tis for this reason, that the Verses of Empedocles, Parmenides, those of the Biting of Venomous Beasts, the Remedies of Nicander, the Sentences of Theognis, are only Discourses which have borrowed the Nobleness of Stile, and Measure of Syllables from Poetry, as a means to avoid the Baseness of Prose.

33. In effect, if any one should think it adviscable to make a Poem of all the different sorts of Verse, &c.] He is not satisfy’d to expoise the Ridiculousness of those who would distinguish and Name Poets according to their Verse, but shows, that it may so happen, that it cannot be done at all: For what Name can be given to that Poet, who mingles all sorts of Verse in his Poem; he is neither an Heroick, Elegick, nor Iambick Poet, he must then be no Poet; and this is what can be maintain’d.

34. As Cheremon made his Centaur.] Cheremon was a Tragick Poet, and Socrates’s Disciple. The Ancients cite many of his Pieces, as his Alphise, Bacchus, Thyestes, Io, Elysieia, Oenues, Blesseas, and Centaur. Athenæus calls this last, Αθηναῖος θεῖος, μέλος.
A Play of divers sorts of Verses: 'Twas a Tragedy, which he made on the Centaur Neffus, he mix'd several sorts of Verse, thinking perhaps, by such a Poetick Medley, he should the more livelily represent the Centaur's double Nature, who was both Man and Horse. I shall speak again of this Piece in the 25th Chapter.

35. Dithyrambicks, Nomes.] He joyns Dithyrambicks and Nomes, because they were both Hymns, sung in the Honour of the Gods: The Nomes were for Apollo; and the Dithyrambicks for Bacchus. NOME properly signifies, a Mode, or manner of Singing, according to a certain Law, and Rule, which ought never to be transgress'd. There's this difference between the Nomes and Dithyrambicks, these were unruly and bold, and sang with the Phrygian Tone, those sweet and easy, and sang after the Lydian manner.

36. With this difference, that some use them all together.] As Dithyrambicks and Nomes, whose Verses were always accompanied with Singing and Dancing.

37. And others separately.] As Tragedy and Comedy, which employ'd only Verse in the Acts; Dancing and Singing with the Verse in the Chorus, as you'll see in what follows.
The Subjects of Imitation; their Difference, and what they produce in those who Imitate; and in their Imitation, the different Character of Homer, Cleophon, Hegemon, Niocares, Timotheus and Philoxenus.

As all those who Imitate, Imitate Actions, and 'tis impossible but Actions must be either good, or bad, for as Manners cannot be distinguished, but by these two Qualities, and Men differ among themselves only as they are Virtuous or Vicious, it necessarily follows, that Poets in their Imitations must represent Men in respect to us, either better or worse, or just as we are. 'Tis the same of Painters. Thus Polygnotus painted Men better, Pauson worse, and Dionysus as they were: And it is evident, that these Differences are without fail, to be found in every one of the Imitations, of which we have spoke; which are different, as the Subjects of which they treat are so.

2. The same Differences are also to be found in Dances, in the Airs for the Flute, Lessons for the Harp and all other Instruments, and in all Works whether in Prose or Verse. For Exam-
ple: Homer has made Men better, Cleophon has made them such as they are, and Hegemon of Thasos, who invented Parodies, and Niceobare the Author of the Deliad, have made them worse. It is the same with those Poets, who have composed Dithyrambicks and Nomes. Thus it is that Timotheus and Philoxenus have imitated the Persians and Cyclops, in the Pieces, which bear those Names. And 'tis this, which makes the Difference between Tragedy and Comedy; for the first (a) represents them better and the latter (b) worse.

(a) Endeavours to represent. (b) Then they are in those Times.

REMARKS on Chap. II.

1. As all those who imitate, imitate Actions.] Aristotle lays down this as an undoubted Principle; and indeed it is so, for there is nothing else but Actions which can be imitated.

2. For Manners cannot be distinguished, but by these two Qualities.] The Philosopher expresses himself morePathetically, in the Original; for says he, Manners are not found but in those that are such: which is as much as to say, that properly speaking, there are no Manners, in any, but those who are good, or bad. If there were any, that kept a Medium between both, we could not properly lay of them that they had manners, at least they would not be perceptible, and consequently, could not be the Subject of an imitation; but true Philosophy proves, that all is Virtue, or Vice; so that this Medium can't be found.
3. In respect to us, either better, or worse, or just as we are.] 'Tis impossible to Conceive any other Qualifications, than these three. If Poets keep to an exact imitation, of the Ages in which they live, they make Men like themselves, that is, such as they really are; if they add any thing to their Virtue, they make them better, that is greater, more Virtuous and Heroick; if they retrench any thing, or aggravate their Faults, they make them more wicked. Because the second Imitation is Capable of giving a Noble Emulation to Mankind, and to lead them to Virtue. The Thebans made a Law, which oblig'd Poets, and Painters, to represent Men better, than they were; and those who made them worse, were severely fin'd.

4. Polygnotus painted Men better.] Aelian confirms the Judgment of Aristotle; for he says that Polygnotus always painted Noble Subjects, and that he hit the features to Perfection; and that Dionysius imitated him in ev'ry thing but the size. παλιν τὰ μεγάλα. Polygnotus was of the Isle of Thasos, and Dionysius of Colophon, they both liv'd in the Ninetieth Olympic, in the times of Xerxes, Sophocles, and Socrates. Polygnotus painted in the Gallery called Poikile, the Battle of Marathon, gain'd by Miltiades, over the Medes and Persians.

5. Pauson worse.] Perhaps this is the same, which Pliny calls Pausias; he was of Sicynia, and the first, that painted Ceilings, Lacunaria. Aelian calls him Pausan, as Aristotle does, and tells this Story of him. A certain Man, would have him draw a Picture of an Horse, wallowing, and rowling, on the Ground, he drew one running full speed; and when the Man, for whom the Picture was drawn, refus'd to have it, because, he would have had an Horse rowling and not running; Pauson said to him, Do but turn the Picture upside-down, and the Horse which is now running will then be rowling. The Ancients use to Compare Socrates Writings, to this Painting of Pauson's, for to find what you
you look for, you must not take them, as he gives 'em; but turn, and take them the Contrary way. *Helen Book the xiv. Chap. xv.

6. The same differences are also to be found; in Dances, in the Ayres for the Flute, and Lessons for the Harp, &c. For Dancers, and Players on Instruments, must represent Men, either, better, or worse, or alike; having no other qualities which they can make the Subjects of their Imitation.

7. And in all Works whether in Prose or Verse.] The Greek lays in Discourses, πρατεῖ τὸν λόγον, alluding, to the Socratical Dialogues, of which we have already spoken; and in Rhetorics, that is, in those Works, which are pure Verse; and where there is neither Dance; nor Song, as in an Epick Poem. The Interpreters continue here in the same fault which they were in before.

8. For Example, Homer made men better.] For no Man is so Brave as Achilles, so Prudent as Ulysses, &c.; and somebody spake very aptly, to this purpose, when he said, That Homer made Gods of his Men; and Men of his Gods.

9. Cleophon has made them such as they are.] Cleophon the Athenian Poet. Suidas has preserved the Names of a great many Tragedies which he writ; as Achilles, Telephus, Bacchantes, &c. And this Passage of Aristotle seems to prove that he also made some Epick Poem.

10. Hegemon of Thasos; who invented Parodies.] Athenæus speaks of this Hegemon, and quotes some places of his Parodies; but denies, that he was the Inventor of them, and attributes that to Hipponax, who was before Hegemon. It may be, the term which Aristotle uses, παραφράζω, παραφράζω, who first made them, may not signify, that he found them out, but that he made them.
best. We certainly find, that Hegemon was the first, who enter'd the Lists of the Publick Shows at Athens, for Parodies, and who won the Prize. Epicharmus, Cratinus, and Hermippus, Poets who made the old Comedy, made also Parodies, but they came not near those of Hegemon; for besides his lucky hits, he was an incomparable Actor, and diverted the Athenians so much, that one day, when he recited his Gigantomachia, they were so pleas'd, and laugh'd so heartily, that tho' the News came of the Defeat of their Army in Sicily, they could not leave off. And if Hegemon had not given over, they would have staid there, till the end, as much for the Pleasure they took in hearing it, as for Shame to shew their Concern, before those Strangers who came from all the adjoyning Towns to see that Show. After Hegemon, appear'd Eubæus of Paros, and Bœotus, who surpass'd all that ever were before them; The first, who liv'd in the time of Philip, made Parodies against the Athenians, and there were remaining in the second Century, four entire Books of 'em.

II. Parodies.] A sort of Poem, in which another Poets Verses were ridicul'd, by making some little change. This was Parodie in its original. The Authors of these Poems, as Aristotle observes of Hegemon, made Men worse, than they really were; for that was the only aim of Parodies. Afterwards they made se- rious Parodies; but I believe, they were not known to the Ancients, or at least, I have seen no Example that they were.

Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

13. It is the same with those Poets, who have Composed Dithyrambicks and Nomæ.] Since Dithyramicks were Poems in Honour of Bacchus, and Nomæ in that of Apollo, how could it possibly be, that a Poet should represent, Men better or worse. Tho' this difficulty seems Considerable, yet it will soon vanish, when we are inform'd, That in them were sung the Actions of those whom they would praise, or blame.

14. Thus it is that Timotheus, and Philoxenus, have imitated the Persians and Cyclops.] Timotheus of Miletum, a great Poet; He composed Eighteen Books of Nomæ, Abundance of Dithyrambicks, and a great many other Works. He added two Strings to the Harp, the Eleventh and the Twelfth, and improv'd the Ancient Musick. He liv'd in the time of Euripides. In some of his Nomæ, he sung the Victory, which the Athenians obtain'd over the Persians, and to heighten the value of it, he made the Persians much more Valiant, than really they were. This is the reason why Aristotle says, that in Nomæ Men may be describ'd to be better than they are. The Antients quote Timotheus's Cyclops also.

15. Philoxenus.] Is the Famous Dithyrambick Poet, who liv'd in Plato's time, and Dionysius the Tyrant, against whom he made his Cyclops, or under the feign'd Names of Polyphemus and Galatea described the Amours of that Prince. Athenæus quotes one place of the Cyclops, and finds fault, that Polyphemus, in praising Galatea's Beauty, takes no notice of her Eyes, which is the Part Lovers, generally, and most voluntarily praise; he says 'tis a blind Praise. I believe that Polyphemus, said nothing of Galatea's Eyes; because without doubt he thought it a Deformity to have two Eyes, and that 'twas better to have but one, as we have but one Mouth: As for what remains, Aristotle proves, that
this Poem of Philoxenus, was a Piece of Dithyrambs; and not a Comedy.

16. And 'tis this which makes the difference which is between Tragedy and Comedy.] Since he comes so directly to Tragedy and Comedy, 'tis to me a clear Proof, that they are deceiv'd, who take the Cyclops, and Persians (of which we have spoke) for Pieces of the Theatre.

17. For the first represents Men better] For Tragedy, is the imitation, of great Persons Actions, and whole Actions it represents, still greater than they are, making them, however, somewhat like, as shall be explain'd elsewhere.

18. And the latter worse.] This agrees only to the old, and Mean Comedy, which represented Men worse, for the New endeavour'd to make them like. Menander and Terence, have drawn Men very Naturally. Our Comedies have in many things Chosen the Manner of the two first.

C H A P,
CHAP. III.

The Manner how Imitations are made. The difference it puts between the Subjects it treats of. How far Sophocles represented Homer, and Aristophanes. The Pretences of the Doriens against the Athenians, on account of Tragedy and Comedy.

1. The Third Difference (a) consists in the manner, in which these Imitations are made; for the same Subjects, may be imitated with the same things, and yet be render'd very different, by the manner of doing it; either in making a Narration, or acting some other Person, as Homer has successfully Practis'd; either without shifting the Person, and remaining still the same, or (b) by always making those act, which we imitate.

2. All That, which is call'd Imitation, is Capable of those three (a) Differences only, of which I have spoke in the beginning, and which I shall explain, under these three words, With What, What, and How. So that in the second respect, Sophocles, is (b) like Homer, in his Imitation, for they both imitate the most Considerable Men; and in the third, he is like Aristophanes; because he imitates those who act, and also in their Acting, as he does. (c) 'Tis for

(a) Besides these there is a Third Difference, which (b) by making those who act the affair, and are Concerned in the Actions, to express the things by their Imitation.
(b) Imitation is in these three. (c) From whence.
this reason, some have maintain'd that the Pieces for the Theatre, (d) were called Dramatick, from the word Drama which signifies an Action. That which gave occasion, to the Dorians, to attribute to themselves the Invention of Tragedy, and Comedy. For the Megarians of that Country, took Comedy, for their share, pretending, that it had its Original, in their Popular State. The Megarians of Sicily, also claim'd it, because the Poet Epicharmus, was elder than Chionides, and Magnes, who was a Sicilian. (e) Some of (f) the Dorians, in the Peloponese, have attributed both to themselves, and found their Pretensions on the Names. And first as for Comedy, they assert that the Villages, which the Athenians call Demois, they call Comai, which proves, say they, that Comedy, was not so called from the word Comazein, (g) as the Athenians pretend, to get this Honour; but from the word Comae, Village, because (b) the first Comedians not being allow'd to enter the Cities, went and acted in the Villages. They assert also, that as the Athenians say Prattein to do, or act, they say Dran, from whence proceeded the Name, given to all Pieces of the Theatre, which are called Dramatick, Drames, that is Actions. This suffices for, the Differences of Imitation, their Number, and Nature.

(d) Dramata were called, because they imitated by Action. (e) And Tragedy. (f) Trofe who were of the Peloponese. (g) To Ear luxuriously together. (b) Being counted ignominious, they went out of the City.
REMARKS on Chap. III.

1. The Third Difference consists, in the Manner, in which these Imitations are made.] After having spoke of the Subjects of Imitation, and the Means which are there employ'd, he comes to the third Difference, he hath established; that is, the Manners which are used, in imitating; for tho' Imitations may be alike, as to the Matter, and Means; yet they may be different, as to the Manner, and this is what he goes on to explain.

2. Either in making a Narration, or in acting some other Person.] This Passage appears a little difficult, for Aristotle says here in three Lines, what Plato has fill'd three Pages with, in the Third Book of his Republic. We'll endeavour to explain it, Epick, Dithyrambick; and Dramatick Poems, do all three imitate the same Subjects, for they imitate Actions, they all employ the same Means, that is Verse. From whence then proceeds the Difference between them? 'Tis after this manner: In an Epick Poem, sometimes the Poet makes a Simple Narration, sometimes he personates another; thus his Poem is composed of Narration and Action. This is what Aristotle means, when he says, Either in making a Narration, or acting some other Person; this is the first manner of making an Imitation. The second is, when the entire Poem, is only a Narration, as a Dithyrambick Poem, where the Poet always relates, without acting at all, and this is the meaning of those words, Either without shifting the Person, and remaining still the same; for 'tis a continued Narration, when the Poet remains always such. To conclude, the third is, when the Poem always Employs action, as Tragedy, and Comedy, for 'tis not the Poet who then speaks, 'tis the Actor, who explains in Acting, what the Poet meant; and this is what Aristotle would have understood by these words, or by always making those act, which we imitate. These three Differences, are evidently explain'd, at the end of that Passage.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Passage of Plato's, which I mention'd. I think I have plainly enough expounded to you, what I would have you understand, That Poetry, or Fable, consists in a continued Imitation, as in Tragedy, and Comedy; or in the Narration of the Poet, as in Dithyrambs; or else in both, that is in Narration, and Imitation, or Action, as in an Epic Poem, and some other Works of that Nature.

3. Which I shall explain under these three words. There are the three essential Differences, established, between all Arts; in, &c. the first Chapter, with what, regards the Means; what, regards the Subject; and how, regards the Manner.

4. So that in the second respect, Sophocles is like Homer in his Imitation. Homer, and Sophocles are alike, in the second respect, because they both imitate, the same Subjects, that is those who act, but they differ, in respect, of the other two, for they imitate neither after the same Manner, nor with the same Means, Homer employing only Verse; but Sophocles, Verse, Singing, Dancing.

5. In the third he is like Aristophanes. For he imitates after the same Manner, that is, with Action, but they differ in the quality of the Subjects, they imitate.

6. 'Tis for this reason, some have maintained, that the Pieces for the Theatre, were call'd Dramatick, from the word Drama, which signifies an Action. It seems that Aristotle was not very far from believing, that they might be called Dramatick, for some other reason; for the word Drama, Drame, may be Synonymous to Poem, and signify Composition only; But the first Derivation, is the most probable.

7. For the Megarians of that Country. That is, the true Megarians, in the Neighbourhood of Athens; for there were other Megarians, in Sicily, which descended from the former, as shall be shewn hereafter. They were all Dorians.
8. Pretending that it had its Original from their popular State. Megara, was a true Democracy. And itis certain, that Comedy could never be produc'd, under any other Government than that of the People; Considering how free it was in its beginning.

9. The Megarians of Sicily have also Claim'd it. Strabo writes, that one Theocles an Athenian, having gathered together a great number of Ionians, Dorians, and Calchidians which liv'd in Euboea, of which the greatest part belonged to Megara, went into Sicily, that the Calchidians built Naxus, and the Dorians Megara, and consequently were a Colony of the Megarians of Greece. Thucydides calls the chief of the Colony of the Megarians, Lamii.

10. Because the Poet Epicharmus was elder than Chionides, and Magnes, who was a Sicilian. This Testimony of Aristotle, concerning the Antiquity of Epicharmus, is very remarkable, if Epicharmus be elder than Chionides, and Magnes, then he liv'd before Echylus; for it agrees, with what Suidas relates, that Magnes appear'd, at the latter end of Epicharmus's time. As for what remains, Aristotle only relates the Peoples Pretentions, without passing his Judgment. But what if Thespis was elder than Epicharmus? Why, if so, the Athenians would certainly have the Advantage.

11. Some Dorians of the Peloponnesus. The Dorians were those People, who dwelt round about Parnassus; They had at first but four Cities, which were called the Dorians Tetrapolis, viz. Cythinum, Eryneum, Beon, and Pindus; but by degrees they extended themselves, as far as Megara; for Strabo counts Megara among the Dorian Towns, as we have already seen. To Conclude, Four and twenty Years after the Trojan War, they, together with the Heraclides, took Possession of the Peloponnesus; thus Aristotle speaks of the Dorians, of the Peloponnesus.
12. They assert that the Villages, which the Athenians call Demoi, they call Comai.] This would Conclude nothing in favour of the Dorians, if it were true; for Tragedy was a long time, the General Name, for Tragedy, and Comedy both; so it might have been in Attica, a great while, before the Dorians, of Peloponesus, gave it the Name of Comedy.

13. Which proves, say they, that Comedy, was not so called, from the word Comazein, as the Athenians pretend.] The Athenians, to overthrow the Arguments the Dorians draw from the word Comai, urge that the Original of the name Comedy, was found among them, and that 'was so call'd, from the Verb Comazein; which signifies properly, to go mask'd thro' the Streets, Singing, and Dancing. The Etymology which the Dorians give, seems indeed more probable, than that of the Athenians; for how can Comodein, be made of the word Comazein. The Analogy won't bear; it seems indeed more likely, that Κόμως, comes from Κόμος Ἀρεί, to sing to the God Comus: but 'tis not decent, for me to determine, that, which Aristotle has thought fit to leave Undecided.

14. Because the first Comedians, not being allow'd to enter the Cities,] For as Aristotle says, in what follows, The Athenian Magistrates were very late, e're they gave Liberty to the Acting of those Pieces.

15. They assert also, that as the Athenians say Prattein to do, they say Dram.] This Concludes only for the General Appellation, but nothing for Tragedy in particular, which was so called, either from τραγῳδία, The Goats Song; because as Horace says in his Art of Poetry, that was the Prize of Tragedy.

*Carmine qui Tragico vilem certavit ob Hircum;*  
Who strove in Tragedy, for a vile Goat.
Or from τυρών ὁδῆ, The Vintage Song; because they were invented at that time: Or from τυρών ὁδῆ, The Song of Lees; because the Authors besmear'd their Faces with the Lees of Wine. Horace.

Qui Canerent, agerentque perunditi facibus ora.

Who Act, and Sing, with Faces all besmear'd,
With Lees of Wine.

16. This suffices for the Differences of Imitation, their Number, and Nature.] This is the Summary, of all which Aristotle has said, in the three first Chapters; he explains the Essential Differences, Number, and Nature, which are to be found, in whatever is call'd Imitation.
The Causes of Poetry. Imitation is as natural to Men, as Number and Harmony. Whence it proceeds, that Painting gives so much Pleasure. The First Essays of Poetry. How it chang’d its Form. Elegy of Homer. What Poem his Margites was. Poets divided into two Classes. Homer first made Dramatick Imitations for Tragick and Comick Poetry, and open’d the way to all Poets. The Origine of Tragedy and Comedy. The encrease of the first, and by what degrees, it came to the Perfection it is now at. From whence it proceeded that ’twas so long e’er it obtained the Loveliness which is proper to it. The first Verses which were made use of, and the reason they were afterwards chang’d.

There are two Principal Causes, and both very natural, which seem to have produc’d Poetry: (a) The first is Imitation, a quality born with Men, for they differ from other Creatures, by the great (b) desire they have for Imitation, and ’tis by its means, that they learn the first Elements of Sciences, and (c) that all their Imitations give them a peculiar Pleasure; As we may see ev’ry day, when we view Pictures: Some Originals, as terrible Beasts, dead, or dying Men, which we hardly dare look on, as they naturally

(a) For to imitate is natural to Men from their Childhood. (b) Aptness. (c) They are pleased with Imitations.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

are, or at least not without Fear, and Horror, we behold very agreeably in Paintings, and we see them, with so much the more Pleasure, as they resemble their Originals. The reason of this is, That not only Philosophers, have a desire to learn, but the same Passion, is equally natural, to all Men; tho' all cannot be Equally informed. 'Tis this which makes them behold Pictures with so much Satisfaction, because they are capable of reasoning, and being informed, by looking on them. For Example, When they see a Picture of a Man they know, they say, 'tis such an one; and if 'tis the Portrait of one, they never saw, the Pleasure they then have, does not proceed from the Exactness of the Imitation, but from the Art, or the Mixture and Vivacity of the Colours, or from something else which draws their Eyes and Attention.

2. If Imitation is Natural to us, Number and Harmony are not less so; under Number I comprehend Verse also, which is evidently one part of it: and these are the two Causes which have produced Poetry. (a) For those who had the greatest Genius for these, gave it Birth by degrees; by some Extempore Essays: But it soon (b) chang'd its form, according to the several Inclinations of Poets; for those who had the most Sublime Genius, Sang the Actions of Great Persons. (c) Those who had a meaner, made the Adventures of the worst of Men the Subjects of their Songs, of whom they made (d) provoking Railles, as the first made Panegyricks, and Hymns.

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(a) Extempore. (b) was dissatisfied or divided. (c) And their Fortunes. (d) Reproaches.
3. There remains (a) no Poem of this Sort, before Homer, tho' there is a great deal of Probability that there were many. But we have some of his time, for Example, his Margites, and (b) many others of the same Species, in which Iambick Verses were made use of, as the most proper for Raillery and Reproach; for this reason those Poems are now called Iambick Poems, from the name of the Verse, which is nothing else but continual Invectives. (c) Thus the first Poets, were divided, into two Sects, for one made Heroick Verses, and the other Iambick. And thus Homer, without Contradiction, deserves the first place in the Heroick, and Tragick kind; for he alone deserves the Name of a Poet, not only because he has wrote well; but also, because he has made Dramatick Imitations; He was also the first, who gave us as it were the Sketches of Comedy, by Converting into Pleasantery, the biting reproaches of former Poets. And truly his Margites, has the same (d) relation to Comedy, as his Ilias and Odysies have to Tragedy. The Poets who came after him, were naturally carried to one or other of these Sorts of Poetry, and according as they had more, or less Inclination, some set themselves to make Comedies, instead of Iambicks; while others left Heroicks to give us Tragedies: Those two Sorts of Work, appearing more Noble, and worthy of their Labour.

4. Tis not proper to examine in this place, whether Tragedy be now in its Perfection, and

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(a) We can Name. (b) Suchlike. (c) Against one another. (d) Analogy.
whether it has received, that form, which is agreeable, both to it self, and to the Theatre.

5. Tragedy then, and Comedy, being thus produc'd Extempore, as I have said; for the first ow'd its Origine to the Dithyrambicks, sung in Praise of Bacchus, and the other to (a) Obscene Songs, which are now at this time Sung in several Towns, being authoriz'd by Custom, and the Laws, both one and t'other, encreafed by little and little, ev'ry one adding somewhat to their Beauty, as they discover'd (b); what was agreeable to their Character.

6. After Tragedy had received a great many Changes, and acquir'd all which was proper for it, it stoppt. (a) Aeschylyus was the first who brought two Actors on the Stage, for before him there was only one; he shorten'd the Songs of the Chorus, and invented the Idea of the Principal Character. Sophocles (b) added a third Actor, to Aeschylyus's two, and adorned the Scenes with fine Decorations. In short, 'twas late, e'er it received, that Gravity and Grandeur, which are Convenient for it, for 'twas not easily rid, of (c) those insignifiant Subjects, (d) Burlesque Stile, which it retain'd of those Satyrical Pieces, from whence it came.

7. The Trimeter Iambicks succeeded the Tetrameter, which were always us'd, because they were Satyrical, and full of Motion and Dances. But after the Diction, that was proper for it,

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(a) Phallica. (b) it. (a) Aeschylyus first made two Actors, instead of one. (b) Made three, as, &c. (c) Changed. (d) Little Stories.
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

was (a) establisht'd. That sort of Verse which was most agreeable, was found out Naturally, and without any trouble, for Iambicks are of all sorts of Verse, the most proper for Conversation; this is a certain Sign of it, that we often make Iambicks, in talking to one another, and very rarely Hexameters, which almost never come from us, but when we (b) pass the bounds of ordinary Discourse, and change the Harmony and Tone.

8. The Number of Episodes, increased also with time, as all the other beauties of Tragedy (a) did, successively, and by degrees. But it may suffice to have spoken of them in General; for it would be too difficult and tedious an Undertaking, to treat of ev'ry one in particular.

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(a) Found out. (b) Pass the Harmony of Discourse.
(a) Were adorna'd.

**REMARKS on Chap. IV.**

1. There are two different Causes, and both very Natural, which seem to have produc'd Poetry.] 'Tis not sufficient, for us to have been taught, that Poetry is an Imitation, but we must learn what it is, which gave occasion to this Imitation, and how it was produc'd; this is what Aristotle does here, whose Modesty we shall do well to take notice of; for he afferts nothing, and is content to say, that It seems, for he had been rash, to ascertain a true Origine of a thing so Ancient, and which can only be known by simple Conjectures, which however true they may seem, don't always lead to the truth. This Philosopher has had the Misfortune, not to be understood, tho' he has express'd himself very clearly in this Chapter; for People have compre-
comprehended only, the first of these two Causes, and been very much deceiv'd in the latter.

2. For they differ from other Creatures by the great desire they have for Imitation.] The Greek says in that, they are very imitating; and Aristotle uses the Superlative, because, there are other Creatures, which are naturally inclin'd to Imitation, as Dawes, Monkeys, &c. but that Imitation is only Superficial, Particular, and Casual, when that of Men, is Solid, General, and has sure Principles.

3. And 'tis by its Means that they learn the first Elements of Sciences.] 'Tis by imitation only, that Children learn any thing, as to Walk, Speak, &c. and 'tis for this reason Horace says,

Reddere qui voces Jam scit Puer:

The Child who has already learn'd to talk.

But I believe that Aristotle speaks here of Fable, in particular, with which the Greeks began the Education of their Children: There is a very fine passage of this in the First Book of Strabo. First of all, says he, The Poets are not the only People, who have received Fables, for Cities and Legislators did it a long time before them, by reason of the Advantage which arose from them, and Conformity to the natural Inclination of a reasonable Creature. For Man loves to learn, and Fable opens the Way: And 'tis by this Way that Children, begin to listen to what is said to them, and to take notice of it. The reason of it is this, Fable is a new Story, not of what is really, but of somewhat quite different, now nothing is so agreeable as what is new, and unknown; and this is the reason too, why we love Sciences. If to Fable, we add the Wonderful, and Prodigious, it infinitely increases the Pleasure; which is the only Charm, that makes us desirous to hear it. It is necessary to use this Artifice at first, to allure Children: when they are advanced in Age, and their reason grows Stronger, and there is no further occasion
occasion to Care, and Flatter them, than we must introduce them into the true Sciences, and let them know things as they are, &c.

4. And that all their Imitations, give them a peculiar Pleasure.] The most learned Interpreters of Aristotle, have committed a very considerable Fault here, in taking these words, for an Explication, of the Second Cause, which he gives of Poetry; as if Aristotle had said: And the Second, that all their Imitations, give them a peculiar Pleasure. Aristotle was not Capable of Saying such a Nonsensical thing; and to attribute to one Effect, two Causes, which are one and the same. It is as if we should say, there are two Causes which make a Plant grow, that a Gardiner has set; one the water'ring it, and the other the Pleasure he takes in water'ring it; Sure this must appear absurd to ev'ry body. This Philosopher says then, that the first Cause of Poetry is Imitation, to which Men are naturally carried; and as that Inclination, however Natural it is, would be useless to Men, unless they had the Pleasure of exercising it; he adds, and in which they take a peculiar Delight, But still this makes only one, and the same Cause; the Second shall be explain'd in the Ninth Remark.

5. Some Originals, as terrible Beasts, Dead, or Dying Men, which we hardly dare look on as they Naturally are, yet at least, not without fear, and horror, we behold very agreeably in Paintings.] There is nothing so ugly, or so horrible, but looks pleasant in a Picture; 'tis not that the thing is fine in itself, for what is ugly, cannot be fine; but it is, because there is nothing so agreeable as Imitation. 'Tis on this account, that the Poets in all times, have chosen, what was most Horrible, for the Subjects of their Descriptions: Nicomachus represented Medea killing her Children, and Theon painted Orestes murd'ring Clytemnestra. We have some Pieces of Modern Painters, on these frightful Subjects; we look on them with Delight, but don't by that, praise the Actions which they imitate; but the Art, which knew
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 37

knew how to imitate these Actions so happily. It is the same of Poetry. We are pleased to see the Descriptions of those things, that we could not look on as they are in Nature. If Philoctetes should appear to us in the Condition Sophocles represents him, we should endeavour to avoid him; but the Imitation he makes, attracts and charms us.

6. The reason of this is, that not only Philosophers have a desire to learn, but the same Passion is equally Natural to all Men.] Men being endow'd with Reason, and naturally loving Arts, take a singular Delight, in seeing any thing that is made by Art and Reason. Both one and t'other are found in Imitation. And therefore 'tis, that it has the advantage over Truth it self, which appears simple, ordinary and common, when Subtility and Industry, are joyned to Truth, in an exact and lucy Imitation. 'Tis that which gives to the Mind an occasion of reasoning, and making reflexions, inso-much that it always apprehends something new, as Aristotle himself teaches, in the 11th Chapter of his Rhetorick, where he shows, that the pleasure we have in seeing a Curious Imitation, doth not arise from the beauty of the Original, which is imitated; but from this, that the Mind thereby, finds means, to Consider, and inform it self. 'Twas from this truth also, that the Cyrenaick Philosophers, drew this Argument, to Convince the Epicureans, that the Pleasure we take in any Object, does not proceed from the Seeing, or Hearing, but from the Understanding which apprehends, and Judges.

7. Tho all cannot be equally inform'd.] These words are difficult to be understood, tho' I believe this is the sense of them, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν ὑποκοινωνεῖν ἔτι, altho' they partake little of it, that is, altho', they are not all equally proper to be inform'd, for some learn better than others, in proportion to the Ingenuity they have. The Will is equal in all, but the Power is not to.
8. The Pleasure they have does not proceed from the exactness of the Imitation, but from the Art, or the mixture, and vivacity of the Colours.] For none can judge of the Exactness of an Imitation, who knows not the Original, which is imitated. But as Aristotle says, the Pleasure we then have, proceeds from the Beauty of the Piece, or from the Vivacity, and Mixture of the Colours, or from the Choice of the Action, or from the Posture of the Persons, or something else, which in attracting the Eyes, exercises and instructs the Mind whilst it diverts it.

9. If Imitation is Natural to us, Number and Harmony is not less so.] After having explain’d the first Cause of Poetry, he comes to the second, which is Number and Harmony; for whatever Inclination, Men may have had to Imitation, yet they had never invented Poesy, if they had not been as much Inclin’d, to what Aristotle here calls Number and Harmony, that is, Cadence, and Song, this is very plain.

10. Under Number, I Comprehend Verse also, which is evidently one part of it.] For truly, there is no Verse without number; but there are Numbers, or Rythms, without Verse.

11. For these who had the greatest Genius for these.] For these two Causes, (viz.) for Imitation, and Number and Harmony; Imitation, without Number and Harmony, Could never have produced Poetry, any more than Number and Harmony, without Imitation.

12. Gave it birth by degrees, by some extempore Essays.] For Poesy being produc’d, in the Assemblies which the first Men, (who were either Shepheards, or Labourers,) had in Honour of the Gods, after their Vintage, it was not the effect of Study; but Nature excited with Joy and Wine. In a word, the first rough Draughts of Poetry, were extempore; you may see what has been remark’d, on the 144th Verse of the First Epistle, of the 11th Book of Horace.
13. But it soon changed its form, according to the several Inclinations of the Poets.] Aristotle explains the origine, and progress of Poetry, in an admirable Method. 'Twas at first, some gross Extempore-pieces, where Satyr and Panegyrick were mixt; but it was soon divided into two Sects, if I may use that word. Those who had the largest Capacities, Sang the Praises of the Gods, and Heroes; those who had less, amused themselves in making Satyrical Pieces. We may take notice, En passant, of this Judgment of Aristotle, who clearly determines that there is requir'd a greater Genius to Praise, than to Slander; and for this reason calls those who spend their time in making Hymns and Panegyrics συμβέβλησαν, more grave, and lofty; and the others ἐνθεάσησαν, more low, and debas'd.

14. There remains no Poem of this sort.] That is any of these last Poems, which were fill'd, with raillery; and it seems by this, that there were some of the first sort in Aristotle's time. It having had more respect for grave, and serious Works, than for those Railleries, and Satyrs, it would be the quite contrary now adays, she should rather preserve the Railleries, and Satyrs, than the serious, and grave Pieces.

15. For example his Margites.] Which was the Name of a Man, who was neither Labourer, Husbandman, nor Shephheard, and who knew not how to do any thing. Wherefore Homer made a Poem against him, and call'd it after his Name.

16. In which Iambick Verses were made use of as the most proper for Raillery.] This Expression of Aristotle, deserves to be examined; word for word 'tis thus. In which Poems, the Iambick also enter as being suitable. This gives us to understand, that these Poems were not entirely Compos'd, of Iambicks, and that if it was not the most frequent neither; and that is true. Iambicks were also scatter'd up and down in Heroick Poems, without observing any order, or distance; as Hephestion has
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*.

has taught us in his little Treatise of Poetry; where he says, *as in the Homer's Margites, when Iambicks are mixt with the Heroick Verse.* It was not long in Use, for the Poets soon appropriated, the Heroick to Panegyricks and Hymns, and the Iambick, to reproach and Invective.

17. *For this reason those Poems are call'd Iambick Poems, from the Name of the Verse.* It appears by this, that the Name of Iambick Poems, was not given to the Satyrical Poems, till after a considerable time; and very probably, not till Iambick Verses were entirely left off.

18. *Which is nothing else but Continual Invectives.* For the Greek word *Iambizein* signifies to speak Injuriously.

19. *And thus Homer, without Contradiction, deserves the first place, in the Heroick, and Tragick kind.* He hath already said, that those, who had the most extensive Genius, set themselves to write of the Actions of their Gods and Heroes, and that others amus'd themselves in making Satyrs, He proceeds to show, that Homer had the most elevated Genius, that he apply'd himself, to grave, and serious matters, which he calls *συμπύνεα*, and which I have translated, the *Heroick and Tragick Kind*: For 'tis that, which is Noblest, and that is what Aristotle meant.

20. *He alone deserves the Name of a Poet, not only because he has wrote well.* This Encomium which Aristotle here gives is the most Nice, and Judicious Criticism, that ever was; 'tis very remarkable, that he allows Homer, to have written perfectly well, which was never Contested by any body yet. There are some slight Faults found in his Works, but none ever said that he did not write well: On the Contrary, all agree, that he wrote better than other Poets, and that his Stile is more animated, and sprightly.
21. But also because he made Dramatick Imitations.] The Ilias, and Odyfæs may pass, for true Tragedies, by reason of the Action, the Disposition, and the Management of the Subject, the admirable mixture of Episodes, the Nature of the Catastrophe and the liveliness of the Passions, for all these, are eminently in those Poems, as well as in Tragedy; for which reason Plato was not Content, to call Epick Poems Tragedies, but says, that Homer was not only the greatest, but the first of Tragick Poets. In his Theatret: and in the Tenth Book of his Republick.

22. He was also the first who gave us as it were the Sketches of Comedy, by Converting into Pleasantry the biting reproaches of former Poets.] Homer's Genius was as pleasant, and agreeable, as it was lofty, and capable of succeeding, in great Subjects, which lead him to discover the Idea of Comedy. He only chang'd the bitter Invectives of those second Poems, we spake off, into Raillery and Joke, for he was incapable of imitating any gross or brutal Obscenity. Plato writes in the Third Book of his Commonwealth. That 'tho' a Man may be able, to make two different Imitations, yet he cannot do it so easily, in two things which nearly approach one another, as Tragedy and Comedy. Nevertheless, Homer overcame that difficulty, by inventing the Ideas of both; but Plato speaks only of these two Poems when they are entire and perfect, and Informus us that from Homer down to his time, there were no Poets who would make Tragedy and Comedy both, were ever happy in their Imitations. 'Tis very difficult, not to say impossible, and our greatest Poets are very sensible of it.

23. And truly his Margites has the same relation to Comedy, as his Ilias and Odyfæs have to Tragedy.] I admire, that after this Judgment of Aristotle, any Critics should write, that the Ilias was a Model of Tragedy,
gedy, and the Odysseys of Comedy, for nothing can be less true. The Ilias and Odyssee, both for the Subject, and Manner, are the same sort of Poem; one sings Achilles's Anger, and the other Ulysses's Prudence. they both employ the same means, and after the same manner. The most the Odysseys could do was to give an Idea of Satyr, as of Euripides his Cyclops, but besides its being only an Episode, and not the principal Action, it was a truly Tragical Piece, as I have prov'd in my Remarks on Horace his Art of Poetry.

24. The Poets who came after him, were naturally carried, to one, or other of these Sorts of Poetry, as they had more or less Inclination.] This passage is remarkable; Aristotle says, that the Poets who came after Homer, would not have had the ingenuity to invent the Idea of Tragedy, and Comedy, but satisfy'd themselves with the two first sorts of Poetry that is, some would have made Panegyricks and Hymns, and other Songs stuff't with Obscenity and Reviling, according as they had more or less impulse, and vigor. But when Homer, had discovered to them these two different Beauties; they were so charm'd, that they forgot all their former Inclinations, and apply'd themselves wholly to these two. This is a great Commendation of Homer, and 'tis not without reason, that Plato calls him, the Father of Tragedy. Sophocles knew this well enough, for he study'd Homer only, and by imitating him, became himself, so very difficult to imitate.

25. Instead of Iambicks.] Instead of obscene and filthy Songs.

26. Left their Heroicks.] That is Panegyricks, and Hymns.

27. Those two sorts of work appearing more Noble.} Tragedy appear'd more noble, than Panegyricks and Hymns; and Comedy than silly Songs, and this is true.

28. 'Tis
28. 'Tis not proper to examine in this place whether Tragedy has received the Form which is agreeable to it. After Aristotle has explain'd the origine, of Tragedy and Comedy, he prevents the impatient desire we naturally have to know, whether Tragedy, which is a more perfect Poem than Comedy, has yet all that is proper for it, and be arriv'd to its last perfection; but as this is a question very difficult, and would take up a great deal of time to resolve, he reserves it for another Place: Truely, to do that, 'tis not sufficient to have spoken of its origine only; but of its Progress, and the relation all it's Parts have, one to another.

29. Both to it self, and to the Theatre.] For Tragedy, must be examin'd, in these two different respects. In respect to it self, to know, whether that which properly Constitutes its Essence, be perfectly good, as the Fable, the Manners, the Diction and the Plot. In respect to the Theatre, to know, if no new Beauties can be added to the Decoration, and Musick, and what is of more importance, whether the Representation answers so exactly to the Action, that nothing is wanting to render the Imitation more perfect. This is in my Opinion, what Aristotle means; Vitruvius thinks, that to the Theatre, ought to be understood of the Spectators; but Aristotle could not mean that, for the Considerations of the Spectators, ought rather to be referr'd to the First than to this.

30. Tragedy then and Comedy, being thus produc'd extempore, as I have said.] Aristotle makes here, a fort of Recapitulation, in explaining more particularly what he had said of Tragedy and Comedy, and relating the principal changes which have happen'd in them.

31. And the other to Obscene Songs.] Aristotle calls these Songs Phallica; a word which denotes that they were full of all Filthiness, and Impurity.
32. Which are now at this time Sung in several Towns, being authorized by Custom and the Laws.] The Complaint, which Aristotle makes, that these obscene Songs continu'd till his time, and were by Order of the Magistrates, Sung in several Places, is very like that, Horace made, a long time after; Concerning the Subjects, of the first Satyrs. Of Exo-dia, which retain'd much Obscenity, and Fescennine Verses, which last'd a long time after the Establishment of Comedy.

Et grave Virus Munditiae populære. Sed in longum tamen evum Manerunt, hocieq; manent vestigia ruris.

Politeness did at last, Poems obscene Expel; tho' a long time they did remain; And still do marks of Clownishness retain.

Epift. Ift. of the 11th Book. The People are always the same, and obstinately retain, the most licentious, and obscene things; especially, when they are unfortunately joyn'd to Religion. However 'tis the property of rudeness, to give place, to what is polite, with much difficulty.

33. Every one adding somewhat to their Beauty, as they discover'd what was agreeable to their Character.] This is the Sense of these words, πρωγγοντον δοον ἐγι-νερον ὑψεῖν, which have hitherto remain'd in obscurity. The Changes which Tragedy, and Comedy underwent were by little and little; for 'twas impossible to discover what was proper for them all at once; and new Graces were added to them, as the Nature of these two Poems was understood.

34. After-Tragedy had received a great many Changes.] 'Tis in the Greek, when it had all that was of its own Nature. But what shall we say? Since Aristotle assures us, that Tragedy made no stop, till it had received all which was proper for it; he determines that
that it was in its Perfection, and voids the Question which he would not resolve, but reserv'd to another time; however we should be deceived, if we reason'd in this manner: For Tragedy may have all that is proper for it, without being in its Perfection; because tis not impossible, that what is proper to it, may still have occasion to be further polish'd and perfected.

36. [Eschylus was the first who brought two Actors on the Stage, for before him there was only one.] Aristotle does not explain here, the first Changes which were made in Tragedy; he takes it in the State Thespis left it; for before that Poet, 'twas only Song and Chorus. Thespis was the first who thought of introducing an Actor into the Chorus, who to let them rest and take Breath, should recite the Adventures of some famous Man; and this is what Horace means in his Art of Poetry.

Ignotum Tragice genus invenisse Camanæ
Dicitur, & Plautus vexisse Poemata Thespis,
Qui Cancent, agerentque, peruneti facibus ora.

Thespis an unknown Tragedy began,
Whole strolling Crew on all the Country ran;
And Sing, and Act, with Faces all bedawb'd
With Lees of Wine.

What Horace says of Thespis going with his Actors thro' the Villages, serves to explain a Passage of Diogenes Laertius, who speaking of Solon, says, ὑ Θισων ἐκλείφω τετερινιας ἐγέναι τε ἡ διδεκα, ὡς ἄνωτι τοι ἔχωνοις, Causabon was in the wrong to correct, ἐνει to sing, for ἑν to lead. Diogenes says formally, That Solon forbade Thespis to make Tragedies, and to strole about the Country with them, because they were pernicious Lies. As for what remains, the same Diogenes explains the Changes which happened in Philosophy, by those which fell out in Tragedy; and because that Passage serves to explain this of Aristotle, I shall quote it entire. As in Tragedy there was anciently a Chorus
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Chorus only which AEschylus first person to give some rest to the Chorus; and Æschylus added a second to that first, and Sophocles a third, and so they gave the compleat form to Tragedy. The same has also happen'd in Philosophy, at first there was only Natural Philosophy; Socrates found out Morality, and Plato added the Dialectick, and by that means perfected Philosophy. Æschylus finding that the single Person which Thespis had introduc'd, between the Songs of the Chorus did not please, took in another, who should talk with the first on the Stage. This added a great Beauty to Tragedy, and by means of this way of Dialogue, he succeeded according to his expectation. Castelvetro could by no means comprehend what these different Actors of the Chorus were, nor the nature of the Narrations they made, and which at last gave occasion to the Subjects of Tragedies, as we shall see elsewhere.

37. He shortened the Songs of the Chorus.] As the first Person Thespis introduc'd, was design'd only to give a time of rest to the Chorus, so what he recited, was properly nothing, but an Addition to the Tragedy. But after Æschylus had added another to the first Person, and so establish'd Dialogue, that Accessory was become the Principal, and the Chorus in its turn, serv'd only to give respite to the Actors. This is the reason he short'n'd the Songs of the Chorus, for that is the meaning of τὰ νερὰ ἡμάτια. They are in the wrong, who think, that by this, Aristotle would say, he diminished the Number of those that compos'd the Chorus. Æschylus only retrench'd the length of the Songs of the Chorus, to give the more room to the Dialogue between his two Actors, and did not meddle with those who compos'd it, till after his Eumenides, or the Furies, where the great Number of Furies, who compos'd the Chorus, made such a terrible disorder in the Theatre, so frightn'd the Children, and the Great-belly'd Women, that the first died, and the latter miscarried on the Spot. The Magistrates to prevent any such Disorders, ordain'd, that for the future, the Chorus
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*. 47

Aristotle should consist of fifteen Persons at most, whereas before there were fifty. Aristotle then had no reason to attribute to *Aeschylus*, the alteration which was made by order of the Magistrate, and which he was uneasy at. If *Aeschylus* shorted the Songs of the Chorus, whence comes it to pass, That in *Aristophanes*’s *Frogs*, *Euripides* blames him for making the Chorus, in some of his Pieces, consist of four Successive Copies of Verse; and that he does not give time to the Actors to Speak. There are two things by way of Answer to this Objection. The First is, That tho’ *Aeschylus* knew how to abridge the Songs of the Chorus, yet he knew not how to reduce them to their Just Bounds, as *Sophocles* did after him: And the other, That there were some Pieces indeed where *Aeschylus* was particularly guilty of this Fault; nay, where he had affected, to lengthen the Songs of the Chorus, and to give them almost their former extent; As in his *Niobe* and *Hector’s Ransom*, and this is what *Aristophanes* had in view.

37. Invented the Idea of the Principal Character.] The Greek says, the Principal Part. *Aeschylus* having added a second Person, ’twas necessary, in order to preserve the unity of Action in Tragedy, that one of these Persons should have the chief Character, and the other should be one of his Retinue, or dependant on him; for if these two Persons had been both Heroes, so equal, that the part of one had not been subordinate to the other, there had been no unity of Action. ’Tis for this reason, that *Aeschylus* formed the Principal Character. They are much deceived, who think, that *ἀριστολογογόνος λόγος*, signifies the Prologue: for besides, that, those words were never us’d in that sense, *Aeschylus*, had never any Prologues to his Pieces. That was invented afterwards, by *Sophocles*, or *Euripides*; as the latter says in *Aristophanes*’s *Frogs*, to reproach the disorder in *Aeschylus*’s Pieces.
I never Dream, by chance Applause to win,
Nor with Confusion, do my Plays begin;
An Actor first, Comes from behind the Scenes,
To explain to the Audience what the Drama means.

As for what remains, Aristotle speaks here only of the most Considerable changes, Æschylus made in Tragedy, and passes silently over the less important, as that he had his Actors mask'd; that he gave them Gowns with long Tails, and Buskins; that instead of a Cart, he built an Indifferently raised Theatre; that he changed the Stile from Burlesque, to Grave and Serious. Horace does just the Contrary, speaks of these and omits the others.

Post hunc personæ pallaæ; repertor honestæ
Æschylus, & Modicis instravit Pulpita tignis,
Et Docuit magnumq; loqui, nitiq; Cothurno.

Æschylus Robes and Masks, found for this Art,
Actors, in Theatres built in his time,
First trade on Buskins, and first Spoke sublime.

Atheneus adds, that he found out many Dances for the Chorus; that he manag'd his own Habiliments without any help; and Philostratus assures us, that he first thought it indecent, to sprinkle the Scenes with blood: and for that reason, began to remove Murders from the Spectators Eyes.

39. Sophocles added a third Actor to Æschylus's two.] Sophocles having more narrowly examin'd the Nature of Tragedy, found that Æschylus's two Actors did not set off the Scene well, and could not give an opportunity for such a Variety of Plots and Contrivances, as ought to be there: For this reason he added a third,
third, and all the Greek Tragedians remain'd here, and never thought of increasing the Number, being persuaded, that the perfection of it consisted in these three Speakers: at least 'tis certain that they very rarely admitted four; which made Horace lay down this Rule.

\[\text{Nec quarta loqui persona laboret.}\]

Ne'er strive to make a fourth Person speak.

Sophocles undoubtedly took his third Person from Homer, who often brings three Actors together, and very seldom any more. I must confess also, that this Dialogue of three is more, agreeable, because it is less confused. If we will consider Nature her self, we shall find that very few things concern more than three Persons at a time. In Plato's Dialogues, which are purely Dramatick, there are indeed more Persons, but it happens very seldom that more than three speak at a time. Nevertheless, we may admit four or five, Actors, in the same Scene, if the matter requires it, provided that we avoid Confusion; This gives Beauty and Majesty to a Scene, and serves also, to increase the Concern, which ought to be in the Spectators, as we may see in those Tragick Poets who have successfully written, and perhaps this is the only Advantage that ours, has over the Greek Tragedy: But there is a great deal of Art, and Spirit requird, to do it well; 'tis not the work of a Scholar. Aristotle Saying here, that Sophocles added one Person to Aeschylus's two, would make us think, that there were never more than two Actors in the latter's Plays. Yet, in one Scene of his Caphores; Orestes, Pylades, and Clytemnestra talk together: and in another Scene of his Eumenides, we see, Minerva, Orestes and Apollo. 'Tis true that one of these says but very little; but it suffices to show, that Aeschylus was not entirely ignorant, that a Scene would bear three Actors. How can Aristotle then attribute this Invention to Sophocles? Was it because Sophocles did it more Commonly? I can't believe
It was twelve years after Æschylus had seen some of Sophocles's Pieces, that he made, his Caphores, and Eumenides; and from them he took his third Actor which Sophocles had added.

40. Adorn'd the Scenes, with fine Decorations.] Æschylus had adorn'd the Scenes very well before Sophocles; for instead of Huts, and Dens, and Woods, with which they were adorn'd, he represented Cities, Palaces, Altars, Tombs and Machines, for which he employ'd a certain Engineer, call'd Agatharcus, as Vitruvius informs us. Namque primum Agatharcus, Athenè, Æschylus docente, Tragicam Scenam fecit, & de ea Commentarium reliquit. He who has translated Vitruvius into French, and enrich'd him with fine Cuts, is very much deceived in this Passage, for he Translates it. 'Tis thus that Agatharcus being instructed by Eschylus at Athens, in the manner how he ought to make Decorations of the Theatre for Tragedy, and in having first wrote a Book, &c. Agatharcus was in no wise instructed by Æschylus; on the contrary, Æschylus was instructed by Agatharcus, Æschylus docente, doth not signifies, Æschylus teaching him, as he thought; but it signifies, Æschylus causing his Pieces to be acted, he at that time possessing the Theaters at Athens; for docere fabulas, as in the Greek, πεισάσαν, to teach Tragedies and Comedies, signifies properly to have them acted. Vitruvius says, for Agatharcus was the first at Athens; who when Æschylus's Pieces were acted, adorn'd the Scenes with fine Decorations, and composed a Book of them. But to return to Aristotle's Passage; Altho' Æschylus had considerably chang'd the Theatre, yet there is great likelihood that the same Decorations serv'd for all his Pieces, whereas Sophocles chang'd the Decorations, according to his Subjects, and 'tis this makes all the Ornament of the Scene, when it agrees exactly with what it represents.

41. In short, 'twas late e'er it received that Gravity and Grandeur which were convenient for it.] For before Æschylus, Tragedy had in no measure its just Grandeur,
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

deur, 'twas proportion'd to the trivial Subjects it treated off, and retain'd very much of its Original Burlesque. Æschylus corrected these two Faults, for he chose Noble Subjects, (to which he gave the extent they ought to have) and exalted the Stile. *Et docuit magnumque loqui.*

42. Which it retain'd of those Satyrical Pieces from whence it came.] He will be very much deceived, who thinks that Aristotle speaks of Satyrical Tragedies, when he says, that it retain'd a long time the Burlesque Stile of those Satyrical Pieces from whence it proceeded; for these Tragedies succeeded the true ones, and the Stile of those Pieces was by no means Burlesque, but half Serious, and half Jocose, 'twas an agreeable mixture of Tragedy and Comedy, as has been fully explain'd in my Remarks on Horace's Art of Poetry. Aristotle calls here these Satyrical Pieces, the first Tragedy, those gross *ex tempore* Pieces, in which a Company of Clowns, bedawb'd with Lees of Wine, and Dancing in Honour of Bacchus, made as it were Satyrs, with which they celebrated his Feast, and speak to one another injuriously and obscenely.

43. The Trimeter Iambicks succeed the Tetrameter, which were always used, because they were Satyrical, and full of Motion and Dances.] As the first Tragedy was only a Chorus of Clowns who Sang and Danc'd, it employ'd only the Tetrameter Verse, which is the most proper for Dancing and Motion, Nature it self having furnish'd them with the sort of Verse which was agreeable to that sort of Tragedy: For as Victorinus says, *Et Carmen Jocosis motibus emollitum, gestibusque agentium satis accommodatum;* that is, a Verse whose Softness agrees to the Gayety of Motion, and is very conformable to the Gestures of Dancers. This Tetrameter Verse is truly compounded of Trochees, *i.e.* one foot long and one short, and this is the most skipping and brisk of all Numbers; 'tis for this the Poets of the Latin Pieces called *Atellani*, retain'd it in their Chorus's, which were composed of Satyrs. *Aristoteles cons-
firms in the third Book of his Rhetorick what he says here. For, as anciently, says he, the Tragick Poets pased from Tetrameter Iambick, to Trimeter, because of all Verse, it was the most like our common Discourse.

44. But after the Division that was proper for it, was established.] That is to say, after Tragedy and Comedy were distinguish'd, and Theseus had added a Person to the Chorus, it changed its Stile; it being unnatural that an Actor should relate the Actions of a Hero, in the same Language used by a Chorus of Countrymen, who Sang and Danc'd. Therefore 'tis, Aristotle adds, that Nature it self discovered the Verse which agreed to the Stile of a common Relation or Discourse.

45. For Iambicks are of all sorts of Verse the most proper for Conversation.] Tragedy had been very imperfect, if Nature had not dictated the Verse which was agreeable to it. Now that which was most agreeable to it, was that which was most like our common Discourse, and consequently it was Trimeter Iambick, for that was most used in familiar Talk and Conversation. And Tragedy being an imitation, it ought to admit nothing but what is natural and easy. If we follow close, all the Consequences which naturally flow from this Principle, (whose truth we cannot question) we shall find the great Advantage the Greek and Latin Tragedy had over ours in this respect. Horace is not content to say with Aristotle, That Tragedy adopted Iambick Verse, because it was most proper for Discourse: He adds, That 'twas also because it was better to still the noise the People made in the Theaters, and that it made the Action go better on.

Hunc soci Cepere pedem, grandisique Cothurni, alternis ap tum sermonibus, & Populares Vincentem sipse tus, & natum rebus agendas.

Tragick and Comic Poets both allow'd
This Verse, fit for both turns; t'appease the Crowd,
And make the Action better to appear.
46. And very rarely Hexameters, which almost never come from us, but when we pass the bounds of ordinary Discourse, and change the Harmony and Tone. We very rarely make Hexameters in Conversation, because it being compos'd of Dactyls, and Spondees, it is loftier, more honorous and harmonious than others, and consequently enters less into Prose, which ought to be very full of Cadences, but such as are broken and negligent, and when any doth escape us, 'tis presently known: For as Aristotle says, 'tis more noble and full of Harmony. Our Tragedy is very unfortunate in this, that it has no other sort of Verse than what is us'd for Elegies and for Epopeia. It signifies little to say, that the Verse in Tragedy is plainer, and not so pompous as that of Epopeia, 'tis always a great Verse of twelve Syllables: Our English ones are ten sometimes twelve, and since we can use such a Verse neither in Writing, Prose or Conversation, without offending a delicate Ear, which is a sure sign, that if our Ears were not corrupted by a long Custom, we should find little of what is natural in Tragedy, whose Language ought as much as possible to imitate familiar Discourse.

47. The Number of Episodes encreased also with Time.] For at first all that was recited in the Songs of the Chorus, was only simple Adventures: Afterwards they were varied by an Episode, and at last they found the Art to incorporate many together, and to make one of many different parts, which however were natural and proper to the Subject.
CHAP. V.

The Definition of Comedy. What Ridicule is. Why Comedy was not cultivated so soon as Tragedy. The Magistrates order'd the Chorus's. Who were the Poets that first form'd the Subjects of Comedy. The Conformity and Difference betwixt Epopoeia and Tragedy. How long the Duration of those Poems ought to be. Those who judge well of Tragedy, can judge well of an Epick Poem, but those who judge well of an Epick Poem, are not always capable of judging well of Tragedy, and why?

1. Comedy is, as I have already said, an Imitation of the worst Men. (a) When I say Woff, I don't mean, in all sort of Vices, but only in Ridicule, for Ridicule is properly a Defect, and Deformity without Pain, and which (b) never contributes to the Destruction of the Subject in which it is. For Example, (c) without (d) going any farther, we call a disagreeable Countenance, and wholly counterfeit, without any pain, a ridiculous Countenance.

2. The Changes which Tragedy has met with are sensible, and the Authors of them known, but Comedy is not so, because it has not been so much improv'd since its beginning as Tragedy.

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(a) Only.  (b) Hills not.  (c) As.  (d) Readily.
For 'twas very late e're the Magistrates allow'd Comick Chorus's. (e) Those who acted then were free and voluntary Actors, who acted by themselves without order from the Magistrate. Since which, Comedy has began to have some Form. We know the Poets who wrote it, but we are ignorant who first used Masks, made Prologues, augmented the Number of Actors, and added those other things, which we find in it at present.

3. Epicharmus and Phormys, were the first who thought of forming the Subjects, and consequent-ly, that Manner came from Sicily. Crates was the first Athenian who (f) follow'd it, in omitting those gross Railleries, which were so brief in it before.

4. Epopeia, has this in common with Tragedy, that 'tis a Discourse in Verse, and an imitation of the Actions of the greatest Persons, and 'tis different in this, that it employs only one and the same sort of Verse, which is a pure Narration, and has a larger extent; for Tragedy endeavours, as much as is possible, to confine it self to the Circuit of the Sun, to exceed it as little as may be. Whereas there is no time limited for Epopeia. But we must also say, That Tragedy, in its beginning, had no more restriction. (g)

5. He that can judge well of a Tragedy, and know assuredly, whether it be good or bad, can

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(e) But they were voluntary.
(f) Fully compleatly the Fable and Division.
(g) Their Epic Poems for some are proper both to them and Tragedy. Wherefore, &c.
also judge of (b) Epopæia, for all the parts of Epopæia are found in Tragedy, but all those of Tragedy, are not found in Epopæia.

(b) Epicl. Poems.

REMARKS on Chap. V.

1. Comedy is, as I have already said, an Imitation of the Worst Men; when I say Worst, I don't mean in all sorts of Vice, but only in Ridicule.] Aristotle in giving this Definition of Comedy, determines like a great Master, what must be the Subject of its Imitation; and it is only that which is ridiculous, for all other sorts of Wickedness and Vice, can take no place here, because they raise Indignation or Pity, Passions which by no means ought to reign in Comedy. But what shall we say, was Ridicule alone the Subject of Eupolis, Cratinus and Aristophanes's Pieces? Since Horace assures us, That there was not in their Times, a Knave, Robber, Adulterer, Murderer, Wicked or Infamous Person in any kind whatsoever, whom they did not expose in their Pieces with a great deal of Liberty.

Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus aut Fur,
Quod machus foret, aut siccarius, aut alioqui
Famesus, multa cum libertate notabant.

Those who in Wickedness were counted chief,
Assailinate, Adulterer or Thief,
Or Profligate, who lived in their Age,
They freely did expose upon the Stage.

Notwithstanding, Theft, Adultery and Murder are Vices which surpass Ridicule, and tend to the Destruction of him who is infected with them; and so Aristotle's Rule is not true. This Objection does not at all invalidate the Philosophers Rule. If Aristophanes had put into his Pieces, a Robber, Adulterer, Profligate
gate or Murderer barefaced; this had indeed been contrary to the aim of Comedy, which always proposes Ridicule for its Object; he was far from doing that: On the contrary, 'twas his chief care so to hide those Vices under the Ridicule, that they might only appear thro' it. To prove this, we need only consider the manner by which he ridicules Socrates, when he would render him suspected of Impiety. Mr. Corneille in his first Discourse of Dramatick Poem, says, That the Definition which Aristotle gives here of Comedy, is not satisfactory, and thinks that he had a better in some of his Books which are lost. But Aristotle could not give a better, and I dare assert, That Mr. Corneille, condemns this only, because he did not well understand it. First of all he translated it wrong, for Aristotle doth not say, Comedy is an Imitation of Low and Deceitful People. Comedy indeed is not an Imitation of the greatest Persons that belongs to Tragedy and Epopeia, neither does it represent the meanest Persons, since it brings eminent Citizens and Magistrates on the Stage. Secondly, That great Man was much in the wrong, to think that Aristotle did not define what the Actions are which ought to be the Subject of Comedy, for he very plainly gives us to understand, that whatever is ridiculous may be the Subject of it. Mr. Corneille was far from having the same thoughts of Comedy that Aristotle had, he was persuaded that the Actions of Kings might be admitted, provided they were not above it; and only Interests of State, or Love Intrigues, without any considerable hazard. But nothing can be more opposite to the nature of Comedy, since it always proposes for its Object that which is ridiculous. The Majesty of Princes agrees by no means with this Poem, much less ought to be sought after by Comedy. The Expedient Mr. Corneille has thought of, to distinguish the Comedies, where these great Persons are seriously introduced from the ordinary ones, by adding an Epithet which shall denote their Quality, and call them Heroick Comedies, is not very good. If there could be any such thing in Nature as Heroick Comedies,
Comedies, there might also be Comick Epopeia’s, which is monstrous. When Plautus made his Amphitryon, where he introduces Gods and Kings, he jeeringly calls it a Tragicomedy; but notwithstanding that, ’tis a true Comedy, where he turns the Subject of Tragedy into Ridicule, and this is the only way that Comedy can take its Subjects from the Actions of Kings and Heroes. Ridicule ought always to be the Subject of that Poem; and ’tis a certain Sign that Nature itself has made this Distinction, for those Pieces which are compos’d according to this Definition, always succeed best, when we never see any others in the Theatre but with a mighty uneasiness.

2. For Ridicule is properly a defect, a deformity without pain, and which never contributes to the destruction of the Subject in which it is.] This Definition is remarkable. We cannot laugh, without Inhumanity at that which is accompanied with pain, or tends to the destruction of its Subject. This can’t be then the Subject of Comedy, and therefore Aristotle banishes all that can cause Horror, Aversion, or Pity, as also what is too serious or severe from his Comick Theatre, and I believe not without good reason. Comedy won’t bear what is Grave and Serious, unless we have the Secret to joyn it with Ridicule. This is so true, that after the Laws had obliged the old Comedy to forfack its first Malice, and to become an Imitation of the common way of living only, the new Comedy endeavour’d to find out this Ridicule, which is the foundation of it. Menander and Terence have it in their Pieces, but not that extravagant Ridicule, which reigned in the old Comedy, ’tis a graceful and slight touch which tickles ones fancy, if I may so say, and may properly be called the Cream of Raillery and Joke. Moliere is not always content with the latter, but often adds the other, which has contributed no small matter to his great success.
3. *We call a ridiculous Countenance.* As Thersites's which Homer describes, in the 11th Book of his Iliads, and is altogether Counterfeit, without any pain, and 'twas so much the more ridiculous, as the Faults which were attributed to him, made him the more Uneasy.

4. But Comedy is not so, because it has not been so much improv'd, since its beginning, as Tragedy.] As it ordinarily happens, the first was neglected, because the latter appeared Noble, and more Perfect; I believe that in Rome, Tragedy and Comedy had a quite Contrary Fate, and that Tragedy was not cultivated, till after Comedy had made a considerable Progress, and perhaps 'tis no very difficult matter to prove it.

5. For 'twas very late, e'er the Magistrates allowed Comick Chorus's.] Aristotle gives a very good reason, for what he hath advance'd; for no Art can be well improved, when it is neither authoriz'd by the Laws, nor receiv'd by Custom. The Magistrate began to allow Comick Chorus's, but very late; that is, to buy the Pieces of the Poets, and to furnish all things Necessary, for a Company of Comedians; for there was an Archon who took Care of these Affairs at Athens, and defray'd all the Charge, as the Ædiles did at Rome. This is what is properly called, To give the Chorus. There is a remarkable passage of the Poet Cratinus, on this Affair, where he Complains of the Avarice of the Magistrate; who to save Money, chose to buy a Piece, of the dull Poet Cleomachus, and to give him the Chorus, rather than to Sophocles who would not let him have so cheap a Bargain.

"Ου μ' ἢδαν αὐτοὺς Ἡρῶκλους Χερόνησος. Τῷ Κλεομάχῳ δ', ἐν ὑμῖν ὡς ἡγεῖται ἐγὼ. Εὖδ' ἐπιθάναι εἰς ἐν τοῖς Ἀθήναις, ὅτε τὸν Κλεόμαχον ἐπεμείνασαν Χερόνησα.
When Sophocles in Greece the Chorus sought,
The Magistrate Cleomachus's bought
Not worthy at Adonik Feasts to Sing.

That is to say, at the meanest of all the Feasts, as we say of the Magistrate, that he gives the Chorus; so we say of the Poet that he receives it: And 'tis this way that we may explain, what Aristophanes says in his Frogs, when he speaks of the dull Poets, who had much difficulty to sell their Pieces; because the Magistrates, who endeavour'd to surpass each other, in the Shows, they gave to the People, strove to Purchase the best.

"A φάεα Σάφεν, λοο μένοι κατ' αθενάν,
Σαξε περιπετείας τι περγαδία.

Greedy of Praise, if he a Chorus can
Obtain, he thinks himself, an happy Man.

6. Those who acted then, were free and voluntary Actors.] They were good honest Countrymen, who being Charm'd with the first Production of Comedy, acted for themselves, when Tragedy was Publickly receiv'd, and acted at the Expence of the Magistrate.

7. But since Comedy, has began, to have some Form, we know the Poets who have wrote it.] Since Comedy has been produc'd out of that Chaos, in which it was before; and that it has begun to take the Air, and Form of a True Piece of the Theatre. We know the Poets who have taken pains in it, and those who have made the most Considerable changes, but we don't know who began to give it that first Form, and an intimation, to other Poets, to bring it to Perfection; neither do we know who they were, which first employ'd Masks, made Prologues, and augment'd the Number of the Actors. For these were the Addi-
Additions made to its first Production, after Tragedy had received all that belonged to it.

8. But we are ignorant, who first used Masks, made Prologues, or augmented the Number of the Actors. Since Comedy succeeded Tragedy, and began to be improv'd, not till after, that, had obtained its Perfection; There is no doubt, but those who made it their business to Advance the first Productions of Comedy, borrow'd Masks, Prologues, and the Number of Actors, from Tragedy, which was already perfect; and consequent, we may well admire, that the Authors of these Changes, should not be known, since they happen'd in a time when things were taken notice of. Probably they began to give no heed to this Show, till it was entirely clear'd; and 'tis remarkable, that it was no long time a doing: and truly Comedy pass'd with a wonderful quickness, from Grofs, to Polite, and from Confusion, to Harmony and Order; for from Epicharmus, Chionides and Magnus, who lived in Æschylus's time, 'twas not Sixty Years to Aristophanes, whose Pieces were read with an extreme Delight and Pleasure.

9. Made Prologues.] The Greek Tragedy and Comedy never had Prologues separate from the Play, as those of Terence and Plautus, where the Subject is explain'd before the beginning of the first Act. Aristotle calls, all that is before the first Song of the Chorus, Prologue; and which is so united to the Subject, that it cannot be separated; as we see in the Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides. There is a Probability then, that Comedy did at first Employ those sorts of Prologues, which were in time left off, because they appear'd too difficult and serious. We shall speak further of these Prologues on the 12th Chapter. But Aristotle could not take the word in that sense; for I don't well understand how, Comedy could be without that Prologue, since that Prologue is all, that is before the first Song of the Chorus, that is, our first Act.
Act, It would thus be a Body without an Head: At least, if we don't say, that the first Act, was (at the beginning) an Exposition, of the Subject of the whole Piece; we shall find in what follows, that 'twas very troublesome, to be bound up to this Regularity; and therefore the Comick Poets, dispens'd with this way of explaining their Pieces. But I rather believe, that what the Philosopher calls here Prologue, is an Explanation of the Subject, which the Comick Poets always put into the first Scene, as Euripides did in his Tragedies: Or else, by Prologue he means, what he afterwards calls Parabase, where the Poet addresses himself to the Audience; and which Aristophanes puts in the middle of his Pieces.

10. Epicharmus and Phormys, were the first, who thought of forming the Subjects.] All the Difficulty of this Passage consists, in knowing, whether by forming the Subjects Aristotle means, to feign Adventures, to make the Subjects of Comedy; or if he barely understood, that these Poets, first endeavour'd to give to their Pieces, a Just extent, and to manage them with the same Art and Method, as Tragedy was. The Interpreters, have declared for the first Opinion; but they are deceived, by not examining this Matter, to the bottom. Aristotle could not say, that Epicharmus and Phormys invented the Subjects of their Pieces; for they were both Poets of the old Comedy, where there was nothing feign'd; and these imaginary Adventures were not brought, on the Stage, till the time of Alexander the Great; that is, till the new Comedy. To form the Subjects, is then, said here, in opposition to the manner of managing these Comick Pieces formerly. There was nothing more uncouth, 'twas only a texture of gross Railleries, where there was no relation or coherence, and consequently could not make one and the same Subject.

11. And consequently that manner came from Sicily.] This is to establish what he said in the Third Chapter;
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

That the Megarians of Sicily attributed to themselves the Invention of Comedy.

12. Crates was the first Athenian who follow'd it, in omitting these gross Ralleries, which, were so brief in it before.] This Passage is very remarkable, for there is no one, in all Antiquity, who has exactly set down the time, when Clownishness was left out of Comedy, at Athens. Crates flourish'd, about the 82d Olympiad; that is, about 450 Years before our Saviour, till that time Comedy was unpolish't, and consequently, very little different from what it was, in its beginning. Twelve or Fifteen Years after Aristophanes began to appear; So this Show, which had lain neglected for so many Years, arriv'd at its Perfection almost all at once. When the Greeks undertook to polishe any Art, their first Essays, were generally Master-strokes. This Athenian Crates (for there was another of thebes) Compos'd many Pieces; The Ancients quote his Animals; Neighbours; Witch, or Sorceress; The Plays; The Rhetoricians; The Samians; The Guests; The Bold; The Chiron, or The Centaurs.

13. In omitting those gross Ralleries, which were too brief in it before.] This Confirms the Explanation, I have given of the Expression, To Form the Subjects. For Crates was the first at Athens, who forsook, the gross Ralleries, that is, the first Products of Comedy, to follow Epicharmus's Method; To Form the Subjects, Cannot signifie any thing else, than to dispose and rank them, and by uniting, and adjusting, all the different parts together, to make up one and the same whole; for as I have said already, the new Comedy only, invented its Subjects; those of the old, and mean Comedy, were true, and no ways feign'd. 'Tis false then, that feign'd Subjects, succeeded, the Grossness of the first Comedy. This is Demonstration.

14. Those gross Ralleries.] Aristotle says, to the Lampick Idea, that's to say, to the biting Invectives of the
64  Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

the first Comedy, which used Lambick Verse; as being the most Satyrical.

15. Epopæia has this in Common with Tragedy.] After having spoke of Tragedy and Comedy, he goes on to explain what Epick Poem is, Epopæia, and to distinguish what is Common, to it, and Tragedy, and what is Different.

16. That 'tis a Discourse in Verse.] For tho' the Verse of Tragedy be different, from that of an Epick Poem; yet 'tis true, that Tragedy, and Epopæia, are always Compositions in Verse.

17. And an Imitation of the Actions of the greatest Persons.] For this Passage must be thus translated, μιμετις, and not, an Imitation of great illustrious actions. For it is not necessary, that the Action, which affords Matter for an Epick Poem, be Illustrious and Important in itself; on the Contrary it may be very ordinary, or Common; but it must be so, by the Quality of the Persons who Act. Thus Horace says plainly, Res gestae, Regumq; Ducumq; The Actions of Kings, and Commanders. This is so true, that the most notable Action of a Citizen, can never be made the Subject of an Epick Poem, when the most indifferent one of a King, or General of an Army, will be such, and always with Success.

18. And 'tis different in this that it Employs only one, and the same sort of Verse.] Aristotle says, in that it Employs only Simple Verse, which may signify, and that it makes use only of one sort of Verse: And that it makes its Imitation with Verse only. Whereas, Tragedy, Employs Dancing, and Musick, as well as Verse; but I am satisfy'd, to express the most Essential Difference, the rest being of little account, amongst us.

19. Which
19. Which is a pure Narration.] This Difference, is yet more Considerable than the first; for there is nothing but Action it self, which can livelily repre- sent; the violent Passions which reign in Tragedy. When as Epopœia, uses only a simple recitation, without Actors; it being a Poem, more soft, moderate, and made for Morality. The Poet always speaks in this, and never in the other.

20. And has a larger extent.] This Difference proceeds from the same Cause, I just now explain'd. Passions rule in Tragedy, so that Poem, neither can, nor ought, to be otherwise than short; since nothing that is violent is of long Duration. But Manner, and Customs, which are not begun and finish'd at once, belong to an Epick Poem; and by Consequence, its Action ought to have a larger extent, than that of Tragedy, and cannot well be contained in the space of one Day only.

21. For Tragedy endeavours as much as is possible, to confine it self to the Circuit of the Sun, or to exceed it, as little as may be.] I thought my self oblig'd strictly to adhere to Aristotle's own Words in the Translation of this, and to Content my self to give the Explanation of it. Most People believe that by the Circuit of the Sun, we should understand, the length of a Natural Day; and think, that the Action of a Tragedy, may be of Twenty four Hours, but this Opinion is not only Contradicted, by the Constant Practice of all the Greek Poets, which remain, and on which Aristotle has grounded his Rule; but it is also Contrary to Common Sense, which can never suffer, that a continued Action, all of which, ought Entirely to be exposed to our Sight, should continue so long, and amuse the Spectators a Day and a Night; This would ruin the Verisimilitude, which is one of the Principal Foundations of this Poem. Aristotle assuredly calls the Circuit of the Sun, that
space of time, in which he runs thro' our Hemisphere, and very wisely teaches, that all the Action of a Tragedy, ought to be Contain'd in the space of one Day, or one Night, and not to have the liberty to employ them both. If it is an Action that begins at Sun-rising, it ought to be ended before Night; if it be an Action which begins at Night, it should be finish't, before Morning; but as there are a great many Actions to be found, which are not contained within these Bounds, which employ one part of the Day, and one part of the Night, he adds, that then you may change the time, provided that Change be not Considerable; that is to say, that you may take, the same space of time in the Day, and in the Night together, which may be taken either in the Day, or in the Night alone. For Aristotle did by no means pretend, to give Poets liberty, to exceed the space, of the Circuit of the Sun, or to give (for example) Fourteen, or Fifteen Hours, to the Action of a Tragedy, that would be unaccountable; And he took care not to permit that, which was so contrary to Custom, and capable of diverting the Poets, from that Perfection they ought to seek, and which is only to be found in a Just and exact Regularity. For 'tis certain that the most perfect Pieces are those, which require no more time, for the Action, than for the representation, as those of Sophocles, which ought to be follow'd in that point, as perfect Models: The Actions of his finest Pieces are but of Four Hours. But you may say, if the Action of a Tragedy, can be contain'd in such narrow Bounds, why then does Aristotle allow Eight or Ten Hours? Because there are Actions which necessarily require a longer time, and Aristotle would set down in his Rule, how long the Duration, of these Actions might be, without prejudicing the Verisimilitude, and tryng the Patience of the Auditors. The Poet ought to take his Measures so well, that he doth not give Ten Hours, to an Action, which ought to be finish'd in Four; nor to crowd that into Four, which
22. *When as, there is no time limited, to Epopeia.*] When Aristotle says, that the time for *Epopeia* is indeterminate, *we* must not infer from thence, that we are permitted, to give as many Years as we please, to the Action of an *Epick* Poem; *he* would only have us understand by this, that those *Epick Actions* may be some longer than others, according to the Nature of the particular Action. For Example, The *Ilias* is full of Violence, and Passion; the *Odysse*, of Wisdom, and Conduct; *Homer* had then been guilty of a very great Fault, if he had made these two Actions, of an Equal Duration. Therefore he gives to the first but Seven and Forty Days; of which *Achilles's* anger, takes up but half a quarter: But to the *Odysse* he allows, Eight Years and an half. *Virgil* knew very well this Prudence and Wisdom of the Greek Poet; for to the Action of his *Aeneids*, whose Character is Piety, and good Nature, he gives Seven Years; In Confining that Poem, to the narrow limits of the *Iliads*, he would have been no less blamable, than *Homer*, if he had given to his *Iliads*, the whole extent of his *Odysse*.

23. *But we must say, that Tragedy in its beginning had no more restriction.*] During the Time that Tragedy was only Chorus, there were no Limits prescribed for its Duration, which was measured, only by the Joy, and Effects of the Wine; 'twas no otherwise when one Person was added to the Chorus. For as all the Narrations he made, between the Songs of the Chorus, were only Episodes, which had neither dependance on, nor relation one to another, the Duration of that Diversion depended only on the Fancy, and that alone might take up as much time, as all the Tragedies, which could be acted in one Day, did afterwards take up, when that Poem was brought to the Perfection in which we now see it.

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24. He
24. He that can judge well of a Tragedy, and know assuredly, whether it be good, or bad, can also judge of an Epopæia.] The Foundation of this Maxim of Aristotle's is true in all Arts, and is, That to judge rightly of any Work, we ought perfectly to know, all the Parts of which it is Composed. According to this Principle then, any Man that can judge well, of a Tragedy, can also judge well of an Epick Poem; for what is in this latter, is very nearly in the other, we find in Epopæia, as in Tragedy, Fable, Manners, Detection, and Affections. But he who is capable to judge, of an Epick Poem, may not have enough knowledge, to judge well of a Tragedy; because there are in this, some things which are not in that. For besides the Dance and the Musick, which in Aristotle's time were counted the perfecting Parts of Tragedy, there is Unity of Time, and Place; The Vivacity of the Passions; the Chorus's, the Decoration, and the Action itself, Epopæia being only a Narration. This Judgment of Aristotle's is then very true and solid.
CHAP. VI.

The Definition of Tragedy. Its effect to refine the Passions. Its Style. The six parts which compose it. Manners are the Characters of Men, and the Source of their Actions. Why Tragedy is an imitation of Actions, and not of Men nor their Manners. The End Men propose to themselves, is always an Action, and not a Quality. Tragedy can subsist without Manners. What is of most Importance and Difficulty in Tragedy. What Manners are, and the Discourses which have or have not Manners. The difference of the Ancient Orators, from those of Aristotle's Age. Of the Musick, and Decorations.

1. We shall speak of Epopæia, (a) and Comedy in the following part of this Discourse, and at present of Tragedy, and shall give immediately a Definition of it, which will suit to what has been already said.

2. Tragedy is then, an Imitation of an Action that is Grave, Entire, and hath a

(a) Imitation in Hexameters.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Just Length; of which the Stile is agreeably relishing, but differently in all its parts; and which without the assistance of Narration, by means of Compassion and Terror perfectly refines in us, all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them.

3. I call, a Stile Agreeably Relishing, when it has Number, Verse, and Harmony; and I add, but differently in all its parts; because Verse alone rules in some, and Number and Harmony in others.

4. This Imitation being made by the Actors, it necessarily follows, That the Decoration of Scenes, is in some sort a part of Tragedy, as well as the Melody and Discourse with which the Imitation is made. I call the Composition of the Verse Discourse, and the Musick whose force is sufficiently known, Melody.

5. As this is an Imitation of some Action, and those who Act, are necessarily such, by their Manners and Sentiments; (b) there being no other Character which can distinguish them. 'Tis a sure Consequence, that all Actions proceed from these two Sources; that is, Sentiments and Manners, (c) and which are the Causes of Good or Evil to Mankind.

6. The Imitation of an Action is properly Fable; for I call the Composition of things, Fable.

(b) For by these two we distinguish them. (c) And by these Men either obtain, or lose their Ends.
7. The Manners are that which distinguishes the Quality of those who Act; and the Sentiments are the Discourses, by which they (d) make known ev'ry Action, or discover their Thoughts.

8. Tragedy must then of necessity have six parts: (e) The Fable, Manners, Discourse, Sentiments, Decoration, and Music. Of these six, there are two, (f) which regard (g) the means; one which regards the Manner; and three which regard the Subject, or the Matter of the Imitation.

9. (h) Tho' there are almost no Poets, as I may say, who don't employ these six Parts, in their Tragick Pieces; it is certain also, that they are found in all sorts of Subjects.

10. But the most important is the Fable, or the Composition of things: For Tragedy is an Imitation, not of Men, but of their Actions, Lives, Good or Ill Fortune; all which (i) consist in Action: And the End which Men always propose to themselves, is not a Quality but an Action. Now we (k) have such or such Qualities by our Manners, but we are Happy or Miserable, by our Actions. Tragedy then does not

(d) Demonstrate something.
(e) To make a Tragedy, which are. (f) Parts. (g) With what we imitate, two; those which imitate, three; what is imitated.
(h) There are few, as I may say, who don't use all these Forms; for every thing has Decoration, Manners, Fable, Discourse, Music, and Sentiments.
(i) Good Fortune doth. (k) Are.
endeavour to imitate Manners, but adds them by reason of the Actions; so that Actions and Fable are the end of Tragedy, for in all things the End is that which is of most importance.

11. Add to this truth, That Tragedy cannot be without Action, but it may be without Manners; and truly there are none in most Pieces of the Modern Poets. We may say also, generally speaking, That we find almost the same Difference between our Poets, as between the Painters, Zeuxis and Polygnotus. The (l) latter perfectly express'd the Manners, of which you could not find the least Stroke in the Works of the former.

12. Besides, if any one should undertake to make a Set of Discourses, in which the Manners were perfectly express'd, the Diction fine, and the Sentiments very noble, I can assure him, that he has not all that is proper for Tragedy. Whereas a Peice which shall be much inferior to this in all its parts, yet if it have its Subject, well constituted and manag'd, shall (m) sooner, and with better success obtain its end.

13. A fourth Reason, which is no less essential, than the preceding, is, That the most efficacious means which Tragedy uses to affect and please, are the Peripeties and Recognizances, for both one and the other are Parts of the (n) Subject.

(l) Polygnotus, who painted the Good, imitated the Manners; but Zeuxis's Painting had none.
(m) Rather be called a Tragedy.
(n) Fable.
14. To conclude, a certain Sign of what I have established, is, That those who undertake to make Tragedy, will find it much easier to succeed in the Stile and Manners, than to form the Subject rightly, and this is what all the Ancient Poets have try'd.

15. 'Tis then certain, that the Subject is the Principal, and as it were the Soul of Tragedy. The Manners follow next, and it is absolutely as in Painting. For, if the finest Colours were mix't on a Cloath confusedly and without order, it would not give so much pleasure, as (p) the simple Sketches of a Draught. In a word, Tragedy is the imitation of an Action, and consequently is chiefly an imitation of those who Act.

16. After Manners, come (p) the Sentiments, that is to say, the Faculty of expressing those things which belong to the Subject, and are agreeable to it. Now all that has respect to Discourse, depends on Rhetorick, and (q) common use. The Ancient Orators spake simply, and according to the common way, but those of this time (r) borrow all their helps from Rhetorick.

17. Manners are what discover the (s) Inclination of him who speaks, and (r) the Part he will take in those things, where it will not be easie to

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(o) a Picture drawn in white.
(p) The third is (q) Politicks. (r) Rhetorically.
(s) Choice. (t) What 'twill be.
remember what he will follow, or avoid: 'Tis for this reason, that \(u\) all those Discourses which don't at first give us an insight, into what will become of him who speaks, are without Manners.

18. The Sentiments are that which explains what is, or what is not; \(w\) in a word, 'tis that which lets us know the thoughts of him who speaks.

19. The fourth thing, and \[wh ich only \] regards the Discourse, is the Diction, which is, (as I have already said) the Explication of things by words, and which is of equal force both in Prose and Verse.

20. After the Diction comes \(x\) the Music which is the most agreeable of all that Tragedy can employ.

21. The Decoration is also \(y\) very diverting, but \(z\) that does not properly regard either the Art of the Poet, nor make a part of the Poesie. For Tragedy keeps all its force without Representation, or Actors. And moreover, all that regards the Decoration, is more the business of Workmen and Ingenieurs, than the Poet.

\(u\) Some Discourses have no Manners.
\(w\) Or declares something in general.
\(x\) The Fifth is the \(y\) Most taking, \(z\) Void of Art, &c.

REMARKS
1. Tragedy is then an Imitation of an Action that is Grave.] For we have already inform'd, that nothing but Grave and Serious Actions can be the Subject of Tragedy and Epopeia, since they both propose to imitate what is most important. Tis this also which makes the most essential difference between Tragedy and Comedy. For this imitates only what is Witty and Pleasant; and leaves all that is Grave and Serious for Tragedy. 'Tis Nature herself, who has made this just Distinction, as we have said elsewhere.

2. Entire.] That's to say, which hath a beginning, a middle, and an end: for if any one of these are wanting, the Action is maim'd, and the Poem defective.

3. And hath a just length.] For there are entire Actions, which would be too long, or too short for Tragedy, which ought to have a determinate length, not to be extended as Epopeia, nor straightened as a simple Fable, as we shall find in what follows.

4. Of which the Stile is agreeably relishing.] The Latin Interpreters, who have translated, of which the Stile is agreeable and charming, have by no means comprehended Aristotle's Thought, who does not speak here of the Virtues and Vices of the Discourse, but considers it with all the attendance that Tragedy uses, to perfect its Imitation; for as we have seen already, it employs Number and Harmony, as well as Discourse, either jointly or severally, and this is Number and Harmony, which he calls Relishing with a great deal of reason. He explains himself very clearly in what follows.

5. And
5. And which without the assistance of Narration, by the means of Compassion and Terror, perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them.] A perfect Definition ought to mark the end and aim of the thing defined, and this is what Aristotle does here: We'll endeavour to explain this last part, which without contradiction, is the most important, because it shews us the Advantage which may be made of this Poem, and which Plato had condemned as dangerous to Manners.

6. And which without the assistance of Narration.] This is to distinguish Tragedy from Epopeia, which employs only Narration, in order to obtain the same end, viz. to refine the Passions, and to induce good Habits, instead of those ill ones, it endeavours to root out. 'Tis on this account also, that it takes up a great deal more time than Tragedy, because the means it uses, are slower, and consequently less affecting, for what is represented to the Understanding only, does not make so deep Impressions, as that which is shewn to the Eyes of the Spectators, and which they learn by themselves.

7. By the means of Terror and Compassion.] Epopeia uses these means also, but as it employs others, and quite contrary ones too, and makes particular use of Admiration, Aristotle had reason to attribute Compassion and Terror to Tragedy, for these two Passions are very proper to it, and proceed more from Action than Narration. We may say too, that we could have no Tragedy without Terror and Compassion, when Epopeia will pass very well, and yet have none of their help.

8. Perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them.] This is, as has already been said, the most important place of the Definition,
Ariftotle's Art of Poetry.

arion, as also the most difficult; for what the Commentators have said to explain it, serves only to render it more obscure. There are several Explanations of it, to be found among them, but the true one is not there. And this is what very much embarrass'd Mr. Corneille, who after a long search understood but one small part of it, and had only a glimpse of that neither. Since he doubts whether Tragedy, tho' it has all the Conditions Arifotle requires would refine the Passions. I am afraid, says he, that the Reasoning of this Philosopher, is only a fine Idea, and that it never was effectually true. He is not far from the Opinion of one of Arifotle's Interpreters, who thinks he speaks of this refining of the Passions only to contradict Plato, who had condemn'd Tragedy and banish'd it from his Common-wealth, because in imitating all sorts of Actions, as well bad as good, it insinuated itself into the Minds of the Spectators, by its agreeableness, and reviv'd those Passions which it ought to extinguish. Arifotle is then desirous to show, that 'tis to no purpose to banish it from well regulated States, and to succeed in that Design he finds the Advantage of it in these Agitations of the Soul, and endeavours to render this Poem commendable by the very same reason which Plato used to have it banish'd. If we had the second Book of this Art of Poetry, in which Arifotle explains himself at length, as he had promised in the last Chapter of his Politicks, we should not have been obliged at this time to defend him against these unjust Suppositions; but since that Book is lost, we must endeavour to supply the want of it as well as we can, and to show that there is nothing more true than what Arifotle says here of the refining of the Passions, which is the only end that Tragedy proposes to itself, and which is only found fault with, because it is not understood. There are two things to examine in these words: And which by the means of Compassion and Terror, perfectly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else it like them.
First then, we must see how Tragedy can refine Terror and Compassion, in exciting them; and afterwards, how in refining them, it refines also at the same time, those other Passions which would make us fall into the same Calamities; for in this the Difficulty doth consist; but before we proceed to that, 'tis Convenient to explain the term, To Refine the Passions. The Academicks, and afterwards the Stoicks, made use of it, to say To drive out, To root them out of the Soul. In this sense 'tis false, to say that Tragedy can refine the Passions; for it is out of its power. But the Peripateticks being persuaded that 'twas only the Excess was Vicious, and that the Passions when regulated were useful, nay necessary, they meant only, by To Refine the Passions, to Curb the Excess, by which they err'd, and to reduce them to a J ust Moderation. And this is the End, they attribute to Tragedy, as the only one it can attain to. Now let us see, how it excites in us Terror, and Compassion, in order to refine them; this is not very difficult. It excites them then, by setting before our Eyes, the Calamities, into which, those who are like our Selves, have fallen by involuntary Faults; and it refines them, by rending those very Misfortunes, familiar to us, because it teaches us by that, not to fear them, nor to be too much Concern'd when they do really happen to us. Aristotle is not the only Man who has had this Idea of Tragedy, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, however Stoical he was, pass'd the same Judgment on this Art. Chap. 6th of the 9th Book of his Reflections; his words are very remarkable: Tragedies, says he, were first introduced, to put Men in mind, of those Accidents which happen in their Lives; to Inform them that they must necessarily Come, and teach them, that those things which they see with so much Delight on the Stage, should not appear insupportable in the Grand Theatre of the World; for you see plainly that such ought to be the Catastrophe of all Pieces, and those who Cry so much on the Theatre, Oh Cytheron; do not deliver themselves
selves from their own Evils. This is then the first Effect of Tragedy, it refines Terror and Compassion, by themselves. The Advantage it brings to Man-kind, by this, is sufficiently great, since it prepares them to bear the most unlucky accidents Courageously; and disposes the most miserable, to think themselves happy, when they Compare their own Misfortunes, with those, which Tragedy has represented to them. In whatsoever Condition a Man may be, yet when he shall see, an Oedipus, a Philoctetes an Orestes, he can but think his own Afflictions light in Comparison with theirs. But Tragedy does not stop here. In refining Terror and Compassion, it refines at the same time, all those other Passions, which can precipitate us into the same Miseries. For in laying before us the Crimes, which have drawn those unhappy Ones, into the Pains they suffer, it teaches us to stand on our Guard, that we may not fall into them, and to Moderate, and refine that Passion, which was the only Cause of their loss. This is what Aristotle, thought and this is the Aim of Tragedy. To take away this, is to despoil it of its Character, and to make it lose the very Name of a Fable, since there is no Fable, which was not invented, to form the Manners, by Instructions disguised, under the Allegory of an Action. Our Tragedy may succeed well enough, in the first Part, that is, it may excite and refine Terror and Compassion. But it rarely arrives, at the last, which is nevertheless the most advantagious, it refines few of the other Passions, and as it runs generally on Love-Intrigues, if it refin'd any, it must be that only; So we must expect but very little benefit: we must not admire, if Mr. Corneille thought that this refining of the Passions, was Imaginary. But you may say, that if it was not, how comes it to pass, that Plato Judg'd otherwise, and that he Condemn'd Tragedy, as the Engagement, and Bouteufu of the Passions? Plato confider'd Tragedy, only in its separate Parts, and Judg'd of its Effects, by those which It product on the Spot; for 'tis true, that in that very moment it
So Aristotle also agrees. Aristotle considered it thoroughly and Judg'd of it, by the Effects it produc'd after the representation was over, 'for it's certain that when the violent Motions, which the Actions have stir'd up, begin to abate, we naturally profit by those Crimes we have seen committed, and which had drawn on the heads of their Authors such horrible Calamities. We may Compare Plato and Aristotle on this Occasion to two Physicians; one of which Condemns a Remedy, that the other Approves. The first may argue with some show of Reason, 'that 'twill immediately put all the humours in Motion; and 'that by so doing, it will Cause in the Body an intestine War, which is Capable of destroying it; and the other, after having examin'd more narrowly the Causes, and Consequences of this Disorder, shall maintain his Opinion by the great Advantage, which will accrue from this Evacuation; it being only of those noxious humours which were the Cause of the Malady. This is exactly the Difference which is between Plato and Aristotle. Tragedy is a true Medicine, which Purges the Passions. Since it teaches, the Ambitious, to Moderate his Ambition; the Wicked, to Fear God; the Passionate, to restrain his Anger, &c. but 'tis a very agreeable Medicine, and works only by Pleasure.

9. I call a Style agreeable relishing when it has Number, Verse and Harmony.] This is one of the Differences between Tragedy, and Epopeia. This is only a Discourse in Verse; whereas the other Joyns to it Dancing and Musick.

10. I add, but differently in all its Parts, because Verse alone, rules in some, and Number and Harmony in others.] Verse alone is used in the Acts; Dance, Verse and Musick in one part of the Chorus; and Verse and Musick in the other.

11. This
11. This Imitation being made by the Actors, it necessarily follows, that the Decoration of the Scenes is in some sort, a part of Tragedy. For truly there is no Action, which doth not suppose a Place where it was done, and Actors drest after one certain Fashion, rather than another, for this Decoration serves not only for Pomp and Show, but to express the Nature of the things which are represented. But as Tragedy will bear reading without being Acted, it follows that the Decoration is not one of its Essential Parts, which made Aristotle say, That it is in some sort, a Part; we manage the Decoration now adays, as if it was in no respect a Part of Tragedy, and our Theatre is (if I dare say it) no more than the Skeleton of the Greek and Latin ones.

12. As well as the Melody and Discourse, with which the Imitation is made, I call the Composition of the Verse, Discourse, and the Music, whose force is sufficiently known Melody. The first thing we ought to take notice of, in this Passage is, that Aristotle, puts Music and Verse among the Parts of Tragedy, whereas they are not absolutely Necessary; for 'tis undoubtedly true, that Tragedy may subsist, without any Verse or Song, according to the Judgment of this great Man. 'Tis certain likewise, that Tragedy was not call'd a Poem from the Verse, but from the Fable, or the Composition of the Adventures and Incidents. If Tragedy can subsist without Verse, it can do it no less without Music. I must confess, I could never well understand, how Music came to be considered, as making in any respect, a Part of Tragedy; for if there be any thing in the World that appears stranger, and more Contrary than another, to Tragick Action, 'tis Music. This will displease the Inventors of Tragedies in Music, Poems as ridiculous, as new; and
and which would be unsufferable, if we had the least relish for the Pieces of the Theatre, and were not Enchanted and Seduc'd by one of the greatest Musicians that ever was; for the Opera is, (if I may speak it,) the Grotesque of Poetry; and so much the more insupportable, as they pretend to make them pass, for Regular Pieces. We should have been very much oblig'd to Aristotle, if he had told us, how Musick could be judged necessary for Tragedy. Instead of that he is contented to say only, that, all its force is sufficiently known; which denotes, that then all the World, was convinc'd of its Necessity, and perceiv'd the wonderful Effects it produc'd, in those Poems whose Chorus's only were, fill'd up by it. I have often endeavoured to comprehend the Reasons, which oblig'd the Athenians who were such a nice and delicate People, to Associate Musick, and Dancing with Tragical Actions; and after many Searches to discover, how it could appear to them Natural or Probable, that a Chorus, which represented the Spectators of such an Action, could Dance and Sing after such lamentable and extraordinary Events; I have found, that, they follow'd their Natural Inclinations, and sought to satisfy their Superstition. The Greeks were of all Men in the World the most Superstitious, and most inclin'd to Dancing and Musick; Education confirm'd this Natural Inclination, and Dancing and Musick made a great Part of the Ceremonies of their Religion; after then the Chorus had pass'd from Hymns, to Tragedy, and from the Altar to the Theatre, the first Poets to satisfy their Religion, consecrated the Chorus's of their Tragedies, to Sing the Praises of their Gods, and especially of Bacchus; For the Songs of the Chorus, were for some time independent of the Tragic Action in which they were insert'd, and had little, or no relation to it. The Defect of these Songs, so foreign from the purpose, was too apparent.
parent, not to be soon perceiv'd; and then they endeavour'd to bring the Chorus by degrees, to say nothing, but what was agreeable, to the Subject of the Tragedy: And as almost all the Duty of the Chorus, consisted, in Offices of Charity and Piety, as I have remark'd on Horace his Art of Poetry; they retain'd the Movement and Song of the Ancient Chorus, because both one and other agreed perfectly, with the Discourse of those Persons who Compos'd the Chorus, because they satisfy'd the predominant Passion of those People, and because it agreed admirably well with their Capacities. Thus Musick and Dancing, were look'd on as a part of Tragedy. If it had been one of its Essential Parts, there could have been no Tragedy; but in the Theatre, it was such a Part as might be call'd becoming and ornamental; it was a Relish between the Acts, and not thro' the whole Play; for they would have look'd on that as Monstrous.

13. As this is an Imitation of some Action.] For Tragedy does not propose to imitate Inclinations, and Habits, but Actions: and where there is no Action, there can be no Tragedy.

14. And those who Act are necessarily such, by their Manners, and Sentiments.] It is worth while to observe, in what Method, and with what Address, Aristotle explains the Parts of Tragedy, in discovering the Nature of ev'ry one of them in particular, and dependance they have on one another. Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action, there is no Action, but proceeds from the Manners, and the Sentiments; therefore Manners and Sentiments are necessarily Essential Parts of Tragedy.

15. There being no other Character which can distinguish them.] This decision is worthy of a great
great Philosopher; There is nothing but the Manners, and the Sentiments which can distinguish and Characterize an Action, the Manners, Form, and the Sentiments explain it, and lay open its Causes and Motives.

16. And which are the Causes of Good or Evil to Mankind.] They are the Causes of Good or Ill to Mankind, because they produce Actions. For For altho' we may truly say, that the Manners and Sentiments are sufficient to make a Man happy or miserable, independantly from their Actions, yet the Tragick Poets know no other Good, or Evil, than that which proceeds from Actions; for otherwise, instead of imitating Actions, they would imitate Passions, or Qualities.

17. For I call the Composition of things, Fable.] In my Opinion, by the Composition of things, is not here meant a mixture of Truth and Falshood, as a very Ingenious Man thought; for that mixture is no less found in pure Fable, which consists rather of Words than of Actions. By the Composition of things, Aristotle means the Connexion, which the Causes and Incidents, that Concur to form an Action, have with one another, to make one and the same Subject. In a word, all the different Parts of an Action, tho’ it be neither Epick nor Tragick, ought to take notice of all that, which produces the Parts of which it is composed. Rightly to understand the sense of this Passage of Aristotle, we need only take notice of what follows this reasoning. The Imitation of an Action is properly Fable; For I call that Fable, &c. That For, shews the reason which oblig’d him to call the Composition of things by the name of Fable, and this reason is drawn from its Imitation of an Action. Those Fables which don’t imitate Actions, mix Truth with Falshood, and Consequently this is not what Aristotle means here.

18. The
18. The Manners are that, which distinguishes
the Quality of those who Act.] Manners charac-
terize Men, and denote their Inclinations, either
good, or bad; The Manners of Achilles are to be
cholerick, and hasty; Those of Æneas to be sweet-
temper'd, and devout.

19. And the Sentiments, are Discourses, by which
they make known, ev'ry Action, or discover their
Thoughts.] The Sentiments, dia\vota, are not those
internal Conceptions of the Mind, as the word or-
dinarily signifies; but the Discourses, by which
those Conceptions are explained, whether they have
only prepared an Action, or actually produc'd it.
It is not sufficient to give Manners only to the
Persons, they must also have Sentiments Confor-
mable to those Manners, and must speak so agree-
ably to their Characters, that the Audience may
know their Manners, before they see their A-
ctions.

20. Of these six, there are two, which regard the
means.] These two are the Diction, and Musick;
for these are the two Means, the Poet makes use of,
to make his Imitation, as has been said in the
First Chapter.

21. One which regards the Manner.] That is
the Decoration, for the Poet expo\es his Subject,
on the Stage, where the Actors Play.

22. And three which regard the Subjects.] These
three are the Fable, the Manners, and the Sent-
iments.

23. There are almost no Poets, as I may say, who
don't employ these Six in their Tragi\ck Pieces.] To
shew that these Six Parts, of which he has spoken,
are proper to Tragedy, he assures us, that there is
almost no Poet who does not employ them in his Pieces; but as that Expression, There is almost no Poet, appear'd too general, he took care to soften it by the Modification, As I may say; because he knew that there were bad Poets, who did not employ all six, and whose Pieces were defective, either, for want of the Manners, or Decoration, or the Action.

24. 'Tis true also, that they are found in all sorts of Subjects.] This is a very remarkable Decision; There is no Subject of Tragedy in which six Parts are not naturally found, and truly there is none without Fable, Manners, Sentiment, Diction, and Decoration; There remains only the Musick or Song; but if we look more narrowly, we shall find, that this last, is no less there than the others; for Musick is the Daughter of Passion, both Joy, and Grief do equally produce it, and 'twas yet more familiar to the Greeks, than any other People, for those reasons I have already mentioned. Thus Theophrastus has written, that there are three Principles of Musick, Joy, Grief, and Raptures of the Mind; for every one of these three, changes the Voice into a particular way of Singing; and This is the reason why Love, which Comprehends these three Passions, is so much delighted with Verse and Musick.

25. But the most Considerable is the Fable, or the Composition of things.] Aristotle plainly determines here, that the most important, in this Poem, is the Composition of the Incidents, which ought to form the Subject of Tragedy, and he gives such solid Reasons, that there is no room left to doubt of it.

26. For Tragedy is an Imitation not of Men, but of their Actions.] This is the first Reason Aristotle gives, to prove, that Fable is the Soul of Tra-
Ariftotle's Art of Poetry

gedy; for he says, Tragedy is an Imitation, not of Men, but of their Actions. If the aim of Tragedy, had been to imitate Men, it is certain that it would Manners and Quality much more than Actions; since there is a great number, who don't Act at all, or at most, their Actions are very inconsiderable, and consequently the Chief thing in Tragedy would be Manners. But it imitates Actions; from whence it necessarily follows, that Action constitutes Tragedy, and that there is no Tragedy where there is no Action.

27. Lives, and their good or ill Fortune.] They who believed that Tragedy was an Imitation of the whole Life, of a Man, were not only deceiv'd, but have also made very bad Pieces: It imitates one Action only, but it chooses the most Considerable, which denotes whether a Man's Life be good or bad; wherefore Ariftotle, after having said of their Lives, adds, And their good or ill Fortune; He says good or ill, indifferently, because there was almost as many Tragedies, whole Catastrophe was happy, as there were fatal.

28. Which consists in Action.] He says in what went before, that Manners are the Source of good or evil to Mankind; but 'tis to be understood that both of them are produce'd by their Actions: For the Theatre knows no Good or Evil, but what consistseth in that which Tragedy imitates.

29. And the End, which Men always propose to themselves, is not a Quality; but an Action.] Men always propose an Action, for their end, and not a Quality. But you may say, don't Men propose, to themselves to be Learned, Pious, and Just? and are not Justice, Science and Piety, Qualities? this is true; but if we examine it further, all these Qualities, are not the End proposed, but the Means whereby they hope to attain their End, which...
can be nothing else than an Action. The General End that Mankind proposes, is to live Happily; now to live happily is always an Action, and cannot be a Quality. And truly, as the End of all Trades and Arts is an Action, and the End a Man proposes can be nothing but an Action; for he is properly an Artist, and not born to live Idly. This End is their happiness; now this happiness consists only, in doing those Actions, which are conformable, to the Rules and Precepts of Virtue. If the Felicity of Man did not consist in Action, and was only a Quality, or Habit, he would be happy even Sleeping, and would be the only Being which would have no Action, which was proper and peculiar to him, and consequently he could not propose any End, or that End would, neither be in his power, nor depend on his Labour, which is absurd; for the End and Happiness of any thing whatever, consists in the Perfection of that Action which is proper for it. And this is what Aristotle has prov'd very well, in his Morals, and in his Politics.

30. Now we have such or such Qualities by our Manners.] For the Manners cause us to have, such, or such Inclinations; which make the Qualities, that Characterize the Man.

31. We are happy, or miserable by our Actions.] If this Maxim of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius is true in Morality, That the Good and Evil, of rational Creatures, born for Society, Consisteth, not in the Persuasion, but Action, as their Virtues and Vices do: The reason is stronger in Tragedy, where, a Man may be happy by his Qualities, and unhappy by his Actions.

32. But adds them, by reason of the Actions.] It adds, to render the Actions more probable; to give the Spectator beforehand, the pleasure to discover.
discover, how those Actions will happen, which shall proceed, from such particular Manners; and by that to render the Imitation more Advantageous.

33. So that Actions and Fable, are the End of Tragedy.] He is not content to say, that Actions, are the end of Tragedy, that would be Equivoctal; for Tragedy does not imitate Actions alone, and independantly; he adds, and Fable, and to let us know, that all those things, or Actions, which make the Subject of Tragedy, ought together with their Causes, and the suitableness and relation of all its different Parts, to form only one and the same Subject, this is what he properly calls Fable. I call Fable, says he, the Composition of things. Tragedy then proposes as its End, the Imitation of an Action. It has also another, which is to Correct, and Instruct us, by refining the Passions; but this is mediatelv such, at which it cannot arrive, but by the former, and which then becomes a Means of doing it.

34. For in all things, the End is that which is most important.] This is a truth, against which no Exception can be made. The Means are always less noble than the End, and Subordinate to it; This is a necessary Consequence which depends on that General and Universal Law, that the less perfect, things, are created to be Subservient to those which are more perfect.

35. Add to this truth, that Tragedy cannot be without Action, but it may be without Manners.] A sure and certain sign, that Action is the life of Tragedy, is, that it can subsist, without Manners, but not without Action; This can never be corrected, for where there is no Action, there is no Tragedy, since Tragedy proposes to imitate Actions only.

36. And
36. And truly there are none, in most Pieces, of the Modern Poets. To Confirm, what he hath said, That Tragedy may be without Manners; he cites for Example the Pieces of most part of the Poets of his time, which were nevertheless True Tragedies, altho’ that had not Manners. But what is a Piece without Manners, say you? Mr. Corneille found much difficulty in this Passage, and after having examin’d it, he concludes, that Aristotle calls a Tragedy without Manners, a Piece where the Actors tell their bare Sentiments, or ground them only on Reasons drawn from Matter of Fact, without delivering any Maxims of Morality or Politicks. But he did not comprehend Aristotle, nor know, what he calls hereafter, Moral Discourses; that is, Discourses, where the Manners are well express’d; for the Discourse of an Actor who speaks plainly, may very well express the Manners, without having any Moral or Political Maxims. This is well known. See the 53d and 54th Remarks. A Tragedy then without Manners, is a Piece, where the Persons speak in such a way, that they don’t make their Inclinations known, and so, that we cannot Judge by their discourse, what resolutions they will take in the Sequel; for they discover no farther than they Act. It is evident from this, that a Tragedy cannot be absolutely without Manners; but we say ’tis without Manners, when they are ill, and equivocal, that is to say, not truly distinguished. It were to be wish’d that Aristotle had named the Poets, of which he speaks, and given some Example of this deficiency of Manners. Among the Pieces which remain of the three Greek Tragedians, there is not one without the Manners, altho’ some of the Characters have them very obscure and Equivocal.

37. We may say also, generally speaking, that we find almost the same Difference between our Poets, as between.
between the Painters Zeuxis and Polygnotus.] Poetry, and Painting are so alike, that all the Vices, and Virtues which are in one, may also be found in the other.

38. The latter Perfectly express'd the Manners.] All the Figures of Polygnotus's Drawing, were so lively, that the Spectator had not the least difficulty to know the very Genius and Manners of the Person they represented. The Passions were admirably well express'd. Thus Aristotle says in the Eighth Book of his Politicks; That the Works of this Painter ought rather to be shewn to young People, than those of Pauson, who, as Zeuxis, did not express, the Manners in his Paintings. Parrhe- sius, Polygnotus, and Aristides the Theban, were of all the Ancient Painters these, who endeavour'd, the most, to express them. The first painted the People of Athens, and succeeded so well in his Design, that he represented them Just as they were, you might see there at the same time all sorts of Passions, and distinguish the Inconstant, and Tenacious, the Cholerick and Mild, the Merciful and Cruel, the Proud and Humble, the Coward and the Brave, &c.

39. Of which you could not find the least Stroke in the Works of the former.] All the Works of Zeuxis were without Manners, because he wrought on the Prodigious and Wonderful; as we shall see, in the last Chapter save one. Pliny nevertheless, assures us, that he drew a Penelope, in which he seem'd to have painted the Manners, fecit & Penelope, in qua pinnxisse mores videtur. But this Remark of Pliny seems, rather to confirm, than destroy the reproach, which Aristotle casts on Zeuxis.

40. Besides, if any one should undertake, to make a Sett of Discourses, in which the Manners were perfectly
perfectly express'd, the Diction fine, and the Sentiments very Noble. This is a third Reason of no less force than the former, to shew that the Subject of Tragedy is more considerable than the Manners, the Diction, or the Sentiments. For Example: Take a Tragedy in which these three Parts are admirably well managed, but whose Subject is not well treated; and another where the Subject is well conducted, and where the other Parts are much less so, this last shall much surpasa the first, and succeed better, because it has the Property of Tragedy, viz. the care of the Action, and not so much the Discourse.

41. I can assure him, that he has not all that is proper for Tragedy.] Victorius pretends that the Negative ought to be suppress'd, and that Aristotle had written, he had all which is proper for Tragedy, because in effect, says he, Tragedy very advantageously makes use of these three parts, to arrive at what it aims at. But he would do it much better if, &c. This Learned Man did not remember that Tragedy doth consist neither in the Manners, nor the Diction, nor the Sentiments, but in the Actions only, since it imitates them alone, and employs all the rest, as means only to perfect its Imitation. If there was no other difference between the Fable, Manners, Diction, and Sentiments, than being more or less necessary, Aristotle was in the wrong, to assure us, that Fable was the Soul of Tragedy, and this third reason would be very weak, if we might assert (as truly of the other three Parts separately, what he said of Fable. In a word, Aristotle could never say, that a Poet who neglected the Fable, could ever obtain what was proper for Tragedy, since his Work would be no Tragedy. Besides, 'tis a sure Maxim, That the Nature of every thing is that only in which its Perfection doth consist. The Nature of Tragedy is to imitate an Action.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Action then is that alone which does properly belong to Tragedy, and this cannot be disputed.

If it have its Subject well constituted and managed.] This is worth taking notice of, that a Subject well managed, tho' the Manners are ill expressed, the Elocution dull, and the Sentiments mean, shall succeed better than a Piece where the Subject shall not be rightly disposed, even tho' the Manners shall be perfect, the Diction well wrought up, and the Sentiments very fine. And this is true of Tragedy, because as I said before, the Perfection of every thing is in its Nature, and in its End. I am apt to think Comedy is quite contrary, the Manners, and Sentiments are more necessary there, than the Subject, and this no doubt proceeds from Comedy, being an Imitation of Manners, rather than Actions. You may see my Remarks on the three hundred and nineteenth Verse of Horace's Art of Poetry.

Is that the most efficacious means which Tragedy uses to affect and please, are the Peripeties and Recognizances.] The most perfect Tragedies are those in which there are Peripeties; that is, Revolutions, Changes of Fortune, and Remembrances, as in the Oedipus. Now the Peripeties and Remembrances are inseparable Parts of the Subject, since they consist entirely in Action; and consequently the Subject is the most important part of Tragedy, as being that which furnishes the most sure and efficacious means to arrive at its end?

Those who undertake to make a Tragedy, will find it much easier to succeed in the Style and Manners, than to form the Subject rightly.] The fifth and last Reason which Aristotle gives to shew the
the Advantage the Subject has over all the other Parts of Tragedy, is drawn from the difficulty which is always found in disposing the Subject. This difficulty being compar'd with the facility of succeeding in the other Parts, is an Incontestable Proof that the Subject is the most important and proper part of Tragedy. For 'tis a Truth confirm'd by the Experience of all Ages, that in all Arts whatever, that which is the principal, is most difficult, and arrives latest to its Perfection.

45. And this is what the Ancient Poets have try'd.] Altho' the first Poets affected a florid and lofty Stile, than which nothing is more opposite to the Manners, and which hides them so much as this elaborate way. Yet however they succeeded better in the Manners and the Stile, than in the Conduct of the Subject, in which they found such insuperable Difficulties, that hardly one has had good success. Æschylus himself did not know all the Secrets of this Art, tho' he came nearer it than any of his Predecessors, and Sophocles was the only Man who perfected it. This fifth Reason of Aristotle is then very solid, and Experience has long since convinced us, and what we do now confirms, that there is at this Day nothing which gives so much trouble to our Tragick Poets, as the Constitution of the Subject; we have few Pieces where there are not essential Defects as to the Conduct, and the Faults which are committed in any Art, after its Rules, are not only well explain'd, but what is more considerable, after they have been happily followed, and that we have Examples of it before our Eyes, do more plainly denote the difficulty, than all those which could be committed before that Art was known.
46. The Manners follow next.] After the Fable, the Manners without contradiction, are the next. For as Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action, and there are no Actions without Manners, since Manners are always the Cause of Actions, it is evident that after the Subject, the Manners are the most important in Tragedy.

47. For if the finest Colours were mixt on a Cloath, confusedly, and without order, it would not give so much Pleasure as the simple Sketches of a Draught.] Aristotle by a very natural and just Comparison, shews the truth of the two things he has established, viz. That Subject has the first place in Tragedy, and the Manners the second. The Subject is in that Poem, what the Sketches are in Painting, and the Colours are the same in this, as the Manners are in the other. As a Painter who would draw a Picture, doth not mix his Colours on the Cloath confusedly, but traces first the Strokes of the Figure he would represent, and then uses with Order and Art those Colours which are proper to make his Picture remarkable and like. 'Tis just so with the Poet, he doth not huddle his Manners confusedly in his Piece, but begins by disposing the Subject and all the Parts of the Action; and afterwards adds those Manners which are proper to render the Action credible and probable. If the Poet and the Painter should manage their Business otherwise, 'tis possible one might divert the Sight, by the Vivacity of the Colours, and the other might amuse the Minds by the Beauty of the Relations, where the Manners might be very well taken notice, but neither one nor the other would give that Pleasure which Tragedy and Painting ought to give; and consequently, they must be out of the Rules of their Art.
48. In a word, Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action; and consequently, is chiefly an Imitation of those who Act. Aristotle does not finish this proof, but the reasoning intire, is thus. Since Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action, it must needs Imitate those who Act. Those who Act cannot Act without Manners, for they are the Character and Principle of the Actions. The Manners then immediately follow the Subject of Tragedy; the consequence of which, is easily drawn.

49. After the Manners, come the Sentiments; that is to say, the Faculty of expressing those things which belong to the Subject. Aristotle follows the Natural Order, the Sentiments are for the Manners, as the Manners are for the Subject; so as a Tragick Poet cannot imitate an Action well, but by employing Manners; so he cannot well denote the Manners, but by the means of Sentiments, and by consequence the Sentiments must hold the third place in Tragedy.

50. Those things which belong to the Subject, and are agreeable to it. In the Sentiments Truth, or at least Verisimilitude must be followed. We follow the Truth, when we speak those things which are necessary to the Subject; and Veri-similitude, when we say those things which are agreeable to it. A Poet who makes a Madman speak, must make him speak either exactly as a Madman doth, or as 'tis probable he would do.

51. Now all that has respect to Discourse, depends on Rhetorick or the common use. The Greek has it, All that is of Discourse, is the Work of Polity and Rhetorick. Aristotle calls common usage Polity, the ordinary Language of the People, who speak plainly without Art, whereas Rhetorick teaches
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

teaches to speak with Art and Method, and to adorn its Thoughts with all the Graces of an Embellish Discourse. After the Philosopher has said, That the Sentiments consist in expressing those things which belong to the Subject, or those which are agreeable to it, he teaches two ways, by which you may find all that is necessary to be said in both respects. Policy is for those things which are naturally found in the Subject treated of; for to find that, we need only follow the general Considerations, and common use. And Rhetorick is for those things which are agreeable to the Subject, and embellish it, to discover these, 'tis necessary to have recourse to Art and Study, and to think a long time of their agreeableness, that we be not mistaken.

52. The Ancient Orators spake simply, and according to the common way. [The Greek says, spakepolitickly. Aristotle would have us understand by this, That the Ancient Orators were content to speak according to the truth; that is, they did not endeavour to express any thing but what was to the purpose; and therefore they spake according to common Custom, as we spake in ordinary Conversation and Affairs of Life. But those who followed, were more corrupted, and seeking either to disguise or destroy the Truth, took very little notice of what belonged to the Subject, they endeavoured to find out the Veri-similitude, and only to express those things which were useful for them, and tending to the obtaining their Ends. And this is the reason why they borrowed assistance from Rhetorick. Victorius was deceived when he thought that Aristotle spake here of Poets, and not of Orators. The Ancient Poets acted quite contrary to what we have said, they endeavoured as much as possible to adorn their Discourses, and did not all follow the natural and plain way, as I shall prove elsewhere.
53. Manners are what discover the Inclination of him who speaks, and the Part he will take. This Definition of Manners, is wonderful. Aristotle uses only the word τέκτονική ἔξωτη, which signifies a Resolution made, with Inclination and Choice, and which proceeds from a Will which is determin'd; a Choice made with Advice, and after mature Deliberation. 'Tis for this reason, I say, The Inclination of him who speaks, and the Part he will take. In which I have followed the Definition, Aristotle gives of this word in his Morals, ὅτι τέκτονική ἔξωτη. What I call Resolution, Election, is a desire which follows a Deliberation. Manners cannot be without this Choice, for Choice follows the Manners, ὅτι τέκτονική ἔξωτη. Aristotle explains the same in the third Book of his Rhetorick, that there are Manners in the Discourse of him who speaketh, when what he says, can give us occasion to judge what part he will take in all his Actions. This is the Oratio Morata, and ὑπερτέκτονική of Aristotle.

54. In those things, where it will not be easy to remember what he will follow, or avoid.] These words ought to be examin'd with care, for they discover to us a Secret, which many Poets are ignorant of, and against which many do every Day offend. That the Manners of a Person may be good, and well adapted, 'tis necessary that the Poet so order it, that when we see him in any important and difficult Emergency, we may be able to foresee what side he will choose, to know how he will behave himself, and for what he will determine. 'Tis thus that Homer, Virgil, and Sophocles have given Manners to their Persons. When Agamemnon sent Ambassadors to Achilles, we can judge what will be the Success of the Embassy, by what the Poet has told us of his Hero, when Aeneas in the Fourth Book of the Aeneids, received a Message from
from the Gods to Abandon \textit{Dido}, and to forsake the sweetness of a young and tender Passion. What \textit{Virgil} had told us of the Piety of that Prince, makes us determine the Resolution he will take, and before \textit{Mercury} has finished his Message, we perceive the Impatience he had to be gone, and the Poet only confirms that Opinion, when he says,

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ardet abeunt fugâ, dulcesque relinquere terras,}
\textit{Attonitus tanto monitu, imperioque Deorum.}
\end{quote}

Longs to be gone, and leave that happy Land, Mov'd by the Message, and the God's Command.

It is the same with \textit{Sophocles}, all which that Poet says of the Character of \textit{Oedipus}, prepares us for his extravagant Passions, and teaches us to judge what excess his blind Obstination will make him commit.

55. 'Tis for this Reason, that these Discourses that don't at first give us some insight into what will become of him who speaks, are without Manners.] This is very intelligible, and I wonder any one could mistake it: In most part of the Pieces of our Poets now adays, we can't know the Manners of the Persons, but as we see them Act, we perceive that they are Unjust, or Cruel only, when we see them commit some Injustice, or Cruelty. What they say is not absolutely without Manners, for no Action can be without them; but we don't find those Manners which Tragedy requires, even such as consist in letting us know what those Persons will do before we see what they have determin'd. If \textit{Virgil} had let us see none of \textit{Aeneas}'s Resolutions, and we had been uncertain whether he would have obey'd the Gods, or prefer'd \textit{Dido}? In that case, there had been no Manners, whatever Diligence \textit{Aeneas} might have used to hasten his Departure.
56. The Sentiments are that which explains what is, and what is not.] The Greek word, διάταξις, as the Latin word Sententia, or the French and our English word Sentence, signifies ordinarily, a discourse of few words, which contains a Moral Instruction. It has also a larger Signification, for it signifies all sorts of Thoughts and Sentiments, whether they be expressed, or not. Aristotle puts it here for Sentiments which are spoken.

57. The fourth thing, and which only regards the Discourse, is the Diction.] Aristotle assigns the fourth place to the Diction, Elocution. And we may truly say, That of all the essential Parts of Tragedy, Diction is of the least importance, tho' it extremly enhances the Beauty of a Piece, when it is Noble, and proportion'd to the Subject. The Fable, the Manners, and the Sentiments, are without doubt the more considerable. And so says Aristotle, That it regards only the Discourse to let us understand, That a Tragedy may be perfect without the assistance of Elocution; for the Subject may be well managed, the Manners may be well denoted, the Sentiments may be fine, altho' ill expressed. An ill Elocution renders the Discourse flat, but that doth not destroy the Beauty of the other Parts. And this is what Aristotle means when he says, And which regards only the Discourse, or the Stile.

58. Which is of equal force, both in Prose and Verse.] It has the same force in Prose, as in Verse, because it explains the Sentiments, and the Thoughts in both one and t'other. And for this reason Tragedy may indifferently make use of it here. But Verse is only used, because that Diction is more harmonious, and consequently more agreeable.
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

59. After the Diction, comes the Musick, which is the most agreeable of all, that Tragedy can employ.]

Aristotle having sufficiently explained the four essential Parts of Tragedy, comes now to the last; which may be called the Parts of Decency and Ornament, and these are the Decoration, and the Musick. He gives the fifth place to Musick, and to show the difference which he puts between this and those of which he has already spoke, he explains its Nature, by calling it plainly Agreeable. The word which he uses ἀναπόγγης, signifies properly a seasoning, which is added to a thing to make it more agreeable. Thus Tragedy doth subsist without Musick, but of all the Agreements this Poem can employ, Musick is the greatest, for it is preferable not only to the Dancing and the Decoration, but also to the Number and Harmony of the Verse. This was Aristotle's Thought, and by it we see that the People who were most inclined of any in the World to Singing, did yet however use Musick as an Agreement, tho' not as the principal part of their Shows, and their nice Taste in this can never be sufficiently praised. As for the rest, the Musick of their Tragedies was the same which they used in their sacred Songs, for the Expiation and Purification of Men, because it was the most proper to refine the Passions. But that which appears to me yet more remarkable is, That the Poets had the care of ord'ring the Musick, for as they had two sorts of People in the Theaters, Persons of Quality, and the Commonalty, they judged it expedient to have two sorts of Musick in their Chorus's; one soft and sweet for those of the best Rank and Knowledge, the other loud and brisk for those of duller Apprehensions. This way all of them were in a manner equally pleas'd with the Musick, and Tragedy had very near the same effect on all sorts of Spectators, for whose advantage they were shown.
60. The Decoration is also very diverting.] The Greek word which I have translated Decoration, is a general term, which properly signifies Sight, and comprehends all, that makes the Beauty of the Shows as the Scene, the Ornaments, the Machines, the Habits of the Actors, &c. The Decoration was a Piece of Magnificence, never to be equal'd, and always proportion'd, to the Subject; nevertheless Aristotle makes it the last part of Tragedy, he puts it after the Musick, and is satisfy'd to say, that it is agreeable and diverting. Tragedy can indeed sublift, and perform its Effect, by reading, without the Decoration. For that is only a simple Ornament, and which contributes among the rest to the Beauty of the Show; but which renders the Piece, neither better nor worse in itself. We ought not however, to desist from improving it; for besides the Service it does in the representation, it excites the Poets, and elevates their Spirits. The Decorations of the Theatres at Athens were so Noble and Magnificent, that the Ancients have wrote, that if the Charge for every Piece was computed, we should find, that they expended more Money for the Bacchantes, the Phenicians, and the Medea of Euripides; for the Oedipus, Antigone; and Eleftra of Sophocles, than for all the Wars which they maintain'd against the Barbarians.

61. For that does not properly regard, either the Art of the Poet, nor make a Part of the Poetry.] Tho' there had been Poets which invented, new Ornaments, for the Decorations; yet those new Inventions had been by no means the fruit of Poetry, they are the Productions of a quite different Art. 'Tis the Art of an Ingenious, and not that of a Poet, which is then made use of. But this Passage, occasions a Remark which I think very important; Since Aristotle assures us, here, that the Decoration is the only Part, which does not regard
regard the Poets Art, and that in no respect it depends on Poesy, 'tis a sure sign that the other five do necessarily depend on it. No body doubts of the four first, the Fable, the Manners, the Sentiments, and the Diction. For altho' properly speaking, there is only the Fable which regards the Poets Art, the Manners depending on Morality, the Sentiments on Rhetorick, and the Diction on Grammar; nevertheless, as a Poet ought to be no less instructed in all those Arts, than in that of Poesy, and that that of Poesy necessarily presupposes the rest, it may be truly said that those four things regard the Poet only. But does Music make a Part of this Art? This is what we can scarce imagine now, when we see Poesy and Music two such different Arts, that we rarely find them joined. Those who have succeeded in Poetry have known nothing of Music, and the greatest Musicians have had no knowledge of Poetry. There were many Musicians who were not Poets; but there was no Poet, who was not a Musician, because he composed the Music for his Pieces: Musici qui erant quondam, idem Poetae, says Cicero; for in Greece Music was the Foundation of all Sciences; they began the Education of their Children by it, and were persuaded that they ought not to expect any thing Considerable from that Man, who was not Skill'd in Music. This Sentiment was but too well grounded; and I don't doubt, but it was one of those things, which gave, such an Advantage to the Greek Poesy, over ours, and the Latin; for at Rome, as now in France and England, Poesy and Music were two Arts, entirely separated; and the Poets gave their Pieces to the Musicians to compose the Music, not only for Comedies, as we see by those Pieces of Terence but also for Tragedies, as appears by divers places of Cicero.

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62. And
62. And moreover, all, that regards the Decoration is more the Business of Engineers and Workmen, than the Poet. Tis true that the Decoration properly belongs to the Workmen and Engineers, but the Poet ought notwithstanding, to be Capable of Judging, whether it be well or ill done; and of what is proper, or improper for his Pieces.
CHAP. VII.

Of the Constitution of the Subject. An Exact Definition of the Three Parts, of a Perfect, and Entire Whole. In what the Beauty of all Beings that have Parts doth Consist. What the Extent of Dramatick Pieces ought to be, and the length of their Representation.

1. These things being explain'd, let us see how the Constitution of the Subject ought to be, since it is the First and Principal Part of Tragedy.

2. We have said that Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action that is perfect and entire, and of a Just extent, for there is a thing which is entire, and yet hath not a (a) Just extent; I call that Entire, which hath a Beginning, a Middle, and an End.

3. The Beginning is that, which necessarily supposes nothing to be before it, and requires after it, something else, which is, or ought to be. The End, is Just Contrary, for it requires nothing after it, but necessarily supposes something which precedes it. (b) The Middle is that, which (c) supposes

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(a) Any Extent.
(b) But nothing after it. (c) Is after something, and both something after it.
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

something, which ought to precede it, and requires something which ought to follow.

4. Those then who would manage a Subject well, can neither begin nor end it, where they please, but ought to follow the Scheme which I have given.

5. Add to this, that whatever is fine among Animals, or other beings, if it is Compos'd of Parts, ought not only to be in order, but it ought also to have a Just and reasonable Magnitude; for Beauty consists in the Order, and in the Magnitude. 'Tis for this reason that nothing which is too little, can be fine, because the Sight is confounded in an Object, which we see as it were in an insensible moment; what is too great cannot be fine neither, because we don't see it all at once; and in viewing the Parts successively, one after the other, we loose the Idea of the entire thing; as if we say a Creature that was a Thousand Furlongs. Thus as Animals, and all other (d) Beings, ought to have such a Magnitude, that the Eye can take it in, and Measure it easily; all at once; so ought the Subjects of Dramatick Pieces, to have such an extent, that (e) the Memory may receive and retain them without trouble.

6. Now the precise Measure of this Extent, in what regards the Duration of the Re-

(d) Bodies. (e) May easily be remembered.
presentation, and the Attention of the Spectator, cannot be determin'd by certain and fixt Rules. For Example, If an hundred Tragedies were to be play'd in one Day, we must measure the time by the Hour-glass, as they say it was formerly practis'd. It must be regulated then, by the Nature of the Poem itself, and assuredly the larger Extent any Piece has, the finer it will be, provided it be not so large, that the Subject, cannot be Comprehended all at once; and so the Prospect of it, be amazed and Confounded; We may then determine in General, that this Measure depends on the truth, or the Verisimilitude, (f) That is to say, that a Piece to have its Just Extent, ought to take up so much time as it must necessarily, or probably do, rightly to induce all the Incidents, till the unravelling the Plot, shows the last Good, or ill Fortune of the Principal Persons. This is the Exact, and Just Measure of its Extent.

(f) The Just Extent is to have time enough to bring the good out of the ill, or the ill Fortune according to Truth or Probability.
188 Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

REMARKS on Chap. VII.

1. For there is a thing, which is entire, and yet hath not a just extent.] Aristotle declares here, why the Action which makes the Subject of a Tragedy, ought to be not only entire, and perfect, but of a just Extent; for, says he, there are Actions, which are entire and perfect, and which nevertheless, have not a just Magnitude, as are all those Actions which we may call Momentaneous; because they happen in an instant, and have neither Preparation, nor Sequel. These Actions however Entire they may be, yet not having a due Extension, they can never make the Subject either of a Dramatick, nor an Epic Poem; They can enter only as Episodes, or Incidents.

2. I call that Entire, which hath a Beginning, a Middle, and an End.] This is the same Definition which Plato had given us before in his Parmenides of, an Whole, or Entire thing. 'Tis necessary then, for an Action to be of a just Extent; that it has, a Beginning, a Middle, and an End: That which has not these three Conditions, cannot be Entire, it will be imperfect; and consequently, cannot be the Subject either, of Tragedy or Epopeia. For both one and the other, necessarily require Actions, which have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End. In which they differ from ordinary Fables, that are very often, with a Beginning and Middle; but without an End, as are most of those of Aesop. But as these Terms, Beginning, Middle, and End, are Indeterminate, we must explain them the more exactly. And this the Author of that excellent Piece of Epic Poem, has done before me, in shewing, that the Cause and Design of Undertaking
3. The Beginning is that, which necessarily suppose nothing before it.] Aristotole is not Content to say, that an Epick and Dramatick Poem, ought
to have a Beginning, a Middle, and an End; but gives also, an exact definition of the Three Parts; in shewing, that every one of them is Imperfect, and necessarily supposes something else: He says then, that The Beginning is that, which necessarily supposes, nothing to be before it. The beginning of an Epick, or Dramatick Poem, may be the Sequel of another Action; for Example, the Quarrel of Agamemnon, and Achilles, which is the beginning of the Action, of the Iliad, is only what follows, from an Incident, in the War of Troy. But to make that Beginning, to be Just, and Sufficient, as Aristotle here says, that it supposes nothing necessary before it, that nothing ought necessarily to precede it, and that it has something which follows; and this is the Beginning of the Action of the Iliad, all was quiet in the Grecian Camp, when Agamemnon, by his Injustice, gave Achilles an Occasion of being Angry with him; so we may consider, this Quarrel, as an Affair, that was beginning, and which did not necessarily, depend on any thing, which preceded, altho’ it did not come to pass without them: and we demand nothing more. There are Poets, as Statius, who little minding this Precept of Aristotle, give a Beginning, to the beginning of their Actions, and which go backwards, to the Original of things. Nothing can be more Vicious. Homer took Care, not to fall into this fault. Thus Horace gives him this Praise in his Art of Poetry,

\[ \text{Necreditum Diomedis, ab Interitu Meleagri,} \\
\text{Nec Geminobellum Trojanum Orditur ab ovo.} \]

Not Meleagers death, doth Diomed bring in; 
Nor from a double Egg, the Trojan War begin.
4. And requires something else, which is, or ought to be.] This last part of the Definition of Beginning, is so essential, that I would not forget the least word; the Literal Translation of Aristotle is, and after which something ought to be, or itself to do. I confess that these Terms appear'd to me very obscure. But as this Philosopher doth not employ one word which is not of absolute necessity, I used them at first without understanding them, but at last I believe I penetrated the Sense of them. Aristotle explains the Nature of the Effects which an Action produces, which are of two sorts, either present or remote. For Example: The present Effects which Achilles his Anger produc'd, were his retreat to his Ships, his Resolution not to fight, and the Defeat which the Greeks receiv'd from the Trojans. The remote Effects, and which were afterwards produc'd, were the Death of Patroclus, which gave occasion to his Reconciliation to Agamemnon; and the Death of Heitor, which giving perfect satisfaction to Achilles, leads to the entire unravelling of the Action, and disposes Achilles to relent at Priam's Tears, and to return to his first Tranquility.

5. The end is just contrary.] To find the true Definition of the End, we need only reverse the Conditions, which are given to the Beginning, and take the contrary Sense; for the End is that which is followed by nothing, and is necessarily preceded by something. The Beginning and the Middle precede the End, but nothing ought to follow it; so that whatever comes after the finishing of an Action, is not only Unprofitable, but Vicious, and offends directly against this Definition of Aristotle's. If there are Poets who have offended, by giving a Beginning to the Beginning, there are others who have transgress'd, by adding an End to the End. And such is Stathis's Fault, who
after the Death of the two Brothers, whose Quarrel was the Subject of his Poem, troubles himself to relate what became of Creon, for whom the Reader had no concern. There are these Faults in our Modern Poets, which any one may remark in reading them.

6. *The Middle is that which supposes something which ought to precede it, and requires something which ought to follow.*] We must not imagine that Aristotle takes any needless trouble to define so exactly things which were very well known, for the Offences which are often committed against this Definition, are a certain sign, that what he defines, is not so well known as we think it is. According to this Doctrine of Aristotle, the Middle ought not to have for itself either Beginning or End, but it ought to have respect to the beginning of the Principal Action, of which it ought to be the effect, and to terminate in the end, of which it ought to be a Cause; and consequently all those *Middle Parts*, which are entire by themselves, that is to say, which suppose nothing before them, nor require nothing after them, are no part of an Action; They are foreign, and don't belong to the Subject of the Poem. Such is Statius's History of Hyppipyla, which is altogether independant from the Theban Action, and makes something Entire, from the rest. The same is to be found in many Poems; for our greatest Wits, could not prevent falling into this defect.

7. *Those who would manage, a Subject well, can neither begin, nor end it, when they please.*] This is a Consequence, which is necessarily drawn, from what has been established. If a Poet will succeed he must not make his Beginning, where something ought necessarily to precede, nor give an end to his Action, when something must of necessity follow; for by that he entirely overthrows,
throws, the Oeconomy of the Subject, and makes a Beginning, or End, where there is only a Middle.

8. Add to this, that whatever is fine, among Animals, or other beings, if it is Composed of Parts, ought not only to be in order, but it ought also to have a Just and reasonable Magnitude. After having explained the Parts of an Action, which ought to make the Subject of a Poem, and shew'd the Order, and relation which they ought to have to one another, he undertakes, to explain its extent, and the Just Magnitude which should be given to it, and to that end, he produces a very good Comparison, which no less proves what he has said, than what he is going to say.

9. If it is Composed of Parts. For Aristotle knew, there were Beings, which not being Composed of Parts, could not from thence draw their Beauty, nor Order, nor Grandeur, nor Symmetry, such are Angels, Spirits, and God himself.

10. 'Tis for this reason that nothing which is too little can be fine.] Aristotle maintains this Truth in the Fourth Book of his Morals also, where to undeceive the People, and bring them out of the Error in which they were, in believing that Young People, altho' they were little, yet they might be fine, provided they were of a well proportion'd Shape; for he tells how we ought to call them. Magnanimity, says he, Doth consist in the greatness of the Soul, as Beauty doth in that of the Body. Young People who are little, may be called Handsome and Well-shap'd, but they cannot be called fine. It is not possible then, that Beauty, which Plato so justly called, The most
Transcendent and Aimable of all things, can ever be found in that which is little.

11. *Because the Sight is confounded in an Object, which we see as it were in an insensible Moment.* This is a wonderful Reason, for 'tis taken from Nature it self. The Pleasure which the Sight of any Object gives, is not Pleasure, which is produced in a Moment; it is necessary that the Eye, run over all the Parts, and view the Resemblances and Proportions; and this is what a small Object will not allow, it is seen as it were in an insensible space of time; there is no succession of Time or Place, as we may say, and all the Visual Rays being contracted into so small a Compass, must needs be Jumbled and Confounded.

12. *What is too great, cannot be fine neither.* If the Eye is confounded by an Object which is too small, because it is all seen, in too short time; it is lost in an Object too great, because it can see it only by many repeated Views, and can't contract all the Parts into one view only, whereby it may be capable of judging of it. *Aristotle* pursues this Maxim so far in the Seventh Book of his Politicks, that he proves by the same reason that no Dominion can be fine, that is, Happy, and well Governed, which is either too Little or too Great. If it is too Little, it will be Weak; if it is too Great, it will not Enjoy an Orderly Government; God only being able to rule any State of such Extent; wherefore it ought to have a due Magnitude: And the Measure of this Largeness is, when all the People who compose it, may be known to him who Governs, and be ruled by the same Laws. If *Aristotle* was in the right, as Theory perswades us, his Disciple
13. So ought the Subjects of Dramatick Pieces, to have such an extent, that that the Memory may receive, and retain them without trouble.] For what the Eye is to visible Objects, the Memory is to Intellectual; as the Eye must comprehend and measure the Parts of an Object, without trouble, to find it fine, so must the Memory receive and retain, without being burden'd, all the Parts of the Subject of a Tragedy, to know its Beauty. If it should be too little, the Mind would have no Pleasure in considering it: If it should be too great, it would not apprehend it all together, and the Memory would very difficultly retain it. This Precept of Aristotle's, is founded on Nature, and on the Practice of the Ancients. Let us see for Example, the Subject of the Oedipus of Sophocles, where we shall find that just Magnitude, which Aristotle requires. The Scene opens with a Sacrifice which a great Number of Thebans are making in the Court of Oedipus's Palace. That Prince enters, and to comfort the People, tells them, That he had sent Creon a long time ago to enquire of Apollo's Oracle at Delphos, the means of making the devouring Pestilence cease, upon which Creon arrives and relates what the Oracle had said: Oedipus sends for Tiresias to explain it. The Prophet at first refused to do it; but provok'd at last by the Severe Carriage of Oedipus, he accuses him of the Murder of Laius. Oedipus imagines that 'twas Creon made him do this: Creon complains of this Injustice, so the two Princes Quarrel: Jocasta comes in to appease them, and endeavours to remove the Uneasiness, which the Reproach that was cast on Oedipus, gave him; but all what she said served only
to augment his Trouble. A Messenger enters from Corinth, who brought the News of the Death of King Polybius, who was thought to be his Father; and to remove some Fears which he had upon account of his suppos'd defiling his Mothers Bed, he tells him, That the King and Queen of Corinth were not his Parents; he was resolved to know the Matter thoroughly, and enquires of the Shepherd, who alone was able to give him a perfect Account of his Misfortunes: The Shepherd leaves him no room to doubt of all his Crimes, and when he Punishes himself. This is the entire Plan of the Oedipus, even with the Episodes too. There is nothing in it but what may be seen at once, and which the Memory may easily retain. The Subjects of Epick Poems are neither longer, nor more embarrased, as we shall see in what follows.

14. Now the precise measure of this extent in what regards the duration of the Representation, and the attention of the Spectators, cannot be determin'd by certain and fixed Rules.] Aristotle was very sensible, that after having spoke of the extent of the Subject of Tragedy, the Reader would desire that he should also regulate the time of the duration of the Representation; but this is what he would not engage himself in, because 'tis impossible to give certain Rules to it: The duration of the Representation, depends on the Nature of the Poem, as we shall see in what follows. A Tragedy, to be perfect, ought not to occupy more or less time for the Action, than for the Representation, for then it has all the Circumstances of Probability. The Greek Tragedians always practis'd it, they look'd on it as an indispensible Law, which ought never to be transgres'd; they have sometimes misfod their Incidents in such a manner, as I would
would by no means persuade any to imitate.

15. For Example: If an hundred Tragedies were to be play'd in one Day, we must measure the time by the Hour-glass.] This is the true reason which hinder'd Aristotle from speaking his Mind before: He explains himself with some uneasiness, and his words contain a sharp Reflection on the Athenians, who were so bewitch'd to Shows, that they were never tir'd of them, and caus'd twelve or sixteen Tragedies to be Acted in one Day; for they had established Plays where three or four Poets disputed the Prize of Poetry, every one of them had four Tragedies, of which the last was a Satirical Piece. Wherefore those which were composed on those Occasions, were ordinarily shorter than the others, which were Acted more regularly, and to which they gave a greater Attention. What occasion then (says Aristotle) is there to give Rules for the duration of the Representation, when I have to do with a People, who, if the Fancy takes them, will to Morrow require an hundred Pieces for one Day, and oblige the Poets to make their Poems of such a length, as they ought to have according to the time which is allow'd to represent them in.

16. As they say it was formerly practis'd.] This is the only Passage I know which shows that the Ancient Greeks caused their Plays to be Acted by the Hour-glass. From Aristotle's time that Custom was abolish'd, and was observ'd only at the Bar, as was practis'd afterwards among the Romans, where two Hours were given to the Plaintiff, and three to the Defendant. The Athenians at last law the Folly of measuring out the
the Time to the Poets, who took Pains to divert them.

17. And assuredly the larger extent any Piece has, the finer it will be, provided it be not so large, that the Subject cannot be comprehended all at once, and so the prospect of it be amaz'd and confounded.] I was willing in these last words to express all the force of the Text, Μακατα με τον κουρσόν, by which Aristotle manifestly alludes to what he had said before, "Ον χαρά κα τον κολνιν, Because we do not see it all at once. A Piece ought to increase no longer, than till its Subject hath all, which it ought to have, to be seen all at once without confounding the Sight, which it will infallibly do, if it is too little; or without causing it to wander, as certainly it will, if 'tis too great. This, in my Opinion, is the true Sense of this Passage.

18. That is to say, that a Piece to have its just extent, ought to take up so much time, as it must necessarily, or probably do, rightly to induce the Incidents.] To make a good Tragedy, which shall be a true Imitation, the Action which is Imitated ought not in reality to be longer than the Representation, for so the Representation is more like, and consequently more perfect. The three Greek Tragedians have most an end kept within their Bounds, and have given to their Actions only so much Time as is necessary to Represent them. When they could not Reduce them to this exactly (which very seldom happen'd) they had Recourse to the plain Vers-similitude; that is, not being able to give to the Representation all the Time, which the Truth of the Action did necessarily require; they shortened that Time, and were satisfy'd to to manage it, that the Audience might think, that
that all the Incidents of their Pieces could happen in the Time which they supposed. It is true, that in endeavouring to keep to the Verisimilitude, they have sometimes strangely offended against it. Euripides in his Suppliants, and Aeschylus in his Agamemnon, have made their Heroes Act, what is impossible to do in the time they assign them, which is much too short; but the Violence they offer to the Incidents, and the Law they have made, which obliges them to follow this Rule, prove, that there was an indispensable necessity; and will convince those who will give themselves the trouble to reflect on it, That the Rule of twenty four or thirty Hours, which they would establish at this time, is monstrous, and ruins all the Beauty of a Dramatick Poem; and 'tis also what the Ancients never knew. In a word, the Representation, should neither be longer nor shorter than the Action it imitates. But as there are Actions of ten or twelve Hours, and 'tis impossible to make the Representation of them so long; then indeed not to deprive the Theatre of its Subjects, we may bring in some of the Incidents in the Intervals only, the better to deceive the Audience, who will not pry so narrowly, as to mind what is behind the Scenes; provided there be nothing too extravagant; and that the Poet conducts himself with Art and Measure. And therefore Aristotle supply'd the Defect of Necessity, by the Probability. This Probability may be preserv'd, tho' we should put into four Hours, what really was Acted in ten; but it is impossible not to transgress it, when we crowd into so short a Space, what took up four and twenty or thirty Hours. Such long Actions can never be the Subject of Tragedy; because in the Representation, the Poet can never bring in the Incidents, either

Necessary
120 Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Necessarily or Probably. Thus Aristotle hath said, That all those Actions are without the Rules, since they are not contained in the Space of a Day. You may see what has been Remark'd on the Fifth Chapter.
CHAP. VIII.

The Unity of the Subject, and in what it consists. The Errors of some Ancient Poets in that Unity. How Homer knew it. An Elogy of that Poet. The Integrity of the Action: And what ought to be the Connexion between all its parts.

1. The Subject ought to be one, and not as many think, taken from one person only: For as we see every day an infinity of Accidents, of the greatest part of which, we can make nothing that is one; it happens also that the Actions of the same Man, are so many and different, that we can never reduce them to this Unity, and make of them one and the same Action.

2. For this Reason it seems to me, that all the Poets, who have made the Heracleids, or the Theseids, or any such like Poems, are deceived very much; for they were in the wrong, to think, that because Theseus was one, and Hercules was one, that all (a) their Lives ought only to make one Subject, one Fable; and that the unity of the Hero made the unity of the Action.

3. Homer, who excell'd other Poets in all respects, seems to me perfectly to have known this defect, either by (b) the natural sagacity of his happy Genius, or by the Rules of Art: for in Composing his Odysse, he has not men-

(a) His Life.
(b) Nature, or Art.
t'ion'd all the Adventures of Ulysses: For example, he has not mixt the Wound he receiv'd on Parnassus, with his feigned Madnes, when the Greeks' assembl'd their Army: For, because one of them happen'd, 'tis neither necessary, nor probable, that the other should also happen; but he has employ'd all that could have respect to one only and the same Action, as is that of the Odyssey. He hath follow'd the same in his Iliads.

4. As then in all other Imitations, (c) what is imitated is one, so in Tragedy, since the Fable is imitation of an Action, that Action must be one and entire; and whose different parts are so link'd together, that if you transpose them, or take only one away, the whole will be entirely changed, or destroy'd: For whatever can be put in, or left out, without causing a sensible change, cannot be a part of an Action.

REMARKS on Chap. 8.

1. The Subject ought to be one, and not, as many think, taken from one person only. Aristotle refutes the Error of those who pretended the unity of the Hero made the unity of the Action; and that if the Poem comprehended only the Actions of one Man, it kept unity, and was within the Rules. There is nothing faler, as this Philosopher proves very solidly. But is there no Poem, say you, where there are many Actions? Who doubts it? But there is only one which is independant, and doth not make a part of the Principal Action, which ought to have several subordinate ones. As Aristotle said, it is in Poetry as in Painting; a Painter puts many Actions into one Piece; but those Actions form only one entire perfect

(c) One Imitation is of one thing.
one. A Poet uses many Episodes, but all those Episodes taken by themselves finith nothing, they are but imperfect members, which make together one and the same Action.

2. For, as we see every day an Infinity of Accidents; of the greatest part of which we can make nothing that is one; it happens also, that the Actions of the same Man are so many and different, &c. Aristotle means that what generally happens in the World, in different times, and places, is not sometimes more different than the Actions of one Man: So that 'twould be almost as ridiculous to endeavour to make one Action of all the Actions of the World, as to reduce the Adventures of this one Man to Unity.

3. For this reason it seems to me, that all the Poets who have made the Heracleid, or the Thefeid, or any such like Poems, are deceived very much.] It appears by this passage, that in Aristotle's time there were many Poems as vicious, as the Heracleid, and Thesids, which comprehended all the Actions of their Hero's; 'Tis an astonishing thing, that after so just and so eminent a Censor, and grounded on Examples which are so solid, and of such great Authority, as the two Poems of Homer, from which Virgil himself thought he ought not to wander, that Statius should be guilty of the fault in his Achilles, which is here condemned by Aristotle; for he has not chosen one Action, as Homer and Virgil, but has taken in all the Actions of Achilles, and described him entirely. Probably Statius had not read Aristotle's Art of Poetry; for at all times ill Poets, who have presumed too much on their own knowledge, have neglected to instruct themselves in the Rules of their Art, and wrote without knowing them. But you may say, he had read Homer's and Virgil's Poems: Yes, he had read them, just as some do now; that is, without discovering the beauty of that marvellous Conduct, and yet think themselves able to write much more perfectly. This proves very well
well the truth of what has been said in Horace's *Art of Poetry*, *That none can be an excellent Poet without Art*. It is necessary that the best natural parts be Polished, Enrich'd, Strengthen'd, and Assisted, by Study; for without its help, they are generally rash and blind. We have a very remarkable example in our time: Mr. Corneille had, without doubt, one of the greatest Genius's for the Theatre that ever was seen; when he began to write, he not only had not read the Rules of a Dramatick Poem, but did not know there were any; as he confesses in one of his Prefaces. We need only compare one of those Pieces which were made, as we may say, in his time of Ignorance, with any of those which he made, after he had been by long study instructed in those Rules.

4. Homer, who excell'd all other Poets in all respects, seems to me perfectly to have known the defect, either by the natural sagacity of his happy Genius, or by the Rules of Art.] Aristotle would not decide the Famous Question, *Whether Homer be the first Author of Epick Poem?* or whether he wrote after others, who opened the way to him? If it was the first, he must apprehend by the force of his Genius alone, that an Epick Poem ought to comprehend one Action of the Hero only. If he followed others, then there was an Art known, of which he might follow the Rules.

5. For Example, he has not mixt the Wound he receiv'd on Parnassus, with his feign'd Madness, when the Greeks assembl'd their Army.] If such a Poet as Statius had made the Odysse, he would not have fail'd to set forth all Ulysses Actions, and consequently would not have forgot the cunning trick he used to exempt himself from going to the Siege of Troy; but Homer is not fallen into that fault, he saw that that counterfeit Madness had no connexion either in Truth, or Probability, with the Subject of his Poem; and therefore he lays not one word of it. He has
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.* 133

has dealt otherwise with the Wound Ulysses received at Parnassus; for although that Wound was no more to the Matter of his Poem, than the Madness he feigned when the Greeks assembled themselves, yet however he has not omitted speaking of it, because he found an opportunity of inserting it so naturally in his Principal Action, that it becomes a necessary part of it, since it causes a remembrance of that Hero. The Story in few words is thus: When Ulysses was young, he went to see his Grandfather Autolycus who had some Land near Parnassus: Autolycus, desirous to divert his Grandson, ordered his Children to go a Hunting with him on Mount Parnassus. The Dogs had seized a Bear, Ulysses came first in with him, and was wounded by his Tusks below the Knee; Homer makes a wonderful use of this Adventure of Ulysses; for that Prince being arriv'd at Penelope's Palace, unknown, he orders Euryclea to wash that Prince's Feet; Ulysses perceiving that the Woman who had bred him would know the Scar, went into a dark place that he might not be discovered; but all his precautions were in vain, for Euryclea knew the wound by the touch: So this History, which is related at length, in the Nineteenth Book of the Odyssey, far from being a Foreign Epis[cade], becomes very natural, by the manner of joyning it to the Subject; for 'tis necessary to give an account of that remembrance which followed.

6. With his feigned Madness, when the Greeks assembled their Army.] They Write that Ulysses, to excuse himself from going to the Trojan War, feign'd himself a Fool; that he went to Plow with an Ox and a Horse: Palamedes suspected the Counterfeit; and to be assur'd that it was so, he took Telemachus, who was in his Cradle, and put him just under the Plow-Wheels; Ulysses could not continue his Furrow without Killing his Son, so stop'd, and discover'd the Trick. If this particular had been as glorious to Ulysses, as it is unworthy him, and
and little agreeable to his Character, Homer would certainly never have forgot it.

7. For because one of them happen'd, 'tis neither necessary, nor probable, that the other should also happen.] This Passage is very important; for Aristotle most evidently teaches, of what Nature the different parts, which a Poet uses to form one and the same Action, ought to be: They ought to be the necessary, or probable, consequences of one another, as the remembrance of Ulysses was of his Wound. Every Adventure then, which hath not this connexion, and relation, with some part of the Matter of the Poem, ought to be rejected as Foreign, and which breaks the unity of the Action; and therefore Homer took care not to interrupt the unity of his Odyssey, by the Episode of the Madness which Ulysses feigned; for that Incident could never be produc'd by any of those which were necessary and proper to the Poem, nor produce any which had the least relation to them. Our French Tragedies oftentimes offend against this Rule, and I have remark'd the same faults in the Greek Tragedians. We shall speak of this, when we shall have occasion to explain what an Episode a Fable is.

8. But he has employed all that could have respect to one only and the same Action, as is that of the Odyssey; and he hath followed the same in his Iliads.] There is not one Episode, in the Iliads, or Odyssey, which hath not the three Conditions requir'd in a good one; they are proper to the Subject, and drawn from the ground of the Fable: They are so join'd with the Principal Action, that one is the necessary Consequence of the other, either truly or probably. And to conclude, they are in themselves imperfect Members, which do not make a compleat and finish'd Body; for an Episode, which makes a Compleat Action, can't be one part of a Principal Action.

9. As
9. As then in all other Imitations, what is imitated is one, so in Tragedy. After having assured us, that Tragedy ought to imitate one Action alone, he confirms his opinion by the example of all other Imitations, every one of which proposes to imitate only one thing, as Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, and all other Arts and Imitations, of which he has spoken in the beginning of this Art of Poetry, Par- chasius, who Painted the Madness which Ulysses counterfeited among the Grecian Princes, corrupted the Unity of his Action, by the mixture of the Wound which that Prince received at Patroclus. It is so of all others; Tragedy can have no peculiar privilege in this case; for since it is an Imitation, it must follow the nature of all other Imitations.

10. Whose different parts are so link'd together, that if you transpose them, or take only one away, the whole will be entirely chang'd or destroyned.] In a Dramatick, as well as in an Epick Poem, when the Subject is once well form'd, that all the parts which compose it are in their proper places, and the Episodes so depending on one another, that the first are the occasion of the latter, it is impossible to transpose, or take away any one part, without changing, or destroying the whole Action. If we should transpose, for example, one of the Episodes of Sophocles's Oedipus, the Action could no longer subsist, or it must be double. We may see the same in the Iliads; If Achilles should become tractable, and receive satisfaction from Agamemnon before the death of Patroclus, 'twould destroy the Unity of the Subject entirely; Homer would have two Angers and two Revenges to ring off.

11. For whatever can be put in, or left out, without causing a sensible change, cannot be part of an Action.] That which is a Member of a Body,
is by no means indifferent to that Body; and it makes a very sensible change, when it is either taken away, or added. All that then which can be omitted, or added, to a Subject, with a perceptible alteration, can in no wise be a necessary part of that Subject. This is a very sure Rule, to distinguish the true Episodes from the false; these last add nothing to the Principal Action, when they are added; and diminish nothing of it, when they are omitted. Such is the History of Hypsipyle in Statius's Thebaids, which add nothing to the Subject; nor will the Subject lose any thing, tho' you leave that out.
CHAP. IX.

The Poet ought to follow the Truth, or veri-similitude. The difference between a Poet and an Historian. The advantages Poetry has over History. If Tragedy may invent the Names of all the Persons. An example drawn from the Tragedy of Agathon. If we must always follow the Fables which are received. How a Poet is Master of his Subject. Whether a true History may be the Subject of Tragedy. What Episodick Fables are. And why good Poets have sometimes been Guilty of that Error. Surprize is necessary to Tragedy. How the Fable ought to produce this surprize. The History of the Statue of Mitys.

By what we have already said, it is easy to discern, that 'tis not the (a) Property of a Poet, to relate things just as they came to pass, but as they might, or ought necessarily or probably to happen.

For an Historian, and a Poet don't differ in that one Writes in Prose, and the other in Verse; for truly Herodotus's History might very well be put into Verse, and twould be no les in a History when in Verse, than 'tis now in Prose. But they differ in this, that an Historian Writes what did happen, and a Poet what might, or ought to have, come to pass. It's for this reason that Poetry is more (b) Solid and Moral than

(a) Nature
(b) Philosophical and Studious.
History, because it treats of general, and History relates only particular things; a general thing, is that, which every Man, of such or such a Character, necessarily or probably ought to say, or do, which is the aim of Poetry, even when it imposes Names on the Persons. A particular thing is, for Example, what Alcibiades has done or suffer'd.

3. This is already rendered very (a) sensible in Comedy; for the Comic Poets, after having drawn up their Subject on probability, impose what Names they please on their Persons; and don't imitate the (b) Satyrical Poets, who confine themselves to particulars only.

4. 'Tis true, that the Tragic Poets make use of (c) true Names; but the reason of that is, because whatever is possible (d) is credible; now what never happen'd, does not always appear possible; whereas we cannot doubt, but that which hath been already done, may be possible, (without any difficulty.) since it could not have been, if it had been impossible.

5. It falls out however very often, that in Tragedies we are contented with one or two Names which are known, and all the other invented. There are also Pieces where not one Name is known, as in the Tragedy of Aenon, which he calls the Flower; for in that Piece, all the Names are feign'd, as the things are too, and yet it please.
6. 'Tis not therefore (c) necessary, always
to try up ones self scrupulously to follow known
Fables, from whence the Subject of Tragedies are
generally drawn, that would be ridiculous; for
what is known, is ordinarily so by few, and yet
nevertheless it equally pleases all.

7. By this it is evident, that a Poet, ought
(f) to be the Author of his Subject, as much as
(g) of his Verse, especially, since he imitates
Actions, and is a Poet only by imitation; (h) and
when he also exposes true Incidents on the Stage,
he no less deserves the Name of a Poet, since
nothing hinders, but that the Incidents which
did really happen, may have all the veri-simi-
litude, and all possibility which Art requires;
and which may cause him to be look'd on as the
Author and Poet.

8. The Episodick are the (i) most imper-
fect of all simple Fables and Actions. I call a
Fable Episodick, which hath Episodes that are
not joyn'd one with another, either truly or prob-
bly. ill Poets (k) fall into this Error by their
Ignorance; and the good by their Complaisance to
(l) the Actors; for as (m) there are always
Jealousies between the different Companies of Com-
dians, who dispute the Prize: The Poets, to let
the Actors appear, stretch and violate their Sub-
jects, and Consequently, are very often forc'd to
break the Unity of its parts.

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(a) Required.
(b) Rather.
(c) Then.
(d) And he is no Poet for
(e) Making those things which were really acted, since they were possible and
(f) When.
(g) Make what on their own account.
(h) For.
(i) They write Piece for the prize
9. (n) Tragedy is not only the imitation of an entire Action, but of (o) such an Action as excites Terror and Compassion; now these two Passions come by surprize, when some things are produc'd out of others, contrary to our expectations. For the Wonderful is much more to be seen in these than in those which happen without design, and by chance; since even in those things which Fortune Conducts, these which seem to come to pass designedly, and are by a particular direction, are always much more surprizing and wonderful; as it happen'd to the Statue of Mitys at Argos, which, in the middle of a great Feast, fell on his Murderer, and kill'd him (p) on the spot. For (q) it did not seem upon any account to happen by accident. It necessarily follows from hence, that those Fables, when this Conduct is observed, will always appear the finest.

REMARKS on Chap. 9.

1. By what I have already said, it is easy to discern, that 'tis not the property of a Poet to relate things just as they came to pass, but as they might, or ought, necessarily or probably happen.] Aristotle having taught that Tragedy is the imitation of one single Action, that that Action ought to be perfect and entire; and that all the parts which compose it, ought to be so link'd together, that no one can either be transpos'd, or taken away, without changing, or destroying the whole, draws from those Principles the following consequence; It is easy to discern, that 'tis not the Property of a Poet, to relate things

(n) Since therefore. (o) Terrible and Miserable ones. (p) As he was looking at it. (g) Those things don't seem to happen Accidently. just
just as they came to pass.] In effect, if any Poet should oblige himself to relate things just as they really happen'd. his Action would not have the necessary extent, he could give it neither that beginning, middle, nor end, which Aristotle requires in an Action; and what is yet more considerable, as he could not know all the Causes and Motives of the Incidents which compos'd it, he could not make his Incidents so dependent one on another, that the first should be the cause of the latter; the Reason is plain, for a prodigious number of things happen every day, of which we know not the Causes, especially those which concern Monarchs, which are properly the Subjects of Tragedy. Now a Poet is obliged to explain all the Causes of the Incidents which enter into the Composition of the Subject; and as 'tis just to let him be Master of his Matter, so it should not be required of him to speak things as they are, but as they may, or ought to be, provided he follows either Necessity, or Probability; for nothing more can be required of him. All this Chapter is of great importance; and I shall endeavour to make it as plain and clear as possible.

2. Necessarily, or Probably.] Necessity and Probability, are very often not found in those things which do really happen, because we are Ignorant of the Causes which have produc'd those Effects.

3. For an Historian and a Poet don't differ in that one Writes in Prose, and the other in Verse. ] In order to maintain what he has said, he goes on to shew the difference between a Poet and an Historian; this difference doth not consist, in one's Writing in Verse, and the other in Prose; for if Herodotus's History should be put into Verse, it would be still an History in Verse; and if the Iliads was turn'd into Prose, it would, for all that, be a Poem in Prose; there must then be some more essential difference, and which does not proceed from the Manner,
4. But they differ in this, That an Historian Writes what did happen, and a Poet what might, or ought to have; come to pass. ] An Historian doth not make his Matter; he speaks only what he knows, and no more is required of him, provided he keep to the truth. 'Tis not so with the Poet; as he is Author of his Matter, he follows only truth or verisimilitude, that is to say, That all which he relates, may or ought to happen as he relates it; and if he does at any time take anything from History, 'tis only so far as it can accommodate him, and that is, furnishes Subjects, as he would have feign'd them, otherwise he may change all that is not convenient for him.

5. 'Tis for this Reason that Poetry is more Solid, and Moral, than History; because it treats of general, and History relates only particular things.] There is nothing more solid and real, than the Advantage Aristotle gives here to Poetry, over History; but we must not imagine that he had only a design to extol the excellence of that Art, he would also make known its Nature: Poetry, says he, is more grave and Phyllosophick than History; for that is the term he uses. For truly History can instruct no further than the Facts it relates give an opportunity, and as those Facts are particular, it very rarely happens that they are suitable to those who read them, and there is not one of a Thousand to whom they agree; and those to whom they do agree, have not perhaps in all their Lives two occasions, on which they can draw any advantage from what they have Read. 'Tis not so with Poetry, that keeps close to Generals, and it is so much the more instructive and Moral, as General things surpass Particulars; these agree to one only, those to all the World: Besides, 'tis not the Facts which instruct, 'tis the Causes
Causes of those Facts. The Historian very rarely recounts the Causes of what he relates; for they are almost always kept secret; and if he does explain them, 'tis rather conjectures which he gives, than certain truths. But the Poet being Master of his Matter, advances nothing for which he doth not give a very good Reason; and there is not so much as a small Incident, of which he doth not lay open the Causes, and Effects. In the Third place; History hath a bare Relation, Poetry hath Action, because it is an Imitation; every thing is animated in Tragedy. Now what is only related in order to be understood, affects us much less, than what we see with our Eyes. Fourthly, History is solitary and cold, whereas Poetry associates with Natural Philosophy and Theology; and borrow assistence from the Passions. We may find many other advantages which Poetry has over History; But what I have said, may suffice to shew that Aristotle perfectly well understood the nature of these two Arts, when he said, that one was more Moral and Philosophical than the other. Horace has said more than Aristotle; for he afferts, that an Epick Poem (which without contradiction is inferior to Tragedy in that respect) is more Philosophical than Philosophy itself; for that is what he means by these Verses, of the 2d Epist of the first Book,

Qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
Plenis & melius Chrysippo, & Cratone dict.

Homer told plainer than Crantor did,
Or than Chrysippus, what things were forbid,
What fit to shew, and what ought to be hid.

and truly Poetry has almost the same advantage over Philosophy, as it has over History: But there is no necessity of proving that.
A general thing is that, which every Man, of such or such a Character, necessarily or probably, ought to say or do. To shew that an Action which makes the subject of Tragedy, is not a particular, but a general thing, he defines what a general thing is, and says very well, That 'tis what every Man of the same Character ought to say or do, either necessarily or probably. Thus when Homer wrote the Action of Achilles, he had no design to describe that Man alone who bore that Name, but to set before our Eyes, what Violence and Anger could make all Men of that Character, say, or do. Achilles is then an Universal Person, General and Allegorical; it is so of the Hero's of Tragedy.

7. Which is the aim of Poetry, even when it imposes Names on the Persons.] Aristotle foresaw an Objection which might be made, against a definition he had given of a general thing: For the Ignorant would not fail to say, that Homer, for Example, had no intention to Write a general and universal Action, but a particular one, since he relates what some certain Men, as Achilles, Agamemnon, and Ulysses, &c. had done; and consequently there is no difference between Homer and an Historian who should Write the Actions of Achilles. The Philosopher prevents this Objection, by shewing that the Poets, i.e. the Authors, of a Tragick or Epick Poem, at the same time they give Names to their Persons, don't think at all of making them speak truly, which they would be obliged to do, if they wrote the particular and real Action of a certain Man, called Achilles, or Oedipus, but they propose to make them speak and act, necessarily, or probably; that is to say, to make them speak and do, all that Men of the same Character would say or do in the same Circumstances, either of necessity, or according to the rules of verisimilitude, which proves uncontrollably, that they are
are general and universal Actions: What follows will set this truth in a better light.

8. This is already rendered very sensible in Comedy; for the Comick Poets, after having drawn up their Subject on Probability, impose what Names they please on their Persons.] To confirm what he had laid of Tragedy, That at the very time it imposes Names on the Persons, it has only general and universal prospects; he lays, that it is rendered very sensible by what is done in Comedy. No body doubts that the Action of a Comedy is a feign'd and allegorical Action, since the intention of the Poet is to describe the manners of his own times. Now a Comick Poet goes thus to work; first, he invents and disposes his Subjects, which he endeavours to render as probable as possibly he can. Then he gives Names to his Persons of his own invention, and just as he pleases. Since then the Action which is in a Comedy, and attributed to one certain Person, doth not cease to be a general thing, and of which all are agreed, Why should it be more difficult to conceive that 'tis the same in the Action of a Tragedy, tho' under true Names? 'Tis equal, and the proof is sure. He goes on to explain, why Tragedy does rather employ true than feigned Names; as for what remains, when Aristotle lays, that Comedy invents first its Subjects, and then gives the Names according to its fancy, we may believe that he speaks neither of the old nor of the middle Comedy. For the first invented neither Subjects, nor Names; and the latter, though it might invent the Subjects, yet did not invent the Names but of the new Comedy, which was only in use in his time, the old, and mean, being both forbidden. 'Tis certain Aristotle saw the establishment of the new Comedy; for how could he do otherwise since he survived Alexander, under whose Reign the new Comedy began? He also speaks of it in his Morals. But I don't believe,
however, that he speaks here only of this last sort of Comedy, I am perswaded that he speaks of Comedy in general; for although the old and mean Comedy, brought the real Adventures of the chief Citizens on the Stage, and the Old under their true Names, it may, notwithstanding this, be true, that the Poet invented the plan, and the disposition of his Subject, and that afterwards he gave either true or false Names to his Persons. When Aristophanes nam’d his Actors, Socrates, Euripides, Cleon, Hyperbolus, Lamachus, which are true Names, That did not change the Nature of the Subject of the Piece; the Subject is always feign’d, though it has something of truth, and is a general and universal thing; when a Tragic Poet, takes the Subject of a Tragedy from a true History, it is general, universal, and allegorical, as all others are which have no truth in them.

9. And don’t imitate the Satyrical Poets, who confine themselves to particulars only. ] The Greek has it thus, and don’t do as the makers of Iambicks, i.e. as I have already said, as the Satyrical Poets; for the Iambick Verse was devoted to backbiting and Satyr. This is then the difference between the Comick and Tragic Poets. Both of them are Biting; but the Comick Poets keep close to general, and the Satyrical Poets to particular things. When Archilochus would bespatter Lycambes, he keeps only to what Lycambes had done, or what he was supposed to have done, and had nothing else in view. It is the same with those who Write Satyrs against those whom they make known, under feigned Names only.

10. Tis true, that the Tragic Poets make use of true Names. ] He continues to answr to the Objection which he saw might be brought to destroy what he had advanced, That the Action of a Tragedy is neither Historical nor Particular, but General
General and Allegorical. It must be confess'd, says he, that Tragedy employs true Names; but that does not destroy the Fiction, which is the foundation of a Dramatick, as well as of an Epick Poem. The Tragick Poets, as those who make Epoppoias, have their reasons for what they do, which shall be explained in what follows.

11. But the reason of that is, that whatever is possible, is credible. That which obliges the Tragick Poets to give to their Persons true and known Names, is the better to persuade us, that the Action which they attribute to them, is possible and true; for the Audience easily believes that the Thing is as true as the Name. These true Names furnish the Poets also with another convenience, that they give them an opportunity to make use of the real Adventures of those Persons which are known, and which they accommodate to the grounds of the Fable they treat of, and from which they draw such Ingenious Episodes, that renders the Action more probable, (though 'tis feigned) and make it pass for true History; this is the great address of Homer, and the Tragick Poets of Greece.

12. It falls out however very often, that, in Tragedies, we are not contented with one or two Names which are known, and all the other invented.] As what he hath already said, That the Tragick Poets employ names which are known, might persuade us, that there is an indispensible necessity of putting true Names into the Fable of Tragedy, he takes Care to Advise us, that the Poets were very often contented to employ one or two Names which are true, though all the other were false; and truly one or two Names which are known, are enough to make all the other pass.
13. There are also Pieces, in which not one Name is known. Aristotle goes yet further, and by the example of Agathon, shews us, that a Tragick Poet has the liberty to invent, as well the Names as the Things; the other way is the best, and I would advise to follow it, as being preferable.

14. As in the Tragedy of Agathon, which he calls the Flower. This Agathon Liv’d in the Times of Eupolis and Aristophanes, we don’t know what was the Nature of that Piece which Aristotle speaks of, nor why it was called the Flower; that Poet was very well qualified for a Tragedian, yet he was Guilty of considerable Faults, for which some of his Pieces were damn’d, as we shall see in the 19th. Chap.

15. In that Piece, all the Names are feigned, as the Things are. He means, that there was not one Name which was true; and that all the Parts of the Fable were the Poets invention, without any Incident drawn from a known Subject.

16. ’Tis not therefore necessary, always to tye upon ones self Scrupulously, to follow known Fables, from whence the Subjects of Tragedy are generally drawn. The success which that Piece of Agathon had, encourages Aristotle to declare boldly, that Tragick Poets have the liberty to invent new Subjects, and new Names, and truly there is nothing hinders, why those invented Pieces should not succeed, as well as those whose Subjects are known: Horace was of the same opinion, but thought himself obliged to inform the Romans, that those invented Pieces were much more difficult to manage than the others; and to advise them at the same time, rather to keep to those Subjects which are known.

Difficile est propriè Communia dicere, tuque Rectius Iliaèum Carmen deduces in actus, Quam si preferres ignota, inditbaq, primus.

’Tis
Tis much more safe, known Subjects for to chuse,
Then your own Thoughts in Publick to produce.
For general things are hard to imitate.

and afterwards in speaking of these Satyrical Pieces,
he says,

Ex: noto fictum Carmen sequent.

And feigned Verse, I will from true produce.

Aristotle had not the same reason to give such advice to the Greeks; for they had such a Genius for Tragedy, that nothing was impossible to them. We see that the first, who dar'd to go out of the Common Road, and try, what Horace afterwards found so difficult, for the Romans, did it with such success, that it deserves to be proposed as a Model.

17. That would be Ridiculous. ] He means, That such a scruple as should keep a Poet only to old Fables, for fear that a new Invented Subject will not succeed, would be entirely Ridiculous, and this is the Reason.

18. For what is known, is ordinarily so by few, and yet nevertheless, it equally please all. ] If those Subjects, which were known, were only capable of pleasing, certainly they could please but very few, i.e. those only who understood and knew the History from whence those Subjects were taken. Oedipus and Electra of Sophocles; The Phedra and Iphigenia of Mr. Racine, would divert the Learned only; but on the contrary we see, that they do extreamly delight the moft Ignorant, and those to, who don't so much as know the Names of the Persons; we may be assur'd then, that new Subjects are no les proper for the Theatre than old ones; this proof is certain, for 'tis demonstration.
19. By this it is evident, that a Poet ought to be the Author of his Subject, as much as of his Verse, especially since he imitates Actions, and is a Poet only by imitation. Aristotle says, that the Conduct of Poets, in the composition of their Pieces, clearly proves, that they ought to be as much Masters of the Constitution of their Subjects, as of the Composition of their Verse; and surely, the first thing which a Poet doth, is to make the Fable, which is at first general and universal; he afterwards particularizes, by the giving the Names to his Persons; and if any who are known, afford any thing for his Story, he endeavours to accommodate them to his Subject, and to draw some Episode from them, and this is what the Poet doth. The measure of the Verse does not contribute to him that Name, for he is a Poet by imitation only, since he imitates Actions, and not Words, and instructs by Examples. The very Name of Poet, renders him absolutely Master of his Subject; for Poet signifies properly Maker, if I may use that Term. Now that which is the Principal, in Tragedy or Epick Poem, is the Fable, or the Composition of things; and as that is purely the Invention of the Poet, 'tis by it that he has that Name. We may say further, that the Subject belongs to him more than the Verse, in which he follows the Rules which are prescribed; but in the Subject he has an unbounded Liberty, provided he still keeps in view, either what is Necessary, or Probable.

20. And when he also exposes true Incidents on the Stage, he no less deserves the Name of a Poet. As what he hath said of Poets, being no Poets, but by Imitation, and that they ought to be Authors of their Subjects; might make us think, that if a Poet should expose a true Action on the Stage, he would cease to be a Poet, because he would not invent his Subject. He prevents that Objection, by asserting that he is no less a Poet for that; for the truth of the Action which he relates, does not make him lose that
that Name, and this is the reason which he gives for’t.

21. Since nothing hinders, but the Incidents which did really happen, may have all the veri-similitude, and all the Possibility which Art requires. What doth a Poets Art require? It requires, that he give to his Subjects, all the probability which is possible. Now that probability is not incompatible with the truth; and that which does really come to pass, may be also as probable and possible, as that which is feign’d and even such as the Poet would have invented. The truth of the Matter of Fact, doth never destroy the nature of the Fable; and he is a Poet. Aristotle is satisfied with this Reason, which is drawn from the nature of the Subject, and very convincing; he might have added another which appears to me very Solid, and is, that the truth of any Point of History, which a Poet undertakes to Manage, doth not exclude the Art of Poetry, who hath always the Power to dispose of his Subject, and to order the Plan, in such a Manner, that the Fable be still the Soul of the Poem; ’tis this Economy, and just Convexion of things, which do properly Contribute to Dramatick Poem, and which is as easie to be done in true Subjects, as in those which are invented.

22. The Episodick are the most imperfect of all simple Fables, and Actions; I call a Fable Episodick, which hath Episodes, that are not joyn’d one with another, either truly, or probably. We have seen, that all the Parts which Compose a Tragedy, ought to be well Connex’d, and to have a Relation one to another, that if you take away one only, or transpose it, the whole will be entirely changed or destroyed. When any Action, which doth not make a part of the Principal one, is mixed with the Fable, it may be all left out, without making any Breach, or destroying the Action, which makes the Subject of the Poem, which is thereby made better, since it loses only that which was improper and cor-
rupted its Unity. An Episodick Fable then is, a Fable which has something which is improper, foreign, and superadded, and which may be re-trenched without the Fables losing any thing. These vicious Episodes, are mostly found in simple Fables, because, as they have fewer Incidents, and Parts than others, so they furnish the Poet with less Matter, who is obliged to commit this irregularity, as dextrously as he can, that he may finish five Acts. Mr. Corneille has fallen into this fault, which the Barrenness of the Subjects, often throws the Poets into, though Oedipus was a Complex story, and consequently he might have had Matter enough, without betaking himself to foreign Episodes. The Love of Theseus and Dirce, is the most vicious of all the Episodes; for it is not only no part of the Action, but it makes an Action by itself, so perfect and entire, that the Piece would be more tolerable, if that was the Principal Action, and the Story of Oedipus only an Episode to it; however Mr. Corneille calls that Love, a Lucky Episode. Aristotle would have judged otherwise, and though that Love was capable of furnishing Monstrous Episodes, to the History of Oedipus, which is Composed only of Incests, Paricidies, and all sorts of Horrors.

23. And the good, by their Complaisance to the Actors, for as there are always jealousies between the different Companies of Comedians. I have translated this passage in the sense which seem'd justest and truest, the Complaisance which a Poet has to the Actors whom he would have appear better than others, obliges him oftentimes to for sake his Matter that such and such particular Actors have parts to Play; thus Multiplying the Number of the Persons, he is forc'd to Corrupt the Unity of the Action by Foreign Episodes. And although at this time, we have neither such disputes nor jealousies between the different Companies, yet we see very ill effects of this Complaisance which the Poets shew to the Comedians.

24. Tragedy
24. Tragedy is not only the imitation of an entire Action, but of such an Action as excites Terror and Compassion. Aristotle hath already shewn what an entire and perfect Action is, and what will break its Unity; and in doing that, he has explained the first part of the definition of Tragedy. He now passes to the last part, where he says, That by the means of Terror and Compassion, Tragedy compleatly refines in us all sorts of Passions, and whatever else is like them, and to do this, 'tis necessary that it imitate an Action which is capable of exciting Terror and Compassion; for if it excites any other Passions, the Definition is false, for that Action doth not at all answer the design of Tragedy. It is certain that there can be no Tragedy where Fear and Pity are not excited; and for this Reason Aristotle would have excluded Mr. Corneilles Nicomedes from the number of Tragedies, wherein he only endeavours to stir up Admiration in the minds of the Spectators, and in thus receding from the rules of Aristotle, thought he had discover'd a new way to refine the Passions; for (says he,) the Love this Piece creats for the Virtue we admire, imprints in us an Hatred for the contrary Vice; the greatness of Nicomedes's Courage, can leave in us an aversion only for Cowardise. But this way of refining the Passions by Admiration, is in no wise the design of Tragedy; for that Passion is too soft for such a great Effect: Tragedy employs only Terror and Compassion, and leaves Admiration for an Epick Poem, to which it is more necessary and proper, and where it has more time to act on Habitudes and Manners.

25. Now these two Passions come by Surprize.] This is a certain truth; for where there is no Surprize, there is generally neither Fear nor Pity.

26. When
26. *When some things are produced out of others, contrary to our expectation.* Because there are many accidents which may cause surprise, Aristotle took care to explain those which agree to Tragedy. This Poem doth not accommodate itself in any sort to those who are purely accidental, and which have no cause that produces them, as a man being crush'd to pieces by the fall of an house; or killed by a stone thrown at random. The surprise such accidents cause, are by no means proper to refine the passions: Because there being no sensible cause which produced them, we impute it to blind chance, and know not how to make any application of them. But the surprise which Tragedy requires, is that which shews several incidents that are produced of one another, contrary to the expectation of the spectator. It was worth remarking, that he did not say, incidents which come one after another, but incidents which were produced one of another. For an incident which comes after another may cause surprise, and yet not have that relation to the rest that Tragedy requires, but it must necessarily follow from those which preceded, otherwise 'tis not proper for Tragedy.

27. *For the Marvellous is much more to be seen in these, than in those which happen without design, and by chance.* Aristotle advances nothing for which he does not give a very solid and convincing reason; he tells us here, why Tragedy uses not those surprises, which accidents, that happen without design, and by chance, are the causes of: 'Tis because those which are purely fortuitous, have not that *marvellous*, which we find find in those that are produced from incidents that went before. For truly there is nothing very wonderful in an house falling and crushing a man to death, the mind of the spectator goes not far, in searching the causes of that accident, what are hid in the bosom of Providence; he has no
no other concern on him, than to shew some Sor-
row as the Dead Mans Misfortune, such as com-
mon Humanity obliges him to have; but when any
Surprise come from those things which are pro-
duced from one another, that certainly has this
Wonderful of which Aristotle here speaks. For
the Spirit of the Spectator is stricken and fill'd
with the Object; he sees at the same time, its
Causes, and its end, and 'tis from this double prospect
that the wonderful is produced; 'tis thus, it reigns
with so great splendor in Homer's Poems, where the
Surprise is always the product of the Incidents which
are link'd with the foregoing; and to give a proof,
yet more sensible, 'tis for this reason, that we find
nothing, which is Comparable to the 'Holy Scripture,'
for the Marvellous. It is full of very extraordinary
Events, which come to pass contrary to the ex-
pectation of the Reader; but they are produced by
these means which depend on one another, so
that when you see the Cause, you see also the
Effect.

28. Since even in those things which Fortune Conducts,
those which seem to come to pass designedly, and by a par-
ticular direction, are always much more Surprising and
Wonderful. To prove the truth of what he hath
Establish'd, That things which come from a known
Cause, contrary to the expectation of the Audience,
are more Marvellous and Surprising than those which
arrive casually. He starts a Reason beyond any reply:
and which could not have been thought of, by any
one, who did not know Nature to the Bottom: He
says, that among the Accidents which are purely
of Chance, there are some which have the Wonder-
ful he speaks of, and they are always those which
happen such a manner, that instead of imputing
them to Chance, we are apt to think they fell out
on set purpose, and that they were by some guided
particular direction, as it happen'd to the Murderer
of a certain Man, called Mitys. That Man being
A You're to Crow his Mo'thers Statue try'd.
Thinking with her, her Malice too had dy'd.
The Statue on him fell, for so fate dooms,
And Kill'd him; Young Man fly such Mo'thers Tombs.

29. As it happened to the Statue of Mitys at Ar-
gos, which in the Middle of a great Feast, fell down
on his Murderer, and Killed him on the Spot. Plutarch
relates this History in his Treatise, why Justice,
oftentimes deferrs the Punishment of the Wicked: He
fays, that Mitys, the Argian, was Killed in a Tu-
mult; and that some Years after, the People of
Argos being assemb'ed together to see some
Publick Shows, Mitys's Statue, which was made of
Bras, tumbled down on his Murderer, and Crus'd
him to Pieces. He attributes this Punishment to
Providence.
30. For it did not seem upon any account to happen by Accident.] The Peripateticks believed, neither Providence, nor Fatal Necessity: And this is the reason why Aristotle is content with saying, that it did not seem that this Statue fell by Accident. He was persuaded that it was pure Chance, but he conforms himself to the common opinion of Mankind, to attribute Effects to their Causes, where there is the least Probability that they are such, especially in matters where Religion is concerned. 'Tis no proper place to prove now the truth of such a general sentiment; but 'tis sufficient to say, that the Tragick Poets chose rather to follow the opinion of the Stoicks, who acknowledged such a Providence, and fatal Necessity, than those of the Peripateticks; very well perceiving, that that was the only means, to preserve, in the Theatre, those wonderful Surprises which are produced by accidents that seem fortuitous, and yet nevertheless have Causes assigned to them, which are certain.

31. It necessarily follows from hence, that those Fables where this Conduct is observed, will always appear the finest.]. This is a necessary consequence; since the Surprize which is caused by Incidents, that are well managed, and produced of one another, must assuredly be more wonderful than that which arises from fortuitous accidents only. Tragedies which cause the great Surprize, will always be the best, this is most certain, and without reply; but a scruple may here be raised, and which seems to me very reasonable; and 'tis this, to know whether Aristotle would have the Poets endeavour to make their Surprises by Accidents, which have nothing of Chance in them, and which naturally proceed one from another? Or whether he advises them, to try to produce this Surprize by Accidents which may seem to happen
pen designedly, and yet may be imputed to Chance or Fortune? I should declare myself for the latter, for that seems to me much more Marvelous than the other; and 'tis for this reason that Oedipus is the best Subject for Tragedy that ever was; for whatever happened to that unhappy Prince, has this Character, 'tis managed by Fortune; but every body may see, that all the Accidents have their Causes, and fall out according to the design of a particular Providence. I am persuaded that Aristotle would have explained himself better on this Head, if he had not been afraid of infringing his notion of destiny; and 'tis to this we ought to attribute the obscurity of this place.
Chapter X.

Division of Fable into Simple and Implex: Their Definition. The distance of Incidents which came one after another, or are produced one of another.

1. Fables are either Simple or Implex, for all those Actions which Fables imitate, (a) have either one, or t'other of these qualities.

2. I call the Simple, those Actions which being continued and united, (b) end (c) without any Remembrance or Peripetie. And I call those Implex, (d) which have either a Peripetie, or Remembrance, or both.

3. Now both of them ought to proceed from the very Constitution of the Subject, in such a manner, that what proceeds them, should produce them either necessarily, or probably; for there is a very great difference, (e) between Incidents which arise one from another, and those which only come one after another.

(a) Are such.
(b) As is defined.
(c) The Transition is made.
(d) Whole Transition is made.
(e) Between those things which are done, for, or after others.
REMARKS on Chap. 10.

1. I call the Simple, those Actions, which being Continued, and United, end without any Remembrance, or Peripetie. I call a simple Fable, that, in which there is neither Change of Condition, nor Remembrance, and the unravelling of which, is only a single passage of agitation and trouble, or repose and tranquility. Such is the Ajax and Philoctetes of Sophocles, The Medea and Hecuba of Euripides, the Fable of the Iliads, as also that of the Aeneids, are in the number of simple Fables.

2. I call these Implex, which have either a Peripetie, or Remembrance, or both. If the Peripetie, that is, the change of the State of the Persons, can be without Remembrance, as in Sophocles's Antigone, the Remembrance may also be without the Peripetie. 'Tis true, there are more examples of the former than the latter, in the Oedipus, and Electra of Sophocles, and the Iphigenia Taurica of Euripides, there are Remembrances, and Peripeties too.

3. Now both of them ought to proceed from the very constitution of the Subject; In such a manner, that what precedes them, should produce them, either Necessarily, or Probably. The Peripetie, and Remembrance, can neither be necessarily or probably, if they are not drawn from the bottom of the Subject: The Oedipus, and Electra of Sophocles, are the most excellent Models in that kind. That great Poet, hath perfectly imitated the Remembrance, which unravels the Odysseus; for 'tis Homer, who has given to the Tragick Poets, the finest examples, both of the Plots, and unravelling them; our Tragick Poets, have discovered few intrigues by the Remembrance, either because they have found few Subjects which have afforded them, or because
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

because, such Subjects have appear'd too difficult to manage, they have however wonderful Effects on the Stage, as we may judge, by the double Remembrance of the Electra of Sophocles. Mr. Corneille was convinced of this, when he said, the Remembrance is the greatest Ornament of Tragedies; but it is certain, that it hath its inconveniencies. The inconveniencies are not those which he mentions; for 'tis so far from destroying the Pathetick sentiments, that nothing whatever affords such moving ones. The greatest inconvenience of Remembrances is, that they are very difficult to manage; for if you make the Spirit speak more than the Heart, they Languish, and grow cold. There are many other ways of deviating from them: Mr. Corneille has ventured at a double Remembrance, in his Heraclius, which I believe Aristotle would not have approved of; for besides its being a Riddle from the beginning to the end, nay, and at the very end, you are not certain it is perfected. He offends directly against the Rules which Aristotle has laid down. It is necessary that the Remembrance arise from the Subject; but there is no occasion for it to be the Subject: Now in the Heraclius, 'tis the Remembrance only which makes the Subject; we find only a Father who could not distinguish his Son, whom he had a mind to save, from an Enemy, whom he would destroy. In the Electra of Sophocles, and the Iphigenia Taurica of Euripides, the Remembrance is a means, and not an end.

4. For there is a very great difference, between Incidents which arise one from another, and those which only come one after another. Those Incidents which are only one after another, are, properly speaking, like Numbers which subsist by themselves, independantly, from those which went before, the First neither induces the Second, nor the Second the Third: But those Incidents which arise from one another, are as parts of the same Body.
Body, which could no longer subsist, should we take away, or change, one part only; for that would dissolve the Connexion, and break the Continuity.

C H A P. XI.

Of Peripetie and Remembrance. There are many sorts of Remembrances. Which is the most perfect; and the Conditions it ought to have. It is single, or double. What Passion is in Fable.

1. Peripetie is a change of (a) one Fortune into another (b) contrary to what was expected, and that Change happens either Necessarily, or Probably, as in the Oedipus of Sophocles; for he who comes to tell him agreeable news, and ought to deliver him out of those fears, into which, the thoughts (c) of committing Incest with his Mother had cast him, does the quite contrary, in telling him plainly what he is. (d) Or as in the Lyncus of Theodectes, where Lyncus who was led to dye, and Danaus who followed in order to (e) Sacrifice him, both changed their Fortune; for by a Series of Incidents, it hapned that (f) Danaus suffered the Death he had prepared for Lyncus, and (g) Lyncus was Saved.

(a) Those things which are acted. (b) As was said. (c) Concerning his Mother. (d) And. (e) Kill him. (f) He. (g) The other.

2. The
3. The Remembrance, as the Name it self testifies, is a Change, which causing us to pass from Ignorance to Knowledge, produces either Hatred or Love, in those (b) whom the Poet has a design to render either happy or miserable.

3. The best Remembrance, is that which is found with the Peripetie, as in the Oedipus.

4. There are many other sorts of Remembrances; for it falls out very often, that we (j) Remember inanimate things, and those which are most common. (k) We Remember also, for example, what any Person has done, or what he has not done. But that of which I have spoken is the most proper for Fable and Action; for that Remembrance, accompanied with the Peripetie, will Infalibly produce, either Compassion, (l) or Terror, of which (m) Tragedy (n) is an Imitation, as we have laid down for a fundamental: It will also produce either the Good or Ill Fortune of the Principal Persons.

5. Since then the Remembrance, is the Remembrance of certain Persons, it must be either single, or double; The single is, when one Person is Remembred by another whom he knows; and the double, when two Persons who know not, do yet come to remember one another, as in the Iphigenia of Euripides, where Urestes Remem.

(b) In those who are determined to good or ill Fortune.
(i) Descend to.
(k) As is said.
(l) And.
(m) Actions
(n) Was supposed to be.
bred the Princess by (a) means of a Letter; and there must be another Remembrance, that Orestes might be known.

6. Besides these two parts of a Fable which regard the Subject, (p) there is a Third, which I call the Passion; I have already explained the Remembrance, and the Peripetie. I call Passion (q) an Action which destroys some Person, or causes some violent Pains, as an evident and certain Death, Torments, Wounds, and all such like things.

REMARKS on Chap. 11.

1. Peripetie is a change of one Fortune into another; contrary to what was expected.] I have added these last words, better to explain Aristotle's Thought; for it is certain, that the Peripeties, which are least expected, and most surprising, are the finest, provided they be either necessary or probable.

2. As in the Oedipus of Sophocles; for he who comes to tell him agreeable News, and ought to deliver him out of those Fears, &c.] 'Tis in the Third Scene of the Fourth Act; A Man from Corinth, comes to acquaint Oedipus of King Polybius's Death, that he might go and take possession of that Kingdom: Oedipus, who thought that Polybius was his Father, and being afraid of committing Incest, as the Oracle had said he should, told him, that he was resolved never to go into any place where his Mother was. The Corinthian answered, that 'twas very plain, he did not know himself, and that he distur-
bed himself about nothing; and thinking to do him some signal Service, in bringing him out of his Error, he told him, that he was not the Son of Polybius and Merope, which began the Remembrance, which cast him into the most Horrible of all his Misfortunes. Thus did the discourse of this Corinthian produce a Change of Fortune, not probably, but necessarily; for without doubt whatever is necessary, is probable; but all that is probable, is not always indispensably necessary.

3. Or as in the Lyncus of Theodecles.] Theodecles was a Lycian, a Disciple of Plato, and a great Friend of Aristotle’s; He wrote Fifty Tragedies, but not so well in Prose as in Verse. Nothing of his remains, and we know not the Subject of his Lyncus, ’tis probable that it was taken from the Story of the Danaids, who, by the command of their Father Danaus, killed all their Husbands on the Wedding Night: Hypermnestra only saved hers, and spared his Life, who was this Lyncus. Danaus sent Messengers after him, being resolved to finish what he had begun, lest he should revenge the Death of his Brethren; he would also have put Hypermnestra to Death, under some false pretence, which Tyrants never want: But the People filled with Horror, at the Cruelty and Injustice of such a Barbarous Father, and touch’d with Compassion for his Son-in-Law and his Daughter, made an Insurrection, saved the Life of Lyncus, and put Danaus to Death. You may see the Twentieth Chapter. Mr. Gombault has treated the same Subject in his Piece of the Danaids, but cannot be sufficiently wonder’d at, for not following the Conduct of the Greek Poet; for instead of making Lyncus and Hypermnestra be led to Execution, and afterwards saved by an Insurrection of the People, who tore Danaus in Pieces; he makes Lyncus return with his own Retinue, and kill Danaus his Father-in-Law in a Duel, and thus the Poet fell unnecessarily into a very
very Cruel Action; he loses the best Peripetie that
could ever be brought on the Stage, and spoils an
unravelling which is perfectly fine. He would not
have been guilty of this fault, if he had. Read the
Fifteenth Chapter of this Art of Poetry. This is
the difference which the neglect of Rules makes
in the fame Piece; in observing them we follow
Nature, which is the supreme Reason, and we
always please; in breaking them, just the contrary
happens.

4. The Remembrance, as the Name it self testifies,
is a Change, which causing us to pass from Ignorance to
Knowledge, produces either Hatred or Love, in those
whom the Poet has a design to render either Happy or
Miferable.] In defining the Remembrance, Aristotle
takes care to note the Qualities which it ought to
have to be good; it ought not to be in vain, and to
leave thofe who Remember one another, in the fame
sentiments they were before: It muft produce ei-
ther Hatred, or Love. But this is not fufficient,
it muft also stir up one of these Passions in thofe
whom the Poet has a mind to make Happy or Miferable; that is, of the Principal Persons; for
if the Remembrance descends to the subordinate
Persons, or the Epifodick ones, 'tis vitious, and never
produces any good effect. The Remembrance which
is between the firft and second Persons is blame-
able, if it be not the Confequence of a former Re-
membrance which was between the Principal Acts; and such an one in the Eleftra of Sophocles,
is the Remembrance of Oreftes's Governour, who is
not known to the Princefs, till after Oreftes and she
had Remember'd one another.

5. The best Remembrance, is that which is found with
the Peripetie, as in the Oedipus. [Strictly speaking,
there is no Remembrance which does not produce a
Peripetie; for there is none which doth not make
fome manner of change in the condition of fome of
the
the Persons who are Remember'd; but I believe this is not what Aristotle meant; he would give us to understand, that the finest Remembrance is that which produces on the spot, that change in the Fortune of the Principal Persons, which is the unravelling of the Intrigue, and the finishing of the Piece; for that Remembrance, which makes the Heroe of the Poem pass at once, from the greatest Felicity, to an Extremity of Misery, or which draws him from the depth of Despair, to place him in possession of extraordinary Happiness; has much greater Effects on the minds of the Audience, than that which does not Surprize it all at once, but disposes all things plainly, and conducts them to their end by other means. The Subject of Oedipus furnished Sophocles with the best Remembrance the Theatre ever saw; for that Prince no sooner knew himself to be the Son of Laius and Jocasta, but of the most Happy of Men, he became at once the most Miserable. The Remembrance of the Electra of the same Poet, is not near so sprisingly nor so fine, because it is remote from the Peripetie; for after Orestes and Electra remembered one another, their Fortune continued the same, and they did not change their Condition, till after the Death of Clytemnestra and Egypthes. There is the same Remembrance in the second Iphigenia of Euripides, in his Helena, and in his Electra. All these Examples prove the truth of Aristotle's Judgment; insomuch that we must necessarily agree, that the best Remembrance is that which immediately produces the Peripetie. 'Tis apparent that Mr. Corneille was not sensible of this Truth when he Writ his Heraclius, wherein the Peripetie precedes the Remembrance, for the true Peripetie of that Piece is the Death of Phocas; Martian and Heraclius were known afterwards, but 'twas when they had nothing to fear, and consequently the Audience had no great concern to know, which of the two was Heraclius or Martian.
6. There are many sorts of Remembrances, for it falls out very often, that we remember in animate things, and those which are common.] After having spoke of the Principal Remembrance, Aristotle thought he could not be excused from speaking a Word of the others which are inferior to it; but such however, as the best Poets have not disdain'd to make use of; 'tis when we remember the most Ordinary and Common things, as Horses, Neck-laces, &c. In the Coepheorses of Eschylus, Electra finding Horles at her Father's Tomb, knew them to be Orestes's. The same Chanced to Chrysothemis, in the Eletra of Sophocles, we shall speak at large of these Remembrances in the xvii. Chapter.

7. We remember also, for example, what any Person has done, or what he has not done.] As in the Eletra of Sophocles; Eleatra and Chrysothemis, Remember that the Libations which they found on Agamemnon's Tomb, were not of Clytemnestra's putting, but Orestes's, or somebody on his account.

8. But that of which I have spoken, is the most proper for Fable, and Action.] If the other Remembrances are well managed, they ought to be means and preparatives for that which should follow; for they would be very vicious if they were alone; but as their end is to produce another Remembrance, they are never so proper for Fable, and have not so much Action as those which are done at once, and produce the Peripetie without delay.

9. For that Remembrance accompanied with the Peripetie, will Infallibly produce either Compassion, or Terror, of which Tragedy is an Imitation, &c.] He here gives the reason of what he had before said, (viz.) That the Remembrance which is Joyned to the Peripetie, is the most proper for Fable, and for Action: And this reason is drawn from his general principle.
principle, that Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action; and not only of an Action, but of such an one which excites Pity, and Fear, all this is found in that Remembrance which he prefers to the rest; there is Action, since it makes the Good or Ill Fortune of the principal Personages, and it can't fail of exciting Terror or Compassion, since in one and the same moment, it decides things of so great Importance, and produces such grand Effects.

10. The Single is, when one Person is Remember'd, by another which he knows. As in Oedipus, for that Prince is remember'd by Jocasta whom he knew.

11. And the Double, when two Persons who know not, do yet come to Remember one another, as in the Iphigenia of Euripides. Tis in the Iphigenia Taurica, where Iphigenia is Remember'd by Orestes, by a Letter which she gave him to carry into Greece, and of which, she had told him the Contents, that if the Letter should chance to be lost, he might deliver what she had writ by word of Mouth. And Orestes is Remember'd by Iphigenia, by certain Presents which she made him. In the Electra of Sophocles, the Remembrance is also Double; for Electra is first known by Orestes, and afterwards Orestes by Electra.

12. Besides these two parts of a Fable which regard the Subject, there is also another which I call the Passion. The Passion is still more Essential to the Subject than the Remembrance, and the Peripetie; since there are simple Subjects which have neither Remembrance, nor Peripetie, and yet have Passion, as the Ajax of Sophocles, and the Hecuba of Euripides.

13. I call the Passion, an Action which destroys some Person. I know very well that the word Passion is
is neither French nor English in this sense, except it be in Matters of Religion, and that ev'ry where else it signifies the Sentiments, or to speak more properly, the Weaknesses of the Soul: But this does not explain what Aristotle would say, but I am willing to avoid Equivocations in the explanation of this Sentence.

14. As are evident and certain Deaths, The Greek words are remarkable, το τὸ παρέεν Ἀνάφειον Μορτες in aperto; Open deaths. Mr. Corneille, in his Examen of Horace, explains it, Deaths in the Shows, or Plays. 'Tis a Rule, says he, not to fill the Stage with Blood; It was not so in Aristotle's time, who tells us, That to move Powerfully and Effectually, we must shew on the Stage the unpleasant sights of Wounds, and Death. But this could not be Aristotle's meaning, who had no design to approve of Murders on the Stage, since it was contrary to the practice of the Ancients. Mr. Corneille did not well understand the Greek term, in τὸ παρέεν, which does not strictly signify a thing exposed to the Eyes; but a thing which is evident and certain, and of which we have such tokens that we cannot doubt of it: He opposes παρέεν, certain; to ἀπαρέεν, doubtful. Under this General expression, the Philosopher comprehends the two sorts of Death which were found in Tragedy, those which were seen, and those which were not seen; for a Person may come and dye on the Stage, though he was not any ways hurt.
The Parts of Quantity of Tragedy, and their Definition.

1. After having explained the Parts which Constitute the Form and Quality of Tragedy, I must speak of those which Constitute the Quantity, and which have a separate Substance.

2. Tragedy hath four Principal Parts, the Prologue, the Episode, the Exode, and the Chorus, and the last is again divided into Three Parts, which are called Parodos, (a) Stasimon, and (b) Commoi. The two First are found in all Pieces; but the Third is only in certain Tragedies: It is always mixed with the Action, and is common to the Actors, and the Chorus.

3. The Prologue, is all that part of the Tragedy which (c) precedes the entrance of the Chorus.

4. The Episode, is that which is between the (d) Songs of the Chorus.

5. The Exode, is all that which is said after the Chorus has left of singing, not to begin again.

(a) And. (b) These two are common to all, but the Commoi proper, to a Scene.
(c) Before the Parodos.
(d) Full.
6. The Parodos, is the first discourse of all the Chorus.

7. The Stasimon, is all that which the Chorus sings after it has taken possession of the Stage, and is as it were incorporated in the Action. This Song is without Anapaests and Trochees.

8. Commoi, are the Lamentations which the Chorus and the Actors make together.

REMARKS on Chap. 12.

1. After having explained the parts which constitute the form and quality of Tragedy, These Parts are the Subjects, Manners, Sentiments, Musick, Decoration, Remembrance, Peripetie, and Passion.

2. I must speak of those which constitute the Quantity, and which have a separate subsistence. The Parts of Quality may be found altogether, thro' the whole Piece, and not taken notice of separately; on the Contrary, the Parts of Quantity are separately measured, and can never be together; they have their fixed places marked out which they can never change, any more than the Parts of the Body.

3. Tragedy hath four Principal Parts, The Prologue, the Episodes, the Exode, and the Chorus. We are come now to one of the most difficult places, of the Art of Poetry. That is the Division which Aristotle makes of the Parts which compose the Body of Tragedy. I shall endeavour to clear these

(1) We have before explain'd the Parts of Tragedy, which ought to be used, but those in which the quantity consists, and which are separate are those.
Ariftotle’s Art of Poetry.

difficulties, and hope to do it in such a manner, that every one may Wonder at the Boldness of a certain Writer; who in his practice of the Theatre, (a work otherwise filled with good things) makes no Scruple to say, that Arifotle did not distinguish the Parts of the Poem as it was in his time, or at least in the time of those three excellent Tragedians which now remains, whose Works, says he, have no agreement with his Discourse: Surely no Accusation was ever so Rash. He was not quite so Bold, who accused Hercules of being a Coward. We shall see in what follows, that the Writer did not know the Practice of the Greeks, nor the Art of their Plays. But before we begin with that, we will say a Word or two of the Nature of this Division, no Body can doubt, but that ’tis much better than the Latins have made, in saying, that a Tragedy hath five Acts; for this Division which Divides Tragedy into so many equal Parts, denotes well enough its extent, but not the difference of its Parts; whereas that of the Greeks into unequal Parts, shews the extent of Tragedy in general, and the different nature of its Parts in particular. Perhaps you may say, that the Latin Division makes four Intervals, or Time of rest in Tragedy, which the Greek does not. To this I answer, that the Greek Division does what it ought to do, that is, to let us know the different Parts which Compole the Body of Tragedy, and which the Latin by no means does; on the contrary, it explains the Matter, as if there were five Actions in the place of one, which is very vicious. And as for the Intervals, ’tis true, Arifotle doth not speak of them in this Work, for that was the Matter of another Precept which he has without doubt explained in some of his Books, which are lost, either in his Treatise of Musick, or in that of Tragedies: for it is not sufficient to tell us only as Horace doth, that a Dramatick Poem ought to have five Acts.

Neve minor, neu fit quinto producStior allu Fabula.
Five Acts, no more, nor less, a Play must have.

He should have added, the reason of this Division, and show'd why a Piece of the Theatre ought to have four Intervals, or four Songs of the Chorus, rather than five; and certainly, this is what he ought not to have forgot. I am also perswaded that 'tis from this, that Vitruvius has taken what he says of the Intervals of the Greek Pieces: That the Comick Poets divided the Spaces of their Fables into parts, by a Cubical Proportion; Diviserunt Spatia Fabularum, in partes, ratione Cubica. That is to say, that what Aristotle calls here Episode, the Subject of the Piece was included between the four Songs of the Chorus; and that the four Songs, joyned to the Prologue and Exode, made the Number six, which is a Cubick Number, and the most perfect of all Numbers, as some Mathematicians pretend. Vitruvius says, of the Comick Poets, what he ought to have said of all the Poets in general; for the Comick Poets have nothing peculiar, as to what regards the Intervals: As to the Convenience of these Spaces, divided by the Song of the Chorus, 'twas no less than that of the Division into our Acts; for we may Count by the first, second, third, &c. Song of the Chorus, as we Count by the first, second, third, &c. Act; and it had moreover this Advantage, that every Song of the Chorus having some difference, whereby it was distinguish'd from the rest, any one who came in, for example, at the third Song, might presently tell which it was: Whereas when we come in at the second, or third Act, we cannot tell whereabouts they are, unless those who were there from the beginning tell us.

4. And this last is again divided into three Parts, which are called Parodos, Stalimon, and Commoi. Aristotle does not speak here only, of what the Chorus Sung between the Acts, and sometimes also in
in the course of the Acts, when they Lamented with the Actors; but what the Chorus said in the Acts, as an Actor, was not comprehended, in what Aristotle calls here Choricus, Song of the Chorus. We will explain every part one by one.

5. The Prologue is the part of the Tragedy, which precedes the entrance of the Chorus. The Prologue is made to explain to the Audience, not only what concerns the Subject of the Poem; but what is proper, and necessary, and makes a true part of it; 'tis our first Act. But you may say, since the Prologue is a part of quantity of the Tragedy, there can be no Tragedy without a Prologue; The Prologue is all that which precedes the entrance of the Chorus; now there are Tragedies, where the Chorus enters first on the Stage, and consequently there can be no Prologue to those Pieces; or what Aristotle has said, that the Prologue precedes the entrance of the Chorus, is false. Thus they will talk, who don't understand what they Read, nor give themselves time to examine those things of which they Write. The Author of the Practice of the Theatre, would not have fallen into this Error, if he had known the nature of those Actions which make the Subjects of the Greek Tragedies; or to speak more properly, might make the Subject of Tragedy; considering the Truth and Simplicity of that Poem, when associated with the Chorus. These Actions then can be but of two sorts, for either they begin before the People concerned are Assembled, and give occasion to that Assembly; or else 'tis the Assembly of the People which begins the Action, and which gives occasion to the Incidents that Compose it. There is no mean between these two sorts of Actions; and which we shall endeavour to render very plain, by Examples. It is no difficult Matter to find enough for the first Case, these Actions which begin before the People are Assembled, are very common; and 'tis thus, that almost all the Actions which make the
the Subjects of the Greek Pieces, do begin. In the
Electra of Sophocles, Orestes accompanied by Pylades,
arrived at Mycenae, just at Day-break, and concerted
with his Governor the proper Methods to succeed
in his Enterprize. Electra at the same time left Egysthes Palace, which she could no longer endure, and
went to Lament her Misfortunes. These Complaints of hers, gave occasion to the Young Ladies of
Mycenae to visit that Prince, in order to Comfort
her, and at the end of the first Act, those Ladies are
the Chorus. Thus what preceded the first Song of the
Chorus, is the true Prologue of that Play, according
to Aristotle's definition. 'Tis the same with all the
other Pieces of that great Poet, they have every one
their Prologue, and 'tis directly contrary to the
Truth to assume that they have not. We come
now to the second sort of Actions, which gave oc-
casion to this Error; but as they are much more
rare than the other, we must not wonder if there
are very few Tragedies which begin in this man-
er. There are but two, in Aeschylus, the Persians, and
the Suppliants; and one in Euripides, (viz.) Rhesus.
We need only explain the Subject of these Pieces,
and 'twill appear, that altho' the Chorus opens the
Scene, yet they are not without Prologues, but have
them as well as those Pieces, where the Chorus doth
not enter, till some of the Actors have spoke, and
the Action is begun.

The Subject of the Persians of Aeschylus, is the
defeat of Xerxes, who retired out of Greece, after
he had lost the two Famous Battles of Salamine,
and Platea. This is the manner in which the Sub-
ject is constituted, or rather, the manner in which
the Scene opens; for the question is concerning that.
As it was a long time, since that Prince sent a Cou-
rrier to the Queen Asossa his Mother, the chief Lords
of Susa, who were some old State-men, to whom
the King had committed the Administration of his
Kingdom, Assembled together to consult of the
present
present Affairs; whilst they were in Council, the Queen Atossa, who had been Frightened by some Dreams the Night before, comes to them. Thus these old Gentlemen make the Prologue, but they don't begin the Duty of the Chorus, till after the Action is commenced, and the Audience instructed.

In the Suppliants of the same Poet, the fifty Daughters of Danaus, to avoid Marrying with their Cousin-Germans, the Sons of Aegyptus, forfake their Country; and demand Protection of the King of Argos. The Scene opens by the fifty Ladies, who coming before the Town, declare the reason of their flight, and what obliged them to retire to Argos, rather than any where else. These same Gentlewomen make the Chorus, but they don't begin the Duty of the Chorus, till after they have made the Prologue, for otherwise, there would be nothing natural in it.

The Rhene of Euripides sets this Truth in a much better light; the Centinels that watch'd in the Trojan Camp, who then Besieg'd the Greeks in their Retrenchments, after they had Routed them, come to Hecaton's Tent, to inform him that the Enemies had lighted great Fires, and that there was a great Noise towards Agamemnon's Quarters; 'tis these Centinels which open the Scene, begin the Action, and are afterwards the Chorus of the Piece. Tho' the Chorus is first on the Stage, there is nevertheless a Prologue; 'tis the Chorus indeed which makes it, but they are not properly the Chorus, till after the Subject is expounded; and the Action commenced.

Moreover there are Pieces where the Chorus is the first on the Stage, and yet notwithstanding that, there is a Prologue, tho' it be not made by the Chorus: A couple of Examples will make this very plain. The Suppliants of Euripides are the chief Ladies of Argos, whose Husbands were killed before Thebes;
they come to entreat Thefens to let them have the Bodies that they might bury them: They are at Eleusinæ, near the Temple of Ceres; Thefens's his Mother, who went from Athens to Sacrifice to that Goddess, found these Women there, who immediately cast themselves at her Feet: This is the opening of the Scene. 'Tis the Mother of Thefens who makes the Prologue, and the Suppliants don't form the Chorus, till after that Princess had spake and hear'd their request. The other Example is as clear, and 'tis taken from the Oedipus of Sophocles, the finest Tragedy of all Antiquity. Jupiter's High Priest, followed by a great many other Priests, and the chosen young Men of Thebes, is going to prostrate himself at an Altar, which was Erected to Oedipus, before the Court of his Palace; The Cries and Groans both of young and old, obliged that Prince to come out to know the reason of it; and this is what makes the opening of the Scene: Oedipus makes the Prologue, and when the Subject is well explained, the Priests themselves make the Chorus of the Piece. 'Tis certain then, that the Greeks had no Tragedies, without that, which Aristotle here calls Prologue, and consequently the Philosopher had reason to make the Prologue one part of the quantity of Tragedy. He who would contradict him, was so little acquainted with the Greek Authors, that he calls the Persians of Æschylus, the Persian Women; as if the Chorus of that Piece was composed of Women, whereas it was made up of old Men, as I have already said: As for what remains, we must not confound the Prologue of the Greek Tragedy, with the Prologue of the Latin Comedy. The Prologue of those Comick Pieces did not make a part of the Action for the Stage; 'tis borrowed from the old Greek Comedy, where it is very often found in the middle of the Play, under the name of Parabasis. The Latins almost always place it at the beginning of their Pieces. There are some however that have taken the liberty of the Greeks, and placed the Prologue in the Play, as Plautus has made it the First Act, in his Miles Gloriosus.
6. The Episode is that which is between the Songs of
the Chorus.] Tragedy, in its original, was nothing
but a Chorus, without Actors; afterwards they ad-
ded Actors, to give time to the Chorus to rest, and
all that which the Actors said between the Songs of
the Chorus, was called Episode; that is as much as to
say, an Additional Part; because those recitations
were foreign and super-added Pieces, always included
between two Songs of the Chorus, and drawn from
different Adventure to; that there were many differ-
ent Episodes: But when Tragedy began to come into
form, and those Recitations which were only accesi-
ary parts, became the principal; then they began
to look on the Subject of Tragedy, as a Body which
ought to have no strange Members, or which were
independent of one another; The good Poets drew
the Subject of their Recitations from one and the
same Action; and that Action retain'd its first name,
and was called Episode. This is the Reason why
Aristotle says, that the Episode is all that which is
included between the Songs of the Chorus; that is to
say, That 'tis all the Subject of Tragedy, or rather
all that makes the Intrigues and Plot, till its unravelling,
and the Catastrophe, which never hap-
pens till after the Fourth and last Song of the Chorus,
in those Pieces which are well Composed.

7. The Exode, is all that which is said after the
Chorus has left off Singing, not to begin again.] A
very Learned Man thought, that the Exode was
properly the Epilogue, and that 'twas used to thank
the Company, and take leave of them; but I find
no such sort of Epilogues in the Greek Tragedies,
which generally end with a Moral Instruiflion, or
Praise, or Prayer, or Whishes, &c. If the Exode
were only a returning Thanks, and taking Leave, it
would
would not make a part of the Quantity of Tragedy; it would be a separate part, as a Compliment made by an Actor, on our Stage, at the end of the Play. The manner in which Aristotle explains himself, will not permit us to take the Exode in that sense, since he defines it, *All that is after the last Song of the Chorus*; that word *All* denotes, that ‘tis a part, which hath extent; and truly the *Exode* is the Unravelling, and Catastrophe of the Piece. This Unravelling begins always after the last Song of the Chorus, in those Plays which are well made, and answers exactly to our Fifth Act. But you may say, Why was not this *Exode*, *this Fifth Act*, included between two Songs of the Chorus, as those two which precede? ’Tis very easy to answer to that Objection; ’tis not natural to sing, neither does any desire to hear Singing at the End of a Tragic Action. The Audience would have had no Concern in that Chorus, nor would have given Attention to the End of it; what the Chorus should say after the Action was finished, could not be too short: It often says but two or three Verses: It never exceeds seven, or eight; but when it is either an Instruction or a Petition. There are some Plays which end without any Discourse of the Chorus; as the *Troades* of Euripides, the *Prometheus* and *Eumenides* of Aeschylus.

8. The Parodos, is the first Discourse of all the Chorus.] I have kept to Aristotle's own Terms, who uses the Word *ἐξέκαστο*, *Discourse*, for those words which were put into Song; for the *Parodos* was the first Song of the Chorus after the Prologue. When the Chorus Spake, only one did it for the whole Company; but when it sung, all they who composed the Chorus sung together: This is the Reason, why Aristotle says here, the first Discourse of the Chorus; but to render what he hath said more plain, I shall apply it to the *Oedipus* of Sophocles, which I have translated, and am resolved to publish, after this *Art of Poetry*. The Prologue comprehends the two first Scenes which begins Ο Δίος ἀνθρώπου ἐπέτι, Di-vine
Arifotle's Art of Poetry.

wine Oracle of Jupiter, &c. is the Parodos, the first Song of the Chorus. The Episode comprehends the Second, Third, and Fourth Acts, till the Chorus, which begins,

\[ \text{Οδύσσων βεστων, ος ἡμᾶς ἅμα κτὸ τὸ μυθίν} \]

\[ \text{όντως εὐαισθύνω.} \]

Unhappy Mortals, whose extremeest Bliss,
To nothing justly I compare.

And the Exode is all the Fifth Act. 'Tis necessary to know, that the first Song on the Chorus, always ends the first Act, makes the first Interval; and consequently in all those Plays, where the Chorus speaks, in the Course of the first Act, what it says cannot be the Parodos: 'Tis only one Person of the Chorus, who speaks for all the Company. In the Electra of Sophocles the Chorus enters at the hundred and twentieth Verse, and says,

\[ \text{Ω ταί ταί δυσαντάτας} \]

\[ \text{Ηλικτερ μαντείας.} \]

Princess of an unnatural Mother Born.

The Scholiast takes Notice, that 'tis the Parodos; but he only means, that 'tis the coming in of the Chorus, and not the first Song of it, which does not begin till the 475th. Verse.

\[ \text{Εἰ μὴ ἐγὼ περιοδών} \]

\[ \text{Μάθεις θέου.} \]

If I in my Predictions do not fail.

Where the Interval of the first Act begins. This is still more Evident, in the Oedipus Colone of the same Poet, where the first Act is of a prodigious Length, for 'tis seven Hundred Verses; however the Chorus:
Chorus enters at the Hundred and Eighteenth Verse, and in searching for Oedipus, says,

'Oeplis dé lê; τιν ραλιν; τιν Κυρὴ.

Is not that he? Where is he? Where's he hid?

One would think that this was the Parodos, the first Song of the Chorus, but 'tis not; the first Song begins at the 700 Verse.

Εὐερεία τὰς τοὺς ἱάμεν

Stranger, you now into this Land art come. And makes the Interval of the first Act.

Every time then that the Chorus speaks in the Course of the first Act, whether it speaks alone, or discourses with any of the Actors, we must not think that 'tis the Parodos, the first Song of the Chorus.

The Parodos is always at the end of the first Act, and the Chorus never sings before. Twou'd be very unnatural for the Chorus to enter singing. It must have time to learn, and to be instructed in the Action, with which it is to be concerned; and from which it ought to be formed. This is a Rule which the Greeks, who followed Nature very close, never failed to observe, and 'tis only for want of having sufficiently examined their Practice, that the first Discourse of the Chorus has often been taken for the first Song, the Parodos. 'Tis a Fault that some of the Ancients have been guilty of. The Greek Author, who made the Argument to the Persians of Aeschylus, quotes for the Parodos of the Phenicians of Euripides, the first Verses of the Chorus.
Quitting the Tyrian Shore.

Which is the 210 Verse; but 'tis only the Discourse of the Chorus which speaks without singing, the true Parodos begins at the 642 Verse.

Cadmus came to that Land.

Which makes the Interval of the first Act. Plutarch was also deceived, where he took for the Parodos of the Electra of Euripides, what the Chorus says to that Princess at the 167 Verse.

Aγαμεμνόν καὶ νεανίδες, Φίλοι τε καὶ σύντρηκα τε Τησίας

Fam'd Ships of War, which once before Troy rode.

I have been a little long on this Matter, because the understanding of it, is the only Means to read the Greek Poets with Pleasure.

9. The Stasimon is all that which the Chorus sings, after it has taken Possession of the Stage, and is, as it were, incorporated into the Action.] Aristotle says only, that the Stasimon is without Anapaestes, and Trochees: But I have enlarged his Definition, to render the Matter the more intelligible; the Chorus of the Greek Plays did not properly begin to take Possession of the Stage, and to be incorporated into the Action, 'till the Parodos the first Song: All which was sung after that, was called Stasimon, that is to say, the Three last Songs were comprized under that Name; and they were called so, because the Chorus was fixed, and employed in their Songs, slow Measures, never quick, and precipitate, as the Anapaest, and the Trochee, which are good only for Motion.

N 4

10. Thi...
10. *This Song is without Anapæstes and Trochees.*] Those two Feet (of which, the *Anapæst* doth consist of two short, and one long; and the *Trochee* of one long, and one short) were in the first Song of the *Chorus*, but they are very rarely found in the Three others: When the *Chorus* had not so quick a Movement, this Difference of Numbers, and Measures, serves at least, to shew us, with how great Exactness the *Greeks* composed their Pieces, since they were so nice as to weigh (if I may use that Term) even the very Words of the *Chorus*, to give them weight, or Levity, according to the Movements the *Chorus* ought to have.

11. *Common are those Lamentations, which the Chorus, and the Actors make together.*] The *Chorus* accompanied the Actors in their Complaints and Lamentations, which they made in the Course of the Acts, on any dismal Accident which happened: And *Aristotle* did not think it amiss, to give us the Name of those Lamentations: The Name is taken from the Gestures, which are commonly used on such Occasions, as to strike and beat oneself; and as that falls out, only in those Plays where those fatal Accidents are found, the Philosopher took care to inform us before, that they are found only in certain Tragedies, for they never are in those whose places they were used in, and according to the Subject is not very Tragical.
The Characters which Tragedy ought to choose to be perfect, whether it ought to be simple, or double, and to have a Catastrophe Happy or Fatal. The different Relish of the first Athenians, and those of Aristotle's Time. From what Families the Subjects of the best Pieces were taken. Euripides is defended against the Ancients, who accuse him of being too Tragical. The Success of his Pieces. The Publick Disputes of the Poets. To be good, a Tragedy ought to have the Approbation, both of the Learned, and the Ignorant. Euripides his Faults. Double Tragedies more Comical than Tragical. Their Origin.

1. After having sufficiently explained all the Parts of Tragedy, Order requires that we should treat of those things, which a Poet ought to follow, or avoid, in the Composition of a Subject; and the way which he ought to take, to arrive at the end which Tragedy proposes.

2. Since Tragedy ought to be Implex and not Simple, to have all the Beauty which it is capable of, and (a) that it ought to excite Terror and Compassion; for we have already said, that that is the Property of this sort of Imitation;

(a) And be the Imitation of Terrible and Pitiful Things.
'tis (b) a necessary Consequence, that we must not choose to make a very honest Man fall from Prosperity into Adversity; for (c) instead of exciting Terror and Compassion, it will give Horror, which is detested by all.

3. It is also evident, that he must not take an ill Man, to make him pass from an unhappy State, to one that shall be Happy and Ease: There is nothing which is less Tragical; (d) and we don't find in it any of the Effects of Tragedy; for beside, its not Exciting either Terror or Compassion, it does not give any Pleasure.

4. Moreover, he ought not to represent the Misfortunes of a very wicked Man: (e) 'Tis most certain, that such a Representation may give some Pleasure, but it will produce neither Fear nor Pity; for the first is produced by the Misfortunes of those who are like our selves; and the latter from the Miseries of those who deserve better Luck; and consequently (f) such a Subject hath nothing which either deserves Pity, or is Terrible.

5. There remains only him then, who is between these who being (g) neither bad nor good, in the superlative Degree, doth not draw his Misfortunes on him, by his Wickedness, or by his Crimes: He must chuse, from among those who are of Eminent Quality, and of Great Re-

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(b) Very plain.  (c) That is not so Terrible or Pityful, as Wicked.
(d) For it has nothing, which Tragedy ought to have.
(e) For thought it, et c.  (f) That which happens to.
(g) Eminent for Virtue and justice, nor Vice and depravity.
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*.

6. It necessarily follows from hence, that a Fable which is (i) well composed, ought to be simple, and not double, as some People have pretended; and that it ought rather to end with the ill than the good Fortune of the Principal Persons, provided that that Unhappiness be the Consequence of some great Fault, and not the Effect of a Remarkable Crime. *In a Word, it ought to be the Misfortune of (k) a Man, who is neither bad nor good; but if he cannot find one, who, is exactly such, he ought to choose one, who is rather good than wicked.*

7. What we see at this Day, is an evident Proof of this Truth. The Poets do now bring all sorts of Subjects on the Stage, *with Success*; but those which are at present the best Pieces, and which succeed best, are without doubt those whole Subjects are taken only from a small Number of Families, or those of *Alcmeon, Oedipus, Meleager, Thyestes, Telephus,* and all others, who have either done, or suffer'd terrible things. *You may be assured then, that the finest Tragedy, according to the Rules of Art, is that where this Conduct is observed.*

8. 'Tis for this Reason, that those who blame *Euripides* for following these Maxims, in his *Tragedies*.

(i) Such Families.
(k) Eminently good.

(*) Such an one as I have spoken of.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

gedies; and that most of his Pieces have a lamentable Catastrophe, are (l) very much deceived. On the contrary, 'tis perfectly good; and (m) an incontestable Proof of it is, that in all the publick (n) Disputes, and on the Stage, these sort of Tragedies appear always more Tragical and affecting, (o) if nothing that is Foreign, disturb or spoil the Representation. And Euripides himself appear'd the most Tragical of all the Poets, tho' otherwise he was not exact, and correct, in the Conduct and Disposition of his Subjects.

9. The Fable to which I give the second Place, tho' others have given it the first, is that which hath a double Constitution, as that of the Odysses, and which end with a (p) double Catastrophe; that is, by one Catastrophe, which is happy for the Good, and fatal for the Wicked. Thos who have prefer'd this, to the first, did it in all probability, (q) by reason of the weakness of the Audience, to whose Relish and Desires, the Poets do generally Conform themselves. But the Pleasure which this Fable gives, is nothing near so proper for Tragedy, as for Comedy; and truly (r) we see in Comedy, Enemies as irreconcilable as Orestes, and Egysthus, become, at last, very good Friends, and go off the Stage without (s) one drop of Blood being spilt on either side.

(l) Are in the wrong. (m) The greatest sign. (n) Scenes &c. (o) If it be well added. (p) Contrariety. (q) This was first. (r) There we see. (s) Either of them being slain.

REMARKS
REMARKS on Chap. 13.

1. 'Tis a necessary Consequence, that we must not chuse to make a very honest Man fall from Prosperity into Adversity. ] None but Aristotle, who was so great a Philosopher, that he knew, perfectly well, the Nature of the Passions, even to the least Difference, could ever pretend, from the Practice of the Ancients, to form Rules so sure, and so judicious, as those he gives us here; but we must confess, in the mean time, that 'twas to the Greeks alone that he proposed such perfect Rules, for as they were the most nice and delicate People of the whole World, they sought, in Tragedy, only the Pleasures which that Poem ought to give. We are not so difficult to be pleased, if a Tragedy has a great deal of Intrigue, Pathetick Sentiments, and Motions, it stirs up our Curiosity, and we define no more; 'tis equal to us whether a good or wicked Man perish. Let us examine the Rules of Aristotle, with the Reasons which make them so solid; and after that, we shall see whether there be any Opportunity which will permit us to deviate from them. This is Aristotle's way of Reasoning. Tragedy is the imitation of an Action, which ought to excite Terror and Compassion; the Misfortunes of a very vicious Man, do neither one nor t'other; so they can't make the Subject of Tragedy. If the second Proposition is true, the Consequence is so beyond Contradiction. To be convinc'd of the truth of this Second Proposition, we need only remember that Fear, and Pity, which ought to bear the sway in Tragedy, are two Passions which do ordinarily arise from the Misfortunes of those who are like our selves: And truly, Pity is a Sense of Pain, which the Sufferings of a Man who does not deserve it, produces in us, since that Evil is of such
190 *Aristotle's Art of Poetry.*

a Nature, that it may happen to us, and which we may reasonably fear; for Self-love is the Foundation of all the Passions; and that Pity, which seems only to exert itself on our Neighbours Account, is really founded on our own. The Misfortunes of a Man, who is Superior to others by his Virtue, cannot naturally excite in us, either Fear or Pity, because they give us Horror. Now there is a great deal of Difference between a thing that is Horrible, and another that is Pitiful; for the Audience, seeing Virtue unhappy, is thrown into despair; finds fault, and does not endeavour to relift the Passions, thinking it is in vain to overcome them, since Virtue precipitates us into Misery, no less than Vice does. *Aristotle* surely had Reason then to exclude a very virtuous Man from Tragedy. Mr. Corneille perceiving that this Maxime would banish the *Martyrs* from the Stage, endeavoured to find Authorities to defend his *Polyeuctes*, by other means than its great Success; and at last he found out one Minturnus, who examines in his Treatise, If the Passion of Jesus Christ, and the Holy Martyrs, ought to be excluded the Theatre, by reason of their Virtue? And decides it in his Favour. Thus is Minturnus opposed to *Aristotle*. If the *Polyeuctes* of that great Man had no other Foundation, I should think it had but little to rely on. It is better freely to confess, that Mr. Corneille knew the Age he lived in; and that he ventur'd that Poem on that Knowledge which he had. The Success justified the Poet well enough; but I don't know whether it would be easy to justify that Success: I don't speak here of the Subject, of which few are capable of judging; for perhaps in other respects, that Piece is the best composed of all Mr.
Mr. Corneille's Plays. It is full of fine Thoughts, and hath perfectly good Characters where the Manners are admirably well denoted: There's no Body but would Interess themselves for Philippus and Severus, and be concerned at their Integrity. 'Tis this which made the Play succeed, but that Subject is by no means, proper for the Stage, which ought neither to expose the Good or ill Fortune of a very virtuous Man. Whatever manner we regard: Martyrdom, or unhappiness, or an evil, it cannot excite either Pity or Pleasure; and consequently can't refine the Passions, which is the only end that Tragedy aims at, as we have already shewn. This Rule of Aristotle will try several other Pieces, which have pleased, though by the Subject, but some other Places, which being conformable to these Rules, have all the Beauty they are possibly capable of. The Italian Commentator exalts himself here into mighty Theological speculations, to contradict the Philosopher; as if Divinity, and the Holy Scripture, could ever be contrary to the Sentiments of Nature, on which Aristotle founds his Judgment.

2. It is also evident, that he must not take an ill Man, to make him pass from an unhappy to an happy State; there is nothing which is less Tragical.] If the Misfortunes of a virtuous Man give Horror, the good Fortune of an ill Man will give us Indignation; 'tis for this Reason that he ought also to be excluded the Theatre. There is nothing more certain than this Decision.

3. And we don't find in is any of the Effects of Tragedy.] These Effects are those which he explains afterwards; the Terror, Compassion, and Pleasure, which ought to be the Products of Tragedy: If Tragedy does not produce these Effects
Effects which it ought to produce, it is most certain that it can never obtain its end, and purge the Passions. There is nothing more opposite to the Refining of the Passions, than the Prosperity of the Wicked; instead of correcting, it nourishes and strengthens them; for who would take the Trouble to get rid of his Vices, if they make him happy.

4. For beside its not exciting either Terror, or Compassion, it does not give any Pleasure. I could name many Pieces which excite neither Terror, nor Compassion, and yet don't fail of giving Pleasure, and being well received; and don't at all shock the Choice, or the Inclination of the Audience; for he that exposes the happiness of an Ill Man, stirs up Anger, is very far from causing any Pleasure, and consequently can have nothing to render it tolerable.

5. Moreover, he ought not to represent the misfortunes of a very Wicked Man. 'Tis most certain, that such a representation may give some Pleasure, but it will produce neither Fear nor Pity. One may have some Pleasure in seeing a very wicked Man punished for his Crimes; but his Misery will never stir us up to Compassion, because he has only what he deserved: For no good Man is ever concerned to see a Murderer, or a Parricide, punished; because it is a just Action, and consequently all good Men ought to be pleased at it. If his Misery does not excite Pity, it will much less excite Fear, and so cannot refine the Passions; for the Spectators knowing themselves not to be so wicked as that Man, will never fear those evils, which he has drawn on him by his Crimes; nor endeavour to make themselves better.
6. For the first is produced by the misfortunes of those who are like our selves. The misfortunes of those who are above us, don't make us afraid, because they signify little to us, and we are not in a condition to fear them; but it may be objected, that if only the misfortunes of those who are like us—Excite fear, Tragedy would not do it, since it exposes only the misfortunes of Princes and Kings, and other Illustrious Persons; or if it did give it, it would be to Persons of that Quality, which is the reason why Paul Beny applies the effect of Tragedy to them only. 'Tis no difficult matter to answer this Objection. Mr. Corneille hath endeavoured to do it, in laying that Paul Beny understood the Words like our selves, in too literal a Sense, and did not consider that there were no Kings at Athens, where these Poems were Acted, from which Aristotle draws his Examples, and forms his Rules. The Philosopher, says he, bad no such thought, and would not have employed in the Definition of Tragedy, a thing whose effect could so seldom happen, and whose use was restrain'd to so very few Persons. 'Tis true, that Kings are brought on the Stage as the Principal Actors in Tragedy; but the Auditors have no occasion for Scepters to resemble them, in order to fear the misfortunes which befall them, for those Kings are Men as well as the Audience, and fall into misfortune by the Extravagance of those Passions, which the Audience is capable of. They afford an Argument very easy to be made by the greatest and the meanest of Men, and the Spectator can easily judge that a King, who has given himself over to Ambition, Fear, Hatred, Revenge, and falls into great Misfortunes, deserves pity; much more he, who is but an ordinary Man, should curb those Passions for fear they should plunge him into the same misery. But this Answer of Mr. Corneille, instead of solving the difficulty, proves rather that Aristotle's definition is false, for truly, if all the misfortunes which the Passions draw on us should cause fear to every one indifferently, those of Kings and Princes would
give it to the People, as well as those of other Men, and consequently Aristotle was in the wrong to say, both in his Rhetorick and here, that fear is produced by the miseries of those who are like ourselves. The true Answer ought to be drawn from Aristotle's own Doctrine, who hath shew'd the Tragedy at first sight, is an Universal Fable which regards all Men in General; 'tis not Oedipus, Atreus, nor Thyscles, but an ordinary Man, to whom they give what Name they please; but the Poet gives him some eminent Name which is known to render the Action the more noble and credible, notwithstanding the Fable be render'd particular by the Names; however, its Nature remains still the same, and 'twill be always general, 'tis a common Man that Acts under the Name of a Prince, or King. Thus Aristotle had reason to call Kings and Princes like our Selves; for the aim of the Poet is, not to imitate the Actions of Kings, but of mankind, 'tis that which he Represents.

--- Mutato nomine de te

Fabula Narratur.

Change but the Name, the Story's told of thee.

7. And the latter from the Miseries of those who deserve better luck.] What Aristotle says here, that Pity is produc'd by the Miseries of those who don't deserve the evils they suffer, seems to contradict what he had said before, that the unhappiness of a very virtuous Man doth not exile Compassion, but notwithstanding this, he does not contradict himself, Pity always presupposes, that those who are pitied are good People, for none would pity them if they thought they deserved the Evils they suffer; but they are those who have an ordinary and common Honesty, as all those who are called Honest Men; if they were virtuous and just, to the supreme degree,
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

...gree, we should be afflicted with horror only for their misery; for Pity, as well as Fear, requires some sort of equality in those who suffer, and those who are concern'd for their Afflictions.

8. There remains only him then, who is between these two, who being neither Bad nor Good, in the superlative degree, doth not draw his misfortune on him, by his wickedness, or by his Crime.] It seems, that there are yet two conditions of Life which Aristotle has not mention'd, the first is, of those Men who are extraordinarily virtuous, who may pass from a very unhappy to a very blessed condition; the other of those ill Men who should be overwhelm'd with Misery; but Aristotle spake not of them, since one of them has nothing Tragical, and the other nothing that deserves Pity, and which ought not to be admitted, unless in the subordinate Persons; and 'tis thus, the Antients have used it, at last, in those pieces which now remain, except those simple ones where there is neither Peripeties nor Remembrance; in all the rest, that is in the Implex, those wicked Persons, who are introduce'd on the Stage, as Clytemnestra, Egyptes, are never the Principal Persons, and 'tis of these that Aristotle speaks here, and since they cannot be very Vertuous, nor very Vicious, they must certainly be between both; now this mean is only in those who commit Errors by their Infirmities, and fall into involuntary Crimes. They are vicious, because they do that which is so, and they are good because they commit Iniquities, contrary to their Inclinations, and by Infirmity.

9. He must chuse from among those who are of Eminent Quality, great Reputation, and some Illustrious Person.] There happen now extraordinary Adventures, and Tragical enough too, among People of a mean or low Condition, which might deservedly take place in Tragedy; but I believe, it would never succeed, not by reason of the Action, for that would...
have all necessary and requisite Qualifications, but on account of the meaness of the Persons; for Tragedy, as Epick Poem does not require, that the Action which it represents should be great and important in itself. It is sufficient that it be Tragical, the Names of the Persons are sufficient to render it Magnificent, which, for that very reason, are all taken from those of the greatest Fortune and Reputation. The greatness of these eminent Men render the Action great, and their Reputation makes it credible and probable. This is the reason why Aristotle said, in the 5th. Chapt. that Eposæas has this in common with Tragedy, that they are an imitation of the Actions of the greatest Persons, see what was said in the Remarks on that place.

10. Who is become miserable by some Involuntary fault.] These Words άδύνατον έναν δον't signify barely, by an humane frailty or fault, but by an involuntary fault, which has been committed either by Ignorance, or Imprudence, against the natural Temper of the Man, when he was transported by a violent Passion, which he could not suppress, or by some greater and external force, in execution of such Orders, as he neither could, nor ought to disobey. Oedipus his fault is of the first sort, and he is also guilty of the second. That of Thyestes is of the second only. Those of Orestes and Alcmone are of the third, as shall be shewn in what follows.

11. As Oedipus.] Lets hear what Mr. Corneille says, for all, that such great Men as he write, tho' they are deceiv'd, has yet something that is precious. Truly, says he, I don't understand what Aristotle means in this place; Oedipus doth not seem to me to be guilty of any fault, altho' he kill'd his Father, because he did not know him, and no Man of Spirit and Courage but will dispute the way against a Stranger, who attacks him very furiously; nevertheless, as the signification of the Greek word άδύνατον may be extended to mean a sim-
Error of forgetfulness, such as his was, we will (with the Philosopher) admit of it, altho' I don't well see, what Passion it can refine in us, and which of them it would have us correct by his Example. It seems 'tis of his good grace that he gives us this decision, and on account of the citerum which he had for the Philosopher in other respects. Notwithstanding which Aristotle is in the right, and Mr. Corneille is guilty of two very considerable Faults: The first is, that he did not rightly understand the Words, δι' αδυνατον με, and consequently must be ignorant of the Nature of Oedipus's Crime. The second is, that he knew very little of the Character of that Patricide Prince, which hinder'd him from seeing what Passions his example instructs us to Correct. The Greek Term has been sufficiently explained in the preceding Remark. Oedipus his Fault was, being transported to Anger by the Insolence of a Coach-man, who would make him break way against his Will, he killed some Men; two days after the Oracle told him he should kill his own Father. He himself relates the Action in Sophocles very naturally. This Action alone sufficiently denotes his Character, but Sophocles has given 'one, by all his Manners so Conformable to this; and which answers so perfectly to Aristotle's Rules, that it appears in every respect a Man, who is neither Good nor Bad; a mixture of Virtue and Vice; his Vices are Pride, Violence, Anger, Ternery and Imprudence; 'tis not properly his Patricide nor Incest, which made him unhappy. Any punishment for those had been in a manner unjust since they were Crimes Involuntary and Committed without his Knowledge; he fell not into those terrible Calamities, but by his Curiosity, Rashness and Violence. Thus Croon tells him in the Greek Tragedy, Such Temper as yours are insupportable to themselves. These are the Vices which Sophocles would have us correct. 'Tis therefore

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from
from his piece that we must take the true Characters of Oedipus, to find that just mean which Aristotle here requires. Instead of which Mr. Corneille makes a very Virtuous Man, notwithstanding all his Innocence, fall into horrible Miseries. He himself says,

I still remember Generous Exploits,
Yet Parricide and Incest do me haunt,
I've follow'd none, but great Alcides Steps.
Sought ev'ry where just Laws for to maintain,
Ill Men to Punish, and all Vice restrain.

We don't find here, that just mean; the Man, who is neither Good nor Bad, and thereby Mr. Corneille his spoiled the most perfect and compleat Character which the Ancients ever Invented. The exploits of Oedipus alone, were killing four Men in a violent Rage; explaining the Sphinx's Enigma, which the most Wicked Man who had any parts, might have done as well as he; where-upon Sophocles does not praise in him any thing but his Courage, his good Fortune and Judgment, Qualities which are equally common to the Good and the Bad; and in those also, who are made up both of Virtues and Vices, and are neither Righteous nor Wicked. Plutarch was only capable of knowing the true Character of Oedipus; and that Passion which by his Example we ought to correct, for in his Treatise of Curiosity, he attributes not only the least, but also the greatest misfortunes of this Prince to that Vice. I cite the whole Passage because, 'tis very remarkable, Curiosity cast Oedipus into the greatest of all Evils, for being desirous to know who he was, because they reproached him for being a Stranger. He set forward to Consult the Oracle, met with his Father, and killed him without knowing who he was; afterwards he Married his own Mother and by that became King of Thebes, and when he seemed to be most happy, he had still a de-
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

215

desire to know more concerning himself, altho' his Wife used all possible Endeavours to hinder him; but the more he strove to do it, the more he solicited a certain old Man, who knew all the Affair, threats and forcing him by all the ways imaginable; so that at last the Business was so far Revealed, that he began to have some sort of Suspicion; and then the Old Man, seeing himself obliged to declare every particular, Cried out, Alas! I am at last reduced to the Cruel necessity of Speaking. Oedipus transported with Passion and Trembling, answered, and I am reduced to the Cruel necessity to Hear but speak. So much so tickling is the Pleasure of Curiosity, and difficult to withstand as an Ulcer, the more 'tis scratch'd the more 'tis Inflamed and Bloody; but he that is free from this Malady, and of an easy Temper, when he hath neglected to bear some bad News, ought to say. O divine forgetfulness of past Evils, how full of Wisdom art thou!

12. Thyestes.] For Thyestes, as Mr. Corneille goes on, I cannot discover that Common Honesty, nor that Crime without a Fault, which plunged him into his Misery; for he is an Incestuous Person, who abuses his Brother's Wife. This Censure appears at first sight better grounded than the first, and it seems not to be so easy to prove the Thyestes's Action was an Involuntary one, such as Aristotle desires in this place, and that he Committed a Sin by the Violence of his Passion only, which would in some measure render his Fault excusable. If Thyestes's Crime was only the Love which he had for his Sister in-Law, it would not be perhaps so difficult to excuse, and 'tis that way some have endeavour'd to do it; but Love was not the only Crime Thyestes was Guilty of; for he not only defiled Alcestis's Wife, but carried away the Ram, which was the Token of the Empire, and which had the Golden Fleece. Can this premeditated Theft ever pass for a Crime without
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*.

216

a Fault? We will give the History, and then judge of it. *Atrius* and *Thyestes*, both Sons of *Pelops*, agreed after the Death of their Father, that they would both Reign by turns at *Argos*. *Atrius*, who had been used to Govern, would not give place to *Thyestes* when it came to his turn. *Thyestes* being very Angry at this, got *Atrius’s* Wife, carried her away; and that he might have the Empire, which was his due, he carried away the fatal Ram also. 'Twas *Thyestes’s* Anger which provok’d him, to take this Revenge on his Brother. Thus is *Aristotle* justified, and the Character of *Thyestes* Conformable to his Rule; he does amiss, but 'tis by his Anger, and to repel the Injury and Injustice which was done him, and 'tis this without doubt *Horace* had respect to, where he says in the XVIth Ode of the 1st Book.

*Thyestes* exitio gravi
stravere.

As Mr. *Corneille* has accused *Aristotle* of not knowing *Thyestes’s* Character. I accuse *Horace* of having put *Thyestes* for *Atrius*; but *Aristotle* and *Horace* are in the right, and Mr. *Corneille* and I in the wrong. For I may venture to put my self into Competition with that Great Man, where we speak only of faults which we are both Guilty of. As for the Refining the Passions, 'tis no difficult matter to shew immediately, what Vices this example of *Thyestes* may correct in us; 'tis Choler, and an inordinate and unbridled desire of Revenge, which always draws a Man to act Unjustly, and sooner or later is fatal. This Anger of *Thyestes* was the occasion of all the miseries of the *Pelopides*. The only thing which can be opposed to my Remark is what *Aristotle* says in the 3d Book of his Morals, when he treats of Actions, which
which are Voluntary, and of those which are Involuntary, or by Compulsion; plainly determines that all the Actions which are Committed by Anger or Lust, ought to pass for Voluntary, and no ways forced, because their Principles are in us, and we do them willingly, and with the knowledge of all their circumstances. This is certainly true, when we consider Actions one by one, and to the bottom: but when we consider them in general, and in themselves, we may lay of those which Anger has produced, that they are involuntary and forced, because without violent Passion there would be no such things, and they would never be Committed. Otherwise it is certain, as Aristotle assures us, that every forced or involuntary Action is accompanied with sadness, for sadness is an inseparable condition of an involuntary Action. We can no longer doubt but that Cholerick Actions are forced Actions, since in them we find the Character of Sadness and Grief. And this is a truth which Theophrastus perceived very well: for the Emperor Marcus Aurelius tell us in the 2d Book of his Reflections, that in the comparison which that Philosopher had made of Sins in their general respects had allsorted, That those which proceed from Concupiscence, are greater, and deserve more punishment than those which proceed from Anger, because what that Passion makes a Man act, seems to resist Reason, be against his Will, and with a sort of secret Reluctance, and he is very like a Man that has received some affront, whose unkindness obliges him to revenge himself, whereas the Voluptuous goes on to Injustice by his own proper Motion, and to gratify his Passion. But it may be said, that tho' the matter disputed of is preferred, yet that does not excuse Aristotle from contradicting himself, since he says in his Art of Poetry, that the Crime Thresles was guilty of was an involuntary fault; and in his Morals he says that it was an Action purely free, and which lay in his own power.
power to do, or not to do. I answer, that there is no contradiction in Aristotle, for in his Morals he examines the actions of Men, and their Passions throughly, and one by one, according to the Principles of Morality; and that in his Art of Poetry he examines them only in gross, and with respect to Poetry. Which is satisfied with general inspections, whereas Morality requires particular ones, and searches the very Origin and Principle of all our Actions.

13. It necessarily follows from hence, that a Fable which is well composed, ought to be Simple and not Double. Aristotle in this place calls that a Simple Fable, which exposes the unhappiness of one Man only. He calls it double, when it has a double Catastrophe, that is, when it finishes by one Catastrophe which is happy for the Good, and another which is unhappy for the Impious, as in the Electra of Sophocles, where Electra and Orestes are at last made happy, and Egisthus and Clytemnestra perish. But from what this Philosopher says, doth it necessarily follow, that an excellent Tragedy ought to be single, and not double? Yes, without doubt, for since he has said, that to be perfect, a Tragedy ought to take the Action of one Man, who being neither good nor ill, is not rendered unhappy by his own fault; this can be found only in simple Fables; the consequence therefore is necessary, sure and indisputable. The Fable which has the double Catastrophe of which I have spoken, is directly opposite to this Rule, the prosperity of the good hath nothing Tragical in it; and there is nothing terrible, nor that deserves pity in the punishment of the Wicked. We shall see in this Chapter, what 'twas Introduced the double Fables; the reason why they succeed, and will continue so to do.
14. As some People have pretended.] He does not name those who contradicted this opinion, but without doubt they were such, whose Authority had some force. Socrates and Plato were probably of the number, for both of them asserted, that Tragedy ought to be regulated according to Law, and that it should be Conform to the meaning of the Law. Now the Law wills, that the Good prosper, and the Wicked be destroyed. This is a very remarkable passage on this Head in Plato, de Leg. lib. 7.

15. If he cannot find one who is exactly such, he ought to choose one, who is rather good than Wicked.] There is but one Sovereign Perfection, all that is below it is more or less perfect, as it approaches more or less that first Pattern; from whence it follows as a sure Consequence, if the Poet cannot find a Man who is in the just mean, whose good and evil Qualities are so exactly mingled, that he is neither good nor bad, to form the subject of a Tragedy off, he ought to choose one, who is as near that just mean as possibly he can; but if he be rather Wicked than Pious, he can neither excite Fear nor Pity, for those reasons which have been already laid down; he must be rather Pious, than Wicked as the Prometheus and Agamemnon of Eschylus, the Ajax and Antigone of Sophocles, the Hippolitus, and some other Heroes of Euripides, we have at this time some single pieces in our Theatre, but if I well remember there is none which is exact according to either of these Rules, except Mr. Racine's Phedra, which is a Greek Play. That is, there is none whose Hero being neither Good nor Wicked, falls into misfortunes by his own fault, or being rather good, than Wicked draws a fatal Catastrophe on himself by an involuntary Crime. So that our Theatre cannot pretend to say, it has the two forms
220 Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*.

of Tragedy, to which Aristotle gives the chief places.

16. What we see at this day, is an evident Proof of this Truth; the Poets do now bring all sorts of Subjects on the Stage with success; but those which are at present the best pieces, and which succeed best, are those, of which the Subjects are taken only from a small number of Families.] This is one of the most important Passages of the whole Book; the Commentarors think that Aristotle means that the Antient Poets introduc'd all sorts of Subjects on the Stage, and that those of his time being more judicious and wiser, had only choice Subjects, and conformable to the Rules he had given; but this is not Aristotle's meaning, who never had any thoughts of preferring the Poets of his own time to Sophocles and Euripides, whom he always looks on as the Master of, and Patterns for the Stage. His design is to confirm, by Authority and Examples, an Opinion which he has already prov'd, by very solid reasons, he does not take this Authority and Examples from the change the Poets of his time had made in Tragedy; but from the change which was made in the Audience. Formerly, says he, the Poets brought all sorts of Subjects on the Stage, and the People who were not very nice, saw them all with pleasure; but now their Relish is more delicate, and the Audience Criticizing, none succeed, but those Plays, which are made according to the Rules I have laid down: and 'tis an undeniable sign of it, that those Tragedies are the most perfect and fine, which imitate the Action of a Man, who is neither good nor bad, or less wicked than good. It is certain that Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, brought all sorts of Subjects on the Stage indifferently, we have the Persians, and Suppliants of Æschylus, which are not according to the Idea Aristotle gives.
us here: We have the Philocetes of Sophocles; the Alcestes, Suppliants, Rhodus Bacchantes, Hecatides, Helena and Ion of Euripides; without counting the other pieces of these three Poets, which are lost, and of which the Names only remain, these sufficiently denote that most of them were far enough off from that Perfection which Aristotle sought after. This Passage teaches us something which is particularly remarkable, that those very Tragedies which did succeed in their time, had not the same success afterwards, and that those only were esteem'd, which were according to Aristotle's Rules; whatever good Opinion we may have of our selves at this day, were have the same vitiated Relfish the old Athenians had, and for which Aristotle Condemns them; we Entertain, as they did, all sorts of Subjects in our Theatre, the misfortunes of an honest Man, and those of the wicked, Tragical and Romantick Adventures, nay, we have Tragedies, whose Constitution is so Comical, that we need only change the Names, to make a true Comedy of them, but the difference between the old Athenians and us, and which is on their side, is, that Tragedy was hardly finish'd in their time, whereas, 'tis now two Thousand Years since it has had all the Perfection can possibly be given to it.

17. As those of Alcmeon, Oedipus, Thyestes, Meleager, Telephus, &c.] We have had the Stories of Oedipus, Orestes and Thyestes, there remain only Alcmeon, Meleager and Telephus, to give an Account of. Alcmeon was the Son of Amphiaratus and Eriphyla. His Father, who was a great Southlayer, foreseeing that all who went with Adrastus to the Theban War should perish, Adrastus only excepted, refused to go along with him, and prevented several others from entering into the same League. Adrastus, and his Son-
in-law Polynices, or as others call him Eteocles, went to Consult Iphis, to know how they might bring Amphiaraurus to a Compliance. Iphis told them, that they need only give the Necklace to Eriphyla, which Polynices had brought from Thebes, and which had been Dedicated to Harmony. Amphiaraurus being inform'd of all that was Transacted against him, forbid his Wife to take any thing from either of these two Princes; but that Prohibition was in vain, Eriphyla was charm'd with the Beauty of the Necklace, and promised to engage her Husband; for that depended entirely on her, Amphiaraurus having sworn to obey his Wife in every thing. Amphiaraurus was forc'd to leave his Country, but on his departure strictly charg'd his Son Alcmeon, who was very young, that when he came to Age, he should Revenge his Death by killing his Mother. Alcmeon obey'd these orders very punctually, and 'tis this Murder of Eriphyla, by Alcmeon, which the Antients law with so much pleasure Acted on their Stages. I must confess I think this is a very fine Subject for Action, but not for the manners, at least, if the Father's order was not Confirm'd by one of the Oracles, as some Authors pretend it was; almost all Poets treated of this Subject, but since none of their Pieces remain, we cannot tell how they manag'd it; all we can learn is from a Passage in the third Book of Aristotle's Morals, where he tells us that Euripides, did not succeed in it; for the Philosopher ridicules all the fine Arguments the Poet brings to make that Murder look well, and the reasons also, which he also brings to shew, that Alcmeon was forc'd to come to that extremity, the Passage is very remarkable. Aristotle speaking of mixt Actions, that is, such that however voluntary they may seem, yet, when they come to be considered in themselves, and void of all Circumstances, appear to be forc'd, says very well. These Actions are sometimes blame-
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.* 223

able, and sometimes praise worthy, and sometimes pardonable; those are praise worthy when a Man exposes himself to those things which are dangerous, and troublesome to obtain those, which are Great and Honourable. The Blamable are just the contrary, when a Man does shameful Actions for to obtain that which is Dishonest, and of no Reputation; to Conclude, those things deserve Pity, and Pardon; when we do those things, which we ought not to do, in order to avoid some insupportable Extremity. Moreover, says he further, there are some Actions which ought not to be done on these Occasions, tho' we should suffer Death, and 'tis for this reason that all the Excuses, which Alcmeon makes in Euripides, to palliate the Murder of his Mother, are vain and ridiculous, there being nothing which can possibly palliate such an Offence. By this it appears that Euripides did not follow those who said, that this Murder was Commanded by the Oracle; for Aristotle would never have da'd to say, that an order of the Gods was not sufficient to Authorize that Action; and if he had said it, he would also have Condemn'd the Murder of Clytemnestra, by Orestes, which he does not.

18. Meleager.] Meleager was the Son of Althaia, and Oeneus, King of Calydon; a Week after he was born, the Destinies went to see him, and foretold that he should live till a Brand which lay there on the Fire was entirely Consum'd; his Mother immediately extinguish'd the Brand, and kept it very safe. Sometime after Diana, who was angry with Oeneus, sent a very furious Boar, which wasted the whole Country. Oeneus gave publick notice of a day to Hunt this Boar in, and invited all the valiant Princes of Greece. Atalanta was also there; the day of Hunting came, Atalanta was the first who wounded the Boar, which Meleager slew; and that Atalanta, with whom he was in Love, might
might have all the Glory, he presented her with the Hide. Althea’s Brothers, i.e. Meleager’s Uncles, being very uneasy, that a Dame should run away with the Prize, endeav’rd to take it away from her; Meleager being angry at the violence, they offered to that Princes, kill’d his Uncles, Althea was much concern’d for the Death of her Brethren, and to be reveng’d, burnt that fatal Brand, on the Preservation of which her Son’s Life depended, and they were both Confum’d at the same time. The Subject is very fine, and has all the Conditions which Aristotle requires, since Meleager drew on himself his unhappiness, by a Passion which he could not matter; you may see all the Story in the 8th Book of Ovid’s Metamorphoses.

19. Telephus.] Æschylus, Euripides and Agathon, have made Tragedies, whose Subjects were drawn from the History of Telephus. But as those Pieces are lost, ‘tis very difficult to know that History exactly, what follows is taken from a Passage in Strabo, who quotes this Play of Euripides: Hercules passing thro’ Arcadia, tarried with Alevas at Tegea, and Debauch’d his Daughter Auge, who was a Priestess to Minerva, and had a Son by her. The Father discovering his Daughter’s mischance, shut her, and her Child together in a Chest, and cast’em into the Sea. Minerva mov’d with Compassion for her Priestess, and for her Offspring, safely convey’d the Coffer to the Myfian Shore, where Teuthras was King, who Married Auge, and afterwards Adopted her Son. Apollodorus relates this History after another manner, for he says, that Alevas expos’d the Infant on Mount Parthinus, and delivered the Mother to Nauplius to be slain. Nauplius gave her to Teuthras, King of Myfia, who Married her. The Child, who was expos’d on the Mountains, was suckled by a Deer, and afterwards Nurs’d by the Shepherds,
herds, who called him Telephus, because he was
brought up in the Desart, far distant from his Pa-
rents. When he was of Age, he consulted the
Oracle, to know whose Son he was; the Oracle
sent him into Myfia, where he was adopted by Teus-
bras; but neither Strabo nor Apollodorus tell us,
wherein the terrible Adventures which happened
to him do consist, and which make the subje•t
for Tragedy. There is some probability, that
he was guilty of some Murder, since he was Ban-
ished from Myfia, and went into Greece in the
Habit of a Beggar.

20. And all others who have either done or suffered
terrible things.] For all those who meet with such
Tragical Adventures, may equally furnish sub-
ject matter for Tragedy, since they have in them
all a very great loftiness.

21. Who have done, or suffered terrible things.] There have been very great difficulties started on
this passage, without ever being solved, we will
endeavour not to leave one scruple unsatisfied on
this place. It seems at first sight that Aristotle means,
Those who have done and suffered terrible things;
since he said before, that Tragedy ought to imi-
tate the Action of such a Man only, who drew
on himself great miseries by an involuntary Crime,
that is to say, who has suffered terrible things,
after he had done some unwillingly; there is no-
thing in this which is Contradictory. Aristotle
makes use of the disjunctive; or, to denote the
difference of the Actions of Men, which might
furnish the subjects of Tragedy. In some, what
they do is more Remarkable and Outrageous, than
what they suffer, as in Atreus’s Action; in others,
what they suffer is more affecting and terrible
than what they have done, as in the Actions of
Oedipus. ’Tis convenient then, that the Poet
makes use of both these sorts of Actions, pro-
vided
vided that he always observes this general and inviolable Rule, that the principal Person falls into his misfortunes by some involuntary fault.

22. You may be assured then, that the finest Tragedy, according to the Rules of Art, is that, where this Conduct is followed. There may be Plays, which neglecting the Rules of Art, may not fail to please by the conjunction of the Times, or the ignorance of the Audience, or by the humour they are in; or lastly, because they have so many fine things in them, as hide their defects. This is the reason why Aristotle does not say in general, The finest Tragedy is that where, &c. But the finest, according to the Rules of Art, which is sufficient to show, that of two Tragedies, one of which shall be according, and the other contrary to the Rules of Art, if they are equally beautiful in all their parts, that which is regular shall be the most approved of, and be the best beyond Comparison.

23. 'Tis for this Reason, that those who blame Euripides for following these Maxims in his Tragedies, and, that the most part of his pieces have lamentable Catastrophes, are very much deceived. What Aristotle says here of Euripides, confirms the explanation I have given of this Passage, What we see at this day, &c. for if he had spoken of the Modern Poets, he would not have returned so soon to Euripides, who was dead above Three-score Years before our Philosopher wrote this Art of Poetry. This is without dispute, so we'll pass on to examine this Passage, which is of more importance than it really seems to be. As the Philosopher had said, that those Tragedies were at that time thought the best, which exposed the misfortunes of those who had committed involuntary Crimes, so he takes notice that there were
were at the same time some Spirits too weak, or too nice to bear such dismal Catastrophes, as Euripides made in his Plays, who had however the same Relish with the Ancient Athenians, who see those pieces, whose end was happy with a great deal of Pleasure. 'Tis this sort of People whom he would undeceive, and his Argument is invincible, as we shall see in the second Remark after this.

24. And that most part if his pieces have a lamentable Catastrophe.] This is so true, that of XIX. Plays of Euripides which remain, ten or eleven are entirely Tragical, Hecuba, The Phenician Women, Medea, Hippolyta, Andromache, The Suppliants, The Troades, The Bacchantes, The Heracles, Hercules the Furious, and Electra. And there are eight which terminate happily, Orestes, Alcest, the two Iphigenia's, Rhesus, Cyclops, Helena and Ion. But that which more peculiarly denotes the Tragical Temper of Euripides is, that even in most of these last pieces whose end is happy, he doth not fail to excite Terror and Compassion, and we may venture to say that the Constitution is Tragical, but 'tis the end which spoils all.

25. And an incontestable proof of it is, that in all the Publick disputes, and on the Stage, those sorts of Tragedies appear always more Tragical and Affecting.] In order to undeceive those who retained still the Relish of the old Athenians, and preferred those pieces which had an happy Conclusion, to those which had a dismal one; he thinks nothing more proper or effectual, than to shew the wonderful success these last had, when they were Acted before the Learned, or before the People in the Publick Disputes, that is, when the Poets disputed the Prize of Tragedy before Judges,
Ariflotle's Art of Poetry.

who were established for that end, those pieces always succeeded the best. And, on the Stage, that is, when they were play'd before the People for diversion only, they had still the same success. If they had pleased the Learned only, those who are refractory, would be always appealing to the Learned, and so the dispute would never have an end; but, says Ariflotle, they had the Suffrages of the People, as well as of the Learned, and this is an incontestable proof that they were the best. Nothing can be finer, nor more judicious than this decision, it were to be wished that we could follow this Wisdom. We hear some saying every day, such a Play pleased the greatest part of the Audience, therefore it must be good. This is false arguing, pray who did it please? The Ignorant or the Learned, if they say the People, can anybody affirm, that that which pleases the Common People only is fine? And if it pleases the Learned only, how we can be assured that the Learned are infallible, and never deceived? There can be nothing then so sure in any one of these Parties. What Rule then shall we have, and how shall we be able to Judge of what is fine? This is a sure and certain Rule, that whatever pleases the Learned, and the Ignorant too, is infallibly very Good and Beautiful. Now I dare affirm that there are no pieces which will please both, but those which are made according to the Rules of this Art. And this for this reason, that Ariflotle says in the 3d Book of his Politicks, that a multitude judges better of Poetry and Musick than one Man only; for one takes notice of one thing, and another of another, and so among them they take notice of every thing. When he says a multitude, he means the whole Assembly, which is generally Composed of the Learned and the Ignorant.
26. In the Publick Disputes, and on the Stage.] There was every Year a fair opportunity for those Poets, who had a mind to dispute the Prize of Tragedy. They all Assembled as certain Feasts, and every one had four pieces Acted before select Judges, which were taken out of every Tribe, who also took an Oath to Judge according to Right and Equity, without Favour or Affection. There is a very remarkable passage on this by Plutarch, in his Life of Cimon. This is the reason why Aristotle opposes the Publick Disputes to the Stage, where the Plays were Acted to divert the People, and not to have a Judgment past on their value and merit.

27. If nothing that is Foreign, disturb or spoil the Representation.] Aristotle adds this, because the least thing is capable of spoiling the finest piece in the World; there wants only one Actor to Act worse than he commonly does, either accidentally, or by his Caprice, for that which is well plaid, will seem quite a different thing from what it is, when badly Acted.

28. And Euripides himself appeared the most Tragical of all the Poets, tho' otherwise he was not Correct, and exact in the Conduct and disposition of his Subjects.] This is a very just and true Judgment of Euripides, he is so unexact in the management of his Subjects, that he often offends against probability and necessity too; his Incidents are not produced of one another, and the Action does not generally make one and the same whole, there is always something wanting, either in the manner of forming his Plots, or unravelling them. Moreover, his Chorus's are often Foreign to the Subject he treats of, and there are but few of his pieces, where some of these faults are not to be found.
found. But this excepted, he is the most Affecting and Pathetick of all the Poets. Sophocles is more Regular, Noble and Sublime, more Equal and Agreeable; he disposes his Subjects, and forms the Manners and Characters of his Persons much better; but as for being Pathetick, he seems to hit only the Violent Passions, such as excite Terror; but he is not so good for those which are soft and sweet, which depend on Compassion; whereas Euripides is wonderful at the former, and the best that ever wrote for the latter; for this was Quintilian's Judgment. In affectibus vero cum omnibus mirus, tum in ipsis qui miseratione Constant præcipuus. None ever knew better than Euripides the manner of the Affections, and to place the most Tender Affecting Words so well to the purpose, that he would make even the most obdurate Weep. The division of those two Qualities, has prevented the Ancients from determining who was the greatest Poet, Sophocles or Euripides. Quintilian would not say any thing on this point, but is satisfied by telling us, that Euripides is the most useful to those who are obliged to speak in publick; but this is certain, that take them altogether, Aristotle would give the preference to Sophocles, notwithstanding the large Encomiums he bestows on Euripides, and this I believe cannot be disputed.

29. The Fable to which I give the second Place, tho' others have given it the first, is that which hath a double Constitution.] After having spoke of a simple Tragedy, and its two species, he comes to give an account of double or compounded Tragedy, and takes notice of the reasons which his Adversaries had to prefer it to the first, and those also which moved him, not to be of their opinion.
30. As the Odyssey. For the Odyssey hath a double Catastrophe, Ulysses and Penelope are happy, and their Enemies are destroyed. Homer hath given us an Idea of all the sorts of Tragedy, his Iliad is Simple, and his Odyssey Compound; but we ought to remember that that double Catastrophe ought to proceed from one and the same Action. Virgil's Aeneis is Compounded as the Odyssey is.

31. Those who preferred this to the first, did it in all probability by reason of the weakness of the Audience, to whose Relish and Desires the Poets do generally Conform themselves. For truly the generality of Spectators have the Weakness not to bear dismal Catastrophes, they say, they make them Melancholy and Uneasy, and they had rather have such Catastrophes as will please them. Aristotle in the third Book of his Morals, has traced the Original of this Error very well, in shewing that Pleasure doth so much deceive Men, and Corrupt their Judgments, that tho' 'tis no Good, yet they seek it everywhere with the greatest Eagerness imaginable, as if it was the only true and solid Good; and avoid all that is contrary to it, as if it was a real Evil. Wherefore the Poets, that they might Conform themselves to this Humour, and not rob the Theatre of the Happy Catastrophes, invented this double Constitution. According to Homer's Odyssey, never considering that what is fine in an Epick Poem, may not be so in Tragedy. However that be, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and all the rest, endeavoured to please the Athenians that way. Our Poets have the same reasons to follow the Greek Poets. And 'tis now so much the more pardonable, as we are softer and more ignorant than they.
3.2. But the Pleasure which this Fable gives, is nothing near so proper for Tragedy, as for Comedy. This is a very substantial and true Reason; a Tragedy which ends happily for the Good, and unhappily for the Wicked, neither excites Compassion nor Terror, for there is nothing in the punishment of the Wicked, which deserves Pity, nor Terror in the Prosperity of the Good, and consequently it can give only that pleasure which is found in Comedy. It Aristotle could not approve of those Plays, whose Catastrophe is happy for the Good, and fatal for others; 'tis certain, that he would never have endur'd those, which tho' they have a double Constitution, yet end happily for all the Persons, whose Interests are generally opposite. We have some of this sort among our finest pieces; but tho' he might have Condemn'd the design of these Plays, yet he would intollibly have admir'd those infinite Beauties under which this defect, is for the most part hid; and if he shou'd have banish'd the Poet from the Stage, it would have been as Plato did Homer from his Commonwealth, after he had bestowed a Crown on him.

33: And truly we see in Comedy, Enemies as irreconcileable, as Orestes and Egisthes become at last very good Friends.] That we may rightly understand how this double or compounded Tragedy, gives us the same pleasure as Comedy doth, he shews us, wherein the pleasure of a Comick Poem doth consist, viz. in seeing the most exasperated People agree, and the most irreconcileable very good Friends, at the cost of some poor unlucky Footman, who generally comes off, with a good Beating, or at worst a few days Imprisonment; 'tis just the same in a double Tragedy. The wicked perish, and the
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.* 233

rest making a right use of their misfortunes are reconciled, if there was any misunderstanding between them before. I am persuaded that when Aristotle wrote this, he had a regard to the *Orestes* of Euripides. *Orestes* and *Pylades*, after having design'd to kill *Helena*, and held their Daggers a long time at *Hermione's* Throat, whom they threatened to kill before *Menelaus's* Face, were stopped by *Apollo*, who reconciled them, and ordered that *Orestes* should Marry *Hermione*, and give his Sister *Electra* to *Pylades*; thus ended this horrible Story, and *Orestes* became *Menelaus's* Son-in-Law.

34. And go off the Stage without one drop of Blood being spilt on either side.] This passage teaches us, that those Bloody Deaths and Wounds, which are not permitted in Tragedy, but off the Stage, and out of the Spectators view, are absolutely banished from Comedy, in which they ought not to be, either by Representation or Repetition. 'Twould be very barbarous to mix Murders with Comical divertisements, that could never be approved of. Comedy is not only an Enemy to Murders, but also of whatever else is sorrowful; we have some excellent Comedies, which seem to err on this account. I never come from seeing *Moliere's* *Misanthrope*, but I am sorry for the misfortunes of poor *Alceste*. Comedy ought never to send the Spectator away uneasy, since 'tis made with the contrary design, of making him merry by something that is Ridiculous. Now that Ridiculous, is never found where there is any Sorrow or Pain. This is too true, that to avoid the same inconvenience which displeases in *Misanthrope*. Terence adds to his *Andria*, the Person *Charinus*, which was not in *Menander*; *nec te cognosce virum*, says Donatus, *Philumenam Spretam*, *relinquere sine sponso,* *Ramphilus aliciam ducens.*
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

From fear that it should seem too cruel and hard to leave Philumena without a husband, after Pamphilus had left her to marry his mistress. This is what Comedy requires, and 'tis one of the Rules, which ought the least of all to be broke.

**CHAP. XIV.**

From whence the Terrible and the Pityful proceed. The Error of those who would excite them by Decoration, or by Monstrous Incidents.

The Terrible and Pityful, may be produced by the show, and the Decoration. They may also be produced by the (a) Series of Incidents, and that is much the better way. These are what may be called (b) master Strokes, for the Fable must be composed in such a manner; that (c) he who understands the things which happen, 'altho' he see them not, yet tremble (d) at the Recitation of them, and feel the same (e) Compassion, and the same

(a) By the constitution of the things. (b) Of the best poet. (c) Tho the show be removed. (d) When he hears them: (e) As those who hear Oedipus.
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry. 235*

Terror, which, none can hinder themselves from feeling at the Tragedy of Oedipus. Now to endeavour to excite these two Passions by the sight, that is by means of the Scenes, is what the Poet has no concern with, this depends rather on those who order the Decorations, and are at the charge of furnishing the Theatre.

2. Those who don't Endeavour to find the Terrible; but the Monstrous in the Decoration (f) Err, much more from the Scope of Tragedy. For Tragedy is not made to give us all sorts of Pleasure Indifferently, but only that Pleasure, which is proper to it.

3. That Pleasure is that which by imitation produces Terror and Compassion, and consequently it is Evident, that the Poet ought to produce that Pleasure in us, by the means of those things which he Represents.

(f) Have nothing of Tragedy.
REMARKS on Chap. XIV.

1. The Terrible and the Piteiful may be produced by the Shows and the Decoration; they may also be produced by the Series of Incidents, and that is much the better way.] Hitherto Aristotle has proved, that Tragedy is the imitation of an Action, which excites Terror and Compassion; he goes on to shew at present from whence that Terrible and Piteiful proceed. He begins by the refutation of their Error, who believe, that they ought to proceed from the Show and Decoration, when the Stage and the Actors are so adorned and dress'd, that at first view the Audience is prepared for something Terrible. Æschylus depended much on the Decoration, for he chose every thing that was frightful.

Horror and Death were in his Paintings seen.

In the Tragedy of Eumenides, he excites Terror and Compassion by the Show only. His Chorus of the Furies appeared so Terrible, that several Children dy'd with Fear, and the Women Miscarried on the spot. This is not that which is proper for Tragedy, 'tis true, the Decoration ought not to be neglected, it should answer to the Subject of the Play; But that is not the Poets business, he ought to endeavour the exciting Terror and Compassion by the Series of Incidents.

2. For the Fable must be Composed in such a manner, that he who understands the things which happen, altho he sees them not, yet trembles at the Recitation.] If the Terrible proceeds from the Decoration, he who
who is Blind, or Reads the Plays, can never be so affected; but both he that is Blind, and he that Reads the Play only, ought to be as much concerned as he that sees it, and consequently the terrible should principally arise from the Subject itself. When we read the *Eumenides* of *Eschylus*, we are very little affected with it, because the Terrible which was in it, proceeded from the Decoration only; but when we read *Oedipus*, we can’t forbear vexing our selves, and feeling those motions of Terror and Compassion, which those who should see it represented on the Stage would feel, because the Terrible proceeds from the Subject, and not from the Decoration.

3. *Is what the Poet has no concern with, that depends rather on those who order the Decoration.*] If the Terrible was produced by the Decorations, the Ingineers and Workmen would have the Honour of those Passions, which we find raised in us, when we see a Tragedy; and they would be able to regulate them, according to their Skill and Charge they would be at. Every one can easily see how ridiculous this proposition is.

4. *Those who don’t endeavour to find the Terrible but the Monstrous in the Decoration, err much more from the Scope of Tragedy.*] Some have thought that *Aristotle’s* intention here, was to Condemn those Monstrous Decorations, but the Philosopher does not concern himself with giving any Rules about them. These Monstrous Decorations are sufficiently found fault with, in what he has said of the Terrible ones; for after he has refused those who endeavour to excite Terror by means of the Show, he goes on to another, and no less defect, viz. Of the Poets, who not only depend on the Decorations to excite our Passions but endeavour to do it by Preternatural and Monstrous
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

Tragi-ous ones. Nothing can be farther from true Tragedy than this means. Æschylus has a great share in this Censure, for as his imagination was vast and quick, but extravagant and irregular, he often ventured at those things, which were not only contrary to Art, but Nature too. His *Prometheus* is full of these Monsters, which Aristotle Condemns, for what can be more such, than his Punishment of that God, where *Force and Violence,* two persons Nail him to the Rock with vast Hammers? Than the fierce Oceanus mounted on a Griffin, going to see that Criminal on mount Caucasus? To Conclude, that the good should change herself into an Heifer, to go and talk with Prometheus, and learn from him what should afterwards come to pass? Euripides, tho' he is much more simple, and moderate than Æschylus, falls however into his fault. In his *Hercules Furias,* where he introduces Rage, whom Iris by Juno's Order leads on the Stage, that she may take Possession of Hercules. That Monster appears with an hundred Heads, round which are a thousand Serpents hisling, for 'tis thus the Chorus speaks, she made also a very wise and sensible Discourse, with so much Reason, as can never accompany Rage. However, after this fine Speech, she remembers who she is, and doth some things worthy of herself, for Hercules kills his Wife and Children; and surely nothing can be finer than the relation which is made of the effects of that Madness; but the best thing in the World would be spoiled by such an horrible sight. *Seneca* has handled the same subject as Euripides, and if he did not know how to chuse all that was fine, he has prudently avoided the Monstrous: Hercules might grow Mad, without Juno's taking so much pains. 'Tis doing too much Honour to Mankind, to think there are so many things Requisite to make them Fools.
5. For Tragedy is not made to give us all sorts of Pleasure indifferently, but only that Pleasure which is proper to it.] All things in the World are appropriated to some certain end, to endeavour to use them for any other, is to destroy their Essence, and to bring them into their first Confusion and Chaos. This is no less true in Natural, than Moral Philosophy.

6. The Pleasure is that which by Imitation produces Compassion and Terror.] Plato has proved very well in his Philebus, that all the Passions give Men a certain Pleasure, and that they are all mixed with something that is both agreeable and disagreeable; but this mixture is different according to the different Nature of the Passions. That which is produced by Terror and Compassion is not like that which proceeds from Anger and Revenge. Plato expresses that mixture which proceeds from Tragedy by γατακότας καιώς. They Weep Smiling. This therefore is the Pleasure, which we ought to expect from this Poem, 'tis the Terrible and the Pitiful which give it, and not the Monstrous and Surprising.

7. And consequently it is Evident, that the Poet ought to produce that Pleasure in us, by the means of those things which he Represents.] This concludes equally against those, who endeavour to give this Pleasure by the means of Decoration only, and those also, who mix Monstrous and Supernatural Incidents in their prices.
CHAP. XV.

What Incidents are terrible and pitiful? How the Poet ought to behave himself, that he may not change the commonly receiv'd Fables, in what is Principal and most Affecting. Three sorts of cruel Actions, and which of them agrees best with Tragedy. The defect of those cruel Actions which are designedly begun, but not finish'd. The Rarity of the Subjects of Tragedy, and the cause of that Rarity. The Slavery of the Poets.

We will (a) endeavour at present to establish, what Incidents are terrible or pitiful. (b) Whatsoever happens is either be-

(a) Take. (b) 'Tis necessary that.
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.* 241

tween Friends or Enemies, or indifferent Persons, (c) an Enemy who is kill'd by, or kills his Enemy, excites no other pity than what proceeds from the Evil it self; 'tis the same with indifferent Persons, who kill one another. But when such misfortunes happen among Friends, as when one Brother kills, or is (d) kill'd by his Brother, or a Father his Son, or a Mother her Son, or the Son his Mother, or do any such like thing, this is what should be sought after.

2. *And for this reason,* those Fables which are received ought not to be changed, *For Example, (e) Clytemnestra must be kill'd by Orestes,* and *Eriphyla by Alcmeon.* But the Poet himself ought to invent it, in (f) making use of these receiv'd Fables (g) as he should do; now we will explain what we mean by making use of, as he should do.

3. *We may represent Actions which are done by those who act with an entire Knowledge, and know what 'tis they do,* this was the Practice of the Antient Poets, (b) Euripides followed it, when he represented *Medea* killing her Children.

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(c) If an Enemy kill, an Enemy nothing pitiful arises whilst he does it, or is about to do it than, &c.
(d) About to kill.
(e) I say. (f) And. (g) Will.
4. We may also represent the Actions of those who don’t know the (i) Cruelty of the Action they commit, and who, after the doing it, come to remember the (k) Relation and Friendship which was between them, and those on whom they were Reveng’d, as Oedipus in Sophocles. 'Tis true that in Sophocles that Action is out of the Tragedy. But we see the Death of Eriphyla by Alcmeon, in the Poet Askydamas and the wounding of Ulysses by Telegonus, in the very Action of the Tragedy.

5. (l) To conclude, we may manage it so, that (m) a Person that goes ignorant-ly to commit a very great Crime, may recollect himself before he puts it into Execution.

6. If we take due heed, there is no other way than these there, at least which are proper for Tragedy. For 'tis necessary that an Action be done, or not done, and that both of them happen by those Persons who Act, either Ignorantly, or with an entire Knowledge, and deliberate purpose.

(i) Cruel Action. (k) Friendship. (l) Moreover, besides these there is a third. (m) When.
7. 'Tis true that this includes a fourth sort of manner, which is, when any person goes to commit a crime voluntarily, and willingly, and yet does not execute it. But this manner is the very worst of all; for besides its being horrible, 'tis not tragic, (n) since there is nothing affecting in it, and this is the reason why the poets have not followed it, or if they have, 'twas very seldom. Sophocles made use of it once in his Antigone, where Hamon drew his sword against his father Creon to kill him. (On these occasions, 'twere better that the crime was committed, as in the first manner.

8. The second manner is yet preferrable to that. I mean, (o) when he who commits the crime, commits it ignorantly, and remembers what it is after he has committed it; for then the action has nothing that is flagitious in it, and the remembrance (p) is very pathetick.

9. But the (q) third is without doubt the best of all these manners, and which Euripides has followed in his (r) Cresphantes, where Merone (s) remember'd her son, in the very moment she went to kill him, and in his Iphigenia (t) when the princess remember'd her

(n) And wants passion. (o) 'Tis better. (p) Induces terror. (q) Last. (r) As in the. (s) Was going to kill her son, but did it not. (t) The sister, the brother.
ther, as she was going to Sacrifice him. 'Tis thus that Phrixus in Helle remembred his Mother, just as he was going to deliver her to her Enemies.

10. (w) By this 'tis easy to know, that there are few Families which can furnish good Subjects for Tragedy, as I said before, the reason of which is, that the first Poets in search- ing for Subjects, did not draw them by their Act, but (x) borrow'd them from Chance, whose Caprices they have follow'd in their imita- tions, and (y) this is the reason also, why the Poets, at this day, are forc'd to have recourse to the same Families, in which for- tune permitted all these great Misfortunes to happen.

11. This is enough on the Constitution, Nature, and the Quality of Fables, or the Subject of Tragedy.

(u) For this reason as has been already said. (x) found them by. (y) therefore.
1. Whatever happens, is either between Friends or Enemies, or indifferent Persons.] For 'tis impossible to find a fourth condition different from these three.

2. An Enemy who is killed, or kills his Enemy, excites no other Pity, than what proceeds from the Evil it self.] 'Tis Aristotle's Custom to refute before he establishes. Of the three conditions he speaks of, he immediately rejects the two last, as no ways proper for Tragedy, for truly when one Enemy kills another, or indifferent Persons kill one another; this doth not excite any other Pity than what the Murder produces in our Hearts, for Men are naturally formed to, that they cannot see Wounds or Death without being concerned at them; but this Sentiment does not proceed from the Person who suffers, but the accident only, so that 'tis rather a sense of Humanity than Compassion; but the Compassion which Tragedy ought to excite, proceeds not only from the mischief itself, but from the condition in which, and the Relation, both those who suffer, and those who cause them to suffer, have one to another.

3. But when such misfortunes happen among Friends.] Whether they be truly Friends, or ought to be so, because they have been so: Under the Word Friendship, Aristotle comprehends not only Friendship, but Parentage and Alliance, as he shows in what follows, and as he has explained himself in his Morals.

* (Q 3) 4. As
4. As when one Brother kills, or is killed by his Brother.] As Eteocles and Polynices in the Pheni-cian Women of Euripides, and in the Rival Brothers of Mr. Racine.

5. A Son his Father.] As in the Oedipus of Sophocles, Oedipus kills his Father Laius.

6. A Mother her Son, or the Son his Mother.] A Mother her Son, as Merope, who prepared herself to kill her Son Cresphontes, or the Son his Mother, as Orestes killed Clytemnestra, and Alcmene Briphyla; there is a Play of Euripides, wherein these two things happen at the same time, the Mother would kill her Son, and the Son his Mother. 'Tis Ion, where Creusa endeavoured by all the efforts imaginable to kill her Son Ion, whom she took for the Bastard Son of her Husband Lycus, and where Ion would Murder Creusa, because she had prepared some Poison for him. This double danger of two Persons so nearly related, who did not know one another, has an admirable effect in that piece, whose Subject is not otherwise entirely conform to Aristotle's Rules, and which would by no means succeed now.

7. Or do any such like thing.] For there are other things beside Death, which can excite Com-passion, as Wounds, Affronts, Captivity, Banishment, &c. but the more considerable and terrible the affair is, which happens between these Persons, the more it excites Compassion, and consequently is the more proper for Tragedy.

8. This is what should be sought after.] Aristotle would have the Poet confine himself to those En-mities which arm Relations one against another; and 'tis certainly a great advantage, which the prox-
proximity of Blood gives to excite Terror and Compassion; that which doth not happen between Friends, is very inconsiderable. However, there may be certain ties of Love or Friendship, where the Evils which one of the Persons loved, may threaten the other with, may interest us considerably, and have almost the same effect, as if they were never Relations; but then the danger must be certain and evident, that condition is indispensably necessary; if that fails, it is out of doubt, that the Audience will never be touched with it, and of this I can give certain proofs. As for what remains, we must remember, that what Aristotle says here, can be found in impex pieces only, that is, where there is a Peripetie and Remembrance, and which are certainly the most perfect, as Aristotle has already proved.

9. And for this reason, those Fables which are received, ought not to be changed, for example Clytemnestra must be killed by Orestes, and Eriphyle by Alcmeon.] As the misfortunes which happen between Relations, are more Terrible and Pitiful, according to the measure of the strict Union Nature has united the Person who suffers, with that Person who makes him suffer. 'Tis a true Consequence, that we ought not to change those Fables, which furnish us with Actions so proper for Tragedy. Orestes must kill Clytemnestra, and Eriphyle must be slain by Alcmeon. What Aristotle says, in the Xth Chap. That it is not always proper for the Poet to relate things just as they happened, but to tell how they might, or ought to happen, either Necessarily or Probably, is not, contrary to what he says here, That we must not change received Fables; Orestes must kill Clytemnestra; but supposing there was an Historical verity in that case. The Poet would not be obliged scrupulously to follow it in all its circumstances, provided he change not the Fundamentals of the Fable; he is master of the

* (Q 4) mat
ter, and may take what way he pleases to manage his Action, and this is farther explained in what follows.

10. But the Poet himself ought to invent it, in making use of received Fables. This is as important a passage as any in the Book; for the manner, in which he hath hitherto explained himself, fills all the rest of this Chapter with insuperable difficulties, for 'tis thought that Aristotle meant, That the Poet ought to invent new Fables, or make use as he ought to do of the old ones, but he says not so, his own Words are, The Poet should invent and make use of received Fables as he ought to do. He does not say, Or make use of received Fables that's very different. Aristotle doth not speak here of the Liberty which the Poets have to invent new Subjects; he discoursed of that in another Chapter; his intention is, to Teach how they ought to make use of those subjects which are already received; this is servile, and perhaps contrary to the usage of the Theatre, but he must make use of them in inventing himself, that is, he ought to draw from his own Wit, some means which are convenient to make it succeed, and find out some probable Conduct, which is proportioned to the nature of the Action, and which ought not to change it; and this is what he calls making use of as they ought, and what he endeavours to render more plain, in explaining the different Manners, in which all Tragical Actions happen, and in shewing us their Beauties and Defects. All this Doctrine is very considerable, and deserves to be Studied with great Application.

11. We may represent Actions, which are done by those who Act with an entire knowledge, and know what 'tis they do. An Action is finished or not finished,
and that by those who either do, or do not know what they do. The different Combination of these different Manners, produce four sorts of Actions which we shall explain, and take particular notice of those which are the properest for the Stage. The first and most Common Action is, that which is done by those who know it. The Ancient Poets sought for no others, Æschylus and Sophocles brought only this sort of Actions on the Stage, and it does not appear that they had any notion of the other Manners.

12. Euripides followed it, when he represented Medea killing her Children.] Aristotle might have quoted also the Electra of the same Poet, where Orestes kills his Mother, in a perfect knowledge of what he did, but as Euripides did not treat of that Fable, till after Æschylus and Sophocles, the Philosopher would not mention it, and speaks only of his Medea; because Euripides was the first who brought that on the Stage, and consequently had the power of managing it as he pleased. Aristotle blames that Poet for making Medea kill her Children with a perfect knowledge, and can't bear that he should conform himself in that to the Antient Manners, there is a very remarkable History concerning that Tragedy. They say, that after Medea had killed the Daughter of King Creon, the Corinthians to revenge the Death of that Princess, killed Medea's Children, and when Euripides was Writing on that Subject, the Corinthians sent Deputies to him privately, to cast the Murder on Medea herself, hoping that the great Reputation of the Poet, would make the Story current, and that the Lye should take place of the Truth. I should be very glad to see any Town so Industrious, to raze out of the memory of Mankind a Passionate Injustice of their Ancestors. But Euripides might have the Complaisance for the Corinthians, in making Medea kill her Children after
after another manner, in order to give the greater Beauty to his Play: If 'tis true, as Aristotle pretends, that that which he has followed is not the finest; which we shall examine hereafter.

13. We may also Represent the Actions of those, who don't know the Cruelty of the Action which they Commit, and who after the doing it, come to remember the Relation and Friendship which was between them, and those on whom they are Revenge'd.] This is the second manner, according to which Actions may happen, 'tis when those who commit them don't know it, and come to remember what 'tis they have done, after they have Committed the Action. This second manner is divided into two, the least considerable for the Stage is, that when the Action is so far from remembrance, that they cannot come into the same piece, as in the Oedipus of Sophocles, for it was so long after Oedipus had kill'd his Father, that he knew his Crime, that the Poet could only take the Remembrance for the Subject of his Play, which is a very great defect. The other, which is much the finest, is when the Action, and the Remembrance come so near together, that the Poet may use them both, without doing violence to his Subject. The Poet should always choose the last of those ways, if it be possible. 'Tis this, which is the cause of the great success of the Wenceslaus of Rerou, the Murder of Alexander by Ladas, is followed by the remembrance, and tho' that piece has on other accounts very considerable defects, yet 'tis never seen without a great deal of Pleasure.

14. The Death of Eriphyla by Alcmeon in the Poet Aisydamus.] There were two Tragick Poets called Aisydamas, the Father and the Son; the Father began to appear some years before Aristotle's Birth, and the Son was much about the
same Age with him. I don't know which of the two made Alcmeon: That signifies little, 'tis sufficient to know, that the Poet has compriz'd in that Play, the death of the Mother, and the Son's Repentance; but that he might not follow the manner of the Ancients, nor draw on himself the same Reproaches, which Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides had done by not sufficiently Study-dying Nature, in making Orestes stab his Mother, with a perfect Knowledge and premeditated Design; he manag'd his subject after another manner, in feigning that Alcmeon did not know his Mother, when he killed her, but afterwards he remember'd who she was. This change is very remarkable, for it shows us, that notwithstanding all the hatred the Athenians had to Kings, yet they were shock'd at the Barbarity, wherewith Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides made Orestes stab his Mother Clytemnestra.

15. And the Wounding of Ulysses by Telegonus. Telegonus was one of Ulysses's Sons, whom he had by Circe, when he was grown up he would go and find his Father, he arrived at Ithaca, where he took some Sheep for his Retinue to eat; the Shepherds put themselves into a posture to rescue them, one went and told Ulysses, who came with his Son Telemachus to repel the Stranger Telegonus, who in defending himself Wounded Ulysses, not knowing who he was. You may see the History in Hyginus, Dithys and Oppian. Many Poets have brought this on the Stage, and all under the same name, Ulysses Wounded, because he did not dye till three days after the Wound.

16. To Conclude we may Manage it so, that a Person who goes ignorantly to Commit a very great Crime, may recollect himself before he puts it into execution.] This is the third manner which he will presently
Aristotle's Art of Poetry,

prefer to the other two, 'tis when a Person goes to Commit some great Crime against another, whom he does not know, but remembers him a moment before the execution of his design, and so proceeds no farther.

17. 'Tis true, that this includes a fourth sort of Manner.] For Aristotle proves elsewhere, that these four Terms, To do, not to do, to know, not to know, ought necessarily to produce four manner of Actions, Aristotle's Interpreters have explained this method very largely, and particularly Simplicius.

18. Which is, when any Person goes to Commit a Crime, Voluntarily and Wittingly, and yet does not execute it; but this manner is the very worst of them all.] 'Tis with a great deal of Reason, that Aristotle Condemns this fourth manner; for 'tis Compounded of two contraries without any middle which separates them, to do and not to do, which do not constitute any Action, and consequently is very improper for Tragedy. Mr. Corneille says, that if this Condemnation was not modified, it would extend too far, and not only include the Eid, but Cinna Redogune, Heraclius and Nicomedes. Let's say then, says he, that it ought to extend to those only who know the Person whom they would destroy, and retract it, by a single change of their Will, without any notable Accident, which obliges them to it, and without any want of Power on their part; I have already taken notice of that sort of Unravelling at Vicious; but when they do all they can on either side, and are hindered by some Superior Power from obtaining their ends, or by some change of Fortune that destroys them, or reduces them under the Power of those they would destroy, 'tis out of doubt that would make a sort of Tragedy perhaps more sublime than those three Aristotle approves of, &c. This is a very considerable dispute, both in respect to the Parties, and the
matter disputed of; one of the greatest Masters of
the Stage, disputes against the Master of the Rules
of Dramatick Poem, and the dispute is to know,
whether a Cruel Action, tho’ tis imperfect, is
the moft Vicious of all the Actions which Ari-
Stotle speaks of. The Philosopher pretends, that
’tis, and admits of no distinction. Mr. Corneille
maintains, that the Philosopher speaks only
of Actions which are not finished, and which may
be retracted by a simple change of the Will, with-
out any notable Accident, which may oblige to
it. However, that example which Aristotle af-
terwards gives, seems contrary to this explana-
tion; For in the Antigone of Sophocles, if Hamon,
who had a design to kill his Father, did not do it,
’twas not because he had changed his Mind, but
because he could not do it, for his Father avoid-
ed the danger by flying from him, but if any ex-
ample should be conform to the Sense which Mr.
Corneille would give to this Censure, to restrain it
in very narrow bounds; ’tis certain, that his dis-
distion can never take place. If Tragedy were
the Imitation of a design, or an Act of the Will,
then these imperfect Actions might make the sub-
ject of Tragedy; but ’tis not so; ’tis the imitation
of an entire and perfect Action, as we have seen
in the definition of it, all the obstructions which Mr.
Corneille can imagine to hinder the effecting any
thing as greater Force, or some change of Fortune
can never change the nature of that Action, and
render it perfect; therefore it cannot be the sub-
ject of this imitation, and consequently must be
vicious; the only difference which may be, is,
that it is more or less Vicious, according as it is
placed in the Play; if it is not the Principal Acti-
on, but only an Incident, as in the Antigone of
Sophocles, and in the Cid, ’tis not so bad, but if it
is the principal Action, and makes the subject, as
in Cimna and Nicomedes, ’tis entirely Vicious, or all
Aristotle’s Principles are false. The only thing
Mr.
Mr. Corneille seems to be in the right of, is, that when those obstructions which make an Action imperfect, cause those to perish, who would have committed that Action, and save those whom they would destroy; that Action may indeed be the subject of Tragedy, provided it has all the other necessary qualifications, but 'tis not the more perfect for that, it makes a double or compounded Tragedy, of which we have already spoke, and which is so far from being of a sort more sublime than the rest, as Mr. Corneille pretends, that Aristotle has proved it has only the second, or perhaps the third place, 'tis this alone, which can excuse the Action of his Heraclius, and that of his Rodrigo, which are faulty in divers other places.

19. For beside its being horrible and flagitious, 'tis not Tragical, since there is nothing Affecting in it.] Those Actions which are not finished, are faulty, not only because they are imperfect; but because they do that which they ought not to do, and don't do that which they ought to do; they do that which they ought not to do, in shewing to the Spectators the Barbarity of a Crime, that is by no means proper for Tragedy, which as has been shown already, admits not of that which is Abominable and Flagitious, and they don't do what they ought to do, because they have nothing Tragical and Affecting, and are as, Aristotle words it, without Passion; that is, they do nothing which can excite Pity or Compassion, or rather they don't stir up those Commotions which we generally feel, when we see Wounds, Deaths, and all those other Accidents which he hath Comprehended under the General Term of Passion.

20. Sophocles made use of it once in his Antigone, where Hæmon drew his Sword against his Father Creon to kill him.] Antigone having buried her Brother, contrary to Creon's Order, that King caused
caused her to be Buried alive in a Tomb: Hamon, who was in Love with that Prince, went to dye with her; Creon, when he was informed of his Son's despair, went to save him, Hamon, when he saw his Father enter, looked furiously on him, drew his Sword, and struck at him; the King avoided the Blow, on which Hamon stab'd himself, and fell down on the Body of his Mistress.

'Tis not without reason, that Aristotle blames this Action as imperfect, for besides its being Cruel without any necessity, 'tis without Passion; but 'tis the less faulty, because 'tis only a small circumstance of an Episole. Tho' these imperfect Actions take no place in Tragedy, yet they have wonderful fine effects in Epick Poems. We are delighted to see Achilles draw his Sword to slay Agamemnon, and Aeneas going to kill Helena. The first is prevented by Minerva, and the latter by Venus.

21. On these occasions 'twere better that the Crime was Committed, as in the first manner.] It had been better if Hamon had compleated the killing his Father, for the Action would have had the same Crueltv, and there would have been Passion which Tragedy requires.

22. The second Manner is yet preferrable to this, I mean when he who Commits the Crime, Commits it Ignorantly, and Remembers what it is, after he has Committed it.] Aristotle is not satisfied to name only the four ways, which a Cruel Action may happen between Friends and Relations; but takes care also to set down their Order, that is, to shew which are preferrable to others, and to give his Reasons for it. These are the four Manners.

1. To Act with an entire knowledge, and to finish what is projected.
2. To Act with knowledge, and to remember the Crime after it is Committed.

3. To be just on the point of Acting; but to recollect ones self before the Action.

4. To Act with an entire knowledge, but not to compleat or finish the Action.

Of all these four, Aristotle says the last is most deficient, because it is Cruel without Passion.

The next in faults is the First because it is Cruel, and the Stage ought to banish Cruelties; but it is preferrable to the last, because it has Passion, which that has not.

There remain only the Second and the Third. The Second is certainly better than the First, and the last, because there is nothing Cruel in it. Since the Crime is Committed ignorantly, and it hath all the advantages of Passion.

The Third is preferrable to all the rest. Aristotle has not given the Reason, since every body must needs perceive it: 'Tis because it engages us more than the Second, that it is not so Cruel, that it answers the expectation and desires of the Audience, who are wonderfully pleased to see two Persons so nearly related, escape the dangers which threaten'd them, after they had been in great pain lest they should miscarry.

This is Aristotle's Doctrine, Mr. Corneille is of a quite different Opinion, and directly inverts this Order; for he pretends, that the first manner, which Aristotle esteems the least of the three, is the finest, and the third which Aristotle judges the best is the least so, the Reason of which, is, lays he, because
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

cause in the third, *A Mother who goes to kill her Son,* as Merope did Creophontes, and *a Sister to Sacrifice her Brother,* as Iphigenia, look on them as Enemies, or indifferent Persons, till they remember them now, according to Aristotle, neither of these Conditions excite either Pity or Fear.

When a Remembrance is made after the Death of an unknown Person, as in the second Manner, the Compassion, which is excited by the uneasiness of him, who destroyed that Person, can have no great Extent, since it is included, and bound up in the Catastrophe; but when a Person Acts with a perfect Knowledge and Bare-faced, as in the first manner, the Conflict of the Passions against Nature, the Duty and Love takes up the best part of the Poem, and from thence great Emotions are produced, which every moment renew and redouble the Commiseration. To justify this Reasoning by Experience, we see that Chimenes and Antiochus move us much more than Oedipus.

There is some probability, continues this great Poet, that what this Philosopher has said, of the divers degrees of the Perfection of Tragedy, was exact and just in his time, and according to the Humour of his Country-men; that I cannot doubt of no more than I can forbear saying, that the Relish of our Age is not like that of his, on the preference of one of these Manners to another, at least that which pleased the Athenians so nicely and exquisitely, would not please our French; this is the only way I can think of to support my scruples, and at the same time preserve the Veneration I ought to have for all that he has wrote concerning the Art of Poetry.

The fondness Mr. Corneille had for some of his own pieces, to which this Order of preference which Aristotle establishes is not all favourable, obliged him to take the contrary part, and invert the order; but I dare say, that Love was never blind-er than on this occasion; and I hope to demonstrate.
I shall begin at the end, Mr. Corneille's principle, that what was exact and just in the time of the Athenians, is not so in ours, and that that which pleased them, would displease now, appears to me very extraordinary, and as directly contrary to truth as any thing in the World can be. I always believed, that this might depend on the Humours and Fancies of Men, and so might please and displease at different times; but I cannot persuade myself, that what pleased the Athenians according to reason, can now displease us according to reason too. It seems to me to be a manifest contradiction and impossibility. 'Tis that Reason then which must be examined, what Aristotle says of the different degrees of Perfection of these three Manners, is so true and indisputable, that Mr. Corneille never had any thoughts of finding fault with them; and as they are still the same, 'tis a certain consequence that our Relish ought to be in that point agreeable to that of the Athenians, and if it is not, 'tis necessarily true, that ours must be to blame, and indeed it is so: and to prove it, I shall make use of those very examples which Mr. Corneille has taken out of his own pieces.

The misfortune of Antiochus in Rodojune, very far from giving either Fear or Pity, gives only (as Aristotle right foretold) a just horror for the danger, which threatened that Virtuous Prince, and a dreadful Aversion for the unnatural Mother, who attempted to Poison him, after she had assassinated his Brother; and this example plainly proves, that the Commision of a Crime with a perfect Knowledge and Baredac'd, is abominable, and will always be so, when Cruel Actions are exposed on the Stage. Aristotle then had reason to condemn, and Mr. Corneille was in the wrong to defend them. 'Twould be to no purpose to examine that Compassion which Chimenes excites; for
for his Action not having that Cruelty, of which we now Discourse, it doth not belong to this place.

As for Oedipus, Mr. Corneille readily agrees, that he does not excite a great deal of Compassion in his piece; 'tis true, and I have told the reason of it in another place; but it rises up an extraordinary one in Sophocles, and is very far from being included, and bound up in the Catastrophe, as Mr. Corneille pretends, that it ought to be, for it is predominant throughout the Poem, and begins, as I may say at the first Verse; and this alone should determine in favour of the second Manner, which is effectually preferable to the first.

As for what respects the third, it is certain, as Mr. Corneille says, that Merope did not know her Son, when she endeavoured to Kill him; and Iphigenia went to Sacrifice her Brother without knowing him, and that they looked on one another as indifferent Persons or Enemies; but Mr. Corneille forgot that those Subjects were known (for 'tis of them we now speak) the Son, who was Persecuted by his Mother, and the Brother Sacrificed by his Sister, were unknown to the Mother and Sister only, the Spectators knew them, and of consequence must be sensible of all the Passions, which the danger that threatened two Persons so nearly Related, could produce, and since Mr. Corneille appeals to the success his Antigonus, which is after the first manner, has had on our Stage, we may appeal to the Crephontes of Euripides, which is in the third manner, and the effects it had in the Grecian Theatres five hundred years after his Death, not on the ignorant People only, but the most discerning Judges also. Plutarch tells us in his Treatise, whether it be Lawful to eat Flesh? That when Merope went to Kill her Son, there was a murmuring among the Spectators, which shew'd, not only their Attention, but the Interest they made
made themselves to have at the misfortune of a Mother, who was going to kill her Son, and of the Son who was to dye by his Mother’s Hands; and ’tis impossible to imagine the Pleasure which a remembrance so well placed as this is, does create. We have not Euripides his Cretophontes, but we have his Iphigenia Taurica, and nothing can be more Pathetical, than what Orestes and Iphigenia say, after they remember’d one another. Those Crimes which are Transacted with a perfect Knowledge and premeditated Design, can never cause such Emotions as are proper to Tragedy, nor never so much Pleasure.

After having refuted the Inversion which Mr. Corneille would give to Aristotle’s Order, we come to the examination of this passage, in respect to what the Philosopher has elsewhere said. The preference which he gives to the third manner, appears directly contrary to what he delivered in the XIIIth Chapter, where he assures us, that a well composed Fable ought rather to end by the Ill, than good Fortune of the Principal Persons. This third fort ends with the good Luck, and therefore it is not so good as the second; this is certainly a very great difficulty. The Learned Victorius is the only Man who has taken notice of it, but as he did not understand what was treated of in this Chapter, and that ’tis by it only, that the difficulty can be solved, he did not attempt to do it; however, a contradiction so plain as this, deserves to be searched to the bottom, to see if’t was possible that Aristotle should fall into it. I have already said that those who have commented on this Art of Poetry, have comprehended nothing of this whole Chapter, and ’tis this which made Mr. Corneille to be mistaken. They all thought, that Aristotle spake here of the Constitution of Fable in general, but he only Teaches how Cruel Actions ought to be managed, so that the Fable may not be changed, but made use of as it ought to be, and this
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

this is the design of all this Chapter. For example, suppose I would treat of the Murder of Clytemnestra by Orestes; Aristotle gives me here a Plan of four different Manners, in which such Cruel Actions may come to pass. I ought to have particular regard to that which is most convenient for me. The first is not so, because 'tis too Horrible, the fourth is as improper, because it is Imperfect and Cruel without Passion, and beside that it spoils the Fable; the third, which would be more proper, is useless, because it would save Clytemnestra, who must necessarily dye by the hand of Orestes; there remains then the second only, which I can make use of, it hath Passion, and is not so Cruel as the first; 'tis exactly the same of all other Actions which we would represent. The Poet ought to chuse that manner, which is most proper, and affords him an opportunity to preserve all the Beauties of Tragedy without changing the Action. Thus Abydamus used it when he brought Alcesteon the Stage, who kill'd Eriphyla. He did not follow the first manner, as Æschylus did, in his Coephores, and Sophocles and Euripides in Electra. He chose the second, because the certainty of Eriphyla's Death, did not allow him to chuse the third, but Euripides chose the third in his Cretephontes, because the uncertain Tradition of Merope's Action, gave him the Liberty to chuse which he pleased. This is Aristotle's design in this Chapter, who is so far from being guilty of a contradiction, that what he says follows very Naturally. We may remember, that the second manner is the best for single Plays, which are more perfect than the Compound ones, as has been already proved, as the third manner is without doubt the best for the Compound pieces.

23. Which Euripides has followed in his Cretophonies, where Merope remembers her Son in the very moment she goes to Kill him.] 'Tis difficult to know the Subject of this piece. There is in 18
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Poliodorus, one Cresphontes of the Race of the Heraclides, who was King of Messene, and who married Merope, by whom he had three Sons. This Cresphontes was killed with two of his Children, Polyphontes, who was also of the Heraclides succeeded him, and Married Merope; this Polyphontes was slain by Cresphontes's third Son, who by that means regained his Kingdom. 'Tis certain that Euripides drew the Subject of his Tragedy from this History, I remember I have Read part of a Fragment, which deserves to be repeated for the Beauty, and the Sense which is in it. 'Tis Merope speaking of the Death of her Husband and Children, who says,

\[
\text{Mιθὲν λαβέω ὁμών τῷ φίλασα,}
\]

\[
\text{Σοφῶν ἐκμαχ.}
\]

Fortune hath Taught me to be Wise, and take Those things for Ills which should me happy make.

24. And in his Iphigenia, where that Princess remembers her Brother, just when she was going to Sacrifice him. 'Tis his Iphigenia Taurica, we must remember that Aristotle praises only the Remembrance in this piece, and the manner of Euripides managing it, to prevent the Horror which Iphigenia's Sacrificing of Orestes would have caused, if she had actually done it, and truly Euripides is to be commended for preferring the third manner to the second on this occasion; but otherwise the constitution of this piece is not what Aristotle would approve of.

25. 'Tis thus the Phrixus in Helle, remembered his Mother, just as he was going to deliver her to his Enemies. I believe this was also a piece of Euripides, I don't know the Subject, but only that Phrixus and Helle, were the Children of Athamas and Nephele. Apollodorus gives an Account of their Adventures; but there is no circumstance from whence any hint can be taken, to conjecture, how Phrixus could be brought to the necessity of deli-
delivering his Mother to her Enemies without knowing her.

26. The Reason of which is, that the first Poets in their searching for Subjects, did not draw them from Art, but borrowed them from Chance. He throws the Scarcity of the Subjects of Tragedy on the first Poets, who instead of inventing them to furnish the Stage, were contented to take only those which were known; and took from Chance that which they ought to have been obliged to Art for, afterwards it was difficult to overcome and free themselves from that Servitude, as he goes on to explain.

27. This is the reason also, why the Poets at this day, are forced to have recourse to the same Families, in which Fortune permitted all these great misfortunes to happen.] Aristotle says in the 10th Chapter, that the Poets may invent new Subjects, and that it is not necessary to adhere scrupulously to those Fables, which have been always received, and from which Tragedies are generally drawn. If that Liberty may be used, from whence comes it, that Aristotle says here, that the Poets are obliged to have recourse to those few Families? This seems to be a sort of Contradiction, but is really none; however, rightly to understand this matter, 'tis necessary to have recourse to the Origine and Principles of this Art. Aristotle means, that the first Poets neglecting to make use of the Privileges of their Art, which permitted them to bring seigned Adventures on the Stage, provided they did it under names that were known, (as in Epick Poem) to render them more probable, but they took also known Adventures with their Names, in somuch, that the Poets who followed, durst not take the names only, but obliged themselves to take the Adventures too, for as all the World knew, what those Men of great Reputation had done, that was Tragical and Extraordinary, they were afraid, that if they should attribute new
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*

Actions to those Men, the Publick would not believe those things which were really true, and very remarkable; but of which History and Fable should not think it worth while to take notice, and that they might preserve in their Pieces, that necessary Verity, Similitude, and Air of Truth, they Religiousy followed the steps of the Antient Poets, and Custom imposed this Law on them, whose Yoke they have not yet had the Courage to shake off, by inventing not only new Subjects, but new Persons as they had a mind to. *Agathon* has done it with very good success, and that is sufficient to encourage them to follow his example. This is the explanation of this passage, which is so far from prohibiting the Undertaking what Fortune has not afforded; to produce new Subjects on the Stage, independent from her, as Mr. *Corneille* would have it. That on the contrary, it confirms all that *Aristotle* said of the Liberty granted to the Poets to invent both Things and Names; and what makes this passage yet more considerable, is, that it informs us that the Poets did not use that Liberty, and that all their pieces were taken out of the Grecian History or Fables, which proves that *Euripides* did not invent the Subject of his *Iphigenia Taurica*, nor of his *Helene* and his *Ion*, for if he had, *Aristotle* would not fail to have done him the honour to mention it.

28. *This is enough on the Constitution, Nature and Quality of Fables, or the Subjects of Tragedy.* *Aristotle* takes care to give notice of the matters he speaks of, that the order he keeps, may be always taken notice of, and what follows, may be not confounded with what precedes. This Summary comprehends the nine preceding Chapters, for he began at the 7th to treat of the Constitution of the Subject. These Things being explain'd, we'll see what the Constitution of the Subject ought to be, since it is the chief and principal part of Tragedy.
What Manners are in Tragedy, and the four Qualities they ought to have. How the goodness of the Manners ought to be understood. Euripides's Transgressions against the Manners, necessity and probability must be followed in the Manners, as in the Subject; what the unravelling ought to be. Of Machines, and when they ought to be used. A Rule of Aristotle's which is too rigorous. The Vicious unravelling of the Medea, and the Nature of the Greeks. How Incidents without any Cause may be permitted in Tragedy. How a Poet may, and ought to keep the Resemblance in adorning it. When, and how the Verisimilitude ought to be preferred to the Truth. The Ingenuity of Homer and Agathon in their Character of Achilles. The obligation the Poets lay under to satisfy the two Senses, which are the only Judges of Poetry.

1. Here are four things to be observed in the Manners; the first and (a) most important, is, that they be good. There are Manners in a Discourse, or in an Action, as I have already said; when both of them make known the Inclination or Resolution, such as it is, good if it be good,
and bad if it be bad; and this goodness of Manners is found in all conditions. For a Woman may be (b) Good, and a Servant may be Good, tho’ the Women are generally speaking rather bad than good, and the Servants are absolutely naught.

2. The Second thing to be observed in the Manners, is, that they be agreeable (d) Valour is a Moral Virtue, but ’tis very disagreeable to a Woman, who ought neither to be Valiant nor Bold.

3. The Third that they be like, for Manners which are like, are different from those which are good or agreeable, as hath been already said.

4. To Conclude, the fourth is, that they be equal, and if the Original, from whence our Imitation is taken (e) be unequal in its Manners. We ought to make them equally unequal, tho’ the whole Imitation.

5. We offend against the Goodness of the Manners, when they are not necessary. Such are the Manners of Menelas, (f) in the Orestes of Euripides.

6. The Lamentations of Ulysses in the Scylla of the Poet, and all the discourse of his Menalippe, in the piece which bears that Name, offend against the agreeableness, for there is nothing more indecent.

(b) Is. (d) To be Terrible and Valiant are the Manners of Men, but don’t agree with a Woman. (e) Be Subject to such Manners. (f) As.
7. That Poet has also offended against the equality of the Manners, in his Iphigenia at Aulis. For the suppliant Iphigenia, whom we see at the beginning, is not (g) that courageous Iphigenia, which we see at the end.

8. As in the disposition of the Subject, so in the Manners we ought always to seek the necessity, or the verisimilitude; so, that (b) things happen necessarily or probably.

9: 'Tis therefore evident by this, that the unravelling of the Subject ought to be taken from the Subject itself, without making use of any Machine, as in the Medea, or as in the Iliad upon the return of the (i) Grecians. If a Machine be made use of, it ought to be out of the Action of the Tragedy, either to explain some things which happened before, and which 'tis impossible for a Man to know, or to inform of something which will happen, (k) concerning which 'tis necessary to be instructed, for we (l) are all persuaded, that the Gods can see all things. 'Tis absolutely necessary, that among all the Incidents which compose the Fable, no one be without Reason, or if (m) that be impossible, it ought to be so ordered, that that which is without Reason be always out of the Tragedy, as Sophocles has prudently observed in his Oedipus.

(g) Is not like what she appears afterwards. (b) The Person speaks or not, what is necessary or probable, and that one thing be after another probably or necessarily. (i) Sailing back. (k) That wants prediction or a Message. (l) Attribute to the Gods the power of seeing all. (m) Not.

10. Since
10. Since Tragedy is an Imitation of that which is most excellent among Men; we ought to imitate good Painters, who in giving to every one their true form, and making them like, do represent them handsomer than they are: The same must be done by a Poet, who would imitate a Passionate and Cholerick Man, (n) or some other such like Character, in setting before our Eyes what such Anger might probably produce, rather than what it actually did; 'tis thus, that Homer and Agathon have formed their Character of Achilles.

11: All these things must be observed, and besides these, all those which (o) the two Senses require, ought to be satisfied, which are inseparably from Poetry, and the only Judges of it, for it happens, that Poets often err (p) in that respect; but have said (enough of this in the Treatise which I writ on this Head.

(n) See the remarks on this place. Mr. Goulton's Edition does not agree with Mr. Dacier, but with Victorious, &c. (o) Belong to the two Senses. (p) According to them.

REMARKS on Chap. XVI.

1. The first, and the most important is, that they be good. There are Manners in a Discourse, or in an Action, as I have already said; when both of them make known, the Inclination or Resolution, such as it is, bad if it be bad, and good if it be good.] There is nothing in all this Book explained more clearly, than this first condition of the Manners, That they be good, nevertheless some have been deceived, and thought that Aristotle would have them be Virtuous. Mr. Corneille has very solidly refuted that
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.* 253

that explication, which would equally Condemn all the Antient Poems, as well Epic as Tragick Poems, in which are found abundance of Vicious Persons, and he few very well, that we should seek for such a Goodness, as was Compatible with Actions Morally Evil, and with those which are Morally Good; but this is what could never be found, the Explanation which he gives to these Words of Aristotle being no better than that of the others. As for me, says he, I believe that 'tis the shining Character, that enhances a Virtuous, or a Criminal Habit, according as 'tis proper and agreeable to the Person who is introduced. This explication would not only damn a great many Characters, which the Antient Poets have made, and which have neither that greatness of Soul nor Elevation, which Mr Corneille requires; but 'tis certain also, that this Quality would not agree with two of the others, viz. the likeness and agreeableness, 'twould be of no advantage to repeat all the other explanations which are made of this place. What Aristotle says, That the Manners ought to be good, is what Horace has thus Translated "Notandi sunt tibi mores, as I have explained, that is, That the Manners be well adapted. Whether the Person introduced be morally Vicious or Virtuous. Aristotle himself explains this very clearly. There are Manners in a Discourse, or in an Action, when both one and the other, make known the Inclination or Resolution, such as it is, bad if it is bad, and good if it is good. The Manners will have this goodness of which we now speak, if they rightly denote the Resolution, which he, who speaks will take, whether it tends to Good or Evil; that is to say, if they are well adapted and well expressed, for a greater elucidation of this matter; the Philosopher adds, and the goodness of Manners is found in all Conditions, for a Woman may be good, and a Servant may be good. That is, that the most vicious Characters, as those of Servants are capable of this goodness, and consequently this goodness doth consist in denoting truly
Truly their evil Inclinations; 'tis not at all necessary that the Heroes of Poems should be Virtuous; the most Vicious as Achilles, Turnus, Mezentius, are as regularly good, as Æneas and Ulysses. The Author of the Treatise of Epick Poem has handled this admirably well; there is nothing more judicious than what he has wrote, and he hath taken Aristotle for his Guide.

2. Tho the Women, are generally speaking, rather bad than good.] This passage is no more favourable to the Women, than that of Solomon, who says in the Ecclesiastes, that he found one wife Man among a thousand, but not one wife Woman among them all, Virum de mille unum reperi, mulierem ex omnibus non Inveni: The Philosopher assures us, that they are Subject to more Vices than the Men, by reason of their natural frailty. Aristotle gives an account of most part of them in the IXth Book of his History of Animals; but if that be true, I believe those Vices which they have more than the Men, do not so much arise from the Imbecility of their Nature, as from the Education which they generally have, which it is not absolutely Wicked, as too often it is, yet 'tis not proper to strengthen their Vertue, and correct their Vices.

3. And the Servants are absolutely nought.] As the Antients had only Slaves, 'twas almost a miracle to find any of them virtuous, for Virtue rarely dwells in Slavery. Homer said, that when a Freeman was put into Chains, he lost half his Virtue: What thougt we then to think of those who for several Generations have been born Slaves, we have no Slaves our Servants are free, but the Liberty which Christianity gives them, does not make 'em a whit the better.

4. The Second, that they be agreeable.] This is what Horace calls Conveniencia finge, to make the Manners agreeable, is to give to every person that which is convenient for him to make him speak and act, according to his Age, State and Condition.
on, 'tis a thing of no small scope. This is one part of what a Poet ought to know, in order to acquit himself well.

Quis didicit patria quid debeat, & quid amicis,
Quo fiet amore parentis, quos frater amendum & hospes
Quod sit Conspectus, quid Justicis officium: quae
Partes in Bellum misit ducis: Ille profecto
Reddere Personam seiv Convenientia Cuig;
Respiciere exemplar vitae morum; Jubebo,
Doorum Imitatorem & Veras hinc ducere Voces.

He that has learnt what's to his Country due;
What we to Parents, Friends and Kindred owe:
What charge a Statesman, or a Judge does bear,
And what, a leading General's Duties are;
Will never be at loss, he may be sure,
To give each Person their true Portraiture.
Take Humane Life for your Original,
Keep but your Draughts to that, you'll never fall.

5. Valour is a Moral Virtue, but 'tis very disagreeable to a Woman. That Poet who makes a Woman Valiant, offends as much against Manners, as he, who makes her Prudent and Politick, for neither Prudence nor Policy, are the ordinary Virtues of Women. However, there are some exceptions; but then the Poet ought to take care so exactly to hit the Character, that we may expect all that it may produce. Thus Eschylus makes Clytemnestra valiant in these Verses of his Cephores.

Give me my Sword, and I soon will Try,
Who shall be Conqueror, and who shall dye.

But he offends against the 'agreeablefs, because a Woman who had killed her Husband with an Ax, ought not to be represented as others, and have her Character promise it. Thus Orestes says to Electra in Sophocles:

O θεός τό δαίμονι τον ἱερὸν ἴων ἔρη αὐτῷ Ἄρη.
There is no Virtue which Women are not capable of, if Nature was corrected and strengthened by Education. History and Fable give an account of several, who have been Valiant, Prudent and Politick; for this reason Plato would have them Educated as Men, being persuaded, that nothing hindered them from leading of Armies, and governing States as well as they. Euripides has not observed so nicely the agreeableness in the Manners; for sometimes, and without any Grounds for it, he makes the Women greater Philosophers than Anaxagoras, and sometimes more Politick than Solon; his is no less faulty, in respect to the likeness and the equality, as will be shown in what follows. I know no good Patterns for Manners among the Greek Poets, except Homer and Sophocles, and among the Latins, Virgil and Terence only.

6. They be like.] This third quality is only for known Characters, for 'tis from the Story, that this likeness must be drawn, and we must describe them as we find 'em. 'Tis for this reason Horace says, aut Famam sequere, Follow Fame, now to follow Fame, is as the fame Horace speaks.

Scriptor Honoratum si forte reponis Achillèm,
Impiger, Iracundus, Inexorabilis, Acer,
Furaneget sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis.
Sit Medea Ferox Invitiâque, stebilis Ixo,
Perfidus Ixion; Io vaga. Tristis Orestes.

If great Achilles comes upon the Stage, Inexorable, Angry, Fierce with Rage: Let him deny his Right, and Claim by Arms, Though Ixo Weeps, Medea has her Charms; Ixion is Perfidious, Io flies, And sad Orestes moans with Weeping Eyes.
For Manners which are like, are different from those which are good, or agreeable, as hath been already said.) Aristotle had good reason to add this, for most Men are deceived about these two Qualities. They confound one with the other, and those Manners which are Like, for those which are Agreeable, and those which are Agreeable, for those which are Like. There is no necessity of falling into this Error, and therefore we shall examine the nature of these Qualities, and mark their differences exactly. It cannot be very difficult to apprehend, since Aristotle only refers us to what he hath said, of the Goodness, and Agreeableness of Manners; and truly the two first being so well explained, we should not be deceived with the third. Mr. Corneille endeavours to prevent this disorder, by separating them, and attributing those which are like to known Characters, and those which are agreeable to invented ones, see his own Words. These two qualities of which Interpreters have had a great deal of trouble, to find the difference which Aristotle would have between them, without assigning that difference, may be easily reconciled, provided they be separated, and that we give those which are agreeable to imaginary Persons, who never had existence; but in the Poets fancy, and keep the others for those who are known by History or Fable, as I have said. But this Medium is useless, and would destroy all that Aristotle has established. The agreeableness ought no less to be found, in the known than in the invented Characters; there must be then a more essential difference; The Manners which are like, (says Aristotle) are those which we have, and which Eume has spread abroad; of those Persons who are introduced on the Stage, and the agreeable Manners are those, which agree with the Characters of those Persons. By this it is evident, that Manners may be made like and not agreeable, and agreeable yet not like. If I represent an Emperor who is defamed and vilified by sordid and pittiful Covetousness, I should give
give him Manners like himself, if I should make him act and discourse conformably to what was really true of him; but those Manners would by no means be agreeable, for nothing can be more indecent and unworthy of a King. On the contrary, if I should make him Magnificent, and Liberal, I should indeed give him Manners which were Agreeable, but they would not be Like; since they would be contrary to the opinion which was commonly received of him, what must be done then, that we offend neither against the Agreeableness, nor the Likeness, in the Character of this Emperor? we must dissemble his Avarice without changing it into Liberality. And 'tis thus Mr. Corneille has used it, in his Heraclius, in the Character of the Emperor Maurice, as the Author of the Treatise of Epick Poem has rightly observed, he very judiciously suppresses this evil Inclination in Maurice, which was not Agreeable, and yet does not attribute the contrary to him, which would be Unlike. To render this plainer by an Example which is greater, and more known; Homer has represented the Gods with all the Passions of Men; he has not offended against the Likeness; since he lays only, what Fame had published, but he has offended against the Agreeableness, since he attributes those Passions to them, to which Men alone are subject; nevertheless Plato and after him Proclus, have called what Homer says of the Gods, αὐτοίς μηδε σόαι to imitate irregularly; but that is not with relation to the Idea, which we naturally have, or ought to have, of an infinite, immortal and almighty Being.

8. To conclude the fourth is, that they be equal. This is what Horace says.

Servetur ad Innum
Qualis ab Incepto processerit, & sibi Conferet

As you begin, so keep on to the end.
At the same time a Poet offends also against this last sort of Manners, he offends also against the first and third sorts; for if the Manners be not equal, they cannot possibly be either agreeable or good.

9. And if the Original, from whence our imitation is taken, be unequal in its Manners, we ought to make them also unequal, thro' the whole imitation.] As what he hath said of the Manners being equal, might deceive some People, and make them think, that they ought to make the humours of the Persons always the same, without any variety. He takes care to inform them, that such a variety is consistent with the equality he speaks of, provided that it be in the Original, which the imitation is of, and that they be equally unequal. Children and young People are unequal, a Poet ought then to represent them unequally, and he will not err against this fourth Rule. If that inequality be through the whole Character, Equal and Like, Tigelius, Musitian to Augustus, was the most Uneven Person that ever was; _Nil sibi unquam fic impar fibi_, says Horace; 'twould be against the Likeness, to represent them always in the same Manner, and in the same Condition. They must be made Unequal then, and be equally Unequal from the beginning to the end of the Poem.

10. We offend against the goodness of the Manners when they are not necessary.] After he has explained the four qualities of Manners, he gives some Examples of faults which have been committed against them, what he says here, concerning their goodness, may suffice to shew all his Commentators, that that goodness doth not consist in the Virtue, but in the Expression; and that 'tis not a Moral, but a Poetical Goodness; which consists in expressing the Manners, and so well making them known, that we may be able at the same time to perceive what they will produce. Those Manners which are Morally good, may
Aristotle’s Art of Poetry.

may not be necessary, and then, as Aristotle says, they are vitious; if the Goodness of which he speaks were a Moral Goodness, then they might be both Morally, Good and Evil at the same time, which is contradictory and impossible; without staying longer on a thing which is so clear, let us see, how the Manners which are not necessary, trespass against this Goodness, and that is not difficult to show. That the Manners of any Person may be good, they ought to let us foresee what resolutions that Person will take: those which are not necessary, offend directly against this Goodness Aristotle speaks of, because they can neither be foreseen, nor be the consequence of those which we know; and therefore cannot be Agreeable or Equal, for we cannot offend against this goodness, without trespassing on the other three, of which this is the Basis and Foundation. The Example which Aristotle produces will make it more plain.

II. Such are the Manners of Menelas in the Orestes of Euripides.] Menelas arrived at Argos just as they were going to Condemn Orestes to Death. Orestes, hopes, that the Arrival of his Unkle would save him from that danger, and truly the Manners which are poles then gives him, would make us think that he would not so take his Nephew, for he says, that his Calamity and Distress obliged him to take the more care of him; and when Tyndarus pressed to have the Prince executed, that he might revenge the Death of his Daughter Clytemnestra, he tells him that his long stay among the Barbarians, had made him one too. Menelas answers, that he acted in that according to the Grecian Education, who always had great considerations for their Relations, and thought themselves obliged to do them all possible Service. Nay, he was so transported as to tell Tyndarus, that Anger and Old Age made him a Fool. Thus are the Manners of Menelas well denoted, and that he says is Oratio Morata, a Moral Speech.
Speech, and seem to intimate that he will take a resolution agreeable to them. But this is contradicted the next moment, for Menelaus being terrified at Troadamus his threats, b comes at once very fearful, and coward like abandons his Nephew. Aristotle had reason then to say, that here Manners are not necessary, for he would have treated his Subject as well if he had given Menelaus quite contrary Manners. Mr. Corneille seems to be guilty of the same fault; The Manners which he gives to Rodogune, when she proposes to Antiochus and Seleucus the killing of her Mother, are without necessity, and go directly contrary to the Goodness they ought to have, for the Character of that Prince is, till then, made something else to be expected, than such an horrible Proposal. The way by which Mr. Corneille endeavours to justify it, does not do it, and only serves to render it more odious.

12. The lamentations of Ulysses in the Scylla of the same Poet, and all the discourse of his Menalippe, in the piece which bears that Name, offend against the agreeableness, for there is nothing more indecent.] We have neither of these pieces, so 'tis difficult to tell the subjects of them. 'Tis probable that the lamentations of Ulysses proceeded from his fear of his being devoured by that Monster. Such lamentations are indecent in a Man of Spirit. As for what respects Menalippe, the indecency which Aristotle takes notice of was, that the lady before her Father all Anaxagoras's Opinions in Natural Philosophy, to prevent his burning two Children, which he had found in his Stable, and took for Monsters brought forth by some of his Cattle, not thinking that they were two Children which his Daughter was newly delivered of, and put into the Stable to hide her shame. All these Physical reasonings, to prove that a Child might be born of a Beast and not be a Monster, are in no wise agreeable to a young Lady, but very unbecoming. And as the Critics have well observed
observed, *Euripides is often guilty of this fault. Aristotle* blames only *Menalippe’s Character, but Dionysius Halicarnassans* who says a great deal of this Play in his first and second Treatise of Figur’d Discourses, gives us an occasion to discover two other very considerable Defects. The first is, that *Euripides has described himself under the Person of Menalippe, and that he might honour his Master Anaxagoras by shewing that he was his Scholar, very impertinently tells, that famous Opinion which was not known in the time of Menalippe, That all things were in confusion. The precaution which this Poet had taken to render this Philosophy probable, in the mouth of a young Princess, in calling his Piece *Menalippe the Philosopher, Μεναλίππη τὸν Φιλόσοφον,* and making her say, that what she spoke on this occasion she had learned of her Mother, doth not excuse him. The other fault is yet greater than this, for by that he has debased the Majesty of Tragedy, which does not allow of Philosophical Discourses, which Comedy may indeed use for ridicule. *Euripides was guilty of this fault, by following the Comick Poets too nearly, he has a great many good things, but did not always consider that Comedy and Tragedy are Poems very different, and that what agrees with one, is not proper for the other. Dionysius Halicarnassans* speaks of this piece, only to shew the Ingenuity of the Poet, who found out a way for *Menalippe to tell her Father her Story, for after she had run thro’ all the Arguments she could use, to save the Childrens Lives, she adds by way of Advice; but suppose some young Woman, who has had a misfortune, should have exposed these Children, to hide her shame from her Father, would you then kill them? by this means she succeeded according to her request.

13. The same Poet has also offended against the equality of Manners, in his *Iphigenia at Aulis, for the suppliants Iphigenia whom we see at the beginning, is not that Courageous Iphigenia whom we see at the end.*
This Remark of Aristotle's is extraordinarily judicious. When Iphigenia embraces her Fathers knees, conjuring him not to deliver her up to death, she carries her Prayers even to meanness and baseness, and shews such a love for Life, as is unworthy a high born Prince, for she says, There is nothing more agreeable than to see the light of the Sun, and none but Fools can deserve Death; and that she had rather live shamefully then die gloriously. After which she makes a thousand complaints, and calls her Father impious; but immediately she becomes another Person, she loves nothing now, so much as Glory, and begs of her Mother that she would let her die, for the safety of the Greeks, the glorious Victory which her Country was to obtain by her Death, should be to her a Husband, Children and whatever else was agreeable in the whole World. She desires her Mother that she would not put her self into Mourning, nor suffer her Sisters to do it, because she was happy, and her Fortune deserved rather envy than pity. Mr. Racine has succeed much better in borrowing all the Beauties of Euripides, and avoiding his faults, he makes a noble Character of Iphigenia, always such, and without any inequality. Before I finish this Remark, I shall make one reflection, which seems to me very important. That after Aristotle has spoken of the faults which may be committed against the Goodness, Agreeableness and Equality of the Manners, he says nothing of those which may be committed against the Resemblance or Likeness, did he forget it? or is there any part of this Chapter lost as Vitellius thinks? Not at all, Aristotle speaks nothing of it, because it's next to an impossibility to be defective in the Resemblance on set purpose; for if the Characters which are brought on the Stage, are not known at all, or at most very little, it's impossible to err against the Likeness then, because the Poet has liberty to make them just as he pleases. If they are known, there is nothing more easy than to follow them. St. Chrysostom however has observed,
observed, that Æschylus has offended against this third Manner, in his Philoctetes, where he makes Ulysses a dull and severe Man, whereas he ought to be easy and cunning, according to the Idea which we have of him. Mr. Racine has also trespassed against the Resemblance, in the Character of his Hippolytus, for he knows very well, that he deviated from the truth when he makes him amorous, but to hide the defect, and in some measure to recover the Resemblance, he gives him a fierce and savage Love, imagining that our Stage could not endure a Man who had no Love at all. However, I would not advise any to follow his Example; 'tis of dangerous consequence to change known and established Characters.

14. As in the disposition of the Subject, so in the Manners, we ought always to seek the necessity or the verisimilitude.] After having set down the faults, in managing the Manners, he tells us in two words, how we may avoid them; by always following the necessity, or the verisimilitude. The necessity ought always to precede, that is, we ought as much as we can to make the Persons speak and act as they would necessarily or probably do. A young Man ought not to speak, and act as an old one, nor an old Man as a young; but as it sometimes falls out that an old Man may have the inclinations of Youth, and a Youth the inclinations of an old Man, then the necessity fails, and we must go on to the verisimilitude. If Euripides had endeavoured after the necessity and the probability, he had not fallen into those Errors Aristotle accuses him of. Thus Horace did not forget to take notice of this precept, when he endeavours to denote its extent, by saying,

Semper in adjunctione, avq; morabimur aptis.

Still to the Age, and Circumstances keep.

For
For what he says simply in respect to Age, ought also to be meant of Sex, Country, Quality, and all those other things by which Men are distinguished.

15. So that things happen necessarily or probably.] The Probability or the Necessity of the Manners ought to be found in all the Actions they produce, in such a manner, that they may be all of them either necessary or probable, not only by their Nature and Quality, but also by their Order and Consequence, for they must come one after another, either necessarily or probably. All humane Passions have different degrees, which produce different Actions, which must not be confounded, nor put out of Order. In a Word, the Poet ought to observe, that all those things which the Manners produce, be in their proper Order, and that they be produced one of another, necessarily or at least probably.

16. 'Tis therefore evident by this, that the unraveling a subject ought to be taken from the subject itself.] Since the Manners ought to produce the Actions, and these Actions ought to arise one from another, it necessary follows from thence, that the unraveling which is also an Action, ought to arise, either necessarily or probably, from that which precedes it, and which the Manners have already produced. This is an undeniable Consequence. The unraveling of Oedipus arises from the Manners, which produced the beginning of the Action.

17. Without making use of any Machine, as in the Medea.] Aristotle condemns the unraveling the Medea of the Euripides, which is done by a Machine, in which Medea flies away after she had reveng'd her self on Jason for his infidelity, by killing her Rival. I find that that Machine has no foundation in the Play. Mr. Corneille is of a quite different Opinion. I find, says he, that Aristotle's opinion is a little too rigorous;
250 Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

rigorous; it seems to have a sufficient foundation, by making Medea a Magician, to have related her to be so all along the Poem, and to have done Actions as much above the power of Nature, as this, after what she had done for Jason at Colchis, had renewed Aeson's Youth at his return, after she had joyn'd invisible Fire to the present she made to Creusa, this flying Chariot cannot be beyond probability, and the Play had no occasion of any other preparation for this extraordinary Action. Mr. Corneille would have been in the right, if Medea had had recourse to her Art, for this flying Chariot, as she had for all the others. But the unravelling doth not in the least proceed from Medea's Manners, nor from the incidents which preceded it, where nothing was seen that could give the least reason to expect an end of this Nature. Tho' Medea was a great Magician, yet she did not owe this Chariot to her Enchantments, but to the goodness of the Sun her Grandfather, who was very de-}

"Τοὶν δ' ἥχυμα πατρὸς Ἡλίῳ πα'θε

Δὶςων ἥμιν ἐρμα στερεῖκας κερὸς.

The Sun my Grandfather, this Chariot gave Me, from my cruel Enemies to save.

Tho' Medea had been no Sorceress, yet she would have been saved by the power of that God, and this is the reason why Aristotle condemns it: for 'tis that which makes the unravelling vitious. Euripides should have done it some other way, by making Medea have recourse to her Art for it, and not to a Machine, and the power of a God, that is the ordinary usage of low Genius's, when they know not how to bring themselves off.

18. Or as in the Ilias upon the return of the Grecians.] The Question here, is not concerning E-
pick Poem, for Aristotle speaks only of the Dramatick, he could not Condemn the usage of Machines, without directly opposing Homer's Practice, and entirely destroying the nature of that Poem, when those Machines are as necessary as they are unnecessary in Tragedy, for we may lay that Epick Poem requires every thing to be done by Machine, that is, by the assistance and power, of the Gods. The Poet employs them with a great deal of reason, and which he could not well omit, for the Ministry of those Divinities renders, the incidents, more Majestical and Wonderful. The Gods are the unravelling of the Iliads, Odyffes and Aeneids, the Iliads then which Aristotle brings his allegation against, is not Homer's Iliads, but a Tragedy whose Title was the Ileas or the return of the Greeks, and tis very probably the same which Longinus quotes, in his XIII. Chapter, and attributes to Sophocles. The unravelling of that piece is made by Achilles's Spectre, which comes out of his Tomb and demands that Polyxenus may be Sacrificed to him. Aristotle condemns this unravelling, which comes on a sudden, and has too much of the Miracle in it; and the Encomiums which Longinus gives to the same place of that piece, are not contrary to this determination: Longinus praises only, the spritely fine description, which Sophocles gives of that Ghost: But Aristotle does not only condemn the manner in which it is done, but finds fault with the Apparition also.

19. If a Machine be made use of, it ought to be out of the action of the Tragedy, either to explain some things which happened before, which 'tis impossible for a Man to know, or to inform of some things which will happen, concerning which 'tis necessary to be Instructed.] After having condemned the use of Machines in general, he tells us when 'tis allowed to make use of them.
He says then, that they should be employed, in those things only, which are not of the Subject, that is, which are not of the action of the Tragedy. Now those things which don't enter into the subject of the Tragedy are of two sorts, either those which have already happened, or which ought to happen, when either of these are of such a nature, that they cannot be known to Men, and yet 'tis necessary that they know them, then the assistance of some God must be called in, from whom nothing is hid. 'Tis thus Sophocles uses the presence of Minerva in his Ajax, to tell Ulysses, what Ajax had done, the night before his rage. Euripides likewise introduces Apollo at the end of his Orestes, to tell Menelaus, and Orestes, what was become of Helena, and to inform the latter, what should afterwards happen to him. But the usage of Machines and recourse to the Gods is so limited by this, that it can very rarely happen, that the Poet shall have occasion to use them. Sophocles might very well have omitted the making Minerva descend, to inform Ulysses of something, which she might easily have discovered to him another way. Apollo was not necessary for Euripides, to unravel his Orestes, since he might have done it in some other manner. The Prologue which Venus makes in the Hippolytus of the same Poet, is also contrary to Aristotle's rule. Phaedra's Son, and the cause of it, might have been well explained without Venus being concerned in the matter. Diana, who comes at the end of that Play, to inform Theseus of Hippolytus's innocence, is another needless Machine, since his innocence, might have been discovered, without the assistance of the Goddess. Alcestis's proposal might have very well been made, without Apollo: And the Dialogue of that God with Death, was not necessary. Minerva also came without any occasion for't, in Theseus, to hinder Diomedes, and Ulysses from returning into the Trojan Camp; without performing any other exploit than killing DOLON; and I can't believe
believe that any body can approve of the Stratagem which he used to amuse Paris, by talking to him, as if she was Venus. To conclude, the Troades might subsist, without Neptune's Prologue, and the Discourse which that God had with Minerva. There are only four Pieces of Euripides, in which, the presence of the Gods is managed as Aristotle here prescribes. Those are, the Iphigenia Taurica, Helena, Ion, and Elektra: But I am persuaded that Euripides, might have found out some other means, in his Art, to have avoided these Machines. Sophocles was wiser, in the managing his Philoctetes, at the end of which Hercules descends from Heaven of mere necessity, to carry Philoctetes, to follow Ulysses and Achilles's Son, which could never have been done without that Gods assistance. But to return to Aristotle, I can't tell whether he be not too severe, when he would have no Machines employ'd, but only to explain those things which are out of the action. 'Tis out of doubt, that this Law is made for Pieces of the first Rank, and I believe this rigor must and ought to be moderated, and Machines suffered in the unravelling of the subject, provided it cannot be well done, any other way. It seems Horace mitigated this precept, when he is content, to say in general,

**Nec Deus interstis, nisi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit.**

Let great occasions make the Gods attend,
And no slight cause oblige them to descend,

And if we take due notice, the practice of the antiquents is conformable to this Opinion. The Apparition of Hercules in Sophocles's Philoctetes, is not at all out of the action, the presence of the Gods, is more necessary for the unravelling the Play, which would be imperfect without it, than for the Predictions which Philoctetes makes, which are not so absolute-
by necessary, but that the Audience might be without their Instruction. I put into the number of the Machines, which Aristotle speaks of, that furious Storm, which makes the unravelling of the Second Oedipus of the same Poet; for altho' Jupiter does not appear, 'tis he who sends that Tempest, during which Oedipus is buried. We see then, that Machines may be employed, not only out of, but also in the action of Tragedy, provided there be an absolute necessity for them; those pieces indeed where they are used to explain those things which are out of the Subject, will certainly be more perfect than the others, but these will not be vicious; and that is sufficient not to deprive the Theatre, of those pieces, where recourse must be had to a Machine to unravel the Plot. If Aristotle did not approve of those pieces, but where the Machines were out of the Subject, 'tis certain that he would reasonably blame those pieces where the Machines are very frequent. The Poets ought not to be prodigal of their Miracles, and their Gods. Tragedy should leave these Ornaments for Epick Poetry, where the relation makes that very agreeable to the Auditor which he would infallibly condemn if it were exposed to his view.

20. For we are all persuaded, that the Gods can see all things. The use of Machines, which makes the Gods appear on the Stage, is founded on the generally received Opinion, that the Gods can see all things, and take care of Men; for if, for example there were none but Epicureans in the world, the Machines would be ridiculous, or not suffered, because they would directly thwart their Opinion, that the Gods lead a quiet life, free from all sorts of care, and if Nature sometimes doth those things which seem miraculous, the Gods take no notice of it, and don't interrupt their pleasure. This is one reason why the Tragick Poets conform themselves rather to the opinions of the Stoicks than other Philosophers.
21. 'Tis absolutely necessary, that among all the incidents which compose the Fable, no one be without reason.] This is the Foundation of what he hath advanced, viz. That the Machines ought not to be employed, but out of the Action; for says he, among all the incidents which compose the Subject, no one ought to be without reason: and which doth not arise naturally from what preceded, what is done by Machine, and the assistance of the Gods is separated from all the rest; for what the Gods are pleased to do, is pure Miracle; it is without Reason so far, as it is above Reason, and doth not come to pass according to the natural order of common events, that is, from the Causes which preceded, and therefore ought to be excluded from the action of Tragedy: this is a sure Consequence. Plays would be more perfect, if this Precept was always followed, but this does not hinder, but on some occasions recourse may be had to Machines, even in the Subject itself, as the Ancients sometimes had; for there is a great deal of difference, between that which is without Reason, and that which is contrary to Reason. The latter cannot be permitted upon any account whatever, but the former would be tolerable, if it were not abused. This Precept of Aristotle's doth not regard only those incidents, where Machines are employed, but extends to all others, of what nature soever, as the following example will amply demonstrate. Whatever is unreasonable, and absurd, ought to be out of the Action of the Tragedy. The same ought to be observed in Epopeia, as he advises in the 24. Chap. where this Precept is more circumstantiated, and extensive.

22. Or if that be impossible, it ought to be so ordered, that that which is without Reason, be always out of the Tragedy, as Sophocles has prudently observed in his Oedipus.] As there are Subjects which cannot be managed without using these Incidents, which Aristotle calls without reason, he says, that they ought to be
be placed out of the Tragedy, that is, out of the Action which makes the Subject of the piece, and made use of, as Sophocles does of that which is without reason in his Oedipus. 'Twas without reason that Oedipus should be so long Married to Jocasta, and not know in what manner Laius was killed, and making Enquiry after the Murderers, but as that Subject, which is otherwise the finest in the world, could not subsist without that, Sophocles did not think fit to omit it, but has placed it out of the Action, which he has taken for the Subject of his piece; that Incident is related as a thing already done, and which precedes the day of the Action. The Poet is answerable, only for those Incidents which enter into the Composition of his Subject, and not for those which precede or follow it.

23. Since Tragedy is an imitation of that, which is most excellent among Men, we ought to imitate good Painters, who in giving to everyone their true form and making them like, do always represent them handsomer than they are. This is a very important precept, for informing the Characters the Poet must imitate the Painters, who in drawing the Picture of any Person, preserve the true Strokes, which may be called the Characteristic Strokes, for without them, there would be no resemblance between the Copy and the Originals; but after that, they don't confine themselves to the Object, but endeavour to find what will make the Picture fine. They give it a graceful mean, Embellish it with a good Complexion, and a Noble Air. To conclude they omit nothing which can encrease the Beauty of the Person, without changing the true Features, and altering the Proportions of the Shape and Face. The Tragick Poets ought to Act after the same manner, and with so much the more reason, as they imitate more Illustrious Persons, such as Kings and Princes, and they may make them so much finer, as they are exalted above other Men, for those Characters are capable of
of all the Beauty that can possibly be given them, if they are agreeable to the Truth, and don't destroy the remembrance. Aristotle tell us how this is to be done.

24. The same must be done by a Poet, who would imitate a Passionate and Cholerick Man, or some other such like Character, in setting before our eyes, what such like anger might probably produce, rather than what it actually did.] This passage has given a deal of trouble to all Aristotle's Commentators. The Author of the Treatise of Epick Poem, has taken it in Victorious's Sense. The Poet also ought to form examples of Goodness or Harshness, when he imitates a Cholerick and Violent Man; or Sweet and Easy, or some other such like Character. And because he was not satisfied with this Explanation, he gives us another in the same Chapter, When a Poet imitates a Cholerick Person, or one who is of a Sweet and easy Temper, or any such like Character, he ought rather to propose models of Goodness than Harshness. Mr. Corneille has taken it almost in the same Sense with Robernells, for he Translates it, Thus the Poet representing Cholerick, or lazy persons, ought to draw a Lofty Idea, from those qualities which they attribute to them, so that there may be found a very good example of Equity, or Inflexibility. But none of these Translations explain Aristotle's meaning. Mr. Corneille was so little satisfied both with his own, and the others, that after he had run through all the different Opinions, he says, There is very good reason to reject all these Interpretations, when a new one shall offer, that will please better, for the opinions of the most learned are no Laws. I shall not stick to say, that having explained this Passage, in a Letter, which I wrote to Mr. Chevreau, about fourteen years ago, which Letter was read to Mr. Corneille, who was very well pleased to see the true meaning, of a precept, which had always appeared very obscure, and concerning which he could never receive any satisfaction: He praised this Explanation; for he loved the Truth no less when it was found
found out by others, than when 'twas discovered by himself. The obscurity of this passage is caused by these two words, ἐθνονός and ἐπινείω: which were not rightly understood; ἐπινείω signifies often Probity, Easiness, Goodness, but it also signifies Verisimilitude, as in this place; and ἐθνονός signifies ordinarily a lazy, soft, condescending, easy Man; but it signifies also a Passionate, Furious Man, and excels the word ἐγνατός, see Hesychius, 'tis there in this latter Sense. These words being rightly explained, 'tis easy to Translate the whole Passage. 'Tis thus word for word. Thus a Poet who imitates passionate and cholerick Men, or such other Characters, ought rather to propose an Idea of Verisimilitude, than an Idea of Easiness. That is to say, that he ought rather to consider, what Anger might probably make a Man do, than what he did: He ought rather to work after Nature, who is the true Original than to amuse himself with any particulars, which is only an imperfect and confused Copy, or so vitious that the Poet ought to avoid it. Having explained the Letter of the Text, I shall proceed, to make the Application of the Comparifon, which Aristotle has made use of. If a Poet would imitate a Cholerick, Unjust and Passionate Man, he is obliged to keep the true, Draught of that Man, his Choler, his Injustice, his Passion; but in preserving them he hath the Liberty which Painters have, he may Flatter and Embellish them: and in order to that, he ought not to fix on any particular Man that hath been Cholerick, but he ought to consult Nature, and borrow from her, those Colours which may make his Picture fine, without spoiling the resemblance. The angry Man, may be Lazy, Perfidious, or a Traitor. If the Poet endeavours, to joyn these qualities to his Character, he will spoil his Picture, instead of beautifying it, and trespass against this rule of Aristotle. Let him then seek other Colours, and Nature, who is the true Original, and model of that which is fine, will not fail to furnish him, she'll shew him that Val-
four agrees admirably well with the very fundamental part of his Character, and consequently, he should give his Hero a large share of it. 'Tis thus Homer has made use of it for Achilles, he has preserved in that Character, all that was necessary from the Fable, but when he was left to his own liberty, he hath used it so much to his Hero's advantage, and set it off so finely, that he hath almost hid his great Vices, by the Brilliant of a wonderful Valour, which has deceived an infinite number of people. Sophocles uses the same Conduct, in his Oedipus. He would describe a Man, that is Passionate, Violent, Rash; he always keeps in that Character, what is necessary and proper for the subject; and enhances it, by all the Embellishments it is capable of. He neither makes him a Base, nor a very vicious Man, that would spoil the likeness, but he makes him a very good, and valiant King, who neglects nothing, that may contribute to the good of his People; This is the way by which the Poets set rather before our Eyes, what their Characters can do, according to the probability, than matter of fact: And this is the fence of that extraordinary Precept, which Horace has endeavoured to express, by these two verses in his Art of Poetry.

Respicere exemplur vite motumque fubebo
Doctum imitatores, & veras hinc discere voces.

Take Humane Life for the Original,
Keep but your draughts to that, you'll never fall.

25. 'Tis thus that Homer and Agathon have formed their Character of Achilles. It is in the Greek, and 'tis thus that Homer and Agathon have made Achilles. This passage hath been explained otherwise. And 'tis thus that Homer himself hath made Achilles good. For the word Agathon, which is a proper name, was taken for the Adjective which signifies good; and this is a sequel of the fault, in
translating the word ἰνεκτεία, goodness, but here is no dispute about goodness, but Beauty. Aristotle says that Homer and Agathon, Tragic Poets, have made Achilles, as he has mentioned; drawn him like, but much finer.

26. All these things must be observed, besides these, all those which the two Senses require, ought to be satisfied, which are inseparable from Poetry, and the only Judges of it.] This passage is much more difficult than the former; and of as great Consequence: I believe I have found the true sense of it. Aristotle teaches us, that it is not sufficient, to observe all those things he has spoken of, and to form the Characters according to the necessity, and probability, but the Poet must endeavour to satisfy the two Senses, which judge of Poetry, that is the Hearing and Seeing. There are things which the Audience ought to see, and there are others which they ought only to hear related. If this order is inverted, and that is related which ought to be seen, and that is exposed to the sight, which ought to be only related, 'tis such a fault as will certainly spoil the Poem. A Poet has need of a great deal of Judgment, and Ingenuity, not to leave any of those Incidents behind the Scene, which will affect the Audience by being seen: And to hide those which might offend by reason of their Cruelty, or be found fault with for the want of probability. And what is yet worth taking notice of, is, that Horace has explained the same passage in these Verses of his Art of Poetry.

Ant agitur res in Scenis, aut acta referitur,
Segnis, irritant animum demissa per aurem,
Quam qua sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus, & que,
Iple sibi tradit spettator, non tamen intus,
Digna geri, promes in Scenam, multaque tolles
Ex oculis, qua mon narrat facundia poësia.
Neque pueros coram Populo Medea Traxider.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry: 277

...aut Humana palam coquat extra nefarius Ateus.

Aut in avem Progne vertatnr, Cadmus in anguem,
Quaecunque ostendi mihi sic, incredulus odi,

Some things are best to act, others to tell,
Those by the Ear conveyed, don't near so well,
Nor with such moving Passions stir our Mind,
As what we to our Eyes presented find.
Yet there are many things, which should not come
In view, nor pass beyond the Tiring-room.
Which after that, in moving language told,
Shall please the Audience more than to behold.
Let not Medea shew her cruel rage,
And cut her Children's Throats upon the Stage,
Nor wicked Ateus his dire part prepare,
Cadmus nor Progne in new forms appear.

When one a Snakes to ther a Bird's shall wear.
Whatever so incredible, you show
Shocks my Belief; but trait does nauseous grow.

27. For it happens that the Poets often err in that respect.] He has good reason to say, that 'tis very easy to err in Dramatick Poem, in that respect, and to offend both the Seeing, and Hearing. For nothing is more delicate; and they may be offended a thousand ways, either by shewing those things which they dislike, or keeping back those things they would be pleased with.

28. But I have said enough of this, in the Treatises which I have written on this head. ] He speaks without doubt of some pieces which he had writ on Dramatick Poetry, and called the Didascalies. Aristotle did not only explain in them the Subjects of Plays, but when, how, on what occasions, those Plays were Acted, so that Work was an exact History of the Ancient Poets, and a sure method to resolve the Chronological difficulties in the Greek History. These Didascalies which are now at the Head of Terence's Comedies, may give us a slight Idea of it; 'tis pity these pieces are lost.
The different sorts of Remembrances, of those which are most perfect, and which the Poet ought to prefer:

1. WE have already explained in that which preceded, what a Remembrance is, there are several sorts. The first (a) is the most simple, without any Art, and which most Poets use for want of Invention, is that which is made by marks or tokens. These marks are either natural as the Lance imprinted on the bodies of those Thebans, who were Earth-born. And as the Stars which Carcinus made use of, in his Thyestes; or adventitious: And these latter, are, either on the Body, as Scars, or off from it, as Necklaces, or the little Cradle in the Play called Tyro.

2. These marks may be used with more, or less Art, as we may see in the Remembrance of Ulysses, by the Scar of his Wound, for he is remembred by his Nurse, otherwise, than by his Shepherds. Thus 'tis certain, that all marks which are used, on set purpose, to establish a truth (b) have but little ingenuity in them; whereas those which produce their effects by chance, are much better, (c) and more ingenious, as that which is in the Odyssey, when Ulysses's Feet were washed.

(a) Sort. (b) Are void of Art, and all such like. (c) Arise from the Perspicile.
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*. 279

3. The second sort of remembrance, is that which is invented by the Poet, and therefore it is (d) without Art. 'Tis thus in the *Iphigenia of Euripides*, Orestes having remembered his Sisiter by a Letter, is known to her (e) by certain tokens which she gave him: for there (f) the Poet says what he pleases; 'tis not his Subject which speaks and explains itself. Thus this remembrance falls almost into the same defect, which I have spoken of, for the Poet had the liberty to make Orestes be remembered by *Iphigenia*, by any other token which he pleased, that Orestes could have carried about him. The voice which Sophocles has given to a Weaver's Shuttle, in his *Tercus*, is of the same nature.

4. A third sort of remembrance is that which is made by the Memory, when (g) an Object, stirs up in us some thought, which produces the remembrance, as is the Cypriacks of *Dicyogenes*, where he who saw a Picture wept, and his tears made him remember: Or as, in (h) Alcinous, Ulysses hearing a Man play on the Harp, and remembrance his former hardships could not forbear weeping, and so was remembered.

5. The fourth sort of remembrance is that which is made by reasoning: as in the Coephorces of *Eschylus*, where *Electra* reasons after this manner, *There is a Man come hither, who is like me, no body like me but Orestes, therefore Orestes is come*. And as in the *Iphigenia* of the Sophist.

(d) Not. (e) By a Concourse of Signs. (f) He says, what the Poet bids him. (g) We see something we remember. (h) Apol. of Alcinous.
Polyides, where Orestes argues thus; as my Sister was sacrificed to Diana, I must also be sacrificed too. In the Tydeus, of Thocoletes, Adrastus makes this argumentation; Laius was gone to get news of his Son, he was killed in the way, this is his Grandson, therefore 'tis Oedipus's Son, and in the Phineides, those unhappy Women, seeing the place, where they went to be slain, cried out with grief, that they saw very well that cruel destiny had condemned them to die in that place, since 'twas the very same where they were exposed, and 'tis this reasoning which made them to be remembred.

6. There is yet a (i) fifth sort of remembrance, which is also made by reasoning, and is followed by (k) false consequences; that draws the Audience, as in the false Ulysses: For his saying that he should remember a Bow which he had never seen, deceives the Audience by that (l) proposition, who expect that he should be remembred by that means, but they are catched by false reasoning.

7. The finest of all the remembrances, is that, which arises from the (m) Incidents themselves, and which causes a great surprize, by means of its probability, as in the (n) Oedipus of Sophocles, and the Iphigenia of Euripides, for 'tis very natural, and probable, that Oedipus should be curious, and that Iphigenia should write a Letter to Orestes, and this sort of Remembrances, is the only one which is made without natural or adventitious signs (o).

8. The best after these, are those, which are made by reasoning.

(i) Compound. (k) Paralogism. (l) Paralogism. (m) Things themselves which are probable. (n) The Tyrant. (o) Or Necklaces, &c.
Remarks on Chapter XVII.

1. *WE have already explained in that which went before what a remembrance is.*] In the XII. Chapter Aristotle explained what a remembrance was, and it seems at first sight, that which he says here, should immediately follow that, and this is the reason why Heinrich did not scruple to transpose this Chapter to the place where he thought it ought naturally to be; but if that learned Man had given himself the trouble to have examined Aristotle’s management, he would have seen, that, as he hath spoken of the Manners, in the foregoing Chapter, and hath shewed, that the actions they produce ought to come one after another so, that the unravelling of a subject should arise from the subject itself, so this was the proper place and time, to speak of the different remembrances, since they generally make the unravelling. We need only take notice of the terms which he uses here, *We have explained before εις τας προτέρους*, which could not have been said, if this Chapter had followed the XII. immediately. It seems that Aristotle foreknew what would happen, for he endeavours to prevent it, in shewing by these Words, that he had not lost the design he had in view, but had his reasons for not treating of this matter till after the Chapter of Manners. But Heinrich seems less to have consulted the Text, than to be prickt with an immoderate desire of changing every thing, in all the transpositions he has made in this Art of Poetry, as also in Horace, we may say of him what Horace says of Fortune.

*Hinc apicem rapax
Fortuna cum stridore acuto,
Sustulit, hic posuisse gaudit.*

With dismal shrieks Fortune is glad, as ’twere,
To move things hence, only to place them there.

2. **Thс**
2. The first is the most simple, without any Art, and which most Poets use, for want of invention, is, that which is made by marks.] There is nothing less ingenious than the Remembrances, which are made by these marks, that are prepared designedly, and which come unexpectedly to unravel the Plot, when it seems most embarrassed, and bring a very profound tranquility, immediately after a great trouble and confusion. These remembrances are ordinarily used in Comedy, because Comedy does not make its principal of the subject.

3. These marks are either natural, as the Lance imprinted on the Bodies of those Thebans, &c.] The first Founders of Thebes had a Lance marked on their Bodies, and as marks and tokens pass often from the Father to the Son, 'tis said that that Lance appeared a long time on that Race; so long that Plutarch writes, there was one Python of Nisibis, who passed for one of the Race of the first Theban Lords, had a Son, who died, and had such a Lance on his Body, which had been a long time lost, till 'twas revived again in him. Just as we see Warts, &c. disappear in the Children, and appear again in the Grand, and Great-Grand Children. This Lance might give occasion to the Story of the Thebans being born armed.

4. And as the Star, which Carcinus made use of in his Thyestes.] That Star was a natural mark on Thyestes, or some of his Family, as the Lance was of the first Family of Thebes. But as we have not the piece of Carcinus, we can't know how the Remembrance was made by the means of the Star, nor in what manner that Star was on his Body. Robert's conjectures, not without great probability, that instead of the Word τροπ, which signifies a Star, Aristotle writes τροπα, which signifies Bones, and that he means the Bone-of Ivory with which the Gods repaired.
paired Pelops Shoulder, and which appeared in his Descendants.

5. Carcius.] There were two Poets of that Name, at the same time, one was an Athenian, and a Tragick, the other a Sicilian and a Comick Poet. 'Tis the first that is spoke of here, they both lived about the hundredth Olympiad, and were Contemporaries with Aristophanes.

6. Or the little Cradle, in the piece called Tyro.] Tyro the Daughter of Salmoeneus and Alcidice, was in Love with the River Enipeus. Neptune transformed himself into that River, and took the advantage of that Princesses Passion, for another: Tyro was with Child, and delivered of Twins, Pelens and Neleus, whom she exposed on the Banks of that River in a Cradle, which afterwards served as a remembrance of those Children, who killed Tyro's cruel Stepmother, in the Temple of Juno. This History is related at large in Appollodorus. Sophostrus made a Tragedy on this subject.

7. These marks may be used with more or less Art, as we may see in the remembrance of Ulysses, by the Scar of his Wound, for he is remembered by his Nurse, otherwise than by his Shepherds.] By this single Example of the Remembrance of Ulysses, which is made two different ways in Homer's Odysseus, he shews that these marks may be employed with more or less Address, according as the Poet has Art to make use of it. In the XIX Book of the Odysseus, Ulysses is remembered by his Nurse by chance, by the Scar of that Wound, which a Boar had formerly given him in Parnassus, the remembrance is very ingenious, because it seems to be done without design: But in the XXI. Book, he is known to his Shepherds, by the fame Scar thro' in a quite different manner, for 'tis Ulysses himself, who shows them the Scar, to let them see that he had not deceived them, but that he had told them the
the truth, when he said he was Ulysses. Aristotle assures us, with a great deal of reason, that this remembrance has little ingenuity in it, for there is no great occasion for any great address or wit, to have recourse to those marks, which one would have known, and this recognizance, causes neither any great change or surprize.

8. As that which is in the Oddyse, when Ulysses Feet were washed.] That is, as the first remembrance of Ulysses, which was made whilst his Nurse washed his Feet, the Greek says in one Word, at the washing his Feet. The Ancients gave to Homers Epistles, such Names as denoted the Subjects, that where Ulysses is remembred by his Nurse, is called Nypttra, by reason of the washing his Feet which gave occasion to that Remembrance.

9. The second sort of Remembrance, is that, which is invented by the Poet, and therefore it is without Art.] None has yet comprehended, how a Remembrance must be without Art because it is invented by the Poet. However Aristotle sufficiently explains himself in what follows; for there the Poet says what he pleases, and 'tis not the Subject which speaks, and explains it self. That the remembrance may be ingenious, it ought to arise from the Subject, and the series of Incidents, and not from the fancy of the Poet only, who having the Liberty to invent what he pleases, deserves no great commendation, for inventing a sort of Remembrance, which he may do a thousand ways. The following Example will make it very plain.

10. 'Tis thus in the Iphigenia of the Euripides, Orestes remembered his Sister by a Letter, is known to her by certain tokens which she gave him.] There is a double Recognizance, in this piece of Euripides, the first is when Iphigenia is remembred by Orestes, by a Letter which she gave to Pylades, that when he re-
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 285

returned to Argos: he should deliver it to Orestes, and
told him the Contents of it, lest if he should chance
to lose the Letter, he might deliver by word of
mouth what she had wrote to him. This gave an op-
portunity to Orestes to remember Iphigenia; Aris-
totle does not say, that this first Remembrance is with-
out Art, for on the contrary 'tis very ingenious, since
it proceeds from the preceding Incidents, and 'tis
natural, and probable that Iphigenia should write a
Letter to her Brother; this appears rather to be fur-
nished by the Subject, than invented by the Poet. Ar-
sotle speaks of the other Recognizance, viz. that
of Orestes, who remembering his Sister, embraced
her, and told her that he was her Brother. Iphige-
genia at first doubted the truth of it, and desired
proofs; Orestes shewed her that he did not lie, spoke
to her of the hatred between Atreus and Thyestes,
and how he had taken away the fatal Ram; he told
her, that he had wrought all this Story in Tapestry,
where she had drawn the Sun retiring behind a Cloud,
that he might not see the Murder committed by At-
reus; to finish his perjuries, he told her the old
Lance which Pelops used in the Combat against Ono-
manus, when he fought for Hippodamia. Iphige-
genia was convinced by this proof; for it could only be
her Brother that could see that Lance in her Apart-
ment; it being lawful only for Fathers, Husbands
or Brothers to come into the Womens Lodgings.
The Philosopher has reason to say, that this Recog-
nizance is without Art, and falls almost into the
same fault, with Homer's second, when Ulysses be-
comes known to the Shepherds: for the Poet says
what he pleases here, and no Body contradicts him;
he might have said any thing else, and none would
have opposed it.

11. Is known to her, by certain Tokens which she gave
him.] The Names of those things, by which Orestes
was known, are wanting in the Text. Some have
endeavoured to supply them, but without any success.
and I the more wonder at it, because 'tis easy to learn it from Euripides, who names these proofs in two places, *Teumφρια*, which I translate Tokens. The Greek must be read thus, "Εξειν' 

12. For the Poet had the liberty to make *Orestes* be remembered by Iphigenia, by any other Tokens, he pleased, that *Orestes* could carry about him.] Aristotle gives here the reason, why this second sort of Remembrance, is almost as vicious as the first, which is made by visible marks, because the Poet might say whatever he pleased, and instead of using verbal proofs, he might have made *Orestes* say some marks, which *Iphigenia* should have remembered.

13. The Voice which Sophocles has given to a Weaver Shittle in his *Tereus* is of the same Nature.] We have not Sophocles his *Tereus*, so don't know what to say, to the Recognizance made by the voice of that Shittle. 'Tis enough to know that Aristotle had reason to damn it, and that he puts it into the Number of the disingenious Remembrances, and truly if it were allowable to give voices to inanimate things, in order to make a Recognizance, nothing would be more easy; but that which seems very remarkable to me, is, that Aristotle speaks of this remembrance, as of one that is without Art, but I think a speaking Shittle, would appear a very monstrous thing in a Tragedy, and I should be glad to know how Sophocles managed the point to make it pass.

14. The third sort of Remembrance is that which is made by the Memory, when an object stirs up in us some thought which produces the Remembrance, as in the Cypriacks of Dicæogenes where he who saw a Picture wept, and his Tears made him Remember.] I have added these Words, *And his Tears made him Remember*, for they are necessary to make out the Sense. Dicæogenes was a Tragick, and Dithyrambick Poet, he also composed an *Epopteia*, and 'tis this last Work
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 287

Work which Aristotle quotes; I don't know in what time he lived; we have only some fragments of his.

15. Or in Alcinous; Ulysses hearing a Man play on the Harp, and remembering his former Hardships could not forbear weeping, and so was Remembred.] This is taken from the VIII. Book of the Odyssey. Ulysses being arrived at Alcinous King of the Phaeacians, who received him as nobly as possible, and thought only of diverting him. He made a great Feast, where Demodocus the Singing Man, sung to him, the considerable Actions he had done at the Trojan War, Ulysses hearing that, could not refrain from weeping which Alcinous perceiving, obliged Ulysses to discover himself.

16. The fourth sort of Remembrance is that which is made by reasoning, as in the Coephorcs of Aeschylus, where Electra reasons after this manner, There is a Man come here who is like me, no Man is like me but Orestes, therefore Orestes is come.] In the Coephorcs of Aeschylus, Electra going to offer Libations on Agamemnon's Tomb, (which gives the name to this piece) found some Horses so like Orestes's, and saw all about footsteps so equal and conform to hers, that she concluded from thence that Orestes was come; he uses this reasoning which Aristotle here mentions, but it seems to me not very good. Aeschylus did not succeed in the Impex Pieces, that is, where there is a Peripetie and Remembrance too.

17. Or as in the Iphigenia of the Sophist Polyides, where Orestes argues thus, as my Sister was sacrificed to Diana, I must also be sacrificed.] The Sophist Polyides made a Play called Iphigenia Taurica, in which Orestes was brought to the Altar to be sacrificed, who when he was going to receive the fatal blow from the Hands of Iphigenia, cried out, As my Sister, &c. which gave occasion to the Remembrance, which is very moving.
and surprizing. This Polyides was ancienter than Euripides, and consequently Euripides did not invent the subject of the Tragedy of Iphigenia Taurica, as some of the Learned have thought. Change but the Remembrance and that Piece is always the same.

18. In the Tydeus of Theodeeetros, Adraustus makes this Argumentation, Laius was gone to get News of his Son, he was killed on the Road. This is his Grandson therefore 'tis Oedipus's Son.] We have spoken already of Theodeeetros, but as we have nothing of the subject of his Tydens, we cannot tell how the Remembrance was made, nor what the reasoning was, all that we can conjecture, is, that Theodeeetros put in that piece the remembrance of Polynices, by Adraustus in his Voyage to Argos: For that Prince being ashamed to name his Father, by reason of the misfortunes which had befallen him, said only that he was the Grandson of a King, who going to consult the Oracle, to know what was become of his Son, whom he had expos'd, was killed on the Road. On which Adraustus reasons as Aristotle relates. Laius went once to Delphos on such an occasion, and was killed on the way by the Son he went to enquire after, therefore this must be the Grandson of Laius, and consequently one of Oedipus's Children.

19. And in the Phineides, those unhappy Women seeing the place.] We know neither the subject nor the name of this piece; for 'tis writ so differently that we can make but very uncertain conjectures. That is of no great consideration, 'tis enough to know that we see in this piece, these Women going to be slain, and that when they were arrived at the place appointed for their Execution, and remembering it to be the same place where they were expos'd, cried, that they perceived very well that Fate had condemn'd them to die, since they had been expos'd before in that place.
This made them known; to him who was to put them to Death, and so saved their lives.

20. There is yet a fifth sort of Remembrance, which is also made by reasoning, and is followed by a false consequence, which draws the Audience, as in the false Ulysses.] We know nothing of the subject of this Play neither; we can surmise that 'twas a Gallant, who designing to surprize Penelope, said that he was Ulysses, and to confirm it, pretends to remember a Bow, which he used before he went to the Siege of Troy, tho' he had never seen the Bow before, the Audience is deceived by this proposition, and takes him for Ulysses, not doubting but that he would be remembered. This Recognizance is founded, as Aristotle says, on a sort of captious reasoning, which consists in giving for the proof of a thing, a single Token, and such an one as may deceive, for a Stranger might know the Bow, and yet not be Ulysses.

21. The finest of all the Remembrances is that which arises from the incidents themselves, and which causes a great surprize, by means of its probability, as in the Oedipus of Sophocles, and the Iphigenia of Euripides.] Having explained all the different sorts of Recognizances, he tells us which is the finest, and gives the preference to that which arises naturally from the Subject: Truly it is most ingenious, and as it does not appear to be invented, it produces great effects. That of Oedipus in Sophocles, and Iphigenia in Euripides, are convincing proofs of it. There is nothing more natural, more probable, nor at the same time more surprizing; but that of Oedipus is much the better, because it arises more from the very Foundation of the Subject, and is produced in the very moment of the Peripetie, as we have said before.

22. For 'tis very probable and natural, that Oedipus should be curious.] I have added this Line, because it is necessary to make out the Sense, and I think Aristotle
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Aristotle ought to have wrote it. For 'tis blind and rash curiosity which makes Oedipus's Misfortunes, and the unravelling of the Plot; Plutarch very aptly calls this curiosity, an immoderate desire of knowing every thing, and a torrent which breaks down all the Banks of Reason, which oppose it.

23. This sort of Remembrance, is the only one which is made, without adventitious or invented signs.] That which renders these Remembrances so fine is, that they are made otherwise, than by invented or adventitious Tokens. He calls an invented Sign all that the Poet imagines, to produce the remembrance without employing visible and portable marks, and which is produced at once, without being prepared or induced by the subject.

24. The best after these, are those which are made by reasoning.] He gives the second place to those, which are made by reasoning, because they are very often made without any Sign, and if they do at any time use those Signs, they can be only such as are drawn from the Subject, and not invented by the Poet. But we must take notice that the reasoning, which causes the remembrance ought to be very just and exact. That of Adrastus, in the Tydeus of Theodectes, and that of Orestes in the Iphigenia of Polyides, are preferable to the reasoning of Elektra in the Coephores of Aeschylus.
What the Poet ought to observe for the right management of his Subject. The bad success of a Piece of Carcinus for not following this Rule. What ought to be done to form the Characters and the Manners aright. One must have an excellent Genius, or be an Enthusiast to succeed in Poetry. The Fable ought to be form'd, and Names given to the Actors before the Episodcs are thought of. An Example taken from Iphigenia. The reason of that management. An Essential condition of Episodcs. The difference of the Episodcs of Tragedy and of those of Epopœia. The Subject of the Odysse made General and Universal.

1. We ought first to draw the Plan of the Subject, to (a) write it as exactly as possible, to overlook all of it several times, for in thus viewing carefully all its parts, as if we were concerned in the Action, we shall assuredly find what is convenient, and see the least defects, and the least contrarieties (b) which may have escaped us.

(a) Work up the Diction. (b) Which shall not deceive you.
2. A (c) certain token of the importance and necessity of this precept is, (d) the reproach which Carcinus received. That Poet in the Plan of his Subject, made Amphiarus go out of the Temple without any ones seeing him, he did not take notice of this defect, because he did not overlook the whole Plan, but when that piece was acted in the Theater, 'twas Damned, the Audience (e) would not suffer that he should endeavour to persuade them, that Amphiarus was really gone out, when none of them had seen him.

3. The Poet must also, as much as possible, imitate the Gestures and Actions of those whom he makes to speak, for 'tis certain, that take two Men, who are of an equal Genius, he that is in a Passion shall be always the most persuasive, and a proof of this is, that he who is truly moved shall move those which hear him; and he that is actually angry will never fail to excite the same (f) motions in the Minds of the Audience. Therefore a Poet to succeed well, ought to have an excellent Genius, or to be fierce, for the enraged are easily susceptible of all sorts of Figures and Characters, and the excellent Genius's are (g) fruitful and Inventive.

4. Therefore whether a Poet write on a Subject already known, or invents a new one, 'tis necessary that he orders his Fable in general,

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(c) Sign of this is. (d) Carcinus is blamed. (e) It would not bear. (f) The truest way. (g) Beside themselves.
before he thinks of making his Episodes, and to (h)circumstantiate it. Thus he will have all his Subject under one view. For Example, this is the Subject of Iphigenia done as I mean. A young Princess is placed on the Altar to be Sacrificed, disappears on a sudden from the Eyes of the Spectators, is carried into another Country, where the Custom is to Sacrifice Strangers to the Goddess who presides over it. They make her Priestess of that Temple. Some Years after, the Brother of that Princess arrives at the same place. Why did he come there? To obey an Oracle. This is out of the general and universal Fable. What did he come there for? That's out of the Subject. He no sooner arrived but he is taken. But the Remembrance is made in that very moment, either in the manner that Euripides has imagined, or (i) according to the verisimilitude which Polybiades has very well observed in making that Prince say, (k) 'Tis not sufficient that my Sister has been Sacrificed, but I must be Sacrificed too, and 'tis that which saved him.

5. When the Fable is made, the Names must be given to the Actors, and the Episodes made, but due regard must be had, that the Episodes be proper, as in (l) Orestes, the Madness which made him to be taken, and his deliverance by Expiations.

6. The Episodes are short in a Dramatick Poem, but Epopoeia is extended, and amplifi-
ed by those that belong to it. And truly the subject of the *Odyssey*, (for Example) is very long. *A Man is absent from his Country several Years; Neptune persecutes him, destroys all his Companions, so that he remained alone. On the other side all things are in disorder in his Family. his Wives Courtiers spend all he has, and lay snares for his Son. To conclude, having escaped many Storms, he at last gets home, remembers some of his Servants, deceives the rest, re-establishes his Affairs, and kills his Enemies.*

This is what is proper, the rest are *Episodes.*
 Remarks on the XVIII. Chapter.

1. We ought first to draw the Plan of the Subject, to write it, as exactly as possible, to overlook all of it, several times, for in thus reviewing carefully all its parts: as if we were concerned in the Action; we shall assuredly find, what is convenient, &c. After he has told us what Tragedy is, he explains its parts, and shows us, what we ought to follow, or avoid, in the Constitution of the Subjects, and having spoke of what relates to the Theory of this Art, he comes now to the practice, and tells us how we ought to begin when we undertake to make a Tragedy. We ought first says he, to draw the Plan of the Subject; and to review it often, there is nothing more useful than this method, and 'tis for want of observing it, that we fall into very considerable Faults. Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action, which passes into Representation, not recitation, and Consequently is the imitation of a visible Action, which ought to be exposed to the sight. The Poet ought then, to be the first Spectator, to Judge well of the effects it will have. If he tarries till it is finished, before he Judges of it, 'twill be too late, and he will find it much harder to correct its Faults, He ought therefore to lay the Plan in as lofty Prose as he can, and to take particular notice, of what is in every Act. When that is done, he ought to examine it, in respect to the Stage, as if he saw the Actors playing it, before him, and at every thing he sees he should ask himself why's that done? why such an Actor entered? Why he went out? And thus unless he be blind, he must see the least Faults and Contrarieties, which may have escaped him. If the Poets
Poets who write now, would follow this rule; we should not see in their Plays, so many things, which not only offend against the necessity and probability, but which deceive the Eyes of the Spectators too.

2. Is the reproach which Carcinus received, that Poet in the Plan of his Subject, made Amphiaraus go out of the Temple, without any ones seeing him, he took no notice of this defect, because he did not overlook the whole Plan.] This passage was corrupted in the Text, and I dare say, that I have amended it, as Aristotle writ it. The Philosopher could not say δ μὴ ὄφωντα τὸν Σεατίνα ἔλαβθεν. That which escaped the Spectator, which he did not see: For the question is not concerning the Audience, when the fault was committed, but the Poet and Aristotle gives the Reason, and explains the Cause of that deficiency. That which escaped the Poet, says he, because the Poet did not make him pass before their eyes, I read it thus, δ μὴ ὄφωντα τὸν Ποιμιν ἔλαβθεν. He plainly opposes ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς, on the Stage ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μὴ ὄφωντα, to the Poet who did not see the Plan of his piece, and μὴ ὄρατα, who did not see, is the same thing as μὴ πρὸ ὄρατων τιθέμενον, which did not pass before their Eyes. Aristotle says then that a certain proof of the Importance, and Necessity of this Precept is, what happened to Carcinus in his Amphiaraus, that Prince, had took Sanctuary in the Temple; he must needs go out: Carcinus declares that he was gone out, but as he had not in the Plan of his piece made him go out before the Spectators, he did not perceive that it was contrary to all probability that he should go out without being seen, by any body; What a Poet may forget, who has not his first Plan rehearsed before him, shall be taken notice of by the Audience, who don't love to be cheated; and be persuaded that they did see, what they really did not.
3. But when that piece was acted on the Theatre, it was damned. The Audience would not suffer, that he should endeavour to persuade them, that Amphiarous was really gone out, when none of them had seen him.] This passage is worth taking notice of. None must pretend to persuade the Audience, that they see what, they don't see, and that they don't see, what they really behold: And this Precept is of larger extent, than has generally been thought, for it takes in, all the Probability that ought to be observed in Tragedy, and which is the ground of it. Tragedy is the Representation of one Action only, from which it necessarily follows, that, that Action, ought to be publick, and visible, and not transacted in one and the same place. How then shall any one persuade the Audience that without changing the place they can see an Action which passed in three or four different places, distant from one another. In the Cima we are sometimes in Emilius's House, and sometimes in Augustus's Palace: Moreover, there is a Council, in that Princes Closet where the doors are shut. By what Enchantment is this done. Mr. Corneille says, that we don't take the liberty now, to draw Princes and Princesses, from their Appartments. Why don't we take it, and what is there that hinders us? First of all we don't talk of what is done now, but what was done in that time, which we take the Subject of Tragedy from; those Subjects are not taken from the Actions of modern Kings, but from the Fable or History of the ancient ones: Now in those days their manners were simple and their Kings went abroad with less State and Pomp than they do now. We ought therefore to represent them such as they were; or very like, such as they would be in this our Age. I would have Tragedy take its Subjects new, from the History of the Kings which we know, those who are most retired, and least seen by their people: I say, it would be
the Poets fault, if he should not make them go out of their Chambers. Indeed they should not do it for trifles, that is unbecoming them; but that which makes the Subject of a Tragedy ought not to be a Trifle, but a great and a serious Action, and there is no Prince but would go out of his Palace on such an account as this. There ought also, to be good, and very pressing reasons to excuse them from not going out at all. The Women in Greece went abroad, less than the Kings do now; but the Tragedick Poets find such a necessity for their going abroad, that they cannot avoid it, without offending against the Probability, 'tis therefore the Poets business, not to bring any Actions on the Stage, but what are important enough, to oblige Princes and Princesses, to appear in Public; all others are disagreeable to Tragedy, and in no wise proper for the Stage, with what Probability or rather, with what necessity does not Sophocles draw Oedipus, and Jocasta from their Palace, to give to his Action that unity of place, and visibility (as I may say) that was necessary? There is no Prince but may on such an occasion, go out of any Country, in spite of any contrary Custom. Dramatick Poem could not subsist without this; and there can never be any way of managing it found, which can destroy this Liberty. Those which Mr. Corneille has imagined are very faulty. The first is that what is transacted in one Town, has the unity of place: And that that unity may be preferred, by placing the Scene in Covent-Garden, and the Park: I had as lieve, it should be at Rome and Madrid, for 'tis as easy to see without changing the Place, what is transacted at those distant Cities, as to see what happens at two different places of London: The other is that we make use of a Fiction of a Theatre, to establish a place to Act in, as an Hall, to which this privilege shall be granted, that all that is acted in
in it shall in every respect the probability and exact regularity: but 'twould be better to agree on a place to Act in, where the Poets faults should be counted no faults. I am afraid that is too much agreed upon already, and that our Theatre is such a privileged place, for we see very bad pieces, pass for good. I related what Mr. Corneille proposed, only to shew that the greatest Men may fall into errors, when they violate these Rules, and go from Nature and the Truth. Another Consequence of this Precept of Aristotle is, that the Audience know, why the Actors come on the Stage, why they go out, and what they do in the Intervals of the Acts. As we have very few pieces, where this is observed, and we find nothing so difficult as to follow these Rules, Mr. Corneille is willing that the Audience should know why an Actor goes out, when he quits the Stage: but he does not think it necessary that they should always know, why he enters, especially at the first Scene of the first Act. This is the Consequence of that Opinion, that the Apartment of a Princess, the Closet of a Prince, may be the place of the Scene. There is nothing more false. The place of the Scene ought to be publick, since the action ought to be so, and that place being publick, not one Actor ought to appear there without a necessity for't, and that necessity ought to be greater, and more prevalent in the first Scene, than in all the others. We may easily see on what necessity, the ancients always founded the opening of the Scene. Mr. Corneille is satisfied, that the Audience should know, why the Actors go out of the place where the Scene is laid: but he does not think it necessary, to know, what they do, during the intervals, neither that 'tis required that the Actors should do any thing, during the intervals, but is persuaded, that they may sleep then, if they please, and not break the conti-
continuity of the Action, we find just the Con-
trary, according to Aristotle's Principles, and that
it ceases to be a Tragedy, when 'tis so, for this
would certainly ruin all the Probability, if the
Audience did not know what the Actors were
doing during the Intervals; and if the Actors have
nothing to do, pray what does the Audience stay
for? 'tis very odd to expect the sequel of an a-
ction, when the Actors have nothing more to
do, and to be interested, in a thing, which the
Actors are so little concerned in, that they may go
to Sleep. Tragedy never exceeds the bounds of
Truth, or Probability; and those who have a just
Idea of it, had rather see, the first Scene of Oedi-
pus, Electra, or Antigone, of Sophocles, than the
Plays in which such liberty is taken. Tragedy is
indeed a deceiver: but not such an one as Mr. Cor-
neille means, to deceive the Auditor, and hinder
him from perceiving its want of Jufness, it ought
to have, that he may not be displeased at it. It
decieves only the Mob in this manner, who have
Eyes only for the show, or the Women, who judge
of all pieces by the Sentiments, and the Passions,
but it does not deceive those who have more
knowledge, and for whom Tragedies, are general
writ now a days, Puppets, Ropedancers, and mer-
ry Andrews, will serve to please the Common Peo-
pile. When 'tis said, that Tragedy is a deceiver, 'tis
in praise of the Verisimilitude of its Fictions and
Passions. It deceives says one of the Ancients, by
such a deceit, which makes him that deceives more
Jufit and Excellent, than he who it does not deceive:
and who is deceived wiser, and more understand-
ing, than he who is not deceived.

4. The Poet must also as much as possible imi-
tate the Gestures, and Actions of those, whom he
makes to speak.] As the preceeding precept is for
the Subject, this is for the Manners, and the Cha-
acters;
Ariflotle's Art of Poetry.

racters: For these, and the Subject, are the most important parts of Tragedy. He says then, that when a Poet Composes, he ought to imitate the Gestures, Voice, and Air of him whom he makes to speak, for by this means, he will find all that is agreeable to the Character which he Represents. Horace has very well explained this precept, in his Art of Poetry.

Si vis me flere, dolendum est,
Primum ipsi tibi. Tunc tua me infortunia ledent,
Telepho, vel Peleu, male si mandata loqueris,
Aut dormitabo, aut ridebo. Tristia maestum
Vultum verba decent: Iratum, plena minarum:
Ludentem, lasciva; severum, seria dittu.
Format enim natura prius nos inter ad omnem
Fortunarum habitum; Juvat aut impellit ad
Iram:
Aut ad humum gravi morore deducit, & angit:
Post effert animi motus interprete lingua.

Wouldst have me Weep, your self must first begin
Peleus and Telephus, I'll then incline,
To pity thee, and make your suffering mine,
But if you chance to act your parts amiss,
I can't forbear to Laugh, or Sleep, or Hiss;
Let words express the looks, the Speakers wear,
Sad, fit a mournful, and distressed Air.
The Passionat, who's full of Threats, must Rave,
The Gay, Lascivious be, the Serious, Grave.
For Nature works, and moulds, our frame within
To take all manner of Impressions in.
Now gives us Joy, now makes us all on fire
Now casts us down, now Sorrow does inspire
And all these Passions doth the Tongue express.

5. For
5. For 'tis certain, that take two Men, who are of an Equal Genius, he that is in a Passion shall always be the most perswasive.] This is a demonstration. If two Men of an Equal Genius, should write of the same Subject, he that should endeavour quietly, to find out those things which were agreeable to that Character, and should employ only his Ingenuity in that Search, would not succeed so well as he, who should employ the same Ingenuity, and add the Warmth and Sprightlines of Voice, and movements of the Gesture: and I fancy 'tis this that Quintilian means, when he says, in that fine Passage of the 3 Chapter of his X Book. That 'tis not Exercise that makes it easie to Write, but the method also. Si non refupini, spectantesque tectum, & Cogitationum murmure agitantes expectaverimus, quid obveniat, sed quid res poscat, quid persona decent, quid sit tempus qui Judicis animus, intinti, humano quodam modo, ad scribendum accederimus. We should write much better if we did not carelessly Loll on our Beds, view the tops of them, and neglect what comes into our Minds; But if we consider what the thing requires, what becomes the Character, what is proper for that time, what the Mind of the Judge is, with due regard had to these, we should be able to Write Men. That is to say, If we our selves were touch'd with the Passions we would inspire. For that is called to Write like a Man, to Write otherwise, is to Write like an Image. The same Quintilian says afterwards. 'Tis necessary to imitate the Passions often, in which the heat does more than the exactness. In quibus sere pias calor, quam diligentia valet.

6. A
6. A proof of this is, that he who is truly moved, shall move those which hear him.] This is a constant truth, the more a Man is truly touch'd the more impossible is it for others to see him, and not to be sensible of the same motions which agitate him. For the Soul of all Men is like, the same Instrument strung, with so many Strings as there are Passions. Suppose two Lutes well set in Tune together, if one of the Strings be struck that which is Unifon to it will move visibly, and will give some sort of motion to the other's. 'Tis the fame in Mens hearts to move such, or such a Passion in theirs, 'tis necessary that I touch the same in my own. Therefore Horace said

Ut ridemibus arrideat, ita flemibus adsint
Humani vultus, si vis me flere dolendum est
Primum ipsi tibi.

Where Joy, and Sorrow put on good disguise,
We with those persons looks'rait sympathize,
Would't have me weep, you sure must first begin.

7. Therefore a Poet to succeed well, ought to have an excellent Genius, or to be Furious, for the enraged are easily susceptible of all Figures and Characters, and the excellent Genius's are fruitful, and Inventive.] This is a just decision. Poetry is somthing Divine, and to succeed in it, 'tis necessary to have a disposition improved by Art, or an extraordinary and quick Imagination; for that Madness has the same effects, as an excellent Disposition, the first supplies Sweetness and Liberty,
the other furnishes all sorts of Inventions, and thus both of them equally conduct to a perfect Imitation, which is the only aim of Poetry. When Aristotle says, that there must be an excellent Nature, or fury, he means such as is no enemy to the rules, but is lead by the Judgment. Horace takes notice of the inconveniencies, into which the greatest part of the Poets of his time fell, in not knowing this difference, and not believing that a Man was a good Poet, when he was very Mad.

8. Therefore whether a Poet write on a Subject already known, or invents a new one, 'tis necessary that he orders his Fable in general, before he thinks of making his Episodes, and to Circumstantiate it.] He returns again to the Subject, and leaff the Poets should imagine, that there was some difference in the management of an invented, and known Subject, he says very well, that of what nature ever the Fable be, they must follow the same method, and first order the Fable in general. The Fable which makes the Subject of Tragedy, is in no wise different from ordinary Fables, as those of Æsop, &c. except that they are in the number of reasonable Fables, i.e. those that are under the names of Men and Gods: Whereas those of Æsop, &c. are moral, i.e. under the names of Beasts, to which they have given humane Manners. But they are all feigned, universal, and allegorical. A Poet therefore ought to begin thus; he ought first of all, to order the Fable, to make it general, and universal, without Episodes, names, or any other Circumstances, which may render it particular. Aristotle makes this very plain, by the following example.
9. A young Princess is placed on the Altar to be sacrificed, disappears on a sudden from the eyes of the Spectators, is carried into another Country, &c.] This is the Fable, or Subject of the Iphigenia Taurica let down generally, and under one view; The Poet may afterwards give what names he pleases to the Persons, and place the Scene any where, where the same Customs are used; for the Subject is Allegorical, and Universal.

10. Why did he come there? To obey an Oracle. This is out of the general, and universal Fable; what did he come there for? That's out of the Subject. This passage is very remarkable; In the Plan of the Subject of Iphigenia Taurica, the Poet might very well make that Prince's Brother go into the Country where she was, in obedience to an Oracle; for that may be general, and universal; but he doth not say what gave occasion to that Oracle; that particularity had made the Fable no longer general, but particular. He does not put what he went to do there; for that is out of the Subject. Thus the Poet has only the general, and universal Fable before his eyes: He afterwards disposes the rest, as he judges proper, and according to the names which he gives his Persons.

11. But the remembrance is made in that very moment, either as Euripides hath imagined, or according to the verisimilitude, which Polyides has very well observed. [We saw in the preceding Chapter, the difference between these two Remembrances, in Euripides, Orestes remembred Iphigenia, by a Letter, which was very natural, but he is remembred by her, only, by certain tokens which she gave him, and this second remembrance, is not near so good, and Ingenious, as that of Polyides, in making Orestes remembred, by what he said, just as he was going to be sacrificed; that Recognizance has an infinite
advantage over the other, in all respects, and 'tis impossible not to perceive it.

12. When the Fable is made, the Names must be given to the Actors, and the Episodes made.] 'Tis very easy to discern, the reason of this management. After the Fable is formed, the names must be given to the Actors, before the Episodes are made; for if those from whom the names are borrowed, have done any remarkable actions, the Poet should endeavour, to make use of them, and accommodate those truths to the ground of his Fable, which is a pure Fiction; And take all the advantages possible to render that feigned action more probable, according to the rules of Art, and to mix it, with the truth of the History.

Horace, has admirably explained this in the two following Verses.

Atque ita mentitur, sic veris falsa remisset,
Primone medium, medione discrepitimum.

And mixes Truth and Fiction skillfully,
That nothing in the whole may disagree.

The Fiction is the Fable; the Truth are the Episodes, drawn from the real actions of those, from whom the names are borrowed. This is the Secret of Dramatick, and Epistle Poem. If we should give to the Persons of that Fable, that Aristotle mentions, any other names than Iphigenia, Orestes, Pylades, and should for example call the Princess, Jeptha's Daughter, 'tis plain, that the Episodes which Euripides has used, would not be agreeable, to the History of that Princess, and others must be chosen out of the History of her Family. If Homer might have done the same, and given other names in his Fable, the Fable had not changed its nature, but the Episodes must have been different, for they must be proper as Aristotle goes on to explain.
13. But due regard must be had, that the Epitodes be proper.] The Epitodes must be proper, that is, taken from the very foundation of the Fable, in relation to the names of the Persons, and that those be so linked with the Fable, which is rendered particular, by this imposition of names, that the Epitodes cannot be left out; in a word they ought to be necessary, and natural parts of the action itself; so that if after the Fable was made the names given, and the Epitodes added, other names were given, the Epitodes should not be proper, but must necessarily be changed. The following example will give a great light to this matter.

14. As in Orestes, the madness which made him be taken, and his deliverance by expiation.] To shew us what proper Epitodes are, Aristotle, quotes two, which Euripides used in the abovementioned Fable: the first is the access of the madness which caused Orestes to be seized by the Shepherds. One of the Shepherds who brought Orestes and Pylades to Iphigenia, tells her. That, during those things, one of those Strangers tore his Hair, and trembling cast himself into a deep sighing; his fury increas’d, and he cried out, with a terrible noise, see that Fury, see how she falls on me, to destroy me! Look how she excites all the Serpents she is accompanied with, against me, behold the other too, who is encompassed with Fire, and all bedaub’d with blood! Look! see how she comes! She’s griping in her arms my Dear Mother, whom she’s going to throw on the craggy Rocks! good Gods I’m lost! whither shall I fly? at the same time he changed his countenance, and did not seem to be the same Man. Sometimes he bellowed like a Bull, then sometimes roared out, like a Fury: As for our part, we were dismay’d, and fearing what we should all be killed, thought of nothing but hiding our selves, and flying from his sight; but in a moment, he drew his Sword, and cast himself into the midst of our Flocks, where he made such a slaughter, that the foam of the Sea was red with the blood, and he
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

hoped by such a sacrifice to appease the enraged Goddesses. All of us, who were there, seeing our Flocks thus misused, armed for our defence, and with our Horns alarmed the neighbouring Villages, not thinking that a few fearful Shepherds were sufficient to resist two such Courageous Strangers, our number presently increased, when this youngman being a little recovered from his raging, fell down foaming at the mouth, we taking our advantage of this seized on him that was left alone, &c. This is the first Episode, the second is the deliverance of Orestes, by means of expiations: For Iphigenia made use of this pretence to save him. She told the King Thoas, that those Strangers being stained with domestic Murder could not be agreeable victims, till they were washed in the Sea, and that the Statue of the Goddess must be also wash'd, because it had been profaned, by the presence of those Murderers. Thoas commended the Piety, and care of the Princefs, and give her liberty, to make those purifications, as she pleased. Iphigenia, Orestes, and Pylades, taking the opportunity embarked, and carried along with them the Goddesses Statue. We see plainly, that if other names than Orestes and Iphigenia, had been given to the Persons, these Episodes would not be proper and agreeable to the Fable, they not being drawn from the Subject, and consequently manifest that the Episodes ought to be made, after the names are imposed, if we would have them convenient and make a part of the action. But you may say, cannot the Episodes be made before the giving the names to the persons? it may be done, but those Episodes will be general, and universal, and no ways contribute to render the action credible, and give it all the appearance of Truth: This is one of the greatest defects of most of our Tragedies; the Episodes are general, and would agree as well with the Fable, tho' the persons had other names. The Author of the Treatise on Epick Poem was much deceived in this passage.
15. The Episodes are short, in a dramatick Poem but Epopeia; is extended and amplified by those that belong to it. [The Episodes of a Tragedy, ought to be infinitely shorter, than those of an Epick Poem, for these two reasons: The first is, That Tragedy is much shorter, since 'tis confined to one Course of the Sun, but an Epick Poem has no set time. The second is, because Tragedy is a representation, and Epick Poem a recitation, and this is the reason why it ought to be extended and amplified by its Episodes.

16. And truly the subject of the Odyffes, (for example) is very long.] I fancy Aristotle writ, and truly (for example) the subject of the Odyffes, is not very long; for if we consider that subject by itself, without the Episodes, 'tis not longer than that of Iphigenia, but when Aristotle says, that the subject is very long, he considered the subject, with all the Circumstances and Episodes which make the length of it, and inform us also that the Circumstances are no less of the Action than the Subject it self.

A man is absent from his Country several years, Neptune persecutes him, &c.] This is the Subject of the Odyffes, simple and without any Episodes, reduced under one view, according to the method he has taught us: The Fable is general and universal, there is neither Name, Country, or Person, and the Poet, may give what he pleases to it.

18. This is what is proper, the rest are Episodes.] Ulyffes's absence and Neptune's anger, the los of that Prince's Companions, the disorders of his Family, the Storms he was in, his return, and reestablishment, are the parts which Aristotle calls proper, because they are parts of the Action, and cannot be changed without overthrowing the Design, destroying the Fable, and making another Poem. The rest says he
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

are the Episodes, as the adventures of Antiphates, Polyphemus, Circe, the Sirens, Scylla, Charybdis, Calypso, and Alcinous. Homer was at liberty, to have used any other Episodes, instead of these, without changing the Fable; thus the Episodes were at first proper, and necessary parts of the Subject, since it depended entirely on the Poet, whether he would use them or no, but Homer knew how to make them proper and necessary, by rendering them parts of the Action; we must take notice, that the Episodes are not added to the principal Action, but only dilate and encreasethat principal Action; that is to say, that every part of the Fable, being told singly, is the matter and grounds of an Episode, but related with all the Circumstances of Time, Place, Persons, 'tis no longer a simple, but an Episodic Action, and thereby rendered proper and necessary to the Subject, as the Author of the Treatise of Epick Poem, has very well explained.
Of the Plot and the unravelling. The four sorts of Tragedy, The Injustice of the Athenians. Tragick Poets excellent, in the several sorts. How Plays may be alike, or different, whether by the management, or the subject. Epick mixture is vittious in Tragedy, the reason, and proof of this truth. Praise of Æschylus and Euripides, the reason of the ill success of some of Agathon's Pieces. Simple unravellings may be Tragical and agreeable. Agathon's saying on the verisimilitude. What the Chorus is, and all it ought to do. 'Tis an essential part of Tragedy. Sophocles blamed, and Euripides praised, for their Chorus's Strange Songs introduced by Agathon. How those forreign Songs are vittious.

1. (a) A whole Tragedy is composed, of a Plot, and the unravelling it. The incidents which happen without, and very often part of those, which the Poet draws from the Subject make the Plot, all the rest is the unravelling.

(a) The Plot is in every Tragedy.
2. I call the Plot all that part of the Tragedy, from the beginning to that place where, the affairs change their face. (b) I call the unravelling all that is from that change, to the end. For example, in the Lyceus of Theodorus, all that happens till the taking that Prince (c) is the Plot; and the unravelling (d) begins at the place where that Child complains of his Death, and accuses the Destinies of Cruelty and Injustice.

3. We have said, that Tragedy has four parts. There are also four sorts of Tragedy. The first is the implex Tragedy which consisteth entirely in the Peripetie and Remembrance. The second is the Pathetick, as (e) Ajax, and the Ixions. The third is the Moral as the Phthiotides, and Peleus. To conclude the fourth, as Pherecydes, and Promethus, and all that is transacted in Hell.

4. We should endeavour to succeed in all these four sorts, or at least (f) in the greatest part of them, and the most important, especially now, when every one pretends to (g) Criticise on the Poets. For because there have been excellent Men in every one of these kinds, tis expected that one only, ought to surpass all that they have done, in what was proper and particular to themselves.

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(b) To prosperously. (c) Ixys. (d) From his requiring of death to the end. (e) Ajax. (f) Meir and the chief sty. (g) Blame.
5. It seems to me unjust to say that a piece is the same with or different from another, because the subject is the same or different. In my opinion 'twould be more reasonable to say that, of pieces whose Plot and unravelling are the same or different.

6. Most of the Poets after they have laid the Plot well, unravel it very ill; but they ought to succeed in one as well as the other.

7. Above all, they should remember very well, as has been often said already, not to make a Tragedy with an Epick \( (h) \) Complication. I call an Epick Complication a Complication of several Fables, as if all the Iliad should be put into one Tragedy. In an Epick Poem \( (i) \) every part receives its just magnitude, by reason of the length of the Poem; but in Tragedy it happens quite otherwise than was expected: And \( (k) \) we may be convinced of this truth, by the ill success of those who have put \( (l) \) for example all the destruction of Troy into one piece, and not managed that subject in parts, as Euripides treated his Niobe, and Medea, \( (m) \) or as Æschylus did: for they either saw their Pieces damn'd, or were overcome, and this was the only cause of Agathon's misfortune, for otherwise all those Poets are admirable in their Peripeties and simple unravellings, which are Tragical, and \( (n) \) cause a great deal of pleasure. For the Tragical and

\( (h) \) System. \( (i) \) There. \( (k) \) A sign of it is. \( (l) \) Mr. Goulston's Edition is all against Mr. Dacier in this place, see the remark. \( (m) \) And of Common humanity.
agreeable are found together: (for example) we see
a wise Man, but wicked, that is deceived, as
a Sisyphus, or valiant but unjust Man that is con-
quered. All this is probable, for as Aga-
thon says. There are in the Probability several
things which happen contrary to the Probability.

8. The Chorus must (n) also take the part of
an Actor, so that it makes one of the whole,
and sing nothing, but what is agreeable to the
Subject, and which concurs with the advance-
ment of the action, as in Sophocles, and not as
in Euripides. In all the other Poets 'tis yet worse for
the Chorus's (o) belong no more to the Subject
they treat of, than to any other Tragedy. (p)
'Tis for this reason, that they sing Songs which
are inserted without any relation, Agathon
was the first that introduced this Mal-practice.
However what difference is there between sing-
ing such adventitious Songs, and transporting
any long discourse or Episode entirely, from
one piece to another.

(n) Be esteemed one of the Actors. (o) Which are given. (p) Where-
fore at this time.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Remarks on Chap. XIX.

An whole Tragedy is composed of a Plot, and an Unravelling it. The Incidents which happen without, and very often, part of those which the Poet draws from the Subject, make the Plot; all the rest is the Unravelling. After Aristotle has taught how a Fable ought to be formed, the Names given to the Actors, and the Action made Episodic, he comes to the two parts of the Fable, which are the Plot and the Unravelling. The Plot comprehends all the Obstacles which traverse the designs of the principal Person, or Persons, if there be more than one. Most part of these hindrances are generally foreign, that is, which the Poet takes out of the Fable; there are some also which are proper to the Fable, as in the Iphigenia Taurica, the Shepherds who take Orestes, make one of these foreign Obstacles, and the Madness which carried him to fall on their Flocks, is a natural and proper one. The Plots of the Ilias, Odysses and Aeneids, have more of the foreign Obstacles than any other pieces, but although they are foreign, and out of the Fable, the Poet to appropriates them to the Action, that they seem to be proper and necessary parts: For the Unravelling, like an Episode, ought always to arise naturally from the Subject.

2. I call the Plot, all that part of the Tragedy, from the beginning to that place, where the Affairs begin to change their Face.] The Plot comprehends the greatest part of the Tragedy, for it generally takes in the four first Acts, and sometimes the greatest part of the fifth; in a word, it lasts so long that the Spectator is in suspense concerning the issue of his Heroes designs, and the Obstacles which hinder him. In Mr. Racine's Iphigenia, and Phedra, as in the Hippolytus and Iphigenia of Euripides, the Plot holds till the last Scene, where-
where the Unravelling is made: and this is much finer than where the Plot goes no farther than the middle of the fourth Act; for then 'tis very difficult, if not impossible, to keep the rest from being dull and flat.

3. I call the Unravelling, all that is from that change to the end.] The Unravelling begins when all the Obstacles cease, and the doubts are cleared up; and it ought to be a necessary or a probable consequence, of all that preceded, and the shorter and quicker turn it has, 'twill be the more agreeable, provided it be not precipitate and deficient as Aristophanes speaks of the Catastrophe.

4. For Example, in the Lynceus of Theodectes, all that happens before the taking that young Prince, is the Plot, and the Unravelling begins at the place, where the Child complains of his Death, &c.] You may see what has been said concerning the Subject of this piece, in the XII. Chapter; 'tis probable, that those lamentations which Lynceus made, on his dying, stirred up the People, and caused a Sedition, by which that Prince's Life was saved, and Danaus destroyed.

5. We have said that Tragedy has four parts, there are also four sorts of Tragedy.] This Article is perhaps the most difficult in the whole Art of Poetry. I should be too tedious to repeat all which has been said on it to no purpose, and shall therefore deliver only my own Sentiments. Aristotle lays it down as a fundamental, that Tragedy has four principal parts of Quality. The Subject, the Manners, the Sentiments and the Diction: for I don't count here either the Decoration or the Mufick. To these four parts he added, the Recognition, the Peripetie and the Passion; but of these seven, there are only three which are common to all Tragedies in general; the Subject, the Sent-
Sentiments and the Diction. There remain four, viz. the Peripetie, the Recognizance, the Passion, and the Manners, and these four produce the four sorts of Tragedy which Aristotle here speaks of; That which hath a Peripetie and Remembrance is the implex Tragedy; as Oedipus, Electra, Iphigenia Taurica. That which hath neither of them, is the simple Tragedy, which exposeth the Subject as it goes on, with a simple Plot and a simple Unraveling; as the Prometheus of Aeschylus, the Phocides and all those pieces which are made about the Stories of the Infernal Regions. These are the two principal sorts of Tragedy, which are again each of them divided into two, for they may be either Pathetick or Moral. Aristotle calls those pieces where there is Passion, Pathetick; that is, where there are Deaths, Wounds, Torments, &c. the Ajax of Sophocles is Simple and Pathetick, and his Oedipus Implex and Pathetick at the same time. To conclude, the Moral Tragedy is that which whether it be Implex or Simple, doth not exposeth Deaths, Wounds or Torments: but on the contrary, the happiness of some Persons, who are commendable for their virtue. The Ion of Euripides, seems to me to be an Implex and Moral piece. This is all I have to say on this passage, which was certainly very obscure.

6. As Ajax, and Ixion.] He says Ajax and Ixion in the Plural Number, because there were a great many pieces on those Subjects. The Ajax of Sophocles is Simple and Pathetick.

7. The third is the Moral, as the Phthiotides and Peleus.] The Moral Tragedy, is that which is made to reform the Manners, and always ends with a happy Catastrophe, it may be as the Pathetick, either Implex or Simple. We know neither the Subject of the Phthiotides, nor Peleus, for those Tragedies have been lost a long time. 'Tis probable, that the Phthiotides
Phthiotides were Maidens whose Vertue preserved them from some eminent danger. As for Peleus we know, that the Wife of Acaostus, being unable to oblige him to answer her Passion, would take him off, and to that end, accuses him to her Husband, of attempting to force her. Acaostus, to revenge that Affront, exposes Peleus to the wild Beasts on the Mountain Pelion; but Jupiter, who is the Protector of Innocence, sent him a Sword by Vulcan or Chiron, with which he delivered himself, and became Master of Acaostus's Kingdom. The Gods delivered him from many other Dangers, and married him to Thetis. And 'tis on this change of Fortune, that Pindar says in the third Ode of his Pythonicks.

8. To conclude, the fourth, as the Phorcydes, Prometheus.] That which caueth a very great difficulty in this passage, was, that Aristotle has not put the name to this fourth sort of Tragedy; or 'tis lost, but 'tis easy to supply it from the XXVI. Chapter, where the Philosopher says expressly, that there are as many sorts of Epopeia, as Tragedy, and names these four, the Impex, the Simple, the Moral, and the Pathetick. Therefore this last, which is not named here, must be the Simple, since he names the other three, and we need only look on the pieces he

Ei
Δὲ νῦν τις ἔχει,
Ὅρατῶν ἀλαβίας ὀδὼν
Χρῆ ἐρὸς μακάρων
Τούχανοι ᾗ πάχνειν.

If any has an upright Heart, 'tis he,
Shall be made blest with all Felicity.
he quotes, to be convinced of this. We have *A{s-}
ichyles's *Prometheus, which is without doubt a Sim-
ple Tragedy, for it only shews *Prometheus's suf-
ferings without any Remembrance or Peripetie: 'Tis
Simple and Pathetick.

9. As the Phorcydes.] The *Phorcydes were three
Sisters, Daughters of *Phorcys, who was Son of the
Ocean and the Earth: they were old from their
Birth, and had only one Eye among them, which they
used in their turns. They dwelt under ground, in
the extreme parts of Scythia. *A{s}chylus made a
Tragedy on these fine Ladies, for as Aristotle took
notice in another place, the Poets made Tragedies
on any sort of Subjects. Probably *A{s}chylus brought
in the Story of *Perseus who went to steal their Eye
away from them, that he might find out the way
which led to certain Nymphs, who had Claws,
which he had occasion to make use of against the
Gorgons.

10. And all that is transferred in Hell.] That is
to say, and all the Tragedies which treat of those
Subjects, whose Stories are taken from Hell, for
the Antients brought on their Stages, the punish-
ments of those who were tormented there; so *A{s-
chylus made a Tragedy of *Sisyphus rolling his Stone.
There is a very notable passage of *Lucian on this
in his Treatise of Dancing; where he says that
a Ruffoon, a Dancing Master, ought to know all the
Subjects of the Tragedies of Hell, the punishments
of the wicked, and the causes of those punishments:
The friendships of Theseus and Pirithous, which
was preferred even there. To conclude, all that Ho-
mer, Hesiod, and the other Poets have invented, but
chiefly the Tragick.
We should endeavour to succeed in all these four sorts, or at least, in the greatest part of them, and the most important. Aristotle does not say that a Poet ought to gather all these four sorts, into one Tragedy, for that would not have done well; for can a Tragedy be at the same time both implex, and simple? But he says, that a Poet should endeavour, to make good Tragedies, in every one of these kinds, or at least in most of them, and the most important. That is in the implex, Moral, and Pathetic. I know that one Tragedy may have all these qualifications, and be implex, Moral, and Pathetic; but 'tis likely that one of these qualities will predominate over the rest, and give it its name. Aristotle speaks here of Tragedies, in which one of these qualities principally reigns.

And especially now, when every one pretends to Criticize on the Poets. This place teaches us, that the Athenians, who being spoiled, by the fine pieces, they had of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, who were excellent Poets in their several ways, were so nice and delicate, that they wanted a Poet equal to them all. Aristotle complains, of this Injustice, not in that nature, for he uses a term, which I have translated Criticize, which signifies to accuse wrongfully: Litigiously to find fault with, συνομολογεῖν. notwithstanding which, he advises the Poets, to endeavour their satisfaction, and certainly when all that is required of a Poet, is a greater perfection, he ought to use his utmost endeavours to attain it: we are not so unjust as the Athenians, but are well satisfied if those who write now, come near Mr. Corneille, or Mr. Racine, and never expect that any one, should surpass those two in their ways. We are more modest in our desires.
13. For because there have been excellent Men in every one of these kinds. Those who were excellent in these kinds were Æschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, who as Cicero well observes, are all very different, and yet very excellent. The entire Passage in his third Book of an Orator is as follows. 

Una lingendi est ars, in qua praestantes fuerunt Myro, Polycletes, Lysippus, qui omnes inter se diffinimiles fuerunt, sed ita tamen, ut neminem sui velis esse diffinimilum. Una est ars, ratione pictura, diffinimili tamen inter se Zeuxis, Apelles, Aglaophon, neque eorum quisquam est, cui quisquam in suo arte deesse videtur. Et si hoc in his quoque maus artibus est mirandum, & tamen verum; quanto admirabilibus in Oratwn & Lingua, quae cum in ipsis verbis sententiaeque versatur, sumpsit labet diffinimilitudines? non sì ut alii viniperandœ sint, sed ut ii, quos constat esse laudans, in distincti genere fundantur. Iste primum in Poetis cerni licet, quam inter se Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, diffinimiles sint; quamquam omnibus per penes laus in diffinimili scribendi generi tribuant. There is but one Art of Sculpture, in which Myro, Polycletes, and Lysippus, were excellent, also differing one from another, but so, that none would have had any of them to have been otherwise, than what he was. There is but one Art and Reason of Painting; yet Zeuxis, Apelles, and Aglaophon, were very unlike one another, yet none seems to have wanted any thing that was necessary to his Art. Though this is to be admired in these mine Arts, 'tis however true. How much more wonderful is it then, to find the same Differences in Discourse, which uses the same Words and Thoughts, not that any are to be blamed; but that those who are praiseworthy deserve it in their several kinds. And this is chiefly discernable in the Poets; how different are Æschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles from one another, and yet they all deserve equal praise in their differing ways of Writing. These three Poets are different in their Style, and I hope none will take it amiss, that I speak of it,
it now, (though 'tis not what properly belongs to this place) as Dionysius Halicarnassus has explained it in his excellent Treatise of the Composition or placing of Words. That Author shows us, that there are three Differences, which distinguishing all Writers of what Nature soever. The first is the Character, which he calls Rough, that is rude and neglected, which has less of Art, than Nature, and where the Passions are better noted, than the Manners. This is the Character of Æschylus for a Tragedian; Pindar for a Lyrick Poet: and Thucydides for an Historian. The second Character is that which he calls Smooth and Florid, when there is nothing, that grates the Ear, nothing that is rude, bombast, or out of place, where Art hides Nature, and the Manners are better described, than the Passions. This is the Character of Euripides, Hesiod, Anacreon, and Isocrates. The third is that, which is called the Mean, because it is in the Middle between the other two, and is composed of the best of both of them. This Character is the more estimable, because 'tis the most fruitful, and 'tis that of Sophocles, Herodotus, Demosthenes, Aristotle, and Plato. But Homer is the Original of all these. There is no place in his Poems, where the Mixture of these Characters does not give a wonderful Pleasure. Those Writers who have imitated him, are admirable, when taken alone, but compared with Homer, fall infinitely short of him. But to return to our Passage, if these three Poets Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides are different in their Style and Composition, they are not less so in the Manner of their Imitation, and by the Quality of their Pieces, as Aristotle here affurces us. 'Tis to be wish'd, that he would have explained this Difference. He thought without doubt, that 'twould be needless, since 'twas sufficiently known in his time; But as at present we are entirely Ignorant of it, I hope all will be pleased at my Endeavour, to supply what he should have said. Æschylus,
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 323

Aschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides have all of them made these four kinds of Tragedies, and each of them excelled in one kind only. The Question than is, to find out, in what sort each of them was particularly Eminent. I fancy that Aschylus is not so good for the Implex pieces, that is, those which have both a Peripetia, and Remembrance, not for the Moral, which simply expose to view the Happines of some Person, as for the simple Patherick, that is, for those, which show dismal Catastrophes, with a continual Coherence. For example, his Prometheous and his seven Captains against Thebes, are in my Judgment, finer than his Agamemnon, and his Coepbres. The Remembrance in that last piece is so bad, that Euripides could not forbear jering him, and hath abused the Gravity of the Theatre, by those Satyrical Jests, which he hath used against the Coepbres, in his Eletra. We must confess, that Tragedy, but beginning then, to arise from its Chaos and Confusion, he could not succeed so well, in those Implex pieces, which are the most difficult in all the Art. On the contrary, Euripides did certainly succeed much better in these, but that was not his Excellence; he was much better for the Moral ones, where he mix'd the Passions admirably well. Sophocles excelled them all in the Implex; so that we may easily determine, that Sophocles is greater than Euripides, and Aschylus: that Euripides is next to Sophocles, and that Aschylus is the last. This is what I have to say, concerning the Difference between these three great Poets, as 'twas in Aristotle's time. Perhaps I may be deceived; for 'tis no easy Matter, to decide this rightly. I shall be very much obliged to any one, that will give a better Account of these different Characters, and free me from my Error.

14. It seems to me unjust to say, that a piece is the same with, or different from another, because the Subject is the same, or different. In my Opinion 'twould be more reasonable, to say that, of pieces, whose Plot and unravelling are the same or different.] I have enlarged
Aristotle's Thought, to render it intelligible. I have also added one Word, which was necessary, and wanting; for I read it, ἃν ἔνωσιν ἔλαβον. Aristotle condemns here another piece of Injustice in the Athenians; who believing that the pieces were alike, when the Subject was the same, and that they were different, when the Subjects were different, did not relish those pieces, which were made on those Subjects, which had been treated of before: Therefore the Philosopher endeavours, to remove that unjust Prejudice, by telling them, that they must not look on the Subjects of the pieces, to know whether they were alike or no, but mind the Plot, and the Unravelling; for two pieces, tho' on different Subjects, may be alike tho' the Plot, and Unravelling of those two pieces be the same. Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles, all three wrote of the Death of Egypthes and Clytemnestra; but we cannot say, but that they are three different pieces, because there is neither the same Plot, nor the same Unravelling. And to say something that comes nearer to our selves, Sophocles, and Mr. Corneille have both wrote of Oedipus, 'tis the same Subject, and yet they are very different Plays. Mr. Racine has brought Hippolytus, and Iphigenia on the Stage after Euripides. He hath also furnished his Pieces with all the beauties of the Greek ones, and hath followed a Conduct not very different from that Author; nevertheless the Plays are different, because they have not the same Plot, and the way of Unravelling it. Chryses made a Medea after Euripides, and pretends that 'tis the better of the two, because the other had not given that Disposition to the Subject, which it ought to have. We should now give some Examples of pieces, which are alike, though they are made in different Subjects, because the Plot, &c. is the same. I don't know, if there are any such among those of the Ancients, which remain; but I don't remember that I have met with Plots; which have been
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

ben alike; but 'tis common to find Unravellings, which are so; for these which are made by Machines are almost all the same. The Examples of Pieces, which are alike although different in their, Subjects are very scarce on our Stage, and this no doubt proceeds from the Dullness of our Poets, who not having the Power to invent new Plots and Unravellings, fall into a servile Imitation, and use only those which have been in Plays already acted. It may also happen, because Love generally bears a great Sway in our Pieces; so that 'tis impossible to avoid the same Intrigues.

15. Most of the Poets, after they have laid the Plot well, Unravel it very ill; but they ought to succeed in one, as well as the other.] This Judgment of Aristotle is very remarkable. The Poets miscarry oftener in the Unravelling, than in the Plot, whether the Unravelling be harder to manage, because 'tis more tyed up, and ought to arise from what went before; or whether the Poet be tyred of his Work, and begins to grow dull and lazy. We have very few Tragedies, in which, the last Act is not the worst, though if any part ought to be better wrought, than another 'tis that; for 'tis that which makes the last Impression on the Minds of the Audience, and either makes them praise, or blame the Poet. *Illic enim,* says Cicero in his Book of Old Age, *debet totò animo a Poeta in dissolutionem nodi agi; qua præcipua fabula pars est, qua requirit plurimum diligentiam.* The Poet ought to employ all his Ingenuity, in the Unravelling the Plot; for that is the part of the Fab'c, which requires the greatest Care. Aristotle only says, that they ought to succeed in the Unravelling, as well as in the Plot, and to use his own Terms, that both of them be applauded, that is to say, that they merit Applause. He says nothing here of the Vices in the Unravelling, 'tis not a proper place; he spake sufficiently of this Matter, when he treated of the Unity of the Action, and how
the Subject ought to be constituted; for the Unravelling is often Vicious, because 'tis not well prepared, and doth not proceed from the Bottom of the Fable, or because 'tis too long, and embarrased; or because 'tis obscure; or lastly, because 'tis double. We have Examples of all these Defects in some of our pieces; but they are so visible, that there is no need of exposing them. Before I leave this place, I think my self obliged to take Notice, that some have given another Sense to these Words of Aristotle, ἄει δὲ ἄμω δὲ κρύτεισα, for instead of translating it as I do, They must be both applauded, they pretend that Aristotle means they must be both close. That is, that the Unravelling follow the Intrigue very close. But besides its not being Greek in that Sense, I don't think that he meant so. Aristotle does not intend to teach us here, that nothing foreign or needless should come between the Plot, and the Unravelling, that he has done elsewhere. And to explain it so, is wrong. Neither would he tell us, that we should not be long in Expectation of the Unravelling; On the contrary the farther 'tis removed, the better, and that which comes at the end in the last Scene. I did once believe indeed, that Aristotle would have the Catastrophe begin as soon as possible, so that from the very first Scene we might expect the Unravelling to follow: This is one of the great Secrets of Dramatick and Epic Poem. But when I considered this Passage a little more nicely, I found, that that could not be the Meaning; for he would not have spoke in such an Obfuscure and equivocal Manner. He only says here, that the Unravelling is always more difficult to form, than the Plot. And to rsoue up the lazy Poets, He tells them, that they ought to succeed in both, that is, that a Tragedy which shall have the finest Plot in the World, will be spoiled, if the Plot be not well Unravelled.
Aristotle’s Art of Poetry. 327

16. Above all, they should remember very well, as has been often said already, not to make a Tragedy with an Epick Complication. I call an Epick Complication a Complication of several Fables, as if all that Iliad should be put into one Tragedy.] Aristotle has told us very often, that the Action, which makes the Subject of a Tragedy, ought to be one, and that the Unity of the Action must be preserved, not only in the first Plan of the Fable, but also in the Fable, when it is extended, and amplified by the Episodes, which ought also to be Parts and Members of the same Action: And as the same Rule extends its self to Epick Poem, which ought to be one and single, the Philosopher had great Reason to fear, lest the Poets should fall into this Error, and that they should be persuaded, that provided they kept the Unity of the Action in Tragedy, they might put in as many Parts and Fables, as in an Epick Poem. This is what he would prevent, both by Reason and Examples. ‘Tis from this Text, and that of the eleventh Remark, that Horace has taken the Subject of those five Verses in his Art of Poetry.

Publica Materies privati juris erit, si
Nec circa vilum, patulumque moraberis orbem,
Nec verbum verbo curari reddere, fidus
Interpres, nec desilies imitator in aréum,
Unde pedem referre vetat pavor, aut obris lex.

A publick Theme will then your own become,
If you your Author follow not too home,
Not bound him Word by Word nicely to trace,
So straitened up, you cannot add a grace,
If you are thus oblig’d to follow close,
Your Imitation will its Beauty lose.

17. In Epick Poem every part receives its full Magnitude, by reason of the Length of the Poem: but it happens quite otherwise in Tragedy, then was ex-
pec ted.] This is the Reason, why that Multiplicity of Fables, which is receiv'd in an Epick Poem, is Vicious in Tragedy, because the Length of an Epick Poem gives the Poet an Opportunity of letting all the parts of it have their Just Magnitude; Whereas Tragedy, which is an Action contained in a short Space, doth not allow him that Liberty; insomuch that if he would transfer the Fables of an Epick Poem into a Tragedy, instead of making a body, whose Members would be proportionable, not one of them would have its Just Magnitude. Aristotle hath said already, That the Episodes of a Tragedy are short, but that Epopœia, is extended and amplified by those, which belong to it: If Tragedy can admit only of short Episodes, by Reason of its Extensity, how can it suffer such a Number of Episodes, as are necessary for an Epick Poem? We see by this, and 'tis manifest, that a Tragedy is not only Vicious, when it is Episodical, that is, when it hath Episodes, which are not well united with the principal Action, but also, when it has too many, how proper soever they may be.

18. And we may be convinced of this Truth by the ill Success of those, who have put (for Example) all the Destruction of Troy into one Piece, and not managed that Subject in parts.] After the Reason; the Example which confirms it, follows: and 'tis taken from those, who having made an Epick Complication of a Tragedy, had no Success. Many Poets, who made Tragedies on the Taking of Troy, were guilty of this Fault; they put all the Particularities of that Scene into their Pieces, of which any one was sufficient to have made an entire and perfect Tragedy.

19. As Euripides treated his Nite, or his Medea, or as Aeschylus.] The Interpreters pretend, that Aristotle blames one of these Poets, and praises the other, and quarrel, only to know, on which of these
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 329

des two the Praise or the Blame ought to fall. But to reconcile them, I shall shew, that he praises both, and that they who thought otherwise were mistaken, by not taking Notice of the Words, which he utt. That καὶ μὴ ἄστερες Ἀργυλός, and not as Ἑσχυλος, is only a Sequel and Repetition of the first μὴ not καὶ μὴ κατ' ὑμές ἄστερες Ἐυερίδη, and not by parts as Euripides, which is as if he had said, and not by parts as Euripides, and not by parts as Ἑσχυλος. Ἑσχυλος and Euripides both, made a Medea, and a Niobe. Of all those Pieces, we have only Euripides his Medea, where that Poet is very far from putting all the History of that Princeps into his Piece, that he uses only one part, which is the Revenge the takes of Jason for his Infidelity. He us'd the same Conduct in his Niobe, and we have no Reason to doubt, but that Ἑσχυλος had the same Prudence; for those pieces of his, which remain are not chargeable with this Fault. The Reproach, which he lays under, of making Niobe remain three whole Days on her Children's Tomb, without speaking a Word, is grounded on a falle Writing of Suidas's Text, where he transcrib'd Ἑσχυλος's Life read, ἄ ντις τέλων ὑμέςς, to the third Day, instead of 'καὶ τέλων μέςς: To the third part of the Tragedy: that is, till the third Aet; which is evidently justified by the Criticisin, which Aristophanes makes on that piece in his Furies, where he makes Euripides say, That Ἑσχυλος, to amuse the Audience, with an Expectation of Niobe's Speaking, kept her silent till the middle of the Play; and after that, the Play being in the middle, καὶ τε ἀνάμα νὴν µέσον, that is, the Play being in the third Aet, Niobe brake silence with a dozen hard Words, that none of the Audience could understand. If Ἑσχυλος had introduced a Multiplicity of Fables into that piece, no doubt, but Aristophanes would have found Fault with him for it. Aristotle says then, that those, who make Tragedies on the Taking of Troy, ought to treat of that Subject
in parts, not altogether, and imitate the Prudence of Euripides, and Aeschylus, who in composing their Medea, and Niobe, did not put in all their Misfortunes, but one part of them only.

20. For they either saw their Pieces damn’d; or were overcome. They either saw their Pieces damn’d, when they were acted before the People; or they were overcome when these Pieces were play’d before the Judges. Aristotle puts in this Alternative, because sometimes those Pieces, which were condemned by the Judges, had very good Success before the People, but they were not the better for that; for though they were the most knowing, and delicate People in the World, yet they might be deceived. The Orestes of Euripides was one of his Pieces, which succeeded the best in the Representation, though it had been condemned at the Examen with good Reason too, because of the Manners which are Vitiious without any Necessity, and the Catastrophe, which is naught.

21. And this was the only Cause of Agathons Misfortune. Agathon, had several times won the Prize of Tragedy, and was also oftentimes overcome, but that was no oftener than he trespassed against this Rule.

22. For otherwise all these Poets are wonderful in their Peripeties; and simple Unravellings. That is, Agathon, and all those Poets who made Tragedies on the Taking of Troy: Aristotle says, that all those Poets were admirable in the Unravellings of those Pieces, which were overcome; and ’tis remarkable; that one or two good parts in a Play were not sufficient to make it pass. In the Peripeties, that is, in the Catastrophe of the Implex Pieces; and in the simple Unravellings, that is, in the Catastrophe of the Implex Pieces, which had neither Peripetic nor Re-
Aristotle’s *Art of Poetry.*

Remembrance. All the Tragedies, which were made on the Taking of Troy, must be simple Pieces.

23. *Which are Tragical, and cause abundance of Pleasure.*] He says, that the Unravelling of those simple Pieces, although they have no Peripetie, that is, change of Fortune into good or bad, are yet Tragical, and please, we may judge of this, by the Prometheus of Ἀεικύλος, and the Ajax, of Σοφοκλῆς, which are simple Pieces; and although the Misfortune of those two Persons be continued from the beginning to the end of the piece; yet the Unravelling interestes us, and is also Tragical, and agreeable.

24. For the Tragical, and agreeable, are found together, (for example) when we see a Wise Man, but Wicked, who is deceived, as a Sisyphus, or a valiant but unjust Man that is conquered.] What he says of the Subjects, of simple Pieces being agreeable, and Tragical, seems to contradict, what he had advanced in the XVI. Chapter, that the Misfortunes of a wicked Man should not be expos’d on the Stage. He gives the Reason, why the Tragical and Agreeable are found in these Subjects, which is, because the Wickedness of those Men, who were the Subjects of these Plays, was accompanied with some Qualities, which made them seem, as if they should not have fallen into such Miseries, as befell them. For Example, Sisyphus, one of the Heroes of these simple Pieces, was wise, that is, so crafty and cunning, that the Ancients said, he was the most subtile of all Men. It seems then, that he ought to have used that Cunning and Ingenuity, to prevent himself from being deceived, and to commit such Faults, as caused him to be condemned, to rowl a Stone to the Top of a Mountain, which was always running down again. Nevertheless, as the Wisdom of Men is but folly, he was taken in the Snares; and we are both astonisht and ravished at the same time; ’tis exactly the
the name of an unjust Man; for we see with the name Affections, that his Courage did not save him, but these Subjects must never be used, but in the simple Pieces, because they are rather bad, than good. In the impplex Pieces, that is, in the finest, and most regular, none are admitted, but these Persons, who are neither Good, nor Wicked, or who are rather Good, than Wicked. If any other are introduced, they are secondary Persons, as we have laid in another place; this Passage deserv'd to be explained.

25. *All this is probable.*] As a Dramatick Poem is always founded on Probability, and would rather admit of a Lye, that was probable, than a Truth, which was not so. *Aristotle* prevents an Objection, which might be made, that 'tis improbable, the most Cunning of all Mankind should be deceiv'd, and a very valiant Man conquer'd. He says, 'tis not absolutely probable, but only in a certain manner, insomuch as it doth not directly shock the verisimilitude, and appears not to be manifestly false.

26. *For as Agathon says.*] There are in the Probability several things, which happen contrary to the Probability. *Aristotle* in his Rhetorick quotes this Passage of Agathon's.

\[Τὰ γὰρ τις εἰκός αὐτὸ τῇ πεῖσμα λέγο, ἰηθοὶ πολλὰ τυχικῶν ἐκ εἰδένα.\]

*Though many things fall out, which seem to be True; yet, the offence against Probability.*

But Dramatick Poem requires the Common and ordinary sort of Probability. And I would not advise the Tragick Poets to venture at many extraordinary things on this Maxim of Agathon's. The two Subjects, he here speaks of, may be true in another respect. The most valiant Men are sometimes
times conquered, and the Craftiest taken in their own Cunning.

27. The Chorus must a'fo take the part of an Actor, so that it make one part of the whole, and contribute to the Advancement of the Action.] As a Tragedy is the Representation of a publick and visible Action, which is done by Illustrious Persons, and of high Rank, 'tis impossible, that the Action should pass in publick, without more Persons than the Actors, whose Interest is concerned, and whose Fortune depends on that of the chief Persons: These are those who compose the Chorus, the Spectators of the Action, but interested Spectators, and we may affirm, that the Chorus lays the Foundation of the Probability of the Tragedy. I don't wonder, that we omit it; for without taking any Notice of the Unity of Place, which the Chorus requires, we can hardly preserve the Actions, which make the Subject of our Tragedies, they are not the most part visible Actions, but translated in Chambers and Closets. How can the Chorus enter there, to be Witnesses of their Actions, which are rather secret, than publick. The Chorus would not only be needless, and incommodious there, but also improbable. The Mistake is, that the Spectators can enter no more, than the Chorus; and 'tis not a little unnatural, the Citizens should see all, that is translated in the Cabinets of Princes, though the Occasions of the Prince must necessarily require some People to be about him. If we would open our Eyes, and make Use of our Reason, we should find the Necessity of avoiding this Error, and in spite of Custom re-establish the Chorus, which is only capable of restoring Tragedy to its first Lustre, and obliging the Poets to a more exact Choice of those Actions, which they take for their Subjects. We'll explain Aristotle's Text, and shew what was the Business of the Chorus. By what has been already said, 'tis easy to perceive, that the Chorus made one part of the
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry*.

the whole, since it was interested in the Action. Making thus one part of the whole, it could not be dumb in the Course of the Acts, but if all the Chorus spoke together, 'twould have made an horrible Confusion on the Stage, and been a breach of good Manners towards the principal Persons; 'tis for this Reason, that the first Person of the Chorus, who was called the *Crypkeus*, spoke for them all, and as Aristotle says, play'd the part of an Actor. Which Horace has explain'd in his Art of Poetry thus.

*Vitruvius Partes Chorus, officiumque virile Defendat.*

The Chorus too must act a noble part.

The second Duty of the Chorus was to show by its Singing, the Intervals of the Acts. This was its proper Office, and to which 'twas particularly defined; for is it natural that those who were interested in the Action, and expected the Issue with Impatience, should stand with their Arms across, and say nothing, while the Necessity of the Action obliged the Actors to be off the Stage? Is it not reasonable, that these People should entertain themselves with what was past, and talk of that, which they either feared or hoped for? This was the Matter of the Songs of the Chorus, during the *Intermedes*, and there Aristotle very aptly says, that the Chorus ought to sing nothing but what is agreeable to the Subject, and concurs to the Advancement of the Action, or to use Aristotle's own Words; they ought to work with the others ζούσαντες το τέλος, and tend to the same end, and thus Horace has very well translated.

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*Neu quid medios intercinat actus,*

*Quid non proposito conducat, & hæcæ apte.*

For nothing we between the Acts should see But with the Play exactly will agree.

Such was the Conduct of the Ancients in all their Tragedies. The Chorus and the Actors both advanced
advanc'd the same Action; and consequently there was nothing in that Poem, but what was natural, and probable. When I consider, that we have Violins, &c. instead of the Chorus, and when we are in a great Concern, what will become of Oedipus, Cinna, Iphigenia, Phedra, instead of Understand something, that agrees with the Subject, and leads us to the Catastrophe, whilst it gives us Pleasure, we hear nothing but Airs of the Violin, I am astonish'd at our Fancy; but Mr. Corneille says, The Songs of the Chorus don't give the Audience time to breathe, whereas the Violins are of extraordinary great Use; for the Minds of the Spectators are as it were unbent, whilst they play, and reflect on, what they have seen, either to praise or blame, according as it hath pleas'd or displeas'd them. The time that they play is so short, that the Ideas are still fresh so that when the Actors re-enter, there is no Trouble to revive them, and recall their Attention. This great Man should have endeavour'd to make those believe this, who have no Knowledge of the Theatre. A Tragedy is divided into five Parts, to give to the Audience four Opportunities, to consider whether they shall applaud, or condemn, what they have seen. Such a Tragick Action is very commodious, quiet, and well allotted, and the Actors well satisfied to rest in the height of their Passions, to give us time to rest, and to condemn or approve of what they do; but how does the first Act coher to the second, the second to the third when such a forreign thing, as airs for the Violins, separate them? And what is it, that shall oblige me to tarry in my place till the Actors come in again? They tell me they will re-enter. Oh! but will they always re-enter. 'Tis the Custom; a very pleasent sort of Security! but he that sees a Tragedy for the first time, is he instructed in this Custom? He must enquire of his Neighbour, and he will inform him. Besides, in a Tragick Action which either does, or ought to interest us, is it natural that we should seek these strange ways of rest?
Is there any Person in the World, who has Patience enough, to give Attention three or four Hours to see a Tragick Adventure, when it is managed according to the Rules of Art, and mixt with those things, which will render it, agreeable and affecting! This is not sought with an urgent Desire; In a Word whilst the Violins thus separate the Acts, Tragedy can never be one and the same Body. People may imagine and fancy, what they please, but Imagination will not make Amends for the Deviation from the Rules of Art.

28. As in Sophocles, and not as in Euripides.] Aristotle found that the Chorus's of Sophocles agreed with the Subject of the Tragedy, and made with the Acts one and the same whole; on the contrary those of Euripides were entirely separated from the Actions, and agreed no more with that, then any other, you would apply them to. This Judgment is true; we need only take the first Piece of Euripides, and examine the Chorus, which makes the first interval. In the first Act Polydorus, whose Throat was cut by Polymnestor, appears by Night in a Dream to Hecuba, and relates his hard Fortune. Hecuba frightned by the Vision, and the Dream, which she had seen, was in pain for her Daughter Polyxena, rose to go to Agamemnon's Tent, to find Cassandra. On this the Chorus enters, which is made up of Phrygian Slaves, who tell us, that the Greeks had resolved to sacrifice Polyxena on Achilles's Tomb. That unhappy Queen calls her Daughter, to tell her that horrible News. After some tender Complaints between these two Ulysses comes to fetch the Victim, and notwithstanding all the Queen's Entreaties, snatches her from her Arms, and carries her away. Hecuba falls into a Swound in her Women's Arms, who carry her off, and thus ends the first Act. What does the Chorus upon this? Why, instead of singing Things agreeable to the Subject, the Women who compose it, amuse themselves by
by demanding of the Winds. Where will ye carry us? Shall we go to be Slaves in Doris, or Thessaly: or where Endanus fattens the Earth? Shall it be to Delos, where the first Laurel and Palm-tree extended their Branches, to aid Latona in the time of her Child-birth? We'll employ our selves, say they, to praise the fine Dress and Features of Diana? Shall it be in Athens, where Minerva had a Throne of Gold; and where in the finest Silk we'll work on the mysterious Tapisry, the Chariot of that Goddess, and the History of the Titans, who were Thunder-struck by Jupiter? and end, by the unhappy State of themselves and their Country. 'Tis easy to perceive, that this Chorus is not drawn from the Subject, as also that 'tis not proper; for there is nothing in it, but may be transfer'd into any other Piece, where the Chorus is compos'd of captive and strange Women. Sophocles doth not so; we will take his first Piece also, that we may not seem to be prejudiced. In the first Act of Ajax we see Minerva, who informs Ulysses, that 'twas Ajax, who in a mad Fit fell on the Grecian Troops in the Night, and made an horrible laughter, thinking to kill Agamemnon, Menelaus and Ulysses. At the same time she cau'ss Ajax to enter, who discourses with that Goddess of the Vengeance, he had taken of his Enemies, and the Mischief he had prepared for Ulysses. After which he goes to his Tent; Ulysses and Minerva retire. During these things the Chorus enters, (which is compos'd of Salaminians, Ajax's Subiects) to inform their Prince of the ill Report, which was spread abroad concerning him, and of which they thought Ulysses was the Author; and they also entreated him, that he would suppress it, by his Prefence, and after they had taken Possession of the Stage, they 'fang this, which makes the first Intermede.

Powerful Fame, who art the Author of our Disgrace; what Reports have you spread abroad against our Prince? 'Is it not Diana, O Ajax, who excited you against those Troops?
Ariftotle’s Art of Poetry.

Troops? Because you have offended her by not thanking her for the Victory she had given you, or in neglecting to consecrate some Honourable Spoils, or to conclude in depriving her of part of the Prey after some happy Chase? It may be Bellona, or Mars, who not having received the first Fruits of your Spoils, would revenge the Affront, in hurrying you on to commit these Excesses during that Cloud.

O Son of Telamon, you would never have committed such a horrid Action in your right Senses; the Gods dispose of our Reputation as they please, and according to their Inclinations send us such Discontents; No, Jupiter and Apollo scatter these injurious Reports. If our Kings are surprized at these Relations, what will those Apostates be, who are descended from the unhappy Sisyphus. In the Name of the Gods O Prince! don’t give way to these Calumnies by keeping your self thus shut up.

Come out of your Tent, where your stubborn Humour has kept you so long unprofitably, and where you only increase our Uneasinesses. In the mean while your Enemies Triumph, nothing hinders the Retreats of their envenomed Tongues, and we are overwhelmed with Grief.

All this is drawn from the Subject, and concurs with the rest, to the Advancement of the Action, and there is none, but is touch’d with it. To say that the Airs for the Violin, a Sarabrand, or a Chacon will have the same Effect, as this Chorus of Sophocles, if well set to Musick, can never be affeeted by any one that is neither mad nor blind.

29. In all the other Poets ’tis yet worse; for the Chorus’s belong no more to the Subject they treat off, than to any other Tragedy; ’tis for this Reason, that they sing Songs, which are inserted without any Relation.] This is a very remarkable Criticism, since it extends to all the Poets of Ariftotle’s time. There was not one of them, who knew how to accommodate the Chorus’s to the Subject’s. ’Twas worse, than in Euripides; they were so easy in the Matter, that they had
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 339

had in the Chorus's only inserted Songs, That is to say, Songs, which the Poets took either from other Pieces, or any where else and inserted them into their Tragedies.

30. Agathon was the First, who introduced this Mala Practice.] Agathon, to save the Trouble of making the Chorus's found out this nice way, to take any Songs, where he could get them, and to insert them in the Intervals of his Pieces, as if we should take Songs from the Opera, to make the Intermedes of the Cid, Andromache, and Phedra.

31. However what Difference is there, between singing such Adventitious Songs, and transferring any long Discourse, or Episode entirely, from one Piece to another.\] Aristotle could not describe the foreign Chorus's better, than by saying, that a Poet might as well transfer long Recitations, or whole Episodes from one Play to another; for Example, suppose he should transport an Episode of Andromache into Phedra, or Hippolytus's Death into Andromache. That Change would not have a worse Effect in those Pieces, than these borrow'd Chorus's; for the Chorus's are as much parts and Members of the Tragedy, as the Episodes and Imitations. If Aristotle to absolutely condemned these strange Chorus's, these inserted Songs which made the Intervals, what would he say to our Violins, which are Ten Thousand times more vicious; for though the Chorus did not sing any thing, which agreed with the Subject, it serv'd at least to link the Acts together, and to keep the continuity of the Action, and by its Presence obliged the Spectator to tarry, to see what would become of that Chorus, which had a share in the Action, during the Course of the Act.
Of the Sentiments, and in what they consist. The Reasons, from whence the Poets ought do draw them, as the Orators do. The Difference between those things, which the Orators, and those things which the Poets treat off. Of the Action, which comprehends the Pronunciation, and the Gesture. To whom it belongs to treat of it. A Trifling Criticism of Protagoras on Homer.

I. There remain only the Diction, and the Sentiments to be spoken of; for we have sufficiently explained all the other parts of Tragedy. As for the Sentiments, you may see, what has been said in my Books of Rhetorick; for they are properly, what belongs to that Art. The Sentiments is all, that makes the Matter of the Discourse, and (a) they consist in proving, refuting, exciting the Passions, as Pity, Anger, Fear, and all the others, to (b) enhance the Value off, or debase any thing.

II. 'Tis evident then, that in the Subjects of Dramatick Poems, the Poets ought to make use

(a) Their parts are to, &c. (b) Amplify or diminish.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 341

of the same Reasons, which the Orators do, when they would make things appear worthy of Pity, or terrible, or great, or probable.

III. There is (c) however this Difference between those things, we treat of, that some are naturally such, as we would have them appear, without the Assistance of (d) Art; but others are made such by the Ingenuity of him, who speaks, and who (e) gives by his Words such a Form to them, as they seem to us to have; for what would he have to do, if all things were (f) affecting of themselves without the Help of his Discourses.

IV. As for the Diction, there is one part of it, which is for Show and the Stage; that is, the (g) Pronunciation and the Gesture, but that properly Regards the Comedians, or some such like Profession. For 'tis their Business to teach, what a Command, a Petition, an Interrogation, an Answer, and (h) such other like things are.

V. And truly (i) whether we observe, or violate these Rules, 'tis nothing to the Poem, which can suffer no reproach on this Account, that is worthy of Consideration. For Example, (k) I should never allow of Protagoras's Criticisin, who accuses Homer, of commanding the Muses, whereas he should have petitioned them, under Pretense, that he uses the Imperativa.

(c) Only. (d) The Teacher. (e) By his Oration makes them such as. (f) Pleasant (g) Figures of, (h) any such like. (i) The Knowledge or Ignorance of these is &c. (k) what signifies.
Axiolitic Art of Poetry.

Five Mood: Muse sing the Anger, &c. (1) and his Reason is, that to order any one to do a thing, or not to do it, is a Formal Command. But (m) as the Judgment of this Criticism depends on another Art, and not Poetry, we shall not tarry to examine it.

REMARKS on the XX. Chapter.

1. As for the Sentiments, you may see, what hath been said of them in my Books of Rhetorick, for they are properly what belongs to that Art.] As the Passions are the Cause and Source of the Sentiments, and the Sentiments the Matter of the Diffoufe, 'tis Rhetorick, that ought to lay down Rules, to teach what Expressions ought to be us'd, to excite such or such Sentiments, and the Manner, how it should be done, and this is what Aristotle has show'd in his Books of Rhetorick, of which the first Treats of the Passions, and the third of Elocution.

2. 'Tis evident then, that in the Subjects of Dramatick Poems, the Poets ought to use the same Forms, the Orators do.] Aristotle calls Forms a certain fund, and Quantity of general or particular Propositions on all the Heads, that belong to these sorts of Rhetorick, and from which they may take all they have Occasion for in the Business they treat of, as out of a common Treasury. And he says very well, that the Poets ought to make Use of these as well, as the Orators, since they treat of the same things, and aim at the same Design; for the Poets endeavour to praise, and blame, to persuade, or dissuade, to accuse or defend, as the Orators do, if they would prove

(1) For says he. (m) But this may be omitted not being a Theorem of Poetry.
prove, that a thing is Good or Evil; Honest, or Dis-honest; Great or Small; Jut] or Unjust; of little Importance, or great Consideration. They
must then have recourse to the said Forms, whether common or particular, in order to use only proper and necessary Arguments.

3. There is however this Difference between those things we treat of, that some are naturally such, as we would have them appear, without the Assiance of Art, but others are made such, by the Ingenuity of him, who speaks.] This is the Difference between those things, an Orator, and those, which a Poet treats of. Those, that belong to the Poet are in themselves terrible, and pityful, without the Assistance of Art. The Histories of Oedipus, Ajax, Hecuba, have no need of the Ornaments of Art, to appear terrible, or pityful: besides the Poets chuse their Subjects. The Orators have not the same Privilege, for they don't chuse theirs. And as they are obliged to speak on all sorts of Subjects, they are very often obliged to change the Forms of the Matters, to make that pass, for pityful and terrible, which is not so, and to palliate and disguise that, which is. Thus they by their Words give such a Face to Affairs, as they seem to us to have. But it oftentimes happens also, that Orators treat of some Subjects, which are naturally such, as they would have them appear. The Poets also manage those, that are quite different, and in which they have Occasion, for all the Colours, they can borrow from Rhetorick; such is the Discourse made by Clytemnestra, in the Eleftra of Sophocles, to prove, that she did a just Action, in killing her Husband, and had nothing to answer for, in Committing that Murder; but as this seldom happens, it does not destroy the Difference, which Aristotle makes.

4. For what would he have to do, if all things were afflicting of themselves, without the Help of his Discourses?
If all that, which affords Matter to the Orator, was touching in itself, he would have nothing to do; his Art would be superfluous, and all he could say, would been vain; for the most simple Expressions would be the best. Aristotle's Expression is well worth taking notice of. He says properly, if all things are sweet of themselves. The Word Sweet, signifies Touching, and 'tis what Horace has imitated in those Verses of his Art of Poetry.

Non satis est pulchra esse poema, dulcia santer,
Et quicumque voluerit, animum auditeris agunto.

'Tis not sufficient Poems should be fine (incline,
But shold the Readers Minds, where e're you please

5. As for the Diction, there is one part of it, which is for show and the Stage, that is the Pronunciation and the Gesture, but that properly regards the Comedians, or some such like Profession.] The Diction is divided into two parts, the Elocution and the Action. The Action comprehends the Pronunciation and the Gesture, but neither of them are the Business of Poets, or Rhetorick, they belong to a separate Art; those belong to the Comedians, or those, whose province it is to give Rules for it. The Actions of Orators received almost no Improvement in Aristotle's time: only one Thrasymachus spake something of it, in a little Treatise, concerning the ways of exciting pity. Not long after Glauceus of Teos, and some other Actors began to lay down Rules for the Theatre and for those, who recited Epic Poems. This proceeded from the preceding Poets acting their own Pieces: and what they did in Respect to the Action, was not as Poets, but as Comedians. Soon after the Poets had quitted the Stage, and given their Plays to the Comedians, those latter had all the Advantage on Account of the Action: and made the Price
6. But that properly regards the Comedians, or some such like Profession.] Quintilian in the XI. Chapter of his first Book explains this Place very well. Deduc enim docere Comedus, quamodo narrandum, quae sit auctorita e suadeendum, quae concitatione confurgat Íra, qui flexus decent miserationem; &c. Et ne illos quidem reprehendendo putem, qui paullum etiam Pelastricis vacaverint, id nomen est ipsis, a quibus gestus moviusque formantur, ut recta sint brachia, ne indolē patresse manus, ne fatus indecorus, ne qua in proferendis pedibus inicitia, nec ut oculique ab alia corpori inclinatione sidenteant. A Comedian ought to teach, how we should speak, with what Authority we should persuade, with what Emotion Anger should be raised, and with what Change of Voice we may excite Pity, &c. And I can't blame those, who spend some time with the Masters of the Palaestrick Art, that is, those, who form the Gestures and Motions, teach how to hold the Arms, and the Hands, that we seem not to be rustic, or ignorant, to have no unseemly Carriage, no unbecoming Posture of the Feet, and that the Head and Eyes don't differ from the other Motions of the Body. Thus when Aristotle says, καὶ ἡ προτάσεις ἐκζοσίας ἀριστεράνων, and he, who is of some such like Profession, he speaks of those, whom Quintilian calls Palaestricos, Palaestritae, Masters of Exercise, Dancing-Masters, those who dress out for Balls, and Masks; for 'twas they, who formed the Gesture, and taught, how to express the Passions by the Motions of the Body only.

7. For 'tis their Business to teach, what a Command, a Petition, an Interrogation, &c. are.] As is the secret of this, as Aristotle says elsewhere, depends on the Voice; for it consists in knowing, how to make Use of every Passion. For Example, when we have Occasion to raise, or fall, or to speak in the ordinary Tone; how we must use the different Tones,
as the Acute, Grave, Low, Circumflex, to manage
them the better in every particular Movement;
for 'tis certain, that those, who study Pronuncia-
tion, observe these three things, the Body, the
Voice, and the Harmony or Number; but those
are not sufficient; 'tis necessary, that the Voice be
accompanied with a Decent, and proportionable
Gesture. Aristotle said, that the Action was of such
Importance, that of all the Orators, who appear in
publick, those, who have the best Pronunciation,
and speak finest, are generally prefer'd. This is of
as great Prevalence now adays, when we don't
judge of things as they are, but as they please. But
this does not regard the Art of Poetry.

8. And truly, whether we observe, or violate these
Rules, 'tis nothing to the Poem, which can suffer no Re-
preach, on this Account, that is worthy of Consideration.

The Poet is no ways concern'd, whether a Verse be
ill pronounced, or accompanied with a bad Gesture,
whether a Petition be made as it 'twere a Com-
mand, and an Interrogation as an Answer; the
Actor only ought to be accused here, as deficient
in his Duty. A Poet may also transgress the Rules
of Grammar, and all other Arts, and yet the Faults
ought not to be imputed to Poetry. They are For-
 reign, as Aristotle has proved in the XXVI. Chap-
ter, on which see the Remarks.

9. For Example, I should never allow of Protagoras
Criticism, who accuses Homer, of commanding the
Muses, whereas he should have petitioned them, under
pretence, that he uses the Imperative Mood; Muse sing
the Anger.] This Protagoras was a Sophist, all whole
Doctrines had a sort of deceitful Probability, and
Appearance; though he really said nothing, but
what was false, and far distant from the Truth.
All the Objections, which he made against Homer,
were of this Nature; he accuses him of having
spoiled his Poem. For that instead of beginning
with an Invocation, he begins with a Command,
because
because he made use of the Imperative. But Grammar informs us, that Imperatives are not always formal Commands, and denote the Superiority of those, who speak. They are very often Prayers, which are made by the Imperative, instead of the Optative, to shew the pressing Necessity, or the greater Confidence; and thus it is that, we speak to God.

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CHAP. XXI.

The Parts of Diction, and their exact Definition.

I. The parts of (a) Diction properly speaking are eight (b) Letter, Syllable, Conjunction, Noun, Verb, Article, Case, and Speech.

II. A (c) Letter is an indivisible Sound, not of any sort, but (d) articulate, and intelligible, that's to say, of which we understand the Signification. For the Sounds of Beasts are also indivisible, and yet none of them are called (e) Letters.

III. The (f) Letters are divided into Vowels, Demi-Vowels, and Mutes. A Vowel is that, which (g) makes an intelligible Sound alone, and without the Help of any other Letter.

(a) All the Dictions are these. (b) Element. (c) Element. (d) But of which a Voice may be framed. (e) Elements. (f) Sorts are. (g) Hath an easily audible Sound, with an Allison.
A Demi-Vowel is that, which (i) borrows the Voice of a Vowel to precede it, that it may be understood, as S. R. The Mute is that, which not being to be understood, (k) with the Addition of some other Letter, which hath a Sound, employs that Letter after it, such are B, G, D.

IV. There is yet another Difference between them, which is drawn either from the Conformation of the Mouth, and the other parts, which serve for Pronunciation, or because they are harsh, or sweet, short or long; grave or sharp, or Circumflex (l). But 'tis proper to treat of the different qualities of Letters in those Treatises only, which teach the Art of Verfication.

V. A Syllable is a Sound, which signifies nothing, and is composed of a Mute, and a Vowel, for if instead of a Vowel, we put a Demi-Vowel, as G'r (m) 'tis not a Syllable, neither can it be made one but by adding a Vowel, Gra. But to treat of these Differences belongs to the Art of (n) Verfes.

VI. Conjunction is a Sound, which signifying nothing by itself, neither causes, nor hinders any of the others, it's join'd with, to have a (o) Signification, but only determines them, to have one only, and which makes one, and

(h) As A and O. (i) Can be heard with an Allison. (k) But with the Vowels, &c. (l) Or Middle. (m) Is. (n) Metre. (o) Significative Voice, such as is fit to be compounded of many.
the same of all the different Sounds, it unites. 'Tis generally at the end, or in the middle, but sometimes in the beginning (p) or thus: A Conjunction is a Sound, which signifying nothing by it self, and which being join'd with two others, or more, which have their proper Signification, joins them all together, and makes one, and the same thing. (q)

An Article is a Sound, which signifying nothing by it self, serves only to show the beginning or end of a Discourse, or (r) to separate one thing from another, as I say, or to this Subject, or if you please. An Article is a Sound, which signifying nothing by it self, neither makes, nor hinders the rest, from having their Signification; but which determines them, and puts them, either at the beginning or in the middle.

8. A Noun is a compounded Sound, which signifies something, without denoting the time, and whose compounding parts signify nothing alone, for even in double Nouns every Noun separately has no Signification, as Theodore (s) for if we separate the two Nouns, which Form it, neither of them signify any thing.

IX. A Verb is a compounded Sound, which signifies something, and whose parts, when separated, signify no more, than they do in the Nouns. But the Verb has this Advantage of the Noun, that it determines the time, which the Noun doth not. For Example, when I say Man or White. I don't mark any time, but if I say,

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(p) As μὲν ἤτοι Ἀν. (q) Sound. (r) A Distinction. (s) Θεοδορων Διός, signifies nothing.
he goes, or he hath gone, (t) I mark the time present, or past.

X. A Cafe both in Nouns and Verbs; we call a Cafe or Cadence in Nouns, that which marks the Sequel, or Relation, (u) as this is of such, and this is to such, and which denotes (x) the Number, as a Man, Men, this is also common to Verbs; but what we call Cafe in Verbs, is the different Inflexions, according to the Tone and Gesture, as when we ask, or command; as, is he gone? or go you, are the Cafes of a Verb according to the different Species.

XI. Oration, or a Discourse is a compounded Sound, which signifies something, and (y) whose parts though separated, have their Signification; for 'tis not to be imagined, that a Discourse should be always a Composition of Nouns, and Verbs, as the Definition of a Man. There are Speeches without Verbs, but that does not hinder every one of the separate parts, from having their Signification, as well as this Cleon Walks (z).

XII. An Oration is called one after two Manners, either because it signifies one thing only, or (a) else being compounded of several parts, it makes only one and the same Body, by Reason of the Connexions, which put them together. The Iliad, for Example,

(t) One signifies. (u) And such like as I love, thou loves, the other. (x) More or less. (y) Some of whose parts. (z) The Word Cleon signifies something. (a) Many by Conjunction.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

is one by Connexion, and the Definition of a Man is one by the Signification of one thing only.

REMARKS on the XXI. Chapter.

1. **The Parts of Diction properly speaking are Eight.** Without doubt a great many People will admire, that Aristotle having Occasion to speak of Diction and Elocution, goes back to its first Principles, and accuse him of making a Grammatical Treatise, instead of continuing that of the Art of Poetry. 'Tis necessary to answer that Objection first of all. Both the Grammarian, and the Poet examine the parts of Diction, which are the Foundation of their Arts; but in a very different Manner; the Grammarian examines them in order to speak correctly, and according to Rule; the Poet to render his Discourse more polite, soft, and harmonious, and to imitate more exactly by his Words, the Nature of those things he speaks off, and all this depends on a perfect Knowledge of the first Elements. And those Principles are so much more the Business of Poetry, as the Poets were the first, who improved the Diction; from whence it came to pass, that the Poetick Diction was used by the Orators. Aristotle has then done nothing here, but what was agreeable to his Design, and profitable and necessary in his Language. Dionysius Halicarnassus in his little Treatise of Composition gives a more particular Account of Letters, Syllables and Words, and discovers the Treasury, from whence the Poets, Orators, and other famous Writers have drawn this Knowledge. Aristotle does not engage himself in that Detail, but leaves it to those, who teach how to make Verses; for after he has given an exact Definition of the eight part
part of Discourse, he passes in the following Chapter to the Nouns, of which he explains all the Qualities and Differences. When he says, there are eight parts of Diction, it seems, as if 'twas contrary to what Quintilian tells us after Dionysius Halicarnassius, that Aristotle and Theodectes made only three, Verces, says he, quorum fuerunt Aristoteles quoque, atque Theodectes, verba modo & nomina, & conjunctiones tradiderunt. The Ancients of which Number were Aristotle and Theodectes, spake only of Verbs, Nouns, and Conjunctions. That is to say, that which doth express, that which is expressed, and that which joins them both together. There Aristotle speaks as a Philosopher; but here as a Poet, and one who would instruct the Poets, and who ought consequently to examine particularly all that enters into the Diction.

2. A Letter is an indivisible Sound, not of any sort, but articulate, and intelligible.] The Greeks call the Letters by a Word, which signifies Elements; to shew, that as all Bodies are composed of Elements, and resolved into the same Principles, so 'tis with Words, they are all formed of Letters, and return into the same, when they are destroyed. Since a Letter then is an Element, 'tis an indivisible Sound; for all that, which can be divided, is not a Letter; as no compounded Body can be an Element; but to define a Letter, 'tis not sufficient to say, that it is an indivisible Sound, and for that Cause Aristotle adds, but one which is articulate and intelligible; that is, which signifies something; for the Voice of Beasts is an indivisible Sound, but 'tis no Letter, because it cannot signify nothing.

3. The Letters are divided into Vowels, Demi-Vowels, and Mutes.] The Demi-Vowels and Mutes are those which are called Consonants, because they have no Sound, but when a Vowel either precedes, or follows them.
4. A Demi-Vowel is that, which borrows the Sound of a Vowel, which precedes it.] This I allude in my Opinion had no Difficulty in it, but by the Difference, which was made between the two Greek Words περβολα and περσολα. The first signifies that which is added before, and the latter, that which is added after, and this is the Difference, which is between the Demi-Vowels, and the Mutes. The Demi-Vowel is that, which to be understood, puts a Vowel before, f, l, m, n, r, s, for these Letters found as if they were writ, ef, el, em, en, er, es. And the Mute is that, which has a Vowel after it, as b, d, g, p, q, t, as if 'twere; be, de, ge, ka, pe, qu, te.

5. There is yet another Difference between them, which is drawn, either from the Conformation of the Mouth, and the other parts which serve for Pronunciation.] Beside them which Aristotle makes them is another, which he speaks of here that is drawn, from those parts which pronounce. Dionysius Halicarnassus explains this at large, in his XVIII. and XIX. Chapters. This was a necessary Piece of Knowledge for the Greek Tongue; but 'tis of no use to us. We should be no more ingenious to know that, than we make a Mouth to pronounce a, u.

VI. Or because they are harsh, or sweet. ] The Mutes are divided into Aspirates, sweet, and middle. The Aspirates are ph, ch, th, which are simple in the Greek, the sweet are p, k, t. The Middle b, g, d, they are called Middle, because they are between the Aspirates and the Sweets; for b, is changed into p, and into ph, g is changed into k, and into ch, and d, is changed into t and th. These Changes are of wonderful Use in the Greek.
7. Short or long, grave or sharp, or Circumflex. [This regards the Vowels only, or the Syllables, which are distinguished by the Quantity, that is, the time of their Pronunciation, or the Accent, which regards the raising or falling the Voice; for the Acute, Accent raises, the Grave falls, and the Circumflex keeps the Voice even.

8. But 'tis proper to treat of the different Qualities of Letters in those Treatises only, which teach the Art of making Verses.] As 'tis necessary, that a Poet be instructed in the Nature of Letters, and their different Qualities, in order to use them, as they ought to be, to put a sweet Tone, where it ought to be, and an Acute one in its proper Place, &c. for these are the first Elements of Poetry, or Verfification; and Aristotle very reasonably refers to those Treatises, which give the Rules; for this is to instruct Poets, and not to make them such.

9. A Syllable is a Sound, which signifies nothing, and is composed of a Mute and a Vowel.] Which he says, that a Syllable is a Sound, which signifies nothing, 'tis to distinguish them from Monosyllables, which do signify something, as cēs, lux, βς, los, μυς, μις, &c. and for that Reason are not called Syllables, but Nouns. As for the rest, and is composed of a Mute and a Vowel, he calls all the Consonants Mutes; for the Demi-Vowels are in effect Mutes, when they are compared with the Vowels.

10. Conjunction is a Sound, which signifying nothing by itself, neither Causes, nor kinders any of the others, it is joyn'd with, to have a Signification, but only determines them to have one only, and which makes one, and the same of all the different Sounds, it unites.] The Conjunction neither adds to, nor takes any thing from the Words, it is found with, 'tis only to unite them, and make one thing of those Words, which
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

are about it, and which would be otherwise dismissed. Conjunctions writ, or omitted give a wonderful Ornament to Poetry, for in using them one thing is made of a great many; and in leaving them out, many are made of one.

11. 'Tis generally at the end, or in the Middle, but sometimes at the beginning.] Our Language has in this Respect almost the same Advantage with the Greek; for there are Conjunctions for the beginning, for the Middle, and for the End of a Discourse. But those, which are at the End, are not so many as for the others.

12. An Article is a Sound, which signifying nothing by it self, serves only to shew the Beginning or End of a Discourse.] An Article is either Prepositive, or Subjunctive. The Prepositive, as *The,* denotes the Beginning of a Discourse; that is to say, that it points out the thing of which we speak, and which it precedes. As, *the Book,* *the Law,* *the King.* Perhaps the Latin is the only Language, that hath not this prepositive Article; it puts the Pronouns instead of it, as *hic,* *ipsa,* *ille,* which has almost the same Beauty. The Subjunctive Article is that, which shews the end of a Discourse; that is, it follows the thing it denotes, as *animum,* *quem.* That which follows, or to separate one thing from another, as I say, or to this Subject, is much more obscure; it seems Aristotle comprehended under the Articles those Terms, which were used to separate one thing from another, as *I would say,* or to *this Subject,* which Expressions are used to prevent the Auditor, from changing his Thoughts. The second Definition, which Aristotle gives to an Article, is almost the same, as that of a Conjunction, and so plain, that there is no need of laying any thing to it.
13. A Noun is a compounded Sound, which signifies something, without denoting the time, and whose parts, signify nothing alone. A Noun is a compounded Sound, is composed of Letters and Syllables; for there is no Noun of one Letter, which signifies something, that is to distinguish it from a Syllable, which tho' it be a compounded Sound, yet it signifies nothing, without denoting the time, because 'tisamblying and indeterminate. And whose parts signify nothing alone. For if I should disjoin the Word Letter, the parts would signify nothing; and this 'tis, which makes the Difference between a Noun, and a Discourse; for the parts of a Discourse signify something, when they are taken by themselves.

14. For even in double Noun every Noun separately has no Signification, as Theodore. A certain Proof, that the parts or Fragments of Nouns, which are dis-join'd signify nothing is, that even Double Nouns, which are composed of two Nouns, that have both their proper Significations, when they are used alone, yet the two parts signify nothing when they are separated; for Theodorus, Theocritus, Demon-crius, denote certain Men; but if I separate the two Nouns, which compose these Nouns, neither of them will have any Signification, or give any Idea of them. 'Tis by these Compounded Nouns, as 'tis by the Simple, the taking away one Letter entirely destroys them. This is not true in proper Names only, but in Appellatives, and Adjectives also.

15. But the Verb has this Advantage of the Noun, that it determines the time, which the Noun doth not. The Term which Aristotle uses here, is very remarkable, he does not lay ὁ Μνα. It denotes but ἡ ἡ μὲν, it denotes with that is, that beside the primitive Signification, a Verb has something else, which denotes the time; for there are Nouns, which signify
signify time, as a Day, an Hour, Old, New, &c., but in the Neouns the time is the proper Signification of the Word, which 'tis not in the Verbs.

16. A Case is both in Neouns and Verbs.] The Word Case signifies properly a Termination, Cadence, and agrees as well with Nouns, as Verbs; for the Verbs have different Cadences, as well as the Neouns. Aristotle gives the Word a larger Extent, then it has in the Latin, and then we give it in ours; for it comprehends the Number as the Plural, and the Mood, as the Indicative, the Imperative, the Optative, &c. Our Language is unhappy in this, that its Nouns have no Caules, and are Indeclinable.

17. Oration, or a Discourse is a compounded sound, which signifies something, and whose parts, tho' separated, have their Signification.] Oration has this in Common with the Noun and the Verb, that 'tis composed of parts, but that which distinguishes it from the Noun and the Verb is, that the parts of these signify nothing, whereas the parts of Oration do for Nouns and Verbs; which are parts of Discourse, have each their particular Signification.

18. For 'tis not to be imagined, that a Discourse should be always a Composition of Nouns and Verbs, as the Definition of a Man.] Having said, that a Discourse has some parts which have their Signification when separated, he refutes the Error of those, who taught, that all the parts of Discourse had the same Qualification, because a Discourse being composed of Nouns and Verbs, which have their Signification apart, did not loose them by being jointed together; he says, that the whole Discourse is not a compound of Nouns and Verbs, as that which makes the Definition of a Man, A Man is a reasonable Creature. For 'tis certain, that in a Discourse, which is compounded of Nouns and Verbs, all the parts
parts do signify something, but there are others, where there are Nouns without Verbs. When I say, O most surprizing of Miracles! O astonishing, Prodigy! Here is no Verb, and yet some of the parts have their Signification separately, and others not. This in my Opinion is the Sense of the Passage, which is very obscure in the Greek.

19. An Oration is called One after two Manners.] For an Oration is One, when 'tis a simple Enunciation of one thing, as Socrates taught Virtue to Men. And 'tis One, where it gathers together several Orations, or Discourses, as Members, which it unites by proper Connexions. The Orations of Demosthenes, those of Cicero, the Iliad and the Odyssey are all after the same Manner. Aristotle has used the same Division in his Analyticks, and in his Treatise of Interpretation.
CHAP. XXII.

Of Simple and Compounded Nouns of the different sorts of Metaphors, and all other Qualities of Nouns.

I. There are two sorts of Nouns, Simple and Double; the Simple are those, which are composed of parts, which signify nothing, and the Double are formed of one Word, which doth, and another which do not signify anything, or of two Words, which have each their Signification. There are also Triple, and Quadruple Nouns, many (a) of which are to be found in the Dithyrambic Poets.

II. Every Noun is either Proper, or Forreign, or Metaphor, or Ornament, or an Invented Noun, or protracted, or substantiated, or chang'd.

III. (b) A Noun proper is that, which every one makes Use of in the same Place. The Forreign is that, which is used elsewhere, from whence it follows, that the same Noun may be Proper and Forreign (c) by its Relation to different Persons; for the Noun Sigmun is a Proper Word to the Cyprians, but Forreign to us.

(a) Of the Megaliotes, as Hermocaeus Xanthus. (b) I call that. (c) But not to the same People.
IV. A Metaphor, is the (d) Translation of a Noun, from its ordinary Signification, there are four sorts of Metaphors, from the Genus to the Species, from the Species to the Genus, from Species to Species, and that which is founded on the Analogy.

V. I call a Metaphor from the Genus to the Species, such as this Verse of Homer. My Ship flood in the Port at a Distance from the Town. (e) For the Word Stood is a General Term, and is applied to the Species, by saying, 'twas in the Port.

VI. A Metaphor from the Species to the Genus, as in this Place of the same Poet. Certainly Ulysses has done Ten Thousand good Actions; for he puts a Thousand for many.

VII. (f) A Metaphor from Species to Species consists in the Resemblance, as if speaking of a Man, who in hopes of making great Advantage, carried something to his House, which was at last the Cause of a considerable Loss, we might say, 'tis the Carpathian with his Hare.

VIII. To Conclude, an Analogue Metaphor is, when of four Terms the Second has the same Relation to the First, as the Fourth to

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(d) Ilitation of another Noun. (e) For to be in Port, is to stand to be in a Station. (f) From Species to Species drew out his Soul with Brifs, and afterwards cut with fierce Ends, where he uses drew, for cut and cut for drew; for both signify to take away.
the Third; for we may equally say, the Fourth for the Second, and the Second for the Fourth; as also the Third for the First, and the First for the Third.

IX. Sometimes also we add the thing, to which the Resemblance is made, and put it instead of that which is proper. For Example, the Cup is the same to Bacchus, as the Shield is to Mars; we may say then in speaking of a Buckler, that 'tis the Cup of Mars, and in speaking of a Cup, that 'tis the Shield of Bacchus, or thus; the Night is the same to the Day, as old Age is to Life; we may say then in speaking of the Evening, that 'tis the old Age of the Day, and speaking of old Age, that 'tis the Evening, or to use Empedocles's Expression; 'tis the setting of Life.

X. It falls out sometimes, that we meet with those things which have no Analogical Term; however, 'tis used in the same manner. For Example, the Word to sow signifies the Action of an Husband Man, who casts the Seed into the Bosome of the Earth; (g) and because there wanted a proper Term to express the Action of the Sun, when he diffuses his Beams over all, yet the thing, which he would express, having the same Resemblance to the Light, as Sowing has to the Grain, a certain Poet said in speaking of the Sun, sowing the Light Divine.

(g) As Light from the Sun, which wants a proper Term.
XI. There is yet another Manner of using this Metaphor, when (b) after the Metaphorical Noun we add an Epithete, which destroys some Quality, that is proper to it. For Example, as after having called a Shield a Cup, we should say without Wine, instead of Mars.

XII. The invented Noun is that, which the Poet himself creates; as if instead of saying ἱέρα, Horns, he should say ἑπιότας Branches, and instead of ἱερεύς, a Priest, he says ἱερεύς, that is a Man, who makes Prayers.

XIII. (i) The protracted Nouns are those, when a long Vowel is put instead of a short one, as πόλις for πόλις, or when a Syllable is added, as τελειότας for τελεία. And the Subtracted Nouns are those, from which a Syllable is taken away, as νῆ, for (k) νεῖμων, δῶ, for δῶμα, δίς, for ἐὖ.

XIV. The changed Noun is, when one half remains, as it was before, and the other half is new made, as when Homer made the Word (l) νεῖζεν νεῖζετερος.

(b) He calls something that is foreign, and denies that which is proper. (i) The protracted and subtrated. (k) Κεῖεν, and of both if ὡς for ὡς, a Countenance. (l) Νεῖτερος κατὰ μᾶζαν for δεῖζον.

XV.
XV. There is yet another Difference between Nouns; Some are Male, some Female, and by some Middle, that is to say Neuter. The Male are those, which end in ", , , and by one of the double Letters, which are compounded of two Mutes, as Ɇ, and Ʌ. The Feminine end always by the two long Vowels, Ɇ, and Ʌ, and ɇ, long, so that the Number of Terminations of the Nouns Male and Female is equal; for Ɇ, and Ʌ, ought to be reckoned among the Terminations in ɇ. There is no Noun, which ends in a Mute, or a short Vowel. There are only three which terminate in Ɋ, MeɊi, Commi, Piperi, and five in ɋ, Poul, Napu, Comu, Doru, Aftu. The Neuters end with these two latter Vowels, Ɇ and ɇ, and with ɋ, ɇ, and Ʌ.

REMARKS on the XXII. Chapter.

1. THERE are two sorts of Nouns, the Simple and the Double. The Simple are those, which are composed of parts, which signify nothing, and the Double are formed of one Word which doth, and another which doth not signify any thing, or of two Words, which have each their Signification. The Difference, which Aristotle puts here between Single and Double Noun is, that the Fragments of the first signify nothing; of the others, one part does signify, and the other does not; and there are those also, of which both the parts signify. But is not this contrary to what he said.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

That even in the Double Nouns, every Noun being separated signified nothing, as Theodorus. This is no Contradiction. Aristotle speaks in that Place, of Nouns, which after they have been join'd are diminished again, for then every part signifies nothing, and gives no Idea; but here he speaks of the Signification, which those Words have before they enter into the Composition. The Difference then, which is between Double and Simple Nouns is, that the parts of the first signify nothing on any Account, as he elsewhere explains it; but these other signify ἄνευ ἄκοινεσιν, that is to say, both before they are separated, or either into the Composition of the Noun.

2. Of one Word which doth, and another which doth not signify any thing.] That which signifies nothing is only an Extension, or Termination of the first.

3. There are also Triple, and Quadruple Nouns.] The Greeks were very licentious in this sort of Composition, and especially the Dithyrambick Poets. The Latins did not give themselves near so much Liberty; and therefore Quintilian says, that 'twas not permitted to use Triple Nouns in the Latin Tongue: Nam ex tribus nostra atique Linguae non conceperim. And for that Reason he condemns this Verse of Pausanias.

Nerei.
Reparantīrostrum, incurvi Cervicum pœcus.

We are more modest, and reserved in our Language, than the Latins were in theirs.

4. Many of which are to be found in the Dithyrambick Poets.] There is one Word in the Text corrupted, οἷς τὰ πολλὰ τῶν μεγαλαυτῶν. I correct it, τῶν μεγαλεῖσθαι. Among those who say great things,
5. Every Noun is either Proper, or Foreign.] Aristotle takes Notice here of the eight Qualities of Nouns, which he explains in what follows, the Latins had not such a plenty of them, as the Greeks, nor we as they had.

6. A Noun Proper is that, which every one makes use of in the same Place.] A Noun Proper is that, which any People make use of in their Language to signify the same thing: Tis that which renders a Discourse terse, and intelligible; but as it makes it somewhat mean and low, they found out the way of exalting it by foreign Words, and those other Terms, which Aristotle here explains.

7. The Foreign is that, which is used elsewhere.] Foreign Nouns are these, which are borrowed from other Languages. These Words extremely elevate the Diction, and make it Majestick, of which Aristotle gives this Reason in his Books of Rhetorick. As we feel a certain sort of Pleasure at the Sight of Strangers, which we do not at that of our own Country-Men, whom we see every day, so 'tis in the Diction. Therefore 'tis very proper to disguise the manner of speaking, and to cloath it, as I may say, like a Stranger; for that which comes from Strangers appears admirable, and that which is admirable, pleases and delights us. But as we can't now distinguish in the Works of the Ancients the Foreign Nouns from those, which are proper, we loose one of the greatest Pleasures, the Reading of them could give, and consequently cannot know all their Beauties. The Latins had fewer strange Words, than the Greeks; and we have almost none in our Language; and that
that is the Reason, why our Poesy is so flat, and falls so much below that of the Greeks. Homer used the most Rude and Gros words of the Beotians, with a wonderful Grace, and Dionysius Halicarnassensis well observed, that it gives a very great Majesty to his Poem.

8. From whence it follows, that the same Noun may be Properiand Foreign, by its Relation to different Persons.] 'Tis impossible, that this should be otherwise; that Word which is foreign to him, that borrows it, must necessarily be proper to him, from whom 'tis borrowed.

9. For the Noun Signunon, is a proper Word to the Cyprians, but foreign to us.] The Word Signunon, signifies a Dart made all of Iron, Aristotle says, that 'tis Cyprian, and is followed in it, by the Scholiast of Appollonius; Suidas calls it Macedonian, & Enstathius Beotian.

10. A Metaphor in the Translation of a Noun from its ordinary Signification.] Some of the Ancients blame Aristotle, that he has put the two first under the Metaphorical Noun, when they are properly Synecdoches; but Aristotle speaks in general, and wrote in a time, when the Figures were not so refined, as to be nicely distinguished, and have Names given to them, by which their Nature was best explained. Cicero sufficiently justifies Aristotle, when he writes in his Book of an Orator, Itaque Graeci genus hoc appellant Allegoricum, nomine recte, genere melius ille (Aristoteles) qui tpra omnia Translationes vocat.

11. I call a Metaphor from the Genus to the Species, such as this Verse of Homer.]
Nihis & μιὰ ἡρ ἐπικαὶ ἕπρ ἀχρεῖα πάλινα.

My Ship stood in the Fields, far from the Town."

Where he uses the Word Stand, which is a generic Term, and comprehends all the ways of being free from Motion; to be at Anchor; in Port: 'Tis the same to say, the Iron for a Sword, Mortals for Men, a Star for the Sun, &c.

12. A Metaphor from the Species to the Genus, as in this Place of the same Poet: Certainly Ulysses has done a thousand good Actions.] 'Tis a Verfe of the second Book of the Ilias, when the Greeks praise Ulysses, for beating the insolent Thersites, ἱπποὺ μελ ὀμυσασαι εὔθειες ἔργα. Where he puts θανάτος, Ten Thousand, which is the Species for πολλά, many, which is the Genus. Thus Virgil says, Acheoîa pocula, instead of saying Water.

13. The Metaphor from Species to Species consists in the Resemblance.] This is the first true Species of a Metaphor; for those we have already spoke of, are properly Synecdoches, as has been said. The most usual Metaphor then is, that from Species to Species, and it doth properly consist in the Likeness with the thing, from whence, is borrowed hath with that, to which 'tis applied. When Plato calls the Head a Cittadel; the Tongue the Judge of Tasts; the Pores narrow Streets; the Lungs the Ear of the Heart, &c. they are to many Metaphors, which consist in the Resemblance of one Species to another.

14. As in speaking of a Man, who in Hopes, &c.] Aristotle gives here an Example, taken from one of
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Homer's Verses, but as it can't be translated into our Language, I shall instead of it quote such a Passage of his Rhetorick, where he puts as a Metaphor from Species to Species, that of the Carpathian with his Hare, to denote a Man, who hath suffered much by that, from which he thought to reap great Profit; for the Carpathian being great Admirers of Hares, had Reason to repent of it; for those Hares ruined the Island.

15. To conclude, An Analogical Metaphor is, when of four Terms the Second has the same Relation to the First, as the Fourth to the Third.] After he has explained the Metaphor, which consists in the Resemblance, he goes on to that, which consists in the Analogy and Proportion: not that it doth not also consist in the Likeness; for the Likeness is double, and that there is not without it a true Metaphor; but 'tis, because besides the Resemblance, there is an entire Proportion, or Relation. Aristotle understands it thus. I lay down four Terms, Life, Old Age, Day, Evening. We see, that the same Relation, which is between the First and the Second, is also between the Third and the Fourth. Thus I may as well say, Evening, instead of Old Age, the fourth Term for the Second; as Old Age for Evening, the second for the Fourth. I can use also Day for Life, the third for the First, and Life for Day, the First for the Third. 'Tis the same in the other Example, Mars, a Shield, Bacchus, a Cup, I may use the Third for the First, Bacchus for Mars, and the First for the third, Mars for Bacchus; The Second for the Fourth, as Shield for Cup, and the Fourth for the Second, Cup for Shield. Aristotle Discourses at large of this Metaphor in his third Book of Rhetorick, where he says, that of the four sorts of Metaphors,
we should always endeavour to choose the Analogical one, because 'tis the finest, and most esteemed; and that every Metaphor which is grounded on Analogy, must necessarily have these two Conditions: First, That it may be inverted, and that the Terms when transposed, equally answer one to another. Secondly, That 'tis grounded on things of the same Nature and Kind. For Example, If 'tis proper to say of Old Age, That 'tis the Winter of the Life. 'Tis also proper to say of Winter, That 'tis the Old Age of the Year. So if it may be said of Bacchus, That the Cup is his Buckler. We may say of Mars, that, Tho' Buckler is his Cup.

16. Sometimes also we add the thing to which the Resemblance is made, and put it instead of that which is proper. Hence Timonius gave himself a needless trouble to correct this Passage, which is so clear, that it had no occasion for it; but supposing it were faulty, his Correction is intolerable. Aristotle means only, that oftentimes the thing to which the Resemblance is made is added, and put instead of that, from which the Resemblance is taken. For Example, Instead of saying simply, A Cup is a Shield; I say, 'Tis the Shield of Bacchus. So instead of Mars, to whom the Shield is proper, I put the Name of Bacchus, to whom I make the Resemblance: And in speaking of a Shield, I am not satisfy'd to say, That 'tis a Cup; but that, 'Tis the Cup of Mars; putting Mars for Bacchus. To use another Example, I say, Heaven, Stars, Meadow, Flowers: The Flowers are the same to the Meadow, as the Stars to Heaven. I say then, in speaking of the Stars, That they are the Flowers of Heaven. And in speaking of Flowers, That they are the Stars of the Meadow. And thus in all others.

17. We say then, in speaking of a Buckler, That 'tis the Cup of Mars.] Aristotle had without doubt, a Passage of Timotheus in View, and another of Antiphanes, both which call a Buckler the Cup of Mars; but I don't remember to have read any where, that a Cup was
370 Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

was called, 'The Buckler of Bacchus.' It is probable, that Athenaeus took from this place the hint of calling Nestor's Cup, his Shield.

18. It falls out sometimes, that we meet with those things which have no Analogical Term, however 'tis used in the same manner.] As he has shew'd the Analogical Metaphors to be perfect, ought to bear an Inversion; and that the two Subjects from whence they are taken, have each of them a reciprocal Term, which may be transpos'd from one Subject to another; so now he tells us, That Subjects are often found, which having no proper Term borrow it from another, without being able reciprocally to return it. For Example, When an Husbandman casts the Seed on the Ground, there is a proper Term to denote the Action, which is to Sow; but when the Sun casts his Beams, there is no proper Term which expresses that Action: Wherefore in speaking of the Sun, we are obliged to borrow the Term of the Husbandman; but in speaking of an Husbandman, we can borrow no Term from the Sun, because it has none which is proper to him, the Analogy is then imperfect, because the same Term serves two Subjects; but however 'tis used, an Ancient said of the Sun, Sowing the Light Divine. Virgil says the same in speaking of Aurora.

Et jam prima novo spargebat lumine terras;

And,

Postea: vix summos spargebat lumine montes,
Orta dies.

And Lucretius says of the Sun,

Et lumine conserit arua.

19. There is another Manner of using this Metaphor, when after the Metaphorical Noun, we add an Epithet, which destroys some Quality that is proper to it.] Ari-
Aristotle has taught in what manner an Analogical Metaphor is used, and says that the Name of the Subject to which the Resemblance is made, is often added, instead of that from which it is taken; as when a Buckler is called, The Cup of Mars. He tells us here, That there is another way of using this Figure, when in lieu of using the Name of the Subject, we add a Negative Epithet only; that's to say, which denies the Quality, that is most proper to the Metaphorical Term which is used. Thus, if instead of calling a Buckler, The Cup of Mars, we should call it; a Cup without Wine, φιλοτυπία ďοκημον; and in lieu of calling a Cup, The Buckler of Mars, it should be called, δισφάδα διϊφυτμ, A Buckler which is not made for Combats. Aristotle designs this Metaphor; when he says in his Rhetorick, Τίῳν φερομεν ἄγνωτι διερμήθη. A Bow is an Harp without Strings. And when he calls a Consort of Voices only, μέλος ἄχριςφυων ἀχρίςφων, A Consort without Lute and Instruments; and the Sound of the Trumpet, μέλος ἀχρίςφων, An Harmony which is without a Lute. This Figure is common, especially in the Greek Poets, who have used it very happily. Victorius quotes several Examples: Euripides uses it twice in the same place, when he makes Iphigenia say, Τίς ὃι ἐν κάμοις μελοτύμῳ βαδὶ ἀλεξίκς ἐλέγοις, for he calls those Complaints and Regrets, Elegies without a Lyre; and the Groans, Songs without Musick. The same Poet in the Chorus of the Phenician Women, calls an Army, χόμων ἀναλυτητρ, A Feast without Flutes. Aristotle says very well in his Rhetorick, that tho' these Negative Terms express nothing of themselves, because they signify nothing that is positive, that they are very much esteemed in those Metaphors which are founded on Analogy. Our Language sometimes can use these Metaphors accompanied with the Negative Epithetse; but not so often as the Greek.

20. **An Invented Name is that which the Poet himself creates, &c.** After the Metaphor, that which Aristotle calls Ornament, κοσμον, should follow; how comes he then to forget it? Is it because the Ornament...
springs from the Metaphors; so that having explained their different Species, he thought there was no need to explain what an Ornament was. 'Tis not the usage of our Philosopher to advance any thing without explaining it. If he had had a design to mix the Ornament with the Metaphors, he would not have made a separate part of it. I rather think, with Madius and Victorius, that the Text is defective, and that by the Negligence of some Copyist, what Aristotle said of Ornament is lost, either where he had explained it, or refer'd to the place where he would do it; for 'tis possible that he might have refer'd the treating of the Ornament to the Second or Third Book of his Art of Poetry; it appearing by a Passage in Simplicius, that he spoke of Synonyma's in those Books. However it be, what he means by the word Ornament, is the Epithete which he calls ωτεαων, in the Third Book of his Rhetorick; that is to say, proper. The reason of this difference of Names, is, that the Orators use few Epithets for Ornament. They employ them only to express the things they speak of the better, whereas the Poets use them at every turn to grace and adorn their Discourses: For as Quintilian says after Aristotle, an Epithet is a very great Ornament. Wherefore the Poets say, White Milk, Moist Water, Shameful Poverty, Melancholy Old Age, &c. But tho' these Epithets are properly made for Poetic, and a Discourse which has none, appears naked and disagreeable, the use of them is limited by Rules and Bounds. If a Poem is too full of Epithets 'tis flat; if they are ill chosen, and not well adapted, 'tis ridiculous and displeasing, and the Poet is guilty of the Fault, which Aristotle accuses Cleophon of, who would thus adorn the least Discourses, and express himself so Ridiculously, that he said, Venerable Eggs. But to come to the Invented Names.

21. An Invented Name, is that which the Poet himself creates, &c.] Aristotle speaks here of simple words only, and not of compounded ones, because properly speaking, the simple ones alone can be Invented, the other
other being formed of those which are already known, and in use. The Ancients observed, that Homer Invented several; Aristotle gives us two, the last is in the First Book of the 'Hinds,' but I don't know where the first, ἐγκντας or ἐγκντας, Branches for Horns is found, for I don't think 'tis in any of Homer's Works which now remain. 'Tis probable that on this Virgil says, Ramofo Cornua.

Et Ramofo Mycon vivacis Cornua Cervi,

And elsewhere.

Cornibus arborcis.

21. The protracted Nouns are those where a long Vowel is put for a short one.] What Aristotle says of protracted, subtracted, and Invented Nouns, is proper to the Greek only, which diversity made it so copious, florid, and proper to fill up all the Characters of Poets, and Eloquence, that it can express every thing very happily. The Latin endeavoured to imitate this copiousness, by their Apocopes, Syncopes, &c. but 'twould not succeed; for what is very agreeable to one Language, is not so to another. The different Dialects which were properly the usages of the different Countries of Greece, gave them the liberty of using all those ways of speaking, and which were not allowed to the Poets only, but to the Orators, Historians, and Philosophers; and this liberty of changing Letters, and new casting, as I may say, the words, which however altered they were, were still known by the common usage, is one of the chief Causes of that admirable Variety, wonderful Harmony, and inimitable Energy, which are found in the Greek Writers. They were not satisfied to Protract, Subtract, and Invent Nouns, but they used the same Changes in the Parts of Periods; nay, even in the Periods themselves. If we consult Dionysius Halicarnassius, we shall find what Graces and Beauties they knew, to give to their Pieces. There's an infinite Distance between the Copious.
ousness and Sweetness of that Language, and the Penury and Stiffness of ours. This in respect to the other, may be compared to a Tyrant, who commands his Architects and Workmen to build him a fine House, and gives them only a small quantity of Stones as they came out of the Quarry and Timber without being hewn, with a strict Command to use them as they are without any Alteration. Just such is their Condition who write in English, if it happily falls out that the Materials are of a proper Figure to be adjusted together, 'tis very well; but if there be any knotty, unequal, rough, as often happens, they have no liberty to correct, and make them smooth. This is also the Reason, why we have nothing that is perfect and finish'd, that can come into Comparison with the fine Works of Ancient Greece, which always excel ours, especially in this respect; that is, the Composition and the ranging the Words.

23. The Substrafted Nouns, are those from which a Syllable is taken away.] The Latins have the same, fam, sos, sis, for suam, suos, suis. Ennius said gau, for gaudium, Cȧl. for Calum. Do for Domum; but that was not followed: They now say only mi for mibi, caldum for calidum, dixii for dixisti, surpuerat for surripuerat, deceffe for decessisse, and such like.

24. There is yet another Difference between Nouns, some are Masculine, some Feminine, and some Neuter.] I have chose to follow the Sense rather than the Letter, in Translating this place, and what Aristotle meant than what he said, for the Words have been altered, and spoiled by the Copyists: And thus we see what he wrote. 'Tis certain that there is no Greek Nouns that ends with any of the Nine Mutes, or by ε, λ, ν, any more than by the two short Vowels e and o. There remain then only ten Letters; and of these ten the three long, o, r, σ, are for Feminines; i, u, are for Neuters; and the five others, υ, ε, ρ, o, η, and α short, terminate indifferently, the Masculines, Feminines and Neuters.

25. There
There are but three which end in \( \iota \), \( \pi \), \( \tau \). There are also \( \beta \beta \beta \), \( \sigma \sigma \) \( \sigma \sigma \), \( \chi \chi \chi \), and all the Neuters of the Adjectives in \( \iota \), as \( \Phi \Phi \Phi \), \( \E \E \E \). But Aristotle spoke of the three first as Foreign Words; the other three are subtracted Words for \( \E \varepsilon \), \( \T \T \T \), \( \C \C \C \). He speaks here of Nouns Substantives and Primitives only.

Besides the five there are \( \d \d \) and \( \m \m \), and all the Neuters of Adjectives in \( \varepsilon \); \( \E \E \), \( \z \z \), \( \b \b \).
CHAP. XIII.

What 'tis that renders the Expressions clear and noble, of Barbarisms and Enigms. What 'tis that properly makes an Enigm. The Frivolous Criticism of the Ancient Euclid on Homer. The greatest Ornaments of Speech are Vicious, if they are used too often. The Advantage of figured Words, beyond those which are proper. A Verse of Æschylus, made Noble by Addition of a Word in Euripides. The ridiculous Criticism of Arhiphrades on the Tragick Poets. The Division of all the Ornaments of Discourse, and to what Works each of them does particularly belong.

1. The Virtue of an Expression, consists in its (a) Purity, and Nobleness. That which is composed of simple Words, is very clear; but 'tis also low, as is seen in Cleophon's and Sthenelus's Poetry. The Noble Expression, and which differs from the common ways of speaking, is that which employs borrowed Words. I call those Borrowed Words, Words of Foreign Tongues, Metaphors, protracted Words; and to conclude, all that is not a proper Word.

2. But if these sorts of Terms were employed (b) throughout, we should make either Enigms,

(a) Clarity, not being low.
(b) Together.
or Barbarisms. The Metaphors, if too much used, would degenerate into a Riddle, and the Foreign Words taken from strange Languages, would produce obscure Barbarisms. For a Riddle properly consists, in saying things, (c) in such a manner, that it makes them appear impossible; this cannot be done by a simple Composition of Words, for only Metaphors have the Power to make an Enigm, as is seen in this celebrated Riddle. I saw a Man who glued Tin to a Man with Fire, and such like. The Barbarism (d) can be produced only by the use of strange Words, and therefore they ought to be used with a great deal of Judgment and Caution.

3. To make an Expression therefore that shall be neither common, nor mean, we must have recourse to Foreign Words, Metaphors, and Ornaments: And all those other sorts which I have mentioned, and to make proper Words to render it clear and pure. But there is a certain way to render it at the same time clear and noble; that is, to make use of protracted, substracted, or changed Words; for that which is extraordinary in them, makes them to appear different from the proper Words, produces the loftiness, and what they retain of the common usage gives the Purity.

4. 'Tis for this reason, that those who condemn this sort of Expression and blame (e) Homer, for writing it, do it without any reason; as the Ancient Euclid, who maintains that there is nothing easier than to (f) be a Poet, if we have

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(c) Which are, and joyning those which cannot be. (d) From Tongues. (e) The Poet. (f) Make a Poem.
liberty to protract Words according to our Fancies, and laughs at the Poet for following the
same Method in his Verse, (g.)

5. 'Tis not the thing it self which makes the Affection, 'tis the continual using, these Man-
ners of Speech. For there is a measure common
to all these different Species, and which should ne-
ever be transgressed. This is so true, that if we
should use after the same manner Metaphors, For-
ign Words, and all those other Figures which
I have explained, either with Care, or with a de-
sign to make them appear Ridiculous, we should
succeed in both with the same ease.

6. To be convinced of (b) the Beauty which
the figur'd Speeches give to the Diction, provi-
ded they be agreeable, well placed, and in just
Proportion, we need only take the Verses of an
Epick Poem, or Tragedy, and change the
Terms. If instead of Metaphors, Foreign Words,
and the other Figures, we should substitute pro-
per Words, we would find that we had advan-
ced nothing but the Truth.

7. Æschylus and Euripides hath both made the
same Iambick Verse; but because the latter put a
(i) Metaphorical Word in the Place of one which
was common and usual, he made the Verse very
lofty, whereas (k) that of Æschylus was low and
mean. Æschylus made his Philoctetes say, This
Ulcer which Eats my Flesh. Euripides in-

(g) See the Notes on this place.
(b) What agrees with them, and how they excel in Verses. We, &c.
(i) Foreign. (k) The other.
stead of the Word Cats, which is common, makes a Metaphorical Term, and by that heightens his Expression.

8. (l) We should destroy the Beauty of most part of Homer's Verses, if in the place of those Choice and Noble Terms, he used, we should put proper Words. For Example: When Homer says (to represent the terrible Noise, which the enraged Sea makes:) The Rivers Roar'd, we should put, The Rivers Cried, we should spoil it.

9. There was also one Ariphrades, who laugh'd at the Tragick Poets for using such Expressions as no one durst do in ordinary Discourse. (m) For Example: When they reverse of the Prepositions, and put them after the Nouns, and such like. But 'tis for this very reason, because these ways of speaking, are neither proper, nor in common use, that they elevate the Style of the Poets, and distinguish it from the simplicity of the ordinary and familiar Language, and this that Critick was (n) Ignorant of.

'Tis fine, tho' difficult, to make use of all those Figures which we have explained agreeably, and to the purpose, as the double and Foreign Words: But 'tis much finer and difficult, to use the Metaphor happily. And truly that's the on-

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(l) If we (hould put Common for Metaphorical Words, as the Rivers, &c.
(m) As Houses from, instead of from the Houses. Achilles of, for of Achilles, &c. (n) Shamefully.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

By thing which cannot be borrowed elsewhere, and shows a naturally happy (o) and brightly Genius. For to (p) make this Translation of one thing to another as it ought to be, is to see at once, what is alike in very different Subjects.

11. The double Words agree particularly to Dithyrambicks. The Foreign Words to Heroick, and the Metaphors to Iambick Verses. But the double, and Foreign Words; the Metaphors, and all the other sorts of which we have spoken, may be of use in Heroick Verse; whereas the Iambick, which imitates only the Familiar Style, can employ no Terms but such as are used in Conversation; that is, proper Words, the Metaphor, and the Ornament.

12. What we have said, is sufficient for Tragedy, and the Imitation, which doth consist in Action.

(o) Good. (p) To know to transfer in like Intuition.

REMARKS
REMARKS on Chap. XIII.

1. The Virtue of an Expression consists in its Purity and Loftiness; That which is Composed of Simple Words is very clear, but is also low.] That which most contributes to render a Discourse clear and intelligible, are the proper Words, because they are known by every Body: But they make it common and low by the same Reason: For whatever is common, is generally mean and desplicable; wherefore to take away that Baseness, we must have recourse to the Terms which Aristotle has explained, and which render the Diction Noble and Majestic.

2. As is seen in Cleophon's and Sthenelus's Poetry, They were two Tragick Poets: I don't know when the first was, the other lived in the time of Lyceus and Pericles, about the ninetieth Olympiad. The Style of these two Poets was low, because they used only common Terms. Aristotle in the Third Book of his Rhetorick charges Cleophon with another Fault, for he accuses him of using the Ornaments so uncouthly, when he endeavoured to add them to his Diction, that he was Ridiculous, and his Style perfectly Comical; for that is generally the Effect of Ornaments when they are misunderstood.

3. But if these sorts of Terms were employed throughout, we should make either Enigms, or Barbarisms. The Metaphors too much used, would degenerate into a Riddle.] As he has taken notice of the Fault they are guilty of, who use only proper Nouns; he shews them also, into which they would fall, who should employ the other Terms only, and this Error is greater than the first. For a Riddle and Obscurity in Diction, are the greatest of all its Vices. This is the Fault of Lycephon among the Greeks, and Persius among the Latins.

4. And
4. And the Foreign Words taken from strange Languages, would produce obscure Barbarisms. For this Barbarism consists properly, in the use of Foreign Words, as when Catullus said Plovinon, which is a Gallick Word; and Labienus used Castrer, which is Thucdean, and Virgil, Gaza and Mapalia, the first of which is Persian, and the other Carthaginian. These Foreign Words, give a Loziness and Majesty to the Discourse, when they are used with Moderation and Discretion, but make it Barbarous, when they are used too often; the Barbarism then consists in the too frequent use of these Foreign Words.

5. For a Riddle properly consists, in saying things, in such a manner, that it makes them appear impossible, this cannot be done, by a simple Composition of Words, for only Metaphors, have the Power to make an Enigm. This Passage is remarkable, because it teaches us two things, which are necessary for an Enigm. The one is a Metaphor, and the other that it appears impossible; for if we propose a thing that seems impossible; without the Metaphor, or use the Metaphor without making the thing appear impossible, 'twill not be properly a Riddle. There is a third Condition, no less necessary to a Riddle than the two others; and that is; that the Subject of it be natural and known to every Body. For this Reason that Riddle of Sampson's in the fourteenth Chapter of Judges, Out of the Eater came forth Meat, and out of the Strong came forth Sweetness, appears not to be a true one, because it wants the two last Conditions. That in the Third Eclogue of Virgil.

Dic quibus in Terris, & eris mihi Magnus Apollo,
Tres pateat Caeli spatium non amplius ulnas.

Is no true Enigm, because all the Terms are Simple, and there is no Metaphor; for he speaks of Cælius's Tomb. However that which is obscure, is called
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

led a Riddle, after what manner soever it be expressed.

6. As is seen in this Celebrated Riddle, I saw a Man who glued Tin, to another Man with Fire. Aristotle cites this Enigma again in the Third Book of his Rhetoric; Demetrius quotes it after him in his Treatise of Elocution; but they have taken only the first Verse: Athenaeus gives us the Diftich entire.

Αουτος ειδον πυει κολοαν οτ' ανειε κοιλισανθα, Ουτω συκκολλως οιε συμαλωα ποιην.

I saw a Man who glued Tin to another with Fire, so that the Blood ran, into the Tin as into the Man. He speaks here of the Applications of (what we call) Cupping-glasses, which were not made of Glass in those Days, but of Tin: 'Tis plain that this Riddle has all the necessary Conditions: The Subject is known, the Proposition appears impossible, and the Expression is Metaphorical; that is to say, Tin for a Cupping-glass, that's the Genus for the Species; to Glew, is also a Metaphor, for there being no proper Term for the Manner of applying Cupping-glasses, and to glew being a means of making one thing stick to another, he who made the Riddle, used that Word the better to express the Application of the Cupping-glasses; and nothing can be more exact than that Relation.

7. But there is a certain way to render it, at the same time clear and noble; that is, to make use of the proper, substituted, substracted, and changed Words.] For we find in all those Words, the proper, which make the clearness; and the Foreign, or Extraordinary, which make the lofiness; but I have already said, these Beauties are found only in the Greek, the Latins have little advantage of us in that respect, so that they were reduced, as well as we, to look for that lofiness of Style, in the choice of the Words, in the good and proper use of
of Similitudes, Comparisons, Metaphors, and all the Figures.

8. 'Tis for this reason, that those who condemn this sort of Expression; and blame Homer for using it, do it without any reason, as the Ancient Euclid.] 'Tis not only now, that Homer has found unjust Censurers, he had them also in the most refined Ages, but they both then and now had only Confusion and Shame, for all the painful Labour they underwent. There was an Ancient Euclid, not him, who was Contemporary with Plato and Aristotle; whose admirable Propositions we now have, whom Aristotle particularly distinguishes, least we should be mistaken, and that any one should be so Injurious to his Friend, as to believe that he would write against the greatest Poet. This Euclid, in order to make Homer's Works ridiculous, had composed a Poem in Heroick Verse, in which he used at almost ev'ry Word, those Figures which Homer uses, in due measure, and very much to the purpose. Aristotle refutes this Writer solidly, by shewing, that he wrote either thro' Ignorance or Malice.

9. Either following the same Method in his Verses.] Aristotle quotes two Verses of this Euclid's, I have not translated them because they are corrupted, and tell us nothing which is new. Heinsius has endeavoured to correct them; but his Efforts have been fatal to the Passage of Aristotle it self, of which he has spoiled the Sense, and made it unintelligible. As for me, I believe that those Verses ought to be writ thus.

"Ηὴ κἀων εἶδον Μακεδοναδα βασιθρωλα.

And,

"Ουκ ἀν γενομενὸ ἐκεῖν ἐλλειπεῖτε.

In the first Euclid ridicul'd the protracting of Words by μακεδονάδα, and the changing of short Syllables into long, by βασιθρωλα, for βα is short; and in the second
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

cond he laughs at that liberty by these two short Syllables ν&; ε, of which he makes a Spondee, and by ἐλεβερεῖο for ἐλεβερεῦ.

10. 'Tis not the thing itself, which makes the Affection, 'tis the continual use of these Manners of Speech.] This is a Refutation of Euclid; for Aristotle tells him, That Homer us'd these Manners of speaking, which he blames, in a just proportion, and much to the purpose, but you place them without any measure, and when there is no occasion for them. 'Tis you therefore, and not Homer who are ridiculous; for those protracted, substracted, and changed Nouns, are not blameable but according to the Vicious Affection you employ them with, and this is what he proceeds to prove.

11. For there is a measure common to all these different Species, and which should never be transgress'd.] There is nothing but ought to have its just measure, and if this be necessary in every thing, 'tis much more so in those which serve only for Ornament. Every Word which is not proper, is of this Nature: That's to say, 'tis only used to embellish, and elevate a Discourse; and consequently, as Aristotle here says, there is a measure for these Ornaments, which is common to them all; and that is, not to employ them but to the purpose, when the Subject requires it; and they add some Beauty, for there is nothing more requisite, than this good Management. There are a thousand Opportunities, where these Ornaments may be used Ridiculously and Impertinently; but they make a Poem Flat and Insipid when they are used too often; and when they are not necessary, they are not relishing, and proper as it were to excite the Appetite, 'tis a Dilk which cloys, and gives an horrible Disgust.

12. This is so true, that if we should use after the same manner, Metaphors, Foreign Words, &c.] To shew Euclid, that the Ridicule did not consist in the Figures themselves, but the too frequent use of them: He lays, that the finest things, and those the World admires
most, may be made as ridiculous, if they be used with that Design.

13. To be convinced of the Beauty which the figured Speeches give to the Diction, provided they be agreeable, well placed, and in just proportion, we need only take an Epick Poem or Tragedy, and change the Terms.] After he has refuted Euclid, he confirms his Opinion by an Experiment, and says very well, that if we take the Sublimest Verses of an Epick Poem, or a Tragedy, and put proper Words instead of the figured ones, it will lose all its Elevation and Nobleness of Style.

14. Æschylus made his Philoctetes say, This Ulcer which Eats my flesh.] In Æschylus's Verse,

\[\varphi \alpha \gamma \iota \rho \alpha \varsigma \alpha \nu \iota \varsigma \sigma \alpha \rho \kappa \xi \iota \varepsilon \pi \\
\text{The Word } \varepsilon \alpha \iota \nu \text{ to Eat, is a proper Word, and consequently more common and mean, wherefore Euripides changed it, and put into its place } \sigma \epsilon \iota \nu \rho \alpha \nu \alpha \nu \iota \varsigma \text{, which is a Metaphorical Word, and signifies, to feast, to devour, to feed: When Virgil speaks of the Serpents which devoured Laocoon's Sons, he says,} \]

--- Miseros mois[ ] depascitur arm.

And renders the Expression much more noble by the compounded Word.

15. We should destroy the Beauty of most part of Homer's Verses, if in the place of those choice and noble Terms he has used, we should put proper Words.] Aristotle quotes two of Homer's Verses, which I have not Translated, because our Language has not figured Words to express them: But Homer is full of other Examples, which may be put in the place of those I have suppressed: We need only open his Book to find them.

16. There
16. There was also one Arisphrades, who laughed at the Tragick Poets. As Euclid had found fault with Homer's Composition, there was one Arisphrades, who condemned the Tragick Poets, by reason of the liberty which they took, of putting the Propositions, after Nouns, and say \( \text{Domem} \), Dom o ex, the House out of instead of \( \text{Domem} \), out of the House. Aristotle shews that this Critick blamed them thro' his own Ignorance, by not perceiving that these uncommon ways of speaking, ennobled their Style, and took away all that was common or familiar in it. 'Tis sufficient that it be according to the Genius of the Language; 'tis they will be Ridiculous who despise it.

17. 'Tis fine, tho' difficult, to make use of all those Figures which we have explained, agreeably, and to the Purpose, as the double and Foreign Words, but 'tis much more difficult to use the Metaphor happily. 'Tis no easy matter to invent these Words nicely, and to use properly these Foreign ones, Epithets, protracted, subtracted, and changed Words; however a moderate Genius may attain to it; but to invent the Metaphors happily, is the greatest effort of the Ingenuity, and to do it, there is required a very happy and fruitful Invention. Aristotle gives us the reason of this.

18. And truly that's the only thing which cannot be borrowed elsewhere, and which shows a naturally happy and sprightly Genius. For to make this Translation of one thing to another, as it ought to be, is to see all at once, what is alike in very different Subjects. The Foreign Words are borrowed from other People. The Language furnishes the double Words; those which are lengthned, shortned and changed, as also that Epithets they are drawn from the different Dialects, new Words, made according to fancy, which should be always conducted by Imitation. 'Tis not the same with Metaphors, for they in order to be agreeable, should be new, and taken from those things which are neither too common, nor too rare; 'tis for this reason Aristotle says,
Aristotle’s *Art of Poetry.*

says, That it is the only thing which cannot be borrowed elsewhere; and consequently there must be more Ingenuity to invent these Metaphors, than to make a very proper use of all the other Ornaments. Thus we see, that those who have had the quickest Wit and Imagination, have excelled in those ways of speaking, and the more, as their Language has been filled with Metaphors. And truly since a Metaphor consists in the Resemblance, and in the Proportion, they only who have an Ingenious Invention, and sprightly Imagination, can see all at once the likeness of very different Subjects. Thus we see that a Metaphor carries the marks of its Original; for it appears only to enlighten, and always communicates to the Mind some new Knowledge, which the other Ornaments are incapable of doing. For Example, when any one tells me that Compassion is an Altar, by that I understand that Compassion is in the Heart, that which an Altar is in the Temple, that is to say an Azylum, and refuge for the Unhappy. Aristotle proves in the Third Book of his Topicks, that whatsoever we cannot acquire but by itself, is preferable to that, which we can acquire by the assistance of another, by which he shews the excellence of Justice, beyond force. This Rule which is excellent in Morality, may serve admirably well to shew the Advantage a Metaphor has over all the other Figures of Discourse.

19. *The double Words agree particularly to Dithyrambicks,* &c.] Having shewn the different Qualities of Words, and the Advantages of Sense beyond others, he takes care particularly to shew, in what Works each of them ought to be employed. And this is what he has touched on in the Third Book of his Rhetorick, where he says, That the double Words are entirely Politick, and that they agree perfectly well with the Dithyrambick Poesse, because its Style is very lofty, and its aim to sound great, that the Foreign Words are most proper to Heroick Poem, because it is Noble, and loves that which is so: And that the Metaphor agrees best with Lambick Veres, and the Stage. But he
he tells us here, That the Heroick Verse uses that which is proper to the Dithyrambick and Iambick; but the Iambick Verse does not use all, that enters into Epopeia, and the reason is drawn from the different Characters of those two Poems. Insomuch that he who has this different Character in view, will never transgress the Bounds which Aristotle prescribes, nor employ that in Tragedy, which is proper for Epick Poem only. Our Poets have not always observed this Management.

20. That is, proper Words, the Metaphors, and the Ornaments.] By Ornaments he means the Epithets, which belong also to the Familiar Style.

21. What we have said, is sufficient for Tragedy, and the Imitation which does consist in Action.] Aristotle takes care to inform us, that he is come to the end of the Treatise of Tragedy, which he had promised and prepares us, for what he is to do in Epopeia, in setting before our Eyes the difference of those two Poems, one of which imitates by Action, and the other by Narration.
C H A P. XXIV.

The Application of the Rules of Tragedy to Epick Poem. The Difference of this Poem from History. The Art of Homer, in which he is wonderful. The defect of the Cypriacks, and the little Iliad. How many Subjects of Tragedy the Iliad and the Odysse can furnish, and how many have been taken from the little Iliad.

As for the Imitation (a) which consists in Narration, and is made in Hexameter Verses, it is evident that the Fables of it ought to be formed as that of a Dramatick Poem, as Tragedy, and ought to include one only Action, entire, perfect, and finished, and which consequently has a beginning, middle, and an end. For 'tis necessary that it give the Pleasure which is proper to it, as one Living and Animated Body: And to effect that, it should not follow the Rules of History, where we are obliged to relate not one Action only, but all the Events which happened in such a space of Time, either to one or more Persons, and which have very little Connexion with one another. For if the Sea-Fight at Salamine, and the Battle of the Carthaginians in Sicily, which were about the same time, have no relation to the same end; much less, still those things which fall out at different Times, and after one another, tend to the same Design.

(a) Of the Poetry which imitates in Metre only.

2. However
2. However 'tis in this, that most of (b) Poets offend; and 'tis in this as I have said, that Homer (c) appears Divine in respect to them, for having a War before him which had a Beginning and an End, thinking that it would be too great, and could not be comprehended (as it were) at one View, he did not undertake to treat of it entirely. (d) He was sensible also, that if he should have found out the Secret of reducing it to a just extent, yet he (e) could not have avoided the Disorder and Confusion, which such great Variety of Incidents would have thrown him into. For this reason he took one part only, and draws from the rest a great Number of Episodes, as the Lift of the Ships, and many others, by which he enriches and diversifies his Poem.

3. It is not so with other Poets: They imagine they preserve the Unity of the Subject, when they confine themselves to the Actions of one Man only; or the Accidents which happened in a certain space of time, or one History only, tho' it has divers Parts, such is the Conduct of the Poet who made the Cypriacks, and of him who composed the Little Iliad. Thus we see, that neither Homer's Ilia's nor Odysseus can furnish but one Subject for Tragedy, or two at most, whereas a great many may be taken from the Cypriacks, and the Little Iliad will afford more than eight, as the Judgment of Arms, Philoctetes, Neoptolemus, Eurytus, The Beggar, Helena, The Taking of Troy, The Return of the Greeks, Simon, The Troades.

(b) Common Poets. (c) Ought to. (d) But if it had been moderately anger. (e) Would have been perplexed with the Variety.
REMARKS on Chap. XXIV.

1. As for the imitation which consists in Narration, and is made in Hexameter Verses, 'tis evident that the Fable of it ought to be formed, as that of a Dramatick Poem, as Tragedy.] Aristotle told us in the fifth Chapter, that Epopeia has this in common with Tragedy, that 'tis an Imitation of the Actions of the greatest Persons, and took care to inform us, that all the Parts of this Poem are to be found in Tragedy; and now having explained perfectly, and particularly, all which regards the Composition of the Dramatick Poem, he has little more to say of the Epopeia, and that is the reason, why he is so short in his Treatise; it takes up but two Chapters, which are properly speaking, only a summary Recapitulation, and an Application of those Rules to Epopeia, which he has given for Tragedy. The first Precept which he lays before us, is, That the Fable of an Epick Poem, ought to be Dramatick; that is Active, as that of Tragedy; and this he says, is evident; and truly 'tis a Consequence of the Definition of Epopeia, that 'tis the Imitation of an Action. The only difference between the Dramatick of these two Poems is, That Tragedy Imitates without Narration, and Epopeia Imitates by its Assistance; that is to say, that it does not bring Actors before the Spectators, 'tis the Poet only that speaks, but he often interrupts his Discourse, to make his Persons Speak and Act, that he may give the Action to his Poem, which it requires. This is the Dramatick of Epopeia; and 'tis in this Sense that Aristotle said, That Homer made Dramatick Imitations. A Poet ought at first to form his Fable that it be Active; and therefore Aristotle condemns those who search History for some true Heroe, before they have done that. The Foundation of those Poems, is no Fable, and consequently they cannot be Epick Poems. See what I have Remark'd on Horace's Art of Poetry, and on the tenth Chapter of this Work.
2. And ought to Include one only Action, entire, perfect, and finished, and which consequently has a beginning, middle, and an end. For Epopeia as Tragedy, is the Imitation of one Action only, and not of many. The Subject of all other Imitations is only one also, as he says in the ninth Chapter. If Epopeia should imitate many Actions, 'twould be an History, and not a Poem. See the Remarks on the eighth and ninth Chapters.

3. For 'tis necessary that it give the Pleasure which is proper to it, as one living and animated Body.] The Greek says, As an Animal, &c. he used this Comparison in the eighth Chapter, and nothing could better explain his thought to us; for as the whole Animal is composed of different parts, which make the same whole, without any one parts being of a different Nature, and which give the Spectator the Pleasure it ought to give; so must it be in Epopeia and Tragedy, they must be composed of different Parts, which make one and the same whole; and give to the Spectator the Pleasure which is proper for them to give. Those who trespass against this Rule, will be guilty of the fault which Horace condemns in the first verses of his Art of Poetry: They put an Horses Neck, to a Man's Head.

4. And to effect that, it should not follow the Rules of History, where we are obliged to relate not only one Action, but all the Events which happened in such a space of time.] This Passage is much corrupted in the Text, or at least I don't understand it, for I can't know what έν οὐσίαις ἰσοεις τὰς συνάθροισις ἑραί, means, word for word, 'tis neque similes Historias compositione esse: I believe it should be thus Corrected, εν οὐσίαις ἰσοεις τὰς συνάθροισις ἑραί; or thus, εν οὐσίαις ἰσοεις τα σωμάτων ἑραί, neque similes Historias Compositiones esse. He says, That in the Composition of the Incidents, the Connexion which unites the Parts that make an Epic Poem, ought not to be like that which unites the Parts of
of an History. For in an History many events are gathered together, which have only a fortuitous Connexion, and depend not one on another, but by the time in which they happened; whereas the Incidents of an Epick Poem, ought to be so link't one with another, that they make one and the same Action. If a Poet should insert any Incident which was not a Natural part of his Fable, nor Matter proper for Epopeia, it must be at least necessary to give an account of some part of the Action. This is entirely opposite to the Rules of History, and sufficiently clear.

5. And which have very little Connexion with one another.] That's to say, which have no Connexion, but by the time in which they happened, for in other respects they are very different, and one is not the cause of another.

6. For if the Sea-Fight at Salamine, and the Battle of the Carthaginians in Sicily, which were about the same time, have no relation to the same end, much less shall those things which fall out at different Times, and after one another, tend to the same Design.] Aristotle had no better way than this Comparison, to make us understand the difference which is between the Incidents that compose an Epick Poem, and those which enter into an History. Among these latter, those which seem most alike, and are very near, are very different, and tend not to the same end: For example, Herodorus tells us in the same Book of the Fight at Salamine, where the Greeks beat Xerxes, and of the Battle which Gelon gain'd in Sicily over the Carthaginians, who were led by Amilcar. Some say, that both these Fights happened the same Day. There is nothing more different, for as they have not both of them the same Cause, neither do they concur to the same end; since therefore there is so vast a difference between Actions, which happen in the same Hour, what ought we to expect from those which come to pass in different Ages. They all find a place in History, which does not confine it self to relate one Action only; 'twould be ridiculous
culous to make them enter into an Epick Poem, when only those Incidents are admitted, which altogether make the same whole, and aim at the same Design.

7. However 'tis in this that most of the Poets offend and 'tis in this, as I have said, that Homer appears Divine in respect to them, for having a War before him which had a beginning and an end, he did not undertake to treat of it entirely.] What Aristotle says here of Homer's taking only one part of the Trojan War, seems to contradict what he had advanced, viz. That the Action of an Epick Poem should be an entire and perfect whole; but the Author of the Treatise of Epick Poem has plainly shewn, that these contrary Expressions agree very well in their Sense; for the Anger of Achilles, which Homer hath taken for the only Subject of his Poem, is a part, in respect to the War of Troy, and the History from whence it is drawn; but 'tis entire and finished in the Fable, and Poem, which he formed. The Poet may take the entire Action of an History, or one part only; but he is always obliged to put an entire Action into his Poem, and not a part. Homer in his Odysses, and Virgil in his Æneids, have taken an entire Action. Homer proposes Ulysses's return, who after the Destruction of Troy, arrives in his own Country: Virgil proposes the Change of a State, which was ruined in Troy, and re-established in Italy by Æneas: Each of these Actions is an whole, as well in the History from whence they are taken, as in the Fables in which they are employed. 'Tis not the same with the Action of the Ælia's, that is only one part of the History of the War of Troy; but it becomes a Regular whole, in the Poem, by the good Management of the Poet; for that Anger of Achilles has its Causes, Effects, and End; and to shew that the War of Troy is not the Subject of the Ælia's, Homer ends his Poem with Hector's Funeral, before the twelve Days of Truce were expired, and the Fighting re-commenced.
9. And draws from the rest, a great Number of Epis-
dodes, as the Lift of the Ships, and many others, by
which he enriches, and diversifies his Poem.] Aristotle
do not say, That Homer uses a great many Episodes
of the Aktion, which he had chosen: For what Episodes
could Achilles's Anger furnish? But he says, that that
Poet used many Episodes which he took from the Tro-
jan War, and whence he had his Subject, and truly
this is a great part of Homer's Cunning: He does not
Sing of the Trojan War, but draws Episodes from it,
which he renders proper to his Aktion, by accommodating
them to the ground of his Fable, as has been
taken notice of elsewhere: The Lift of the Ships which
is at the end of the second Book of the Iliad, is an E-
piode of this Nature; and 'tis evident, that that Epi-
mode is drawn from the same History that the Subject
is taken from. 'Tis the same of all the rest, and this
'tis which makes the Fable the more probable, in gi-
ving it all the appearance of truth: See the eleventh
Remark on the nineteenth Chapter.

10. 'Tis not the same with other Poets, they imagine
they preserve the Unity of the Subject, when they con-
fine themselves to the Actions of one Man only.] This is
a Confirmation of what he said, in the eighth Chap-
ter. For this reason it seems to me, that all the Poets,
who have made an Incarnate, or a Thecele, or any such
like Poem, are deceived very much; for they were in the
wrong to think, that because Theseus was one, and
Heracles was one, that all their Lives ought only to make
one Subject, one Fable, and that the Unity of the Heroe,
made the Unity of the Aktion. Statius fell into this Mi-
stake, when he sung not one Action of Achilles, as Ho-
mer has done, or Virgil of Aeneas, but all Achilles's
Actions.

11. Or the Incidents which happened in a certain space
of time.] A certain Sign that the greatest part of the
Poets were deceived about Epick Poem; and that they
hardly distinguished it from History, is, that there have
been
been as many sorts of Epopoeia, as there are different ways of writing History. The first is that which relates all that happened to one Man only; such is the History of Quintus Curtius. The Poets have also made Epick Poems of the Life of one Man, as the Achilleid, the Thefeid, the Hercules, &c. The second sort of History is that which takes for its Subject all that fell out, in such a certain time, as in that of Polybius. We have no Poem of this Nature, but 'tis probable by this Passage, that Aristotle had seen some. To conclude, the third sort of History is that which describes one only, and entire Action, which hath different Parts; as the History of Salust, which gives us the Jugurthine War, or Cataline's Conspiracy: And 'tis this last sort of History that Lucan, Silius Italicus, Valerius Flaccus, and those who writ the Cypriacks, and the Little Iliad, have imitated in their Poems.

12. And such is the Conduct of the Poet who made the Cypriacks.] Aristotle has already mentioned the Cypriacks, in the seventeenth Chapter, and attributed them to Dicogeneus; some say, that this we now speak of, is different from the other; that this is an Epopoeia, and that a Tragedy. This is certainly grounded on his calling this Poem in the seventeenth Chapter, κυπριακα, Κυπρια; and here he calls it, κυπριακα, Cypria; but this is no consequence since this Poem which he calls κυπριακα, Cypria; is quoted by the Ancients by the Name of κυπριακα, Cypria, as Herodotus Athenaeus, who cites some Verses of it which are perfectly fine. We know not the Subject of this Poem; all that appears, is, by a Passage in the second Book of Herodotus, where he speaks of the Rape of Helen. I believe that this Author had collected the most extraordinary Accidents which had been caused by Love, and called it Cypriacks, as if we should say Cypriack, or Love Adventures, for Venus was the Goddes of Cyprus. And that which confirms me, in this Opinion is, that Nævius an Ancient Latin Poet, made after this Model, a Poem of the same Nature, which he called Ilias Cypria, the Cyprians Iliad. Where he has all the love.
13. And of him who composed the little Iliad.] This little Iliad was a Poem which took in all the Trojan War; it begins thus.

'Iliov åëîåô' ë ìçîôîâìw ëîçâûîw,
'Tîs åëîç èîçîåâ ðåâóîç ñççîçîçîñèç. Åñòü.

Dardanian, and the Trojan Wars I sing,
Which to the Greeks such mighty damage brought.
'Tis called the Little Iliad, to distinguish it from Homer's, which was called the Great Iliad for the same reason: 'Tis surprizing, that that Iliad which treated only of one small part of the Trojan War, should be called the Great Iliad; and that which comprehended it all, should be called the Little Iliad. He who writes Homer's Life (suppos'd to be Herodotus) pretends that that great Author writ them both. Aristotle is not of this mind: Homer had too great a Genius, and too well understood the Rules of Art, to make a Poem of this Nature.

14. Thus we see, that neither Homer's Iliad nor Odys
des, can furnish but one Subject for Tragedy, or two at moit.] To shew that Homer had taken a different Rule from the rest of the Poets who may be called Historical, and that he took one simple Action for his Subject; he says, that if we consider the Plan of his Fable, we shall find in each of his Poems, but one Subject for Tragedy, or two at most; and truly there is nothing in the Plan of the Iliad's, but may be very well put into a Tragedy, if we shorten the time. All the Grecian Princes, tho' independent of one another, were united against the Trojans. Agamemnon whom they had made their Chief, insults Achilles, who was the most Valiant of all the Confederates: That Prince being offended, retires and refuses to fight: This Misd
understanding gave a great Advantage to the Enemies.

Achilles
Achilles suffers his friend Patroclus to assist the Allies on a very pressing occasion: That friend is killed by Hector, his death inspires Achilles with a very eager desire of Revenge, and inclines him to be reconciled to Agamemnon; he goes then to Battle, re-establishes the Affairs of the Greeks, gains a Victory for them, and revenges his Friend's Death, by killing Hector with his own Hand. Here is nothing but what may enter into a Tragedy; and in dividing the Matter, we may easily find two Subjects for a Fable; for I can bring on the Stage only the first part of the Fable; that Ambition and Discord ruines not only the People, but the Princes also who are divided. Thus I should only treat of the Quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon, and the dismal effects of it, in ruining the Grecian Affairs, and causing the Death of Patroclus. I can also make another Tragedy on the second part of the Fable, which shews that when a Misunderstanding is removed, a good Intelligence re-established, what that Discord had ruined. 'Tis the same in the Odyssey. A Prince is absent from his Country, the Lords of that Country taking the opportunity of his Absence, commit great Disorders, lay Snares for his Son, and would oblige his Wife to chuse one of them for an Husband. During these Transactions the Prince comes home, kills his Enemies and restores Peace and Tranquillity to his Kingdom. This is the Subject of the Odyssey, which can make also two Subjects for Tragedy, by taking for one the first part of the Fable: That the Absence of a Prince doth infallibly cause Mischiefs in the State; and for the second, the happy Effects of his Return. This I take to be what Aristotle meant. The Iliad and the Odyssey, can furnish each of them but one or two Subjects for Tragedy; that's to say, when they are stript of their Episodes; for if we take these Poems with their Episodes, they will afford a great many.

15. Whereas a great many may be taken from the Cypriacks, and the little Iliad will afford more than eight.] For there was no principal and chief Fable in those two
two Poems. They treated of several Independent Actions, every one of which, might afford a Subject for Tragedy. 'Tis the same with the Achilleide of Statius.

16. As the Judgment of Arms.] Aeschylus made a Tragedy on the Dispute between Ulysses and Ajax, for Achilles's Armour: Pacuvius and Accius brought it on the Roman Stage. The Ajax of Sophocles, is only a Sequel of the same Subject.

17. The Philoctetes.] This Subject has been handled by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. We have only Sophocles's Tragedy.

18. Neoptolemus.] 'Twould be difficult to determine what part of the Story of Neoptolemus, he took for the Subject of this Piece.

19. Eurypilus.] There were two Captains of this Name, at the Siege of Troy, one the Son of Evemon of Thessaly, who brought forty Ships to that Siege, and the other the Son of Telephus King of Mysia. The Tragedy which Aristotle speaks of, was made on the first, for it is without doubt that which a Latin Poet Translated afterwards, and is quoted by Cicero, in the second Book of his Tusculane Questions; but we don't know the Subject of it.

20. The Beggar.] This was the Subject of a Tragedy: Ulysses put on the Habit of a Beggar, and went into Troy, where he killed a great many brave Trojans, and returned again to the Grecian Camp, without being known by any Body but Helen. Homer relates this Story in the fourth Book of his Odysse. Euripides speaks of it also in his Hecuba; but adds something of his own; for he says, that Helen discovered him to Hecuba, and that she being moved by his Tears, suffered him to escape. This deserved the Censure of the Scholiast, who has reason to blame him, for having imagined a thing so improbable and unlikely. And
what appearance is there, that Priam's Wife would let
go a Spy, and so considerable an Enemy as Ulysses was,
when she had him in her Power?

21. Helena.] The Greek says, The Lacedemonian; that is, Helena, Helena Lacæna. Aristotle cites these Pieces by their true Names, so that 'tis easy to see that he doth not speak of that Tragedy which Euripides left under the Name of Helena: Besides the Subject of Euripides Piece, was not taken from the Little Iliad. For what likelihood is there that the Author of this Poem, should imagine that Paris carried away a Phantom instead of Helen: Those who will take the Pains to read the false Dīsys of Crete, who has without doubt enrich'd his Work with many things that he has taken from this Poem, will find a great many Particularities of Helen's Life, enough to furnish out the Subject of a Tragedy.

22. The taking of Troy.] We must remember that Aristotle does not speak here of regular Pieces that comprehend one Action only. This Tragedy was made on the burning of Troy; and 'tis probable, that Nero took from this Piece all that he sang, when he set Rome on Fire, that he might the better represent the Horrible Sight which the Poet had described.

23. The Return of the Greeks.] This Piece is lost: 'Tis the same of which we have spoken in the seventeenth Chapter, and which Aristotle calls the Iliad, or the Return of the Greeks. It contained the Sacrifice of Polyxena, whom the Greeks Sacrificed on Achilles's Tomb, to get them a free Passage into Greece, as they had been forced to Sacrifice Iphigenia to open a way to Troy.

24. Sinon.] Sinon having on set purpose been taken by the Trojans, tells them that the Greeks would have Sacrificed him, but that he was escaped from the Altar, he pretends to tell them all the Secrets of the Party he had deserted from, and by his fraudulent and
artificial Discourse persuaded 'em to receive the Wooden Horse into their Walls. Virgil relates this Story at length, in the second Book of his Æneids, and perhaps he took it from the Poem called the Little Iliad, and of which we are now speaking.

25. The Troades.] The Subject of this Piece, which is among those of Euripides, is the distribution of the Trojan Slaves, and the Death of Astyanax, who was thrown headlong from a Tower.
CHAP. XXV.

The different sorts of Epick Poem, the Parts of it, the same as those of Tragedy. The Character of the Iliad, and Odysses. The bounds of the length of an Epick Poem, and why it may be longer than a Tragedy. What Verse is most proper for it. What sort of Poem Cheremon's Centaur is. Elogy of Homer. He hath introduced nothing, that has not Manners. The Wonderful of an Epick Poem; goes as far as Extravagance, and why it does: An Example taken from Homer, how that Poet taught the others to Romance as they ought to do. A Paralogism which he used. The Impossible in some Cases, ought to be preferr'd to the Possible. All the Incidents of a Poem, ought to have their Causes and Reasons, and what must be done, if that be impossible. Sophocles's Fault in his Electra, and the Play of the Mylians. How an Absurdity may be admitted. Homer disguises his Absurdities admirable well. The meanest Parts require all the Ornaments of Diction. Place where these Ornaments of Diction are useless and vicious.

There must necessarily be as many sorts of Epopœia, as there are of Tragedy; for Epopœia should be Simple, or Implex; Moral
The Epopeia has also the same Parts as Tragedy, except the Musick, and the Decoration, for it hath its Peripeties, Remembrances, and Passions. Moreover the Sentiments (a) ought to be as fine as the Diction: Homer was the first who mixed all these in his Poetry, and has done it with a great deal of Prudence and Judgment.

2. And truly if we examine narrowly his two Poems, we shall find, that the Ilias are Simple and Pathetick, and the Odysseis Implex and Moral; for there are Remembrances quite thro' it; and the Morality is plain, from the beginning to the end, and he is so far from neglecting (b) the Sentiments and the Diction, that he excels all the other Poets.

3. Epopeia differs then from Tragedy, only in the length, and the Verse, 'twould be needless to give any other Bounds to it, than what we have already spoken of. It's sufficient if we can have the beginning and end under one View, and that would be done, without doubt, if the Plans were laid shorter than those of the Ancients, and so ordered, that the Recitation of an Epick Poem should take up no more time than the Representation of the different sorts of Tragedy which are Acted in one Day.

4. Epopeia has this Property, That it may be of a much larger extent than Tragedy; for

(a) And Diction must be good, which Homer first used, and that sufficiently.
(b) In it.
this cannot imitate several things which are
Transacted at the same time, it must necessarily
be included in the narrow Bounds of a Theatre,
and a certain number of Actors; whereas Epick
Poem, which is only a Narration, may easily
shew several things which are done at the same
time, and in different Places, and which being
proper to the Subject, give this Poem such an
Extent, that the other cannot have. And this
is so considerable an Advantage, that the Poet
may by its means, add to the Grandeur and Maj-
esty of his Verse, lead his Reader into a won-
derful Variety of Adventures, and Diversifie his
Work, by a great many different Episodes,
which Tragedy cannot do, where the Resem-
blance, which never fails of producing, Of-
fence and Disgust, is the most usual Cause of
their ill Success.

5. As for what regards the Verse of Epopoelia,
Experience shews, that the Heroick is the only
one that agrees with it; for if any should at-
tempt to make (c) an Epick Poem, in any other
sort of Verse, (d) 'twould be without any Beau-
ty, and would not succeed; for as Heroick Verse,
is the most (e) Grave and Pompous, so it (f)
has a particular way of admitting strange Words,
and Metaphors, and that Imitation which con-
sists in Narration, uses them much more than all
the others. The Iambick and Tetrameter Ver-
ses are proper to give Motion; for the Tetra-
meter is good for Dancing, and the Iambick

(c) An Imitation which consists in Narration. (d) Or several mixed.
(e) Solid and Elated. (f) Most of all, admitted.
for Action; but 'twould be more Ridiculous to mix them altogether, as Cheremon has done; wherefore no Body has undertaken to make a long (g) Poem in any other sort of Verse than Hexameter, Nature itself having (as hath been already said) taught how to make a just Division, and to give it what is convenient for it.

6. Homer deserves to be commended for many others; but above all, for being the only Poet, who knew exactly what he ought to do. (b) The Poet ought to say little himself, for in that he is not an Imitator. All the other Poets imitate but rarely, and don't push their Imitation (i) far enough; whereas Homer says little himself, but introduces presently some of his Persons, a Man, or a Woman, or something else that has Manners: for every thing in his Poem has Manners.

7. The Marvellous ought to be (k) in Tragedy, but much more in Epopeia, in which it goes even to the (l) Extravagant: For as we don't see in Epopeia the Persons who Act, whatever passes the bounds of Reason, is proper to produce the Wonderful, and Admirable. For Example: What Homer says of Hector when he was pursued by Achilles, would seem Ridiculous on the Stage; for who could forbear laughing to see the Grecians on one side standing still, without any Motion, and on the other Achilles pursuing Hector, and making Signs to his Troops. But

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(g) Constitution.
(b) Feigned. (i) But in few places.
(l) Void of Reason.
this does not appear so in Epopeia. For the Marvellous is always agreeable, and a Proof of it is, That those who relate any thing generally, add something to the Truth, that it may the better please those who hear it.

8. Homer is the Man who hath given the best Instructions to other Poets how to (m) tell Lyes agreeably, and that is properly a Paralogism; for as all Men are naturally persuad'd, that where such a thing is, or is done, such another must happen, we may easily make them believe, that if the last is, the first must consequently be. But beside, the latter, which we lay down for Truth being often false, the first is often so; and truly it does not follow, that because one thing is, another must necessarily be; but because we are persuad'd of the truth of the latter, we conclude falsely, that the former is also true.

9. The Poet ought rather to chuse Impossibilities, provided they have a Resemblance to the Truth, than the Possible, which are (n) Incrédible with all their Possibility.

10. He should also endeavour to admit nothing unto his Subject which has not its Cause; and if that be absolutely impossible, then that which is unreasonable, must be out of the Subject as in Oedipus, the Ignorance of that Prince, concerning the Man-

(m) To use false Reasons.
(n) Not apt to persuade.
ner of Lais's Death. That should (o) not be seen in that which appears on the Stage, and makes the Body of the Action, as in the Electra, where one enters to inform them of Orestes's Death, who was killed at (p) the Pythian Games. And as in the Mystics, where we see a Messenger, who comes from Tegea to Mysia, without saying one Word.

11. It deserves to be Laugh'd at, only (q) to say that this Exactness will destroy the Fables; for all Efforts imaginable ought to be made to form the Subject rightly from the beginning; and if it be done in such a manner, that some of these Places which appear absurd, cannot be avoided, they must be admitted, especially if they contribute to render the rest more probable.

12. (r) In the Odyssey, the place where Ulysses is expos'd on the Shore of Ithaca, by the Phaeacians, is so full of these Absurdities, that they would be intolable, if a bad Poet had given us them. But that (s) great Man has hid them under an Infinity of admirable things, with which he has sprinkled all that part of his Poem, and which are as so many Charms, to hinder our perceiving that defect.

13. Thus ought we to reserve all the (r) Ornaments of the Dition, for these weak places

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(o) By no means be, &c. (p) Of the A2ious at.
(q) How Ridiculous is'it?
(r) The Absurdities in the Odyssey, would be intolable, if a bad Poet, &c. (s) Poet.
(t) To take great pains about the Dition.
parts: Those that have either good Sentiments, or Manners, have no occasion for them. A Brilliant, or Glorious Expression, damages them rather, and serves only to hide their Beauty.

**REMARKS on Chap. XXV.**

1. There must necessarily be as many sorts of Epopeia, as there are of Tragedy; for Epopeia Should be Simple or Implex, Moral or Pathetick. Since Epopeia is the Imitation of an Action, as well as Tragedy, it must of necessity have one of these four Conditions, and be either Simple or Implex, Moral or Pathetick; for no Action can be imagined, which has not one of these Characters. See what has been remark'd on the twentieth Chapter.

2. The Epopeia has also the same Parts as Tragedy, except the Musick, and the Decoration. Epopeia like a Tragedy, hath Fable, Diction, Manners, Sentiments, Remembrances, Peripeties and Passions: That's to say, Wounds, Violent Deaths, Pains, Griefs, &c. It hath neither Decoration nor Musick, because it imitates by Recitation only.

3. Homer was the first, who mix'd all these in his Poetry, and has done it with a great deal of Prudence and Judgment. This Expression of Aristotle seems to me, worth taking notice of; he says, That Homer used both first, and aptly, ἡ ἰνροι, ἡ έκπορμος, which includes two great Commendations, viz. that of Invention, and that of Perfection, which are rarely found together, for never any thing was ever invented and perfected at the same time. *Nihil simul inventum, perfectariumque est.* Homer alone had this Happiness; he was the first that used all those Parts in his Poems, and did it aptly: That is, he used them à propos, and as they ought to be, for he hath admitted neither too few,
few, nor too many, which is the just Perfection in all things.

4. And truly if we examine his two Poems narrowly, we shall find, that the Ilia's is Simple and Pathetick, and the Odyfjes Implex and Moral.] There can be nothing more Judicious, than Homer's Management of these two Poems: The Ilia's, where Choler and Fury bear sway, is Simple and Pathetick: 'Tis Pathetick, because we see almost every where Deaths and Wounds: 'Tis Simple, because it has neither Peripeties, nor Remembrance. Two Captains of the same side Quarrel, who after they had suffered much by their Division, are reconciled again; one of these revenges the Death of his Friend on his Murderer, and kills him with his own Hand. There's nothing here but what is Simple. Some say there are Peripeties in the Ilia's, because Affairs often change their Face, and sometimes the Greeks, sometimes the Trojans are Conquerors: But that which falls out according to the ordinary Course of the World, is never called a Peripetic; for if so, there would be a Peripetic in all sorts of Accidents. The Odyfjes is Implex and Moral, because it is a more sedate, and slow Poem, as being made for a Model of Wisdom, Moderation, and Constancy; for it hath many Peripeties and Remembrances, and the Heroe of the Poem is an Example of Virtue. But it may be objected, That the Odyfjes is also Pathetick, since Ulyfjes's Companions are lost, that he himself suffers innumerable Evils, and at last kills his Enemies. How comes it then that Aristotle found the Pathetick in the Ilia's only? This is easily answered. Aristotle quotes these two Poems, only in respect to what is the principal, and most essential in them: Simplicity and Passion, are the two Characters of the Ilia's, for they reign from one end of it to the other; he for this Reason therefore, calls it Simple and Pathetick; and tho' this Poem has a Moral Instruction, as well as the Odyfjes, yet he doth not call it Moral, because the Morality is less frequent and more bidden. The Peripeties, Remembrances, and Morality, are the Essential Characters
Chara\textacute{}ters of the \textit{Odysse\textacute{s}; wherefore Aristot\textacute{}le calls it Implex and Moral, and tho' it contains Murders, and Violent Deaths, yet he calls it not Pathetick, because those Deaths take up a very small part of the Poem, and are found rather in the Episodes, than in the principal Action. Virgil in his \textit{Aeneids,} has imitated these two Poems; he has taken both the Simplicity of the \textit{Iliad,} and Morality of the \textit{Odysse\textacute{s; The Aeneid is Simple as the Iliad,} it hath neither Peripeties nor Remembrance; or if there are Peripeties, they are out of the Action, they are in the Episodes, and 'tis Moral, as the \textit{Odysse\textacute{s; for the Heroe of the Aeneid, as him of the Odysse\textacute{s,} is an Heroe in Morality, and sets forth to Monarchs and Rulers, a perfect Model of all Virtues. This is purely the Sense of the Passage. Longinus has also laid down these two different Characters of the \textit{Iliad's} and \textit{Odysse\textacute{s,} as well as Aristot\textacute{}le, and hath also given the reason, when he says in his eighth Chapter, \textit{ὅσ ἐσ ἀναμνὴν ἃν πάθες, ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις, συνετεύχεται ἐν τοῖς ἄνθρωπος ἐν πάθεσι.| When great Poets and Writers cannot teach the Pathetick, they descend to the Moral; for he endeavours to prove that Homer composed the \textit{Iliad,} when his Ingenuity was vigorous, and Wit sprightly, and that he made his \textit{Odysse\textacute{s when he grew Old. This Difference of the Characters was so well known, that those who made it their Business to recite these two Poems in publick, represented the \textit{Iliad} in a Scarlet Robe, by reason of the Bloodshed contain'd in it; and the \textit{Odysse\textacute{s,} in a Sea Green, because of the Voyages it is filled with.}

5. \textit{He is so far from neglecting the Sentiments and the Diction, that he excels all the other Poets.} Aristot\textacute{}le has told us already, That Homer is the only Poet that has employed the four sorts of \textit{Epopoe\textacute{j}, in his two Poems, and he has also given him the Preference in the Constitution of his Fable, for the Manners, the Peripeties, Remembrances, and the Passion. There remain only the Sentiments and the Diction; and he avouches here, That he surpasses all the other Poets in these two also; and certainly nothing equals the Strength.
Strength and Sweetness of Homer's Diction: He animates even that which has no Life, and gives Action to that which is most uncapable of Motion. The Sentiments answer to the Beauty of the Expression, and we may say of Homer, that he has the justest, and most exact Ideas of any Man in the World, and knows how to inspire his Reader with whatever he pleases. The Praise which so great a Critick as Aristotle gives to this Poet, will be always a sufficient defence against all the foolish Insults that can be made on him.

6. Epopoeia differs then from Tragedy only in the length, and the Verse.] For Tragedy makes use of Jambicks, and Epopoeia of Hexameters: Tragedy is confined to one Day, but Epopoeia is not so limited.

7. 'T'would be needless, to give any other bounds to it; that what we have already spoken of, is sufficient, if we can have the beginning and end under one View.] The Epopoeia be more extended by its Episodes than a Tragedy, yet there is the same Rule for the length of those Poems; both of them must come under one View, so that the Memory may easily retain them; for if we lose the Idea of the Beginning, before we come to the End, 'tis a certain Sign that the Poem is too long, and this length destroys all its Beauty. See the Remarks on the seventh Chapter.

8. And that would be done without doubt, if the Plays were laid shorter than those of the Ancients.] Aristotle is not satisfied to give us the Rule only, but the means also of putting it into Practice: And says, That to obtain the just Extent which Epopoeia requires, the Plans ought to be shorter than those of the Ancient Poets, who made the Cypriacks and the Little Ilias, and had embarrassed the Matter; for the Subjects of these Poems could never be brought under one View; but as this Precept was not nice enough, the Philosopher adds a second, which denotes the Bounds of Epopoeia a little more exactly: He adds, And so ordered, that the Recitation
Recitation of an Epick Poem, should take up no more time, than the Representation of the different sorts of Tragedy, which are acted in one Day. Aristotle seeing the Athenians fix whole Days to see several Tragedies Acted, and that with Pleasure, without losing any of the Subject, had good reason to think that they were capable to comprehend and retain, without any difficulty, the Subject of any one Poem, whose Recitation should last no longer, than the Action of those different Plays. He bounds the Extent of Epopeia to such a length; that is, he would have an Epick Poem to be read over in one Day, pretending that which should transcend those Bounds would be too long, where the View would be confounded, and the Idea of the beginning loft, before we came to the End; and that which favours this Decision extremely, is, that the Ilias, the Odysses, and the Æneas, are exactly conformable to this Rule of Aristotle's. This is the meaning of a Passage whose Difficulties have been either passed by, or very little explained. Aristotle speaks here of the duration of the Poem only, and not of the duration of the Action, because there are no certain Rules for that, and it takes in more or less time according to the Action which it represents. If an Action is Violent, and full of Passion, it has less duration; for that which is violent, cannot endure long. For this Reason the Ilias which represents the Anger of Achilles, contains but seven and forty Days in all: But if it be a gentle Action, it may last as long as the Poet thinks fit, provided his Poem don't exceed the Measure which has been laid down. Thus Homer has given eight Years and an half to the duration of the Odysses; and Virgil almost seven to his Æneids.

9. Epopeia has this Property, that it may be of a much larger Extent than Tragedy, for this cannot imitate several things which are transferred at the same time, it must necessarily be included in the narrow Bounds of a Theatre, and a certain Number of Actors.] After he has shown the Bounds of Epopeia, he gives the reason why it may be more extensive than Tragedy, tho' it imitates
imitates but one Action only, and says very well, that it proceeds from the Epopeia’s making its Imitation by Recitation, which Tragedy doth not. Now the Narration gives the Poet an opportunity to represent several things which are transacted in several Places at the same time, and which are done by several Persons: Tragedy is deprived of this Privilege, and can comprehend only what actually passes on the Stage, and is executed by the Persons it introduces, and consequently neither can nor ought to be so extensive as Epopeia.

10. And which being proper to the Subject.] For Epopeia is lengthened by its proper Episodes only; and uses nothing that is foreign, to enlarge it.

11. And diversifies his Work by a great many different Episodes, which Tragedy cannot do, where the Resemblance, which never fails of causing Offence and Disgust, is the most usual Cause of their ill Success.] Narration gives an opportunity to the Poet to adorn Epopeia with different Episodes, for having, as we may say, the whole World for his Stage, he may make as many Episodes as he pleases, and diversify them in such a manner, that no two may be alike. 'Tis not so in Tragedy, that Imitates without the assistance of Narration, hath narrow Bounds, and short time, and consequently can have but few Episodes, or if it has many, they are so alike, that they infallibly displease. Aristotle saw many damn’d on this account, and we should see several served so in our Theaters, if we were as nice and delicate as the Athenians; for we have Plays, in which all the Episodes are alike. 'Tis very difficult to avoid this Resemblance of the Episodes in the same Piece, since ‘tis not easily shun’d in these which are made on far different Subjects. The Episodes are most all of the same Nature, and we may put one for another, without changing the Action.
12. As for what regards the Verse of the Epopeia, Experience shews, that the Heroick is the only one that agrees with it.] 'Twas not Chance that found out this agreeableness, 'tis Nature, assisted by Experience and Custom. There were Poets before Homer, who wrote Heroick Poems in different sorts of Verse, mix'd together. That great Poet perceiving that these displeased, chiefly on the account of the odd Mixture of their Verse, which agreed neither with the Grandeur nor Majesty of Epopeia, began to use only Hexameters, which is the most Serious and Pompous of them all: And for this Reason, Horace gives Homer the Honour of this Invention.

Res gestae Regumque, Ducumque, & tristia bella,
Quo scribi possent numero, monstravit Homerus.

Homer first taught us, how a Poet Sings,
Of Wars, of Gods, of Captains, and of Kings.

13. For the Heroick Verse, is the most Grave and Pompous.] The most Grave, the Greek says: The most Stable, because it is compounded of a Spondee, and a Dactyl, which have each of them two equal Times, and which are confin'd to their Feet, if we may so say; and for this Reason Horace calls them, Spondeos Stabiles; whereas the other Feet are unequal, as the Trochee, and Iambick.

14. So it has a particular way of receiving strange Words and Metaphors.] This 'tis which makes the Pomp and Grandeur of Heroick Verse.

15. And that Imitation which consists in Narration, uses them much more than all the others.] Writers have been much deceived by this Passage. Aristotle doth not say, That Epopeia is the most Noble of all Imitations; for he was perswaded of the contrary, as will be seen in what follows. The Word πρεσβύρ, which hath been Translated, The Most Noble, signifies also
also, The Most Excessive. Aristotle says Word for Word, This Imitation which consists in the Narration, is in that the Most Excessive of all. He gives the Reason why he says that the Heroick Verfe, is most agreeable to Epopeia; that is, because it admits in a particular manner Metaphors, and foreign Words; and this is also the reason why Epopeia makes a better use of all these sorts of Ornaments than any other Imitation, and employs a much greater Number of them: And this he proved, when he shew'd, that the double Words agreed with the Dithyrambicks, the Metaphors to Iambicks, the Strange Words and Metaphors to Epick Poem. This latter proceeds on this Score even to excess, because it is more Pompous than the others, and uses more of the Sublime.

16. The iambick, and Tetrameter Verfe, are proper to give Motion, for the Tetrameter is good for Dancing, and the Iambick for Action. Having shewn the Reason why Heroick Verfe is the most agreeable to Epopeia, he tells us for what Reasons, the others are not at all agreeable to it; (viz.) because they are proper to give Motion, which is not agreeable to a Poem that ought to be Serious and Majestick. The Tetrameter Verfe is composed of Trochees, which are proper for Dances only; and as he says in his Rhetorick, there is no Number more skipping and lively than it; wherefore 'tis not proper for Epopeia. The Iambick Verfe is good for another sort of Movement, for 'tis made to Act; wherefore Horace calls it, Natum rebus aequos; and on that Account, it should be agreeable to Epopeia, but 'tis too Mean and Low, and has too much of ordinary Conversation: It cannot then agree with Epopeia, that admits nothing but what is Lofty and Grandiloquent. Aristotle has also shew'd us, That 'tis not proper for fine Prose, which requires something to heighten it, and to give it Majesty.
17. But it would be more Ridiculous, to mix them altogether, as Cheremon has done. However contrary the other sorts of Verse may be to \textit{Epopoeia}, yet \textit{Aristotle} assures us, That an \textit{Epopoeia} entirely composed of Lambick or Tetrameter Verses, would be more tolerable than that where those sort of Verses, were mixed with the Heroick, for nothing could be more Vicious than this Mixture, and the Heroicks which were mixed with them, would only serve to make the others appear more Ridiculous.

18. Wherefore no Body has undertaken to make a long Poem in any other sort of Verse than the Hexameter. \textit{Aristotle} says, That from Homer's Time, down to his own, there was not one Poet who endeavoured to make a long Poem in any other sort of Verse then Hexameters; and this is what he told us in the first Chapter. Cheremon mixed several sorts of Verse in his \textit{Censure}, but as hath been already said, that Poem was not an \textit{Epopoeia}, but a Tragedy, which is very short in respect to an Epick Poem; he had reason then to say, that an \textit{Epopoeia} of many sorts of Verse, was an unheard of thing; and if this Mixture did not succeed in Tragedy, 'twould do it much less in \textit{Epopoeia}.

19. Nature it self having, as hath been already said, taught us, how to make a just Division, and to give it what is convenient for it. He speaks here of the place of this Chapter, where he says, \textit{Experience} shews us, that Heroick Verse only agrees with \textit{Epopoeia}; for his Experience that helps us to unfold the Mysteries of Nature: And 'tis thus that Nature changed the Tetrameter Lambicks in Tragedy, into the Trimeter, which are more proper for it.

20. Homer deserves to be commended for many others; but above all, for being the only Poet who knew exactly what he ought to do; the Poet ought to say little himself, for in that he is not an Imitator. This is another great \textit{Encomium}, which \textit{Aristotle} gives to Homer, in saying,
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

That he was the only Poet who knew perfectly well what he ought to do. He saw on one side, that Epicurea was different from Tragedy, in that it imitated by Narration; and on the other, that the Epic Fable should not be less active than the Dramatick; and knew that the way of reconciling these two, was to say little himself, but to make those he introduced Act, and speak very much. Epic Poem cannot subsist without Narration, since 'tis the Narration that gives its Form, and distinguishes it from Tragedy; but as Narration, properly speaking, is not an Imitation, or at most an imperfect one, an Epic Poem ought to be a true Imitation. He uses in his Poem only so much of the Narration, as is necessary to preserve its Form; and when he has said some small Matter himself, makes his Persons appear who are really Actors. This is what Aristotle, with good reason too, thought so praise worthy. Virgil knew perfectly well this Address of Homer, and made a wonderful use of it.

All the other Poets imitate but rarely, and don't push their Imitation far enough.] The rest of the Poets follow'd a quite different Method from Homer, they spoke often and their Persons seldom, and therefore they imitate but little; Aristotle then had reason to say, that Homer was the only one who knew what he ought to do.

But presently introduces some of his Persons, a Man or a Woman, or something else that has Manners, for every thing in his Poems has Manners.] Homer has not only made his Poem Dramatick, in making two Persons speak, Men and Women, Achilles, Agamemnon, Ulysses, Priam, Hecator, Hecuba, Helena, but more so, by introducing some other things which have no Manners of themselves, but to which he gives them, either by making them enter into his Poem, under the Allegorical and Feigned Names of Gods and Goddesses, or in giving reason to that which has it not, as the Horte Xanthus, or Life and Passion to that which is Inanimate and Insensible, as when he calls a Rock Impudent.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

dent, makes an Arrow impatient to strike, and Darts to thirst after Blood. Thus ev'ry thing in Homer's Poems has Manners, and by that he has kept the true Character of Fable, which should not admit any thing that has not Manners, Animals, the Elements, Plants, every thing hath Manners in Fable: This is what Homer has admirably well observed in his Epick Poems, and Virgil imitated most wonderfully in his Æneids: Mezentius speaks to his Horse, addresseth himself to his Lance as to a Person: Æthon laments the Death of Pallas, so every thing hath Manners in the Æneid, as well as in the Iliad and Odyssey: This is in my Opinion, the true fence of this Passage, where Aristotle says, that Homer introduced nothing but what has Manners.

23. The Marvellous, ought to be in Tragedy, but much more in Epopeia, in which it goes even to the Extravagant.] Since Tragedy and Epopeia imitate that which is more Excellent, they ought to expose only admirable and extraordinary Incidents: But as that which is contained in a Dramatick Poem, must be more probable than that which is in an Epick, where the Bounds of Veri-similitude are larger, because we don't see those who Act, and ev'ry thing is out of the common Course of Affairs, and there's nothing but what is surprising, so that the Wonderful may be pushed even beyond Reason. However we must not think that he advises the Poets to put things evidently false and impossible into Epopeia, and give them an entire liberty to run to such an excess, as would plainly destroy the Probability, and offend our Reason. And as in Tragedy, the Probable exceeds the Admirable, without excluding it; so in Epopeia, the Wonderful should excel the Probable, without destroying it; and that will be done, if the Poet has the Address, to prepare his Reader, and to lead him by a long train of things that depend on Miracle, and prevent him from perceiving the Cheat which is put upon him; such is the Management of Homer and Virgil. The reading of these two Poets, will sufficiently instruct us, how far the Wonder-
derful may be carried, without becoming Ridiculous Virgil took not so large a Liberty as the Greek Poet; for that which was admirable in Homer's Time, was not so in Augustus's. A Poet must therefore accommodate his Fictions to the Genius; Customs and Manners of the People, among whom, and the Time in which he lives.

24. For, as we don't see in Epopeia, the Persons who Act, whatsoever passes the Bounds of Reason, is proper to produce the Wonderful and Admirable.] This is the only Reason that Aristotle gives for what he hath advanced: That Epopeia may put the Wonderful even beyond Reason, and he takes it from the Nature of the Poem. In Epopeia we don't see the Persons who Act, and understand their Adventures by Relation only, but we see them in Tragedy, and ev'ry thing is Transacted in View of the Spectators, so the unreasonable in Epopeia is hid, because we don't see that which is described; for the Eyes are always more sure and faithful Judges than the Ears, and we are much more easily deceived by that which is told us, than by that we see, and this is what is observed in Tragedy, wherein whatever is too Cruel, Wonderful, or incredible, should be removed from the Sight, and represented only by a true Narration. Horace says in his Art of Poetry.

Yet there are many things which should not come In View, nor pass beyond the Tiring-room; Which after in expressive Language told, Shall please the Audience more than to behold.
Let not Medea shew her Cruel Rage,
And cut her Children's Throats upon the Stage.
Nor Bloody Atreus his dire Feast prepare;
Cadmus or Progne, in new Shape appear,
To this a Snake's, to other a Bird's doth wear.
Whatever so incredible you show,
Shocks my Belief, and straight does Nausious grow.

Since Tragedy receives into its Narration, the Wonderful, which surpasses Reason, 'tis evident that it may more conveniently be admitted into Epopeia, which is only an Active Narration, and hath the Advantage of leading the Reader by an Infinity of Miracles, which would be Ridiculous, if they were exposed to View. Homer in the Odysses, relates how Ulysses's Ship was Metamorphosed into a Stone: And Virgil, how Aeneas's into Nymphs, and both succeed very well. This I take to be the true meaning of this Passage which was spoiled, by reading, _dιδασκαλιν_ in proportion, for _dιδασκαλιν_ without reason.

25. For Example: What Homer says of Hector, when he was pursued by Achilles, would seem ridiculous on the Stage; for who could forbear Laughing, to see the Grecians on one Side standing still, and on the other Achilles pursuing Hector, and making Signs to his Troops; but this does not appear so in Epopeia. The Example which Aristotle has chosen to prove what he said, is taken from the twenty-second Book of the Iliad, where Homer describes the Combat between Achilles and Hector. This latter fled from the Enemy, and ran round the Town, Achilles fearing, that the least Assistance of the Grecians, would fully the Glory of his Victory, makes Signs to the Troops not to move; so that we see on one side Hector who flies, and Achilles who pursues, and making Signs to his Troops not to move, that he might have the entire Honour of the Victory: On the other, the Soldiers with their Arms across, Idle Spectators, waiting the Issue of the Combat. Homer means by this, that all Humane Strength proceeds from the Gods; that their Courage
when they abandon them, and that their Assistance is far from dishonouring the Heroe they favour; that on the contrary it enhances the Glory, which the Aid of Men destroys. For this reason, Achilles who was Jealous of his Honour, forbade the Greeks to assist him; but he received that of Minerva with Pleasure, he boasts of that and tells Hector, Don't think to escape: 'Tis Pallas who makes you fall by my Hand. But however fine the Allegorical Sense, which Homer has hid under this Incident, may be, 'tis certain that it would displease, if it were seen on the Stage, and was transacted before our Eyes; for none would endure to see such a Valiant Man run away like a Coward. It succeeds in Epoppoeia, because it is only a Narration, and we don't see the Persons. This is what Aristotle calls, the unreasonable Wonderful, 'tis reasonable in one Sense, since the Poet put it in designedly, and with a perfect knowledge of the Nature of his Poem, which admits that which a Dramatick does not. 'Tis astonishing, that after such a formal Decision, Homer should be reproached with this very place, as a dishonour to his Poem: But may such a thing be put into an Epick Poem now? A pleasant Argument, as if Homer must become Ridiculous, because we dare not do it now. In Homer's Time 'twas the Custom to speak to the People in Fables and Allegories, but 'tis not so now; and consequently, if we would put any Allegory into a Poem, it must be under the Incidents which are most conform to our Manners; and this Virgil has nicely observed. He imitates the Combat of Achilles and Hector, in that between Æneas and Turnus, but has changed all that was not according to the Customs of his Country, where Allegories, how simple soever they were, would not be received. Turnus flies from Æneas, but not till the Sword which he had taken instead of his own, unfortunately broke, they no sooner gave him his own, but he returns to the Fight, and faces his Enemy; you may see the rest in the same place of Virgil, who does admit the Allegory, but under such things as may be understood simply, and without
without any other Mystery, and this, we may do now.

26. Now the Marvellous is always agreeable.] The Agreeable it inseparable from the Marvellous, of what Nature soever it be, and this proceeds from the Inclination Men naturally have to know something new. There's nothing newer than that which is Wonderful; and consequently there is nothing more agreeable; this gave occasion to the invention of Fables, which are always the first things that excite the Natural Inclination Men have of endeavouring to know every thing. What is a Fable? 'Tis a new Story not of something that is, but of something quite contrary. That which is new, and unknown, is agreeable, and stirs up our Curiosity. To which, if we add the Prodigious and the Wonderful, it makes it perfectly agreeable, and gives a Pleasure beyond compare.

27. And a certain proof of it is, that those who relate any thing, generally add something to the Truth, that it may the better please those who hear it.] And truly nothing demonstrates better that the Wonderful is always agreeable, than the Application they use, who in relating any thing, endeavour to set off the Truth: This 'tis which produces Fables, and which caused the first Historians, as Hecatus, Herodotus, Ephorus, and the first Natural Philosophers; as Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles, to mix Fable with their Works, κοι πρεπον μὲν ἐπιτείχει καὶ συνείκει μνημοσύναι, says Strabo; as Homer mixed the Truth with his Fables, to render them the more probable and useful; these Writers mixed Fables with the Truth, to make it the more Wonderful, and consequently more Agreeable.

28. Homer is the Man who hath given the best Instruction to other Poets how to tell Lies agreeably.] Aristotle doth not speak here of the Mixture which Homer has made of Truth and Falsehood, in the Plan of his Poem; who when he had disposed the Fable which is a pure Lye, had made the Episodes of Incidents;
which he took from a true History; which made Horace say,

\[\textit{Utque thesmentur, sic verna falsa remisset.}\]

Thus he tells Lies, and mixes them with Truth.

As hath been explained on the 19th Chapter, but he speaks also of those particular Falsehoods, which he hath used in adornning the Truth, and which Horace call Speciena Miracula, Plausible, Agreeable Miracles; and truly in all his Fictions, which appear most extraordinary and Wonderful, there is always some Truth, which he disguises after his Manner, that it may give the more Pleasure; for as Strabo has very well remarked, \textit{ex ardua et alta, et tellus mundi tepal}, \textit{Eur. Orest.} Tis Homer's way, to joyn some Truth with his Fictions. Therefore he compares him to Ulysses, who talking to Penelope, as if he were Idomeneus's Brother, relates an History, in which he mixes Truth with Falsehood.

\[\textit{αὐτής θειάς ποιεῖ θεόν εὐμοιοίν ἄδια.}\]

He told her Lies, yet made them seem like Truth.

He made them probable, by the Mixture of some Truth: This is the Character of Homer, what he says of the Cyclops, the Lestrygones, the Cimmerians, Charbydis, Scylla, Eolus, &c. are Homer's Lies, but such as have some mixture of Truth, which serves for a foundation to render them in some sort probable; and 'tis thus that Polybius, and after him Strabo, refuted the Opinion of Eratosthenes, who asserted, That all that Homer Writ, was only frivolous Lies without any Truth, and said, that we should find the place to which Ulysses was carried, when we knew him who sew'd up the Sack, in which the Winds were inglod.
29. And that is properly a Paralogism, for as all Men are naturally perswaded, that where such a thing is, or is done, such another must happen, we may easily make them believe, that if the last is, the first must consequently be.] Homer teaches the other Poets to tell Lies as they should do. These Words, as they should do, denotes the Method which should be observed in making these Lies; and that Method consists in making use of false Reasonings, or of Paralogisms, which Aristotle calls Paralogism, which is to prove a thing by the Consequence; as if when we would prove a Man to be in Love, we are contented to say he is Pale. The first Philosophers have observed, that the long Experience Men had had of some things following consequentially from others, perswaded them that they would always happen after the same manner, and knew that they could easily draw the Means of deceiving them from that natural Perswasion, and that too as much as they pleased, in giving probable Signs for certain Causes; and truly they are perswaded continually of the Truth of that which is most Absurd, and receive what is told them as true effects of the first, which are oftentimes as false as the others, for there are two ways of using this Paralogism: The first is when a false thing is infer'd from a true one; the other when a false thing is used, to make another pass, which is a necessary consequence of it. Homer is full of these Turns. Thus he makes us receive the Fables of the Cyclops, Scylla and Charybdis, which he has changed into hideous Monsters; of the Leaspgones, who carry on their Shoulders Men on a String, as Fish, and eat them, &c. This is, in my Opinion, the Sense of this Pas sage, which was very dark and obscure.

30. And truly it does not follow, that because one thing is, another must necessarily be, but because we are perswaded of the truth of the latter, we conclude falsely, that the former is also true.] Homer knew that all Men were convinced, that all things were possible to God: And 'tis on this that he undertakes to perswade us.
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

That Achilles's Horse spake, because the Goddess Minerva, had given him the use of Voice. This is a Paralogism: For as Aristotle rightly takes notice, that because one is, it does not follow, that the other must be. Homer understood how to make use of our Prepossession to his purposes, to make us receive somewhat that was false, without being able to convince our selves that it was so. And this was the Manner in which Aristotle says, a Poet ought to lye. Victorius says, that after Aristotle's Words, there are in some Manuscripts, paral·o·γι·σμον. An Example of this is in the Place of the Odysseus, where Ulysses's Feet are marked. If this be Aristotle's Text, he refers the Reader to the same Example, which he quotes in the Third Book of his Rhetorick, where speaking of the same Paralogism, which is made by that which is known, we draw Consequences and Conjectures, for that which is not known; and cites these Verses of the nineteenth Book of the Odysseus, where Homer, to render his Story probable, by a simple and natural Circumstance, which is the Consequence of a Passion, says,

Γειναις δὲ καλεθεὶς χαρεῖ τέσσαρα
Δίκεφα και ἔκεαλε γῆμα.

And with her Hands the Old Nurse hid her Face;
Then shed warm Tears———

For those who Weep, generally hide their Face with their Hands, and Homer would by that Sign persuade his Reader, that it is no less false than the rest. 'Tis more likely that 'twas an Observation of some Critick, who had Writ in the Margin, that this Example of a Paralogism, was found in this Place of Homer, as Aristotle had laid in his Rhetorick.

31. The Poet ought rather to chuse Impossibilities, provided they have a resemblance of the Truth, than the Possible, which are Incredible with all their Possibility.] This Passage is of great Importance, to shew us, that the Wonderful in Epopoeia, tho' it transcends the bounds of
of Reason, ought not to destroy the Verisimilitude; and Aristotle says very well, That the Poets ought to prefer the Impossible, which is probable to the Possible that is not so. The Ilias, Odyssey, and Aeneis, are full of things that are humanely speaking Impossible, and yet they continue to be Probable. There are two sorts of these Impossibilities, that are within the Bounds of Probability: The first, which may be called the Great and Incredible, are those which require all the Divine Verisimilitude; as the Horse which speaks in the Ilias, the Metamorphosis of Ulysses's Ship into a Rock in the Odyssey; that of Aeneas's Ships, into so many Nymphs in the Aeneid. These ought not to be too frequent in a Poem, least they be abused. The others are those, which tho' they are Impossible, are humanely speaking Probable, either of themselves, or by the Credulity of those, to whom they are told. This by this last way that Homer has brought into Humane Probability those things which are not so; as the History of Circe and the Syrens, Scylla, Polyphemus, and many others, for he hath so ordered it, that Ulysses tells these Stories to the Phocæs, who were a Foolish, Simple, and a Credulous People, very Idle, and loved dearly to hear such Stories. That Poet designedly gave the Character of those People, when he said, That they dwell far from any place where there were Men of Judgment, or τὰς ἔπειτ' ἄνωθεν ἄριστα διδόναι ἄναμμεν Ὡδυσσεῖς. but as that Probability, which is taken from the Simplicity of those People, cannot acquit the Poet from keeping another sort of Probability in those Fables for the Learned and Rational Readers; he foresaw that, and with exact Address, hides Physical, or Moral Truths under the Allegories, and by that Method reduces to Poetical Verisimilitude and Truth, all those Wonders which Horace calls Speciosa Miracula, Speciosus Miraculis.

32. He should endeavour also to admit nothing into his Subject, which has not its Cause, and if that be Impossible, then that which is unreasonable must be out of the Subject, as in Oedipus, the Ignorance of that Prince concerning the manner of Laius's Death.] This is the name
same Precept which he gave for Tragedy in the fifteenth Chapter. 'Tis absolutely necessary, that in all the Incidents which compose the Fable, there be nothing without Reason, or if that is Impossible, it must be so ordered, that that which is without Reason be found out of the Tragedy, as Sophocles has prudently observed in his Oedipus. There were great Absurdities in the History of that Prince; for what likelihood was there that he could be so long ignorant of the Manner of Laius's Death? Was it possible that he should be Married twenty Years to Jocasta, and neither of them make the least Search after the Murder of that Prince? This was utterly incredible, and contrary to all Sense and Reason; but Sophocles finding it received in the Story, and that 'twas Marvellous, for the Theater, took the Subject of his Play from thence, and disposed it in such a manner, that what is unreasonable, is out of the Action, which doth not begin till the last Day of the Plague which afflicted the Thebans; and 'tis this Judicious Management which Aristotle proposes to those who make Epick Poems.

32. That should not be seen in that which appears on the Stage, and makes the Body of the Action, as in the Eleftra, where one enters to inform them of Orestes's Death, who was killed at the Pythian Games.] Sophocles was not so Prudent and Judicious in the Management of some other of his Pieces, as he was in Oedipus, for in his Eleftra, he was guilty of the very Fault that Aristotle here mentions, by putting in something that was Absurd, and which is the more Vicious, because he was the Author of it. In the second Scene of the second Act, he who brings the false News of Orestes's Death, says, 'That that Prince being at the celebrated meeting of the Grecians, to assist at the Pythian Games, won all the Prizes, but was kill'd in the Race of the Chariots. Aristotle thought this was Absurd, and out of all Reason, not because it was not probable, that Egisthus and Clytemnestra should not hear the News before the Arrival of those who brought Orestes's Ashes, for there were a thousand things which might hinder that;
that; but because the Pythian Games were not Instituted till above five Years after Orestes was Dead, and this Falsehood ruined all the Probability of the Piece, of which it was the Foundation: Sophocles needed only have feigned as Aeschylus did, that he was killed some other way. Some say, in defence of that Poet, that such Anachronisms are allowed in Poetry; and that Virgil has made as great; but beside, one's Absurdities not be sufficient to Justifie another's, there's a great difference between an Absurdity, in the very ground of a Fable, and one that is in an Episode only. It were to be wished, that they were in neither, but they are more excusable in the Episodes. Without doubt Sophocles thought his Audience did not know the Rise of those Games, or else he would have taken care not to have made such an Alteration in the Epocha; otherwise the Absurdity is admirably well hid, under the wonderful Charms which are in the Relation, but that don't Justifie him.

34. And as in the Myrians, where we see one who comes from Tægea to Mydia, without saying one Word.

The Fault which Sophocles is guilty of in the Myrians, is greater, and more inexcusable than that in the Electra; for nothing can be more ridiculous than to imagine, that a Man should go from Tæae, a Town of Arcadia in Mydia, without saying one Word during a Journey of several Days, as we are entirely ignorant of the Subject of that Piece, for 'tis not taken from the History of Telephus; 'tis impossible to conceive what obliged Sophocles to let such an Absurdity be in his Fable.

35. It determines to be Laugh'd at only, to say that this exactness destroys the Fables, for all the Efforts imagina-
ble ought to be made to form the Subject rightly from the beginning. This is the same Objection that some of our Modern Poets make, when we talk to them of Rules; if such Rules as these, (say they,) were to be observed, we should hardly find any Subject that was fit for the Stage, and the Players, had as good give over
over Acting. This deserves only to be Laugh'd at, as Aristotle says; and truly these Rules can never spoil any thing, and are so far from destroying the Fables, that on the contrary, they serve to correct all that is Vicious in them, or to disguise them in such a manner, that they may appear more tolerable; but this is the Cry of Ignorance and Laziness, to find fault with that they don't know how to follow. This is what Aristotle condemns. He says, and with a great deal of reason, that when any thing Absurd is found in the Subject, all Efforts imaginable must be made so to form the Plan, that all that is without Reason, may appear out of the Action of a Poem; and as there are Subjects, in which 'tis impossible to prevent all Absurdities; he says, that it may be admitted, provided it makes the rest Probable, and is adorned by all the Ornaments it is capable of; this Sophocles did, to hide the Absurdity of the Relation of the Death of Orestes. The Example which Aristotle quotes from Homer, will make this Rule more plain and clear.

36. In the Odyssey the place where Ulysses is exposed on the Shore of Ithaca, by the Phaeaces, is so full of these Absurdities, that they would be intolerable, if a bad Poet had given us them, but that great Man has hid them under an Infinity of admirable things, &c.] This is a notable Judgment. There is nothing in the Odyssey that shocks Reason so much as the exposing of Ulysses on the Shore of Ithaca by the Phaeaces. The Fact was thus, as 'tis in the thirteenth Book of the Odyssey, Alcinoüs gave Ulysses a Ship to carry him back into his Country. He Embark'd in the Evening at Corfu, and in the Morning at Break of Day he arrived at Ithaca: The Phaeaces took him Sleeping, went and carried him to the Shore in his Bed, placed it under an Olive-tree, out of the Road, with all the Presents Alcinoüs had made him, and went their way without Waking him. Aristotle had reason to say, that this was Absurd; for what probability is there that a Man so prudent as Ulysses, who saw himself alone in a Ship, at the Discretion of Strangers, and whose Mind was in-
tent, upon his Arrival in his own dear Country, should Sleep so soundly, that he should be taken out of the Vessel, carried with all his Baggage, on Shore, and that they should set Sail and he never Wake? However Homer was not ashamed of that Absurdity, but not being able to omit it, he used it to make the rest Probable; for it was necessary that Ulysses should Land alone at Ithaca, in order to his being concealed: If he had been Waked, the Phæaces would have been obliged to follow him, which Ulysses could not have handsomely denied, nor safely accepted. Homer had no other way to unravel his Fable happily, but as we knew what was Absurd in this means, he takes this Method to hide it; he uses all his Wit and Address, and puts so many admirable things into that part of his Poem, that the Mind of the Reader is Enchanted, so that he can't perceive this Defect, and is so much lull'd Asleep as Ulysses was, that he knows no more than he did how he came there. That great Poet describes the Ceremony of Ulysses taking his leave of Alcinous, and his Queen Arete; after that, he sets off the Swiftness of the Ship by two very fine Comparisons; then he gives us an exact Description of the Haven to which she came: This Description is accompanied with that of the Cave of the Nymphs which is near this Port, beside a Wood of Olives, which is so wonderful and full of Learning, that Porphyrj of Tyre thought it worth his while to explain it by an excellent Commentary. When Homer perceives that the Mind of his Reader is, as it were, Drunk with these fine things, he takes an opportunity to send Ulysses ashore, and the Phæaces back again: All that Work takes up but eight Verses, which are followed by a fine Dialogue between Jupiter and Neptune. When this Dialogue is ended, we see Neptune changing the Ship which carried Ulysses into a Rock: This was done in the View of the Inhabitants of the Island of the Phæaces; Alcinous was astonished at the Prodigy, of which he would fain know the Cause, and endeavoured to appease the Fury of that Angry God, by making a Sacrifice on the Shore, and offering twenty Bulls. Then he returns to Ulysses, who was left.
left Asleep, now Wakes, and not knowing the Place where he was, because Minerva made all things appear otherwise than they were, complains of his Misfortunes, accuses the Peaces of Perfidiousnes3 and to pass the better Judgment on them, looks over his Baggage, to see whether they had taken any thing away. Minerva then appears to him in the Shape of a Young Shepherd; Ulyfes uses his ordinary Reservednes with her, &c. Thus this Absurdity which is found in the Fable, when 'tis examin'd alone, is hidden by the Beauties that surround it, and 'tis this the Poets ought to imitate: This is more adorned with Fictions, than any place of Homer, and whose Style is most wrought up, it signifies little to have this Account of it; Read it and you'll find that Homer is the greatest Charmer in the World.

37. Thus ought we to reserve all the Ornaments of the Diction for these weak Places.] This Precept is of importance; and no less necessary for Orators than Poets. All those Places which are either Absurd or Weak, and that cannot maintain themselves, ought to be supported by all the Ornaments of the Diction; as Homer, Virgil, Demosthenes and Cicero have happily practised.

38. Those that have either good Sentiments or Manners, have no occasion for them.] This is a good Saying. Those Places which have Beautiful Sentiments, have no occasion for the Ornaments of the Diction, because these Ornaments would only obscure them. A good Sentiment never appears better, than in a simple Style: These Places which express the Manners, have no occasion for them neither, because they are also found in Plainness, wherefore Hermogenes has said more than once, That those who Write Morally μικράς, and express the Manners in their Discourse, Write plainly αξιωμάτω τοιαύτω, and without Art.

39. A Brilliant, or Glorious Expression, damages them rather, and serves only to hide their Beauty.] In the Infancy of Poetry they did not perceive this Truth, that
that the Ornaments of the Diction offended the Sentiments, and hid the Manners; for the first Poets were dazled by the Beauties of their Art, and Prodigal of them without any reserve, they were always florid, and never said any thing in a plain manner; and for this Reason there are scarce any Manners in their Pieces, and the Thoughts are so laded with the Ornaments of the Diction, that they hide them, so that they are not easily distinguished. The Poets who followed, perceiving this Fault, forsook that Elaborate Language, and kept to the usual and ordinary way of speaking: Thus Poesie and Eloquence had a different Taste, this was perfect at first, for the Ancient Orators sought only the Simplicity and the Truth; but it was afterwards corrupted, and employed only Lyes and Cheats, whereas Poetry was corrupted at first, and afterwards became found. Eloquence has not yet recovered its first Purity, and Poetry is almost relaps'd into its first Distemper. We have few Tragedies where the Persons speak Politickly, to use Aristotle's Term, that's to say, simply and ordinarily. They endeavour to use all the Ornaments of Rhetorick, and are more Declamators than Actors; and from thence it proceeds, that there are so many false Lustres, and the Manners seldom well denoted; for there is nothing more contrary to the Manners and the Sentiments than a bombast and lofty Style, as Dionysius Halicarnassensis well remarks, "Ο η ἔπιθεισ εὔγείως αὖν τὸν ὄρθωνον."
Objections which are made to the Poets, and Answers to those Objections. Why we must not Judge of Poetry, as we do of Politicks, and other Arts. The Defects in Poetry are of two Sorts; those which may, and those which may not be excused. The difference of the Heroes of Sophocles, and those of Euripides. How we may salve what Homer has said of the Gods. A Maxim of Xenophon. What is Customary and of common use, must not be condemned. A Maxim of Morality applied to Criticism. Justification of several Places of Homer, the unjust prejudice of those who censure him. The Manner of Zeuxis. An Inexcusable fault of Euripides in his Medea, and in his Orestes.

1. (a) If we would know the Number and Qualities of the common Places, from whence the Objections are drawn, that are made to the Poets, and the Answers which may be made to those Objections, we need only read this Chapter.

2. Since a Poet is an Imitator as well as a Painter, (b) and a Statuary, it necessarily fol-

(a) Of Problems and their Solutions, of how many and what forms, those who thus consider, may be informed.
(b) Or any other maker of images.
lows, that he imitates one of those three things, for he represents a Subject either as it was, or as it is; such as it is said to be, or such as it appears; or such as it ought to be (c) and to do that, he uses, either proper or foreign Words, or Metaphors, (d) or any of the other Manners of Diction, that the Poets have the liberty to employ.

3. Moreover, we must remember that we should not judge of the (e) Excellency of Poetry as of Politicks; nor as of any other of the (f) Arts.

4. There are two defects in Poetry, one that proceeds from it self, and the other which happens by Accident. When it chuses Subjects out of its reach and power, 'tis that which proceeds from it self; but when it chuses Subjects that are not above it, but Vitious, this is that which happens by Accident. As for Example, it represents an Horse, that removes his two right Feet at the same time. It may also offend against the Rules of all other Arts, as Medicine, Geography, &c. or treat of Impossibilities, but all these Defects of what Nature soever, do not proceed from it self.

5. We must therefore draw from these Places the Answers which ought to be opposed to the Reproaches that are made to the Poets. First, The Poet is guilty of a Point beyond Contradiction, if he advances these things, which are impossible.

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(c) And these are told. (d) For there are many Passions of Elocution.
(e) Resolutions. (f) As of Poetry.
according to the Rules of this Art. But this ceases to be a fault, when by those means he obtains the end which he proposed; for he has then found what he sought for. For Example, if he renders by it, that, or any other part of his Poem more astonishing or admirable; such is the place (g) in the Iliads, where Achilles pursues Hector.

6. But when the Poet can obtain some end, and produce almost the same effect, without infringing the Rules of Art, then his Fault is no less pardonable, for he must avoid, as much as is possible, the falling into any Error.

7. We must also strictly examine, whether the Fault which is in dispute, be against the Art of Poetry, or whether it be a Fault by any other Accident whatever. For the latter is of less moment, and we may more voluntarily excuse that Poet, who does not know that a Doe has Horns, than he who shall make a bad Imitation.

8. Besides, the Poets are often blamed, that they follow not the Truth in the Characters which they form; but they shew, that they do form them, either as they are, or ought to be: And 'tis thus that Sophocles and Euripides answered their Censures, Sophocles in saying, That He made his Heroes as they ought to be; And Euripides, That He made them as they were. And thus we should answer to all these sorts of Objections.

(g) Pursuit of Hector.
9. But if we cannot answer one of these two ways, we must (b) have recourse to Fame, and demonstrate that she hath said so: 'Tis thus that we salute what Homer has said of the Gods; for it may very well be, that what he has said may be neither true, nor better after this manner; but he has followed that which was reported; and otherwise as Xenophon says, 'Who is sure that he knows the Truth of his Way.'

10. It happens some times that the Thing is no better than the Poet speaks it; for he relates it just as is: And thus it is that we answer the Criticism, which is made on the place of Homer, where be says, 'That the Troops of Diomede slept standing by their Pikes, which they had fixed in the Earth; for it was then the Custom of those People, as it now appears by what the Illyrians do at this Day.

11. To know whether a Thing be well or ill done or spoken, we must not be satisfied to examine the Thing it self, to see whether it be good or ill, but we must also have respect to him who speaks, or acts, and to him to whom he addresses himself, and to consider well the Time, the Means, and the End: For several things which may appear Evil, may be done to procure a greater Good, or to avoid a greater Evil.

12. We may also render a great many Criticisms of none effect, by the manner of expressing

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(b) Say they say so.
our selves: For Example, When that which is taken for a proper Word, may be Foreign, and have a quite different Signification. Thus when they blame Homer for saying impertinently, That the Plague first seiz'd on the (i) Mules, we may say that the Word in this Passage, which they Translate Mules, signifies also, the Guards, the Sentinels, and that Homer took it in this last sense, when he said of Dolon, (k) That he was ill made, he speaks of his Face, and not of his Body, for when the (l) Candiotes would say, That a Man has a fine Face, They use a Word which is compounded of this which Homer uses. When the same Poet is accused of making them give pure Wine to the Ambassadors, which Agamemnon sent to Achilles, he may be justified by saying, That the Greek Word does not signifie (m) Pure Wine, such as is given to Drunkards, but that it signifies readily.

13. We often justify them also, by shewing that they speak Metaphorically; and thus 'tis that we save all those Places of Homer, where he says, That all the Gods and Men Slept, except Jupiter. He puts All for the most part, for Many; when he says of Agamemnon, who being shut up in his Tent in the middle of his Camp, That he cast his Eyes on the Trojan Camp. To cast his Eyes, is a Metaphorical Term, which signifies in that place only to Think, to Revolve in his Mind. When he says in the same place, the Voice of the Flutes and

(i) Οὐράνιας. (k) Φόλος. (l) Κρητανὸς ψύξ, ευερός. (m) Πυριτηρέως.
Pipes. The Voice is put there for the Sound. (n) To conclude, When he says, in speaking of the Bear, that 'tis the Only Constellation, which Baths it self in the Ocean: The Only, that is to say, The Principal, the most Known, for that which is most known, is always alone.

14. It comes to pass sometimes that we answer solidly to the Censures of the Criticks, by only changing the Tone or Accent, and 'tis thus that Hippias of Thasos salved Homer on that place, where Jupiter sends a Dream to Agamemnon, for they accused him of making a Lye upon Jupiter, and that Accusation would have been very well-grounded if it was true that Jupiter said, Let us grant him great Glory; but in changing the Accent, we find that he only commanded the Dream, to promise him that Glory, and this is very different.

15. The same Hippias, after the same manner defends this Poet, in the passage where after having spoken of a dry Tree, he is accused of saying, That one part of that Tree was Corrupted by the Rain; for he shews, that what was taken for a Pronoun, is a Negative Particle, and that Homer said, That the Rain never Corrupted that Tree.

16. There are a great many places salved by (o) the different Pointing; and 'tis this that justifies

(n) And that all the Gods followd Jupiter. All for Many Metaphori-
cally.
(o) By Division.

F f 4 Empeodcic
empedocles, who was accused of contradieting himself, in his verses, where he has explained the principles of things.

17. Sometimes we have recourse to the ambiguity, as in the passage where Homer says, That the night is more than two thirds past, and that there yet remains one third; for this apparent contradiction is reconciled, in explaining the word (π) more, which is ambiguous in the original.

18. The authority of custom is often used to defend the poets, who shall for example call wine that is mixed with water, wine; and 'tis thus that we excuse the expressions of Homer, who call, tin buskins, tho' they were made of iron, and there was only a little tin in the soldering, and he calls the workers in tin, those who laboured in the forging of iron; and says, in speaking of ganymede, that he filled out wine to the (q) gods, altho' they drank none; but all these expressions may be also solved by metaphors.

19. Whenever a word seems to signify something contrary to the intention of the poet, we should examine all the different significations which the word can have in the passage, that is in dispute. For example, in the place where Homer describes the combat of Αἴνεα and Achilles, he says, that the trojans lance pierced the

(p) πλέον.
(q) To Jupiter.
two first Folds of his Enemies Shield, and stopp at the third. The Word stopp, which seems to signifie, that it remained fixed there, signifies that it could go no further, but was repelled; and the shortest way to explain those Places, is to take the Word in the quite contrary Sense from what it is generally used.

20. It happens often, as Glaucon has very well taken notice, that the Criticks are prejudiced, and possetled of some things before they read the Poets; and being perswaded that their Opinion alone is reasonable, they condemn without any further Examination, whatsoever is contrary to that Opinion. 'Tis from this false prejudice, That the Criticism which is made on Homer upon the account of Icarius Penelope's Father was produced; for his Censurers being possetled, That Icarius was a Lacedemonian, blame the Poet for making Telemachus lodge at another place, and not his Grandfather's when he came to (?) Lacedemonia. But they must be silent before the Cephalionians, who asert, That Ulysses Married in their Country, and that his Father in Law was called Acadius, and not Icarius. So that what they take for a just Criticism, can only be Question.

21. When the Poet is accused of saying in general any thing that is impossible, we must examine that Impossibility, either in respect to Poetie, or that which is better, or in respect to (?) Fame. In respect to the Poetry, for we show,

(r) Sparta,
(s) Opinion,
that the probable impossible, ought to be pref-
ferr'd to the possible, which hath no verisimili-
tude, and which would not be believed, and thus that Zeuxis painted his Pieces. In respect to that which is better, for we fee that a thing is most excellent and marvellous in this manner, and that the Originals ought always to surpras. Lastly, in respect to fame (i) for we have proved that the Poet need only follow the common Opinion. All that appears absurd, may be also justifiable by these three ways, either by the Maxim we have already laid down, that it is probable, that a great many things happen against probability.

22. As for these things which seem contrary to what has been said before, we must examine them as we do Objections in (a) Logick. That's to say we must enquire, Whether it be the same thing? Tend to the same end? And whether it be spoken in the same manner? It is also very convenient to consider, Whether he that speaks of himself, or whether he speaks upon the report of some Prudent and Wise Man.

23. The just Criticisms to which no Answer can be given, are those where 'tis plain, that one place is unreasonable and absurd, and that another is bad; a Poet falls into the first Fault, when he has recourse without necessity to that which is without reason, and this is the Fault of Euripides in his Egeus. He was guilty of the se-

(i) And those things which are without reason.
(a) Disputation.
cond, when he introduces for Example, a bad Character without any occasion, such is the Character of Menelaus in the Orestes of that Poet.

24. The Objections, then which are made to the Poets, may be reduced under five Heads: For they may be blamed for saying things which are either (x) impossible, or absurd, or bad, or which contradict one another, or are contrary to the Rules of Art and the (y) Answers which may be made to them, may be drawn from those places we have set down, and which are in all twelve.

(x) Cannot be done.
(y) Solution.

REMARKS on Chap. XXVI.

1. If we would know the Number and Qualities of the Common Places from whence the Objections are drawn that are made to the Poets, and the Answers which may be made to them, we need only read this Chapter.] Aristotle having done giving Rules for Tragedy and Epick Poem, had reason to think, that all his labour would be in vain, unless he should instruct those who read this Work, to answer to the Objections which certain Criticks might make against the Poets; for in his Time there were Censors who were not satisfied to condemn Poetry, as an unprofitable thing, or rather a vicious Imitation, which corrupted the Manners, and consequently was unworthy to amuse Men; but also made all their Efforts to divert People from the reading of it. If those Censors had been only inconsiderable People, as Protagoras or Arispocrates; Aristotle would not have given himself this trouble, but there were Men
444 Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Men of extraordinary Merit, as Socrates and Plato, who had drawn almost all the Academicks on their side; 'twas necessary then, that Aristotle should furnish his Readers with Arms to fight against such dangerous Enemies: This is what he has done, in gathering together the Answers which had been made by learned Men, to most of these Objections, and adding some of his own Invention. The Answers serve very luckily against all the Reproaches which are cast on the Poets now in our Time, especially Homer. I should never have sought an occasion to speak of this; but since it comes so naturally in my way, I will relate some of their Criticisms, not so much to contradict them, as to shew, that if those Censours had read this Chapter, they would have seen themselves condemned.

2. Since a Poet is an Imitator as well as a Painter, and a Statuary, it necessarily follows, that he imitates one of these things.] Aristotle establishes three common Places, which are as Magazines or arsenals, from which we may draw all necessary Arms, for to repel the Attacks of the Adversaries, before he descends to the particular Answers which may be made to every Objection. The first regards the Subject of the Imitation which has three essential Differences. The second regards all the Changes which happen in the Diction, and all the Liberty the Poets use. The third regards the manner, he goes on to explain himself.

3. For he represents a Subject either as it was, or as it is, or such as it is said to be, or such as it appears, or such as it ought to be.] This is the first common Place which regards the Subject: There can be none other than these three Differences thought of, so when the Objection is aimed at the Imitation, we must endeavour to answer it one of these three ways; and if that cannot be, it is unanswerable, and we must not seek to make any Excuse for it. Horace said, Aut Fa- miam sequere, aut Convenientia singe. 'Tis necessary that the Poet search for the Resemblance or the Convenienc
nience, if he doth neither of these he is certainly guil-
ty of a Fault.

4. And to do that, he uses either proper, or Foreign
Words, or Metaphors, or any of the other manners of Di-
Aition that the Poets have the Liberty to employ.] This
is the second common Place, which regards the
Means, for the Poets make their Imitations by the
assistance of Verse; so when a Criticism shall be made
on the Diction, we must see if we cannot answer it,
by some of those Changes that are allowed in the Di-
cion, and the great Liberty which is granted to the
Poets.

5. Moreover we must remember that we should not judge
of the Excellence of Poetry, as of Politicks, nor of any
other of the Arts.] This is the third common Place,
which regards the Manner, in which the Poets make
their Imitation. Aristotle wrote this particularly against
Plato, who in his Books of a Republick, and those of the
Laws, examines Poetry with respect to Politicks, and
condemns it, when it is not conformable to the Rules
which good Politicks gives for the Preservation of
States, and the Welfare of the People. There is no-
thing more unjust. For as Aristotle says very well, we
must not judge of Poetry as of Policy, nor as we
judge of the other Arts; and truly as Policy is the Art
of managing the People wisely; Medicine of preser-
ving the Health, Logick of discerning the Truth from
a Lye, and Rhetorick of persuading; they have all a
different aim from Poetry, and so often as they arrive
not at that aim, they commit inexcusable Faults, which
produce them, and that cannot be imputed to any
other Art. 'Tis not the same of Poeties, its Intention
is to imitate, and the Faults which it is guilty of in
not doing it well, are of two sorts, either Proper or
Foreign; the Proper are those which it commits, in
choosing Subjects above its power; and the Foreign are
those into which it falls by choosing Vicious Subjects.
The first are essential Defects, which are only pardon-
able in some particular Cases, as we shall see in what
follows;
follows; and the others are not the fault of the Poetry, but the Poet, who offends not against his own, but some other Art; this is the sense of this Passage, and what follows, will make it yet plainer.

6. When it chooses Subjects out of its reach and power, 'tis that which proceeds from it self.] There are no Faults that can be attributed to the Arts properly speaking, for they cannot err: Physick never kills the Patient, 'tis the Doctor. 'Tis the same in all other Arts, to accuse them of any such Faults, is to maintain, that the Art of Shooting makes a Man miss the Mark he aimed at. Since 'tis thus, when we say that such a thing is the defect of the Art, we mean that 'tis the fault of the Artist, who deviates from the Rules of his Art; a Poet then who offends against the Art of Poetry, is such an one as chooses Subjects which are not proportionable to his Capacity, for then 'tis impossible that he should succeed in his Imitation. For this reason Horace gives this fine Precept, at the beginning of his Art of Poetry.

Sumite materiam, videvis, qui scribitis, equum Viribus, & versate diu quid forse recubat; Quid valcant humeri; cui leeta potenter eritis, Nec facundia desperit humane, nec lucidus ordo.

Be sure, all you that undertake to Write, To choose a Subject for your Genius fit; Try long and often, what your Talents are; What is the Burthen which your Parts will bear; And where they'll suit; he that discerns with skill To choose his Argument, and Subject well, Will never be to seek for Eloquence To dress, or Method to dispose his Sense.

7. But when it chooses Subjects that are not above it but Vicious, this is that which happens by Accident. For Example, an Horse that removes his two right Feet at one time.] The Foreign Faults, and of which we should not accuse Poetry, are those which the Poets commit against
against some other Art than their own, and those are of less moment and more pardonable than the first: A Poet will not cease to be a good one, tho' in describing the Course of a Sprightly Horse he should make him move his two right Feet at the same time, 'tis a Fault, but not in Poetry. If the Poet would have consulted the Jockeys, or seen an Horse walk, or any other Animal that has four Feet, he would have seen, that none of them move two Feet of the same side, at the same time, but the right Fore-foot, and left one behind, or the left Fore-foot, and the right one behind, so that they bear up both Sides of their Bodies. A Poet ought indeed to know so much of all Arts, as not to offend against any of them; but if I was to chuse, I would rather have him that was guilty of some Faults of this Nature, than one that was too knowing, for nothing is more disagreeable, than a Poet who affects to shew an Universal Knowledge.

8. It may offend against the Rules of all other Arts, as Phyfick.] For Example. Homer may be accused of committing a Fault against the Art of Phyfick, when he gives Wine to those who were dangerously wounded. But besides Athenicus's Jufification of him in shewing, that the Frugality of the Greeks made them find a Sovereign Remedy in Wine, which our Intemperance causes us to lose; 'tis certain, that when he did offend against this and other Arts, as Anatomy, Astronomy, Geography, &c. he did not offend against the Art of Poetry.

9. Or Treat of Impossible Things.] When the Poet advances things which can never be, he errs by Accident also; for his Fault happens by his Ignorance, of the Nature of the Thing he speaks of.

10. We must therefore draw from these Places the Answers, which ought to be opposed to the Reproaches which are made to the Poets.] If the Objection be aimed at the Subject, we must examine these three Differences which he has established and shew, that the Poet hath imita-
imitated such a Thing as it was, or as it is, or as it should be. If it regards the Means, we must examine the Term the Poet made use of, and see whether it be proper or Foreign, or Metaphorical, or any other Ornament of Discourse, if it be protracted, substracted, or changed, and consider the Reasons the Poet might have to make use of that Expression rather than another. To conclude, If it be on the Manner, we must enquire if that which is blamed be a proper, or a foreign Fault, if it be contrary to the Art of Poetry or any other.

11. First the Poet is guilty of a Fault beyond Contradiction, if he advances these things which are impossible, according to the Rules of his Art, but it ceaseth to be a Fault, when by those means he obtains the end which he proposed.] Aristotle begins with those Faults which may be committed against the Art of Poetry. He hath said already, that they consist in an ill choice of the Subject, by chusing them above their Capacity. All that is Absurd is such, and 'tis that which he here calls Impossible, for by the Word Impossible, he doth not mean that which can't happen according to the Course of Nature, since these sort of Faults are foreign, or by Accident, as hath been already shown. Impossible in this place, is that which he calls in the preceding Chapter ἀνόητον, Unreasonable, Absurd. Every Absurdity in the Imitation is a Fault of Poetie. Aristotle does not then only tell us here, on what Occasions the Faults which a Poet commits in this Art, may be excused, but also when they cease to be such: 'Tis only when the Poet by their means obtains the end which he had proposed to himself, that is to excite Wonder and Admiration, and such is the place in the Iliads where Achilles pursues Hector.

12. If he renders by it, that, or any other part of his Poem more astonishing or admirable.] Aristotle tells us here, That the Unreasonable, which the Poets sometimes put designedly into their Poems, is not always designed to render that place more wonderful where it is
13. But when the Poet can obtain the same end, and produce almost all the same effects, without infringing the Rules of Art, his Fault is no less pardonable, for he must avoid as much as is possibly the falling into any Error. As what he hath said of Absurdities ceasing to be Faults, if they are used to excite the greater Admiration, might cast the Poets into a dangerous Security, by preventing them from taking the strictest care to purge their Works from all that is Vicious or Absurd, under pretence that it would render some place more surprizing and admirable, he takes care to inform them, that 'tis not only better to obtain that end without any Fault, but that 'tis also better to do it, tho' not so well, for what is what he means by these Words, ἄλλοι δὲ λέγοντες, more or less, which I have Translated almost, provided the Difference be not too great; 'tis better not to obtain his end so well, and cause less Admiration, than to be guilty of a Fault. This Judgment so worthy of its Author, serves to shew us, that those are the most wonderful and admirable Places, where Homer has violated the Rules of Art, either designedly or being forced to it by the disposition of his Fable.

14. We must also strictly examine, whether the Fault that is in dispute, be against the Art of Poetry, or by any other Accident whatever. Before we condemn a Poet, we should see whether he has offered against the Art of Poetry, or whether it be only an accidental Fault, let the Accident be of what nature soever; for a Poet,
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

properly speaking, only offends when he imitates that Art which the Art is capable of doing well, all the other Faults are trivial, and pardonable, and don't hinder him from being Excellent in his Art.

15. And we may more voluntarily excuse that Poet, who does not know, that a Doe has Horns, than he who shall make a bad Imitation]. He hath already shewed us by an Example, what these Faults are which may be committed against any other Art than that of Poetry, a Poer describes an Horse, that lifts up his two right Feet as he walks. This is another Example drawn from things that are prodigious, or impossible in Nature; a Poet represents a Doe that has Horns; this Fault is not in the Poetry, but proceeds from the Poets Ignorance of that truth, which all Naturalists have taken notice of, and which Aristotle endeavours to prove in the second Chapter of the eleventh Book of the Parts of Animals, (viz.) that Nature doth not give Horns to Does. This is more pardonable, than if the Poet had made a Vicious Imitation; for then he would have been deficient in his own Art. What Aristotle says here, may excuse Anacreon and Pindar, who have both of them made the Does Horned; but however inconsiderable such a Fault may be, 'tis better to omit it; if it is true, that Does have no Horns, how shall we excuse Callimachus, for falling into the same Error, after this Judicious Remark of Aristotle, whom he had certainly read; but without doubt he thought that the authority of Pindar and Anacreon, were sufficient to justify him, and that a Herd of Does with Golden Horns, would set off an Hymn consecrated to Diana, much better than one of Stags, or else they had discovered in his time that Aristotle was deceived, and that Nature doth sometimes give Horns to the Does, as they say was seen in the last Age, in which a Doe was taken that had Horns, and the Head kept as a great Rarity.

16. Besides
16. Besides the Poets are often blamed, that they follow not the Truth in the Characters which they form; but they show that they do form them either as they are, or as they ought to be.] He goes back to the Objections which regard the Subject, and teaches us how we may answer to them. If the Poets represent the finest things, as they are not ordinarily, they may be justified by saying, that they represent them not such as they are; but such as they ought to be; and follow more the verisimilitude than the necessity; and if they represent them with less Ornament, and not in flattering a manner we excuse them by saying, that they represent them, not such as they ought to be; but such as they are, that they followed the Necessity, more than the Probability, and kept closer to their Copies than to the Originals.

17. And 'tis thus that Sophocles and Euripides answer'd their Censures; Sophocles in saying, that he made his Heroes as they ought to be: And Euripides, that he made them as they were.] This is the Sense of the Passage, which in my Opinion is very remarkable, for it teaches us, that in the time of Sophocles and Euripides there were some who found fault with the first for flattering his principal Persons too much, and the latter for not doing it enough; and truly Sophocles endeavour'd to make his Imitations perfect by always following, rather what Nature could do, than what she did; whereas Euripides strove to render them like, consulting chiefly what Nature did, rather than what she could do. I believe that last way would agree best with Comedy, and the first with Tragedy and Epic Poem, which ought to imitate that which is most excellent. If Heinlius had comprehended the Beauty of this Passage and the Solidity of the Judgment, he would not have endeavoured to Correct it. 'Tis one of his worst Criticisms, and is as follows: And 'tis thus that Sophocles answer'd his Critics, in saying, That he made the Women as they ought to be, and that Euripides made them as they were. For says he, Sophocles represented
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

represented the Women Honest and Vertuous, and Euripides made them bad. He founded this Opinion on the Reproach that was cast on Euripides for hating the Women, and truly he is one of the Poets that speaks the worst of them; but that did not hinder him from bringing some very good ones on the Stage, as Alcestes, Iphigenia Andromache. We may say also that he flattered his Heroines more than he did his Heroes. Whereas Sophocles, hath flattered his Heroes more than his Heroines: As for Example, the Character of his Electra appears too severe, and he hath much augmented the Cruelty of Clytemnestra.

18. But if we cannot answer one of these two ways, we must have recourse to Fame, and demonstrate that she hath said so. If the Subject of the Imitation be neither such as it should be probably, or necessarily, then we must have recourse to Report, to see if the Poet has followed that; this is the use of those three Differences, which regard the Subject, and which he hath explained. For a Poet treats of it either as it is, or as it should be, or as 'tis said to be; that which cannot be salved by one of these Authorities, is a Fault.

19. 'Tis thus we value what Homer has said of the Gods; for it may very well be that what he has said, may be neither true, nor better after this manner; but he has followed that which was reported.] The Ancients blamed Homer for attributing all the Passions and Vices of Men to the Gods; for this Reason Plato banished him from his Commonwealth; and Pythagoras said, That he was cruelly tormented in Hell, for having said so many things Injurious to Divinity. Aristotle answers these Objections, and endeavours to defend Homer; he says, That he followed Fame in what she had published concerning them; for Orpheus, and the other Poets who preceded him, gave the same account, and as we can't doubt but that he added something of his own, yet 'tis conformable to all the rest. Aristotle thought this was sufficient to excuse him, but there are several
Several other Reasons to justify him. It hath been already taken notice of, that in Homer's Time they spake to the People only in Allegories and Parables; all the Divinities which he introduces into his Poem are Allegorical, he speaks of them as a Divine, or a Natural, or as a Moral Poet. As a Theological Poet he says nothing of his Gods but what is good, and agreeable to them: But to accommodate them to the usual way of Humane speaking, he attributes to them the same Passions as the most Orthodox Theology doth, viz. Anger, Rage, Sadness, Vengeance, &c. altho' they are free from them. As a Natural Poet, he makes Natural Causes of his Gods, and gives them Manners, Discourses, and Actions conformable to the Natures of those things which those Divinities represent. As a Moral Poet, he makes Gods of our Virtues and Vices. If we take the pains to examine all that appears most Choquant in Homer, according to these several ways, we shall find, that he is blamed in vain, that he is very far from deserving any, but on the contrary is praised worthy. I add, that setting aside the Allegories, his Fictions are marvellous, and that we find in the Sacred Scriptures, Examples of such Expressions and Figures. This Agreeableness of Homer's to the Divine Writings, ought to make the Critics a little more reserved in their Judgments, and modest in their Censures.

20. For it may very well be, that what he has said, may be neither true, nor better, after this manner, but he has followed that which was reported.] Plato condemns these Fictions of Homer, because they were as he says, false, and that they might do a great deal of Prejudice to the Ignorant and Simple, in giving them Ideas unworthy the Holiness and Majesty of the Gods. Aristotle passes by all this, and pretends to justify Homer on his account of his laying only that which had been advanced before his Time; but he doth it in an indeterminate and very equivocal sort of way. It may very well be, says he, that which he says may be neither true nor better, &c. He doth not say, It is, but only It may.
very well: he speaks according to his Maxims, that is, to say, like a Blind Philosopher, who believed that God did not concern himself with the Affairs of Mankind, and that Men had very little Knowledge of him. This Place is unworthy of Aristotle.

21. And otherwife as Xenophanes said, Who is sure that he knows the Truth, this may. This is the consequence of that Impious Opinion, we just now saw. God does not concern himself with Humane Affairs, and Men know so little of him, that in whatsoever manner they speak of him, they cannot be reprehended; and Aristotle calls to his Assistance, the Testimony of an Ancient Philosophical Divine, who had wrote some Verfes of the Nature of the Gods: To prove that we could know nothing of them; and that if we found out any Truth, it was pure Chance; and we could not be certain of it. These are his Verfes.

Of Nature, and the Gods, none e're yet knew, Or ever shall, that which is plainly true; And if by Chance, he thinks h's found it out, He knows it not, it still remains a Doubt.

This is an impertinent and gross Error, and has no need of the Light of the true Religion to confute it; we need only have recourse to some of the Wise Heathen, who acknowledged, That the Godhead was visible by his Works, and Providence, that he must be blind that could not see it, and insensible that should attribute anything to him but what was Good and Just. Euripides said well, The Gods which commit Unjust, or Shameful Actions, are not Gods. Aristotle could without doubt have defended Homer much better, if he had pleased; but he was afraid of Injuring the Sec.
It happens sometimes, that the Thing is no better than the Poet speaks it; for he relates it just as it is, and there it is that we answer the Criticism which is made on the Place of Homer, where he says, That the Troops of Diomede slept standing by their Pikes.] In the tenth Book of the Iliad, Agamemnon, Hector and Ulysses, go to wake Diomedes. Homer says, That they found him laid on an Ox-c-Hide at the Door of his Tent, having under his Head a piece of Purple Cloth, his Soldiers were laid also on the Ground, resting on their Helmets, having fixed their Pikes in the Ground beside them. On this account Homer is blamed, of having a Design to give a fine Idea of the Valour of these Troops; and to shew that they were ready to fight Night or Day; but 'tis quite contrary, for the Pikes being fixed in the Ground, were not so ready at hand as if they had lain down by them. Aristotle enters into no further Examination of the Matter, but consents to the Critics, That it might very well be that the way of keeping the Pikes so near them, was not so good as the other, but thinks 'tis enough to justifie Homer, that it was the Custom of these People, and which as yet remained among the Illyrians, who certainly took it from the Greeks. Eustathius writes, That the Greeks did not leave it off till a long time after that, and then on account of an Accident which happened thus; some of the Pikes fell in the Night-time on the Soldiers, and waked them by Surprize, which caused a general Alarm in the Camp; so they ordered that the Army should be no more exposed to these sort of Accidents. This Criticism is then not only unprofitable, but unjust, as all those will be, that are made on those things that depend purely on Custom, it was impossible that Homer should conform himself to succeeding Ages, but they ought to go back to the Customs of his Time. There was nothing more common then to see in those Days People talking together before they went to fight, Homer is full of [G g 4] these
these Examples; and 'tis but reasonable that we should do him the Justice to think, that he would not so often have mentioned if it had been contrary to the usage of his Time. 'Tis on this Custom that the Conversation of Glaucus and Diomede is founded, in the sixth Book of the Ilias. 'Tis true that it is long, and 'tis the length which offends our Critics, who never lose sight of their own Age, and would have Homer and Virgil from the Manners and Customs of their Persons, according to ours; but if they had given themselves the trouble to have examined the Reasons of that length, 'tis probable they would not have been so much disquieted. Hospitality was in those Heroick Days more sacred than Parentage it self, and 'twas this which made Diomede give such a long Audience to Glaucus, who took him at first sight for his Host, with whom it was not lawful to fight: And Homer admirablely well uses this Conjunctures, to make an agreeable stay after so many Battles as he had related, and to divert his Reader, by such a pleasant History as that of the Family of Sisyphus was: But this is not all, we ought to take notice with what Address and Management he inserst this long Discourse; 'tis not during the heat of a sharp Encounter, that had been wrong timed, and no Custom had been sufficient to excuse it, he places it after Hector was returned into Troy, and the Absence of that Formidable Enemy had given Diomede that leisure, which he could not have had without it, we need only read the Judicious Remark of Euclidius on this place, which I shall only Translate, without inserting the Greek Text: This Poet having sent such a dangerous Enemy as Hector out of the way, and made him retreat from the Throng, breaks off the heat of the Fight, and gives some respite to his Reader, in bringing him from the Disorder and Confusion of the Action, to the Security and Tranquility of an Historical Relation; for by that Happy Episode of Glaucus. He hath found the means of mixing several admirable things in his Poem, as Fables which contain charming Allegories, Histories, Genealogies, Sentences. Ancient Customs, and such like things that are agreeable; which diversifie his Poem, and which
which breaking as we may say, the Series of it, instructs us very agreeably. This is what Homer does, for by this he nicely praises Diomede and Hector; for he shows us, That whilst Hector was in the Field, the Greek had no spare time; and that when he was retir'd, all the rest of the Trojans were not sufficient to employ Diomede, and that 'twas only Play to him; he gives his Reader some rest, by an Episode that is very agreeable, and well placed, and with which he also diversifies his Poem; but this the Criticks are not sensible of. They think they have done Wonders when they have drawn any Passage out of its place, and have without any proof assured us, that 'tis Ridiculous and Impertinent, as if it was not easy to disfigure the most admirable and excellent Places, by relating them alone, and without the Context which they ought to have. It may be objected, That tho' we may justify Homer, yet we can't excuse the Manners of his Age; for 'tis Unnatural for Men to talk coolly together when they have their Swords drawn in order to Fight. 'Tis an Injust Prejudice which makes us prefer our own Customs to those of the Ancients, and perswades us that they are more agreeable to Nature, but more than this, the duration of the ancient Customs in their proper Countries, which the Commerce of Strangers was never able to corrupt, is an evident Sign that they were Natural, and who hath told us, that 'ts more Natural to fall to fighting at once, than to talk with our Enemies before we begin? The first may be more natural to Tygers and Lyons, but the last seems more natural to Men: And if we may judge of two People who have quite contrary Customs, I say that the most reserved would have the greatest Courage and Firmness, and the most Passionate a Raff Heart, and that they would make haste to put into execution that Anger which their Choler should inspire, for fear that it should vanish together with their Courage, if they did not make use of it in that very moment.
22. To know whether a thing be well or ill done or spoken, we must not be satisfied to examine the thing itself, to see whether it be good or ill, but we must also have respect to him who speaks or does.] There is an admirable Rule in Morality, which prohibits us from judging of other Men's Actions, because 'tis very difficult to know certainly whether they are bad; for there are a thousand things which are done designedly, for some unseen Advantage, and which tho' they appear Ridiculous, are very Wise and Solid when we look to the bottom of them. Aristotle had good reason to give the same Rule for Criticism, and that we should examine all the Circumstances of a Subject, before we condemn it; for the Circumstances of Persons, Time, Place, Means, and the End, make such a change in things, that those which appear evil, when they are taken by themselves and in gross, become very good when they are examined in detail, and by the Particulars. 'Tis by such a discreet Conduct as this, that many Places of the Holy Scriptures themselves are to be justified, which being taken according to the Letter, would appear unworthy of the Sanctity of those Writings, and contrary to Justice and Truth. If there are such Places in the Sacred Writings, much more may we expect them in Profane ones; and therefore 'tis the more requisite to read them with the same Circumspection. If we do so, all that appears at first sight defective in the Characters, which Homer has formed, and which has drawn on him the Censures of some Criticks, is not only regular, but wonderful, and the best Model that can be imitated.

23. But we must also have respect to him who speaks or does; and to him to whom be addresses himself.] For the Character of the Person who speaks, and of him to whom he speaks, makes that to be good which would not come well out of another's Mouth, or if it were addressed to any Body else. 'Tis on this Account that the Stories which Ulysses told the Pheoces would appear foolish if they had been told to a more knowing or less igno-
ignorant People, but they are excellent and probable, according to the Character of these People, who were ignorant, and wild after Fables and Stories. 'Tis on this account also as the Author of the Treatise on Epic Poetry has well remarked, that we justify all that is found amiss in the Fable of the Adultery of Mars and Venus, without having any recourse to the Natural or Moral Allegory, which may be hid under the Fable; and shew that Homer is not without excuse, for truly we must consider, that 'tis neither the Poet nor his Heroe, nor a Man of any Value that makes that Story; 'tis a Musician, and one that Sings during the Festival, to a soft and effeminate People, as the Pheaces were, and Homer would shew us by the Example of those Idle People, who know how to do nothing but Sing and Dance, Eat and Drink, that that Idle and Soft Carriage was the Source of Criminal Pleasures, and that those Persons, who lead such a Life, are generally pleased to hear immodest Stories, and to see the Gods made Partakers of their Lusts: From whence we may conclude, that this Relation of Homer's is less an Example of Adultery and Impiety, than of good Advice which he gives to them, who would live Honestly, by insinuating, that if they would avoid those Crimes, they should also avoid the Paths which lead to them. If Scaliger had made this Reflexion, he had not been guilty of this false Criticism. Demodorus Deorum fæditates in Alcinoi canit convivio. Noster Jopas res Rege dignas. Demodorus sings the Lusts of the Gods, at the Feast of Alcinous, and Jopas things worthy of a King. The Songs of Demodorus are proportioned to the Natural Inclination and Relish of those to whom he sings them. And those of Jopas in Virgil, are such as should be for a Queen, who was as then Chaste, who had received Strangers to her Table, before whom she ought to shew all her Prudence and Modesty. But to shew that Virgil is no more referred in this matter than Homer, see the fourth Book of the Georgicks, where he introduces a Nymph, who in the Court of the Cyrenian Goddess, sings to her Mistress who had only Nymphs about her,
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

her, she sings, I say, the same Songs as Demodorus did.

Inter quae Curam Clymene narrabat Inanem
Vulcani Martifque dolos & dulcia surta:
Atque caelo densoo Divum numerabat amores.

To whom Clymene sang Vulcan's vain Care,
The Crafty Tricks of Mars, and Sweetest Thefts,
And th' Gods Amours e're since the World was made.

If any of these two Poets is to be blamed, 'tis certainly Virgil, but neither of them deserve it, but are on the contrary praiseworthy. Virgil understood very well what a Prudent Queen ought to hear before Strangers, and what Women might say when they were alone by themselves. And 'tis these Good Manners that the Poets should never violate. Servius might have convinced Scaliger, if he would have suffered himself to be guided by Reason more than his own Fancy. For this is the wise Remark of that learned Critick, on the singing of Jopas in the first Book of the Æneids. Bene Philosophica inducitur Cantilena in Convidio Regina: Adhibit castre contra, inter Nymphas ubi femina erant, ait Vulcani Martique Dolos. Philosophick Songs are very properly introduced at the Feasts of a Queen, who was as yet Chaste; on the contrary 'twas right to sing the Stories of Vulcan's Fears and Mars's Intrigues amongst the Nymphs, and when the Women were alone.

24. And to consider well the time.] For the Conjunction of the Time may render that good which would otherwise be evil, and 'tis this way that a great many Defects of the Ancient Poets are justified, which seem to be so when they are examined without any regard to the Time, when they were Translated.

25. The Means.] For the Means which the Poets use to obtain the unraveling of the Fable, are not sufficient to justify that which appears extravagant, and extra-
extraordinary in the Characters which they have formed, and 'tis thus, That what the less Judicious Criticks find to Brutal, Cruel, and Capricious in Homer's Heroes, appears to the Wiser sort, not only Jult and Regular, but what is most essential to the Character, and necessary to the Subject. The Brutality of Achilles, the Goodness and Piety of Aeneas, and the profound Diffimulation of Ulysses, may be the Subjects of Raillery among the Unlearned Criticks, but they will be always the Wonder of those who understand themselves.

26. And the End.] The End may also serve very much to palliate that, which seems too low in the Means which are used. This justifies Achilles in many Places, and excusest all the Humiliations of Ulysses.

27. We may also render a great many Criticisms of none effect by the manner of expressing our selves; for Example, When that which is taken for a proper Word, may be foreign, and have a quite different Signification.] Having told us how, we may answer to the Objections which regard the Subject, and the manner of Imitation, he comes to those which regard the Means, that is to say the Diction. The Diction hath two parts, for it generally comprehends the Thoughts and the Expression Aristotle has told us more than once, that Homer has surpassed all the other Poets in the Art of Writing well, whether we look on the Expression, or the Thoughts and Sentiments, and that he has not only excelled the others, but that he has also done it to perfection, after a declaration of this Nature, he might easily dispence with following the Criticks in their wandering Steps, however he doth it, and tells us how we may refute all that Envy and Ignorance can invent against the Poets. The Answers which may be made to these Objections, are drawn from the richness of the Language which the Poets use. The following Examples will make this more plain.

28. Thus
28. Thus when they blame Homer for saying impertinently, That the Plague first seized the Mules, we may say, That the Word in that Passage, &c.] In the first Book of the Iliad, Homer speaking of the Plague which Apollo sent into the Grecian Camp, says,

"Oυσιν ημείς Πηλέος ιππόστασ, τί νέφοι εάνυς.

It seized first the Mules, and then the Dogs.

The Criticks endeavoured to ridicule this: Apollo, they say, was angry with the Greeks, and amuses himself with first killing the Asses, Mules, and Dogs, who had been guilty of no Offence towards him. Aristotle answers to this impertinent Criticism, by saying, That this Word may be a Foreign, and not a Proper one: There is in the Greek, a proper Word 'Oπευς, which signifies a Mule, from a Word which signifies Mountains, but there is also a Foreign Word, which it sometimes uses, 'tis 'Οπευς, which comes from the Word άπευς; of the Verb ἀπεί, I see, I look out, and signifies a Guard, a Centinel. Homer uses that Word in the tenth Book of the Iliad, when Nestor demands of Agamemnon,

Ἡ τίν 'Οπον ἰένας ἢ τίν ἐτάραν:

Seek for a Leader, or some of the Guards.

Aristotle says then, that in the Passage in dispute, the Word 'Οπευς, taken in its proper signification, would be Nonsense, but before we condemn Homer, we should have recourse to the Foreign Signification, which makes it good; and certainly when Homer said that Apollo first flew the Guards, and the Dogs they had with them, is very reasonable, for they being exposed to the heat of the Sun, might first feel the Effects of that Contagion, before it was become general. But Aristotle does not assure us that Homer did make use of this Foreign Word, he only says it may be, because
because he says that the Poet might well enough be justified, tho' he made use of it as a proper Word; for the Beasts, and especially the Mules and the Dogs might by reason of their acute Smelling perceive the Infection of the Air, as all the Commentators on Homer have remarked. Again, That Poet might insinuate, That God, who loves Mankind, and always Punishes them with Regret, would give the Greeks some time to repent; wherefore he first smites those Creatures which are of greatest use to them, as the Mules and Dogs, the former of which carried their Baggage, and the latter kept Watch by Night. There is nothing here that can deserve Raillery, nay, which is not perfectly fine, since it is conformable to the Style of the Holy Scripture, the Plague was the first Stroke with which God afflicted the Egyptians; and Moses thus speaks from God to Pharaoh. Behold my hand shall be on thy Fields, and thy Horses, and thy Asses, and Camels, and Oxen, and Sheep, a very grievous Plague, Exod. Chap. 9.

29. When he said of Dolon, That he was ill made, he speaks of his Face, and not of his Body.] In the tenth Book of the Iliad, Homer says of Dolon, that he offered himself to Hektor to go into the Grecian Camp by Night, to discover what was done there.

He was not Handsome, but was very Swift.

The Criticks say, That Homer contradicted himself in this place, for 'tis impossible that a Man who is ill shaped, can have this Qualification. This Criticism was founded on the Word ἀσως, being taken in the general Usage of the Greek Tongue, for the Air of the whole Person, so that a Man who was well made was called ἐυαριθσ.; but Aristotle shews that the same Word was taken in Crete for the Face only, and the Man who had a fine one was called ἐυαριθσ. For this reason Hesychius has set down ἐυαριθσ., ἐμορφά, and perhaps...
30. When the same Poet is accused of making them give pure Wine to the Ambassadors, which Agamemnon sent to Achilles, be may be justified by saying, That the Greek Word does not signify pure Wine, such as is given to Drunkards, but that it signifies readily. In the ninth Book of the Ilias, Agamemnon sends Ulysses, Ajax and Phoenix to appease Achilles; who received these Ambassadors very kindly, and gave order to Patroclus.

Meïzoun ðu κονῇγες, Męroita và, καλίτα, Ζαρότσεγν ζ κεκαίρε, δέπας δ' ἑυτών ἔκάσαις

Menetus Son, the largest Bowls fill up With purest Wine, and give to each his Cup.

Zoïlus the Amphipolitane, says, that Homer is guilty of an unpardonable Indecency, in ordering pure Wine to be given to such Wise Men, which was used only to be drank by those who were Debauched and Drunken. In answer, we say, That the Word Εαρότσεγνν, doth not signify pure Wine, but readily, as Hesychius has explained it after Aristotle. It signifies also the hottest Wine, fullest of Spirits, and consequently the most excellent. Thus Achilles tells Patroclus, that he should get some of the best Wine, and mingle it with Water, according to their Custom, in a Vessel called Crater. We have reason to think, that he would have less Water mixed with it than ordinary, because his Heroes were fatigued with the Labour of that Day. Plutarch thought that this Question deserved an whole Chapter in his Table Discourses: See what he says in Chap. IV. of Book V. where he assents to the latter Explication. The Word κεκαίρε, which signifies to mix, infallibly denotes, that Water was mixed with the Wine.
31. We often justify them also, by shewing that they speak metaphorically; and thus it is that we save all those Places of Homer when we say, That all the Gods and Men Slept, except Jupiter.] Homer begins the second Book of his Ilias with these two Verses.

Ἀλλαὶ μὴν ἡμῖν ὑπόθεσιν ἄνεἴρεσιν ἡπτοκρυπταὶ,
Εὐσεβῶν παρνάχιοι. Λία σὲ εἰς ἐχενδύμοι ὑπὲρ.

The Gods and Men were then all fast Asleep; Great Jove alone, himself could waking keep.

The Criticks pretend, that 'tis ridiculous to say, that Jupiter only was Awake in Heaven, and that it gave a very bad idea of the Grecian Captains, to tell us that all their Army was Asleep. This was an Army well guarded (say they) when all the Soldiers Slept, but this Criticism is badly founded, for there is nothing more common not only in Verse, but in Prose too, to say the general Word All, for the most part. Thus in the ninth Chapter of Exodus, it is said, That the Plague kill'd all the Beasts: And four Verses after he says, That the sixth Punishment of the Ashes, which immediately followed the Plague, covered the Sores both of Man and Beast. Now 'tis plain by this last Passage, that the Word All in the first, is meant only of a great part. There is nothing more usual, yet notwithstanding this Remark of Aristotle, Scaliger, has fallen into this false Criticism of accusing Homer of a Lyre, when he says in the eleventh Book of the Iliad, That all the Gods were angry with Jupiter for taking the part of the Trojans: "For 'tis false, says he, that all the Gods were angry, since there was half of them that were for Troy. Pitiful Invention!

32. When he says of Agamemnon, who being shut up in his Tent, in the middle of his Camp, that he raise his Eyes on the Trojan Camp.] In the tenth Book of the Iliad, Homer speaking of the Cares which tormented Agamemnon one Night in his Tent, says,
When to the Trojan Camp he cast his Eye,  
He saw the kindling Fires flame round the Town,  
He heard the Voice of Flutes, and Noise of Men;  
But when he saw his Troops, and view’d his Fleet,  
He tore his Hair, and Jove he thus Invok’d.

The Criticks ask how Agamemnon, who was shut up  
in his Tent in the middle of a well fortified Camp,  
could see what passed among the Trojans, and cast his  
Eyes on the Fleet; some would save this Contradiction by saying, That he had a Tent in an eminent place, from whence he could see all that was transacted thereabouts; but this is founded on Conjecture only. Aristotle answers much better, in shewing, that to regard, to cast ones Eyes, are Metaphorical Terms, to think of, revolve in his Mind. Agamemnon, when he was shut up in his Tent thought of all that he had seen before he went thither. The same Criticks blame Homer for having said in the same place, The Voices of the Flutes and Pipes; for Voice is properly said of Men only; but Aristotle answers by saying, That ’tis put Metaphorically for the Sound, and there is nothing more admirable than the Metaphor, which is of wonderful use in the Sublime. ’Tis thus that David says, The Voice of thy Thunder, and the Prophet Nahum makes admirable use of the Description of the Destruction of Nineveh, a Description which is far exceeding all those of Profane Authors, both for its Energy and Vivacity: For he says in the third Chapter, The Shield of the Mighty Men is made red, the Valiant Men are in Scarlet, their Chariots shall be with flaming Torches in the Day of his Preparation, and the Fir-trees shall be sensibly shaken. The Chariots shall rage in the
Aristotle's Art of Poetry. 467

the Streets, they shall jostle one against another, in the broad Ways: They shall seem like Torches, they shall run like the Lightnings. He shall recount his Worthies, they shall stumble in their Walk; they shall make haste to the Walls thereof, and the Defence shall be prepared. The Gates of the Rivers shall be opened, and the Palace shall be dissolved. Voice is not only attributed to things that cannot make a noise, but also to those which are Mute: Thus God blaming Cain for his Crime, says, The Voice of thy Brother's Blood, crieth to me from the Ground.

33. To conclude, when he says, in speaking of the Bear, that 'tis, the only Constellation which doth not bath itself in the Ocean, the only, that is to say, the Principal, the most known.] Among those wonderful things which Vulcan engraved on Achilles's Shield, Homer says that he put.


The Northern Bear, by some the Chariot call'd,
Is turn'd round; and Orion doth behold,
And is above, not in the Ocean bath'd.

The same Verses are repeated in the first Book of the Odysseas. The Criticks have made use of this Passage, to prove, that Homer was entirely ignorant of Astronomy, since he believed, that the Bear was the only Constellation which was not bathed in the Ocean, that is to say, that did not set, and was always visible; for say they, this is common to other Constellations of the Arctic Circle, as the Little-Bear, the Dragon, the Hand of Bootes, and the greatest part of Cepheus. To solve Homer, we answer, That he says it is the only one, to shew, that 'tis the only one of the Constellations he had spoken of, or that he had put the Only, for the Principal, the most known. Strabo justifies this after another manner, in the beginning of his first

H h 2 Book,
Book, see the entire Passage, which I have Translated, because it seemed to me very considerable. Under the Name of the Bear and the Chariot, Homer comprehends all the Artick Circle, for there being several others Stars in that Circle, which never Set, he could not say, That the Bear was the only one which did not bath it self in the Ocean; wherefore these are deceived who accuse the Poet of Ignorance, because he knew one Bear only, when there are two; for the Little one was not found out in his time. The Phenicians were the first who took notice of it, and made use of it in their Navigation, and the Figure of that Sign passed from them to the Greeks: The same thing happened in the Constellation of Berenices Hair, and that of Canopus, which was named Yesterday, or the Day before: And as Aratus says very well, there are several other Stars which have no Names. Crates was then in the wrong to endeavour to correct this Passage, in putting one alone, for the Bear only, for he would avoid that which there is no occasion to do. Heraclitus did better than he, for he put the Bear for the Artick Circle, as Homer has done: The Bear, says he, is the Bounds of the Rising and Setting of the Stars; tis evident then, that by the Word Bear, which he calls the Waggon, and which he says observes Orion, he understands the Artick Circle, that by the Ocean he means the Horizon, where the Stars Rise and Set, and by these Words, which turns to the same place, and doth not bath it self in the Ocean, he shows that the Artick Circle is the most Northern part of the Horizon, &c.

34. It comes to pass sometimes, that we answer solidly to the Censures of the Criticks, by only changing the Tone or Accent; and 'tis thus that Hippias of Thasos, saved Homer on that place where Jupiter sends a Dream to Agamemnon, for they accuse him of making a Lye on Jupiter. I have extended this Passage in the Translation, for it seems to be too short in the Original. Aristotle said only, and by the Accent, as Hippias of Thasos saved that Passage; Let us give him, but that brevity which was so well understood in the Days of Aristotle, when most Men knew Homer almost by Heart,
Heart, would make a Riddle how that few would understand. I therefore thought it necessary to explain the Text itself, the Criticism which is here treated of, is in the second Book of the Iliad; Jupiter, who thought of nothing more than to enhance Achilles's Valour, sends a false Dream to Agamemnon, who orders him to make a general Assault on the Place, and promises him, as from Jupiter, good Success. In the Order which the God gave to the Dream, there was one Verse in which he expressed himself in this manner, διδούς τῇ ἐγείρῃν άνευ, Let us give him great Glory. This Lye in the Mouth of Jupiter appeared horrible to the Ancients. Plato blames Homer, in the second Book of his Republic; but Hippias of Thasos falses that Poet, by shewing, that instead of διδούς, Let us give, he writ it with an Accent on the Penultima, διδούς, which is for διδόσω, the Infinitive for the Imperative; and Jupiter said to the Dream, Give him, Promise him great Glory; now it is not extraordinary to see a Lying Dream, and Jupiter who suffered Agamemnon to be deceived, was by no means guilty of Deceit. He permitted it without being the Author. The Holy Scriptures afford us a parallel Example in the History of King Ahab, when God would have him perish in Ramoth Gilead: And the Lord said, Who will persuade Ahab, that he may go up, and fall at Ramoth Gilead: And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner. And there came forth a Spirit and stood before the Lord, and said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a Lying Spirit in the Mouth of all his Prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him and prevail also: Go forth, and do so. Nothing can be more like. The Jupiter of Homer, is no more a Liar and Seducer in this Passage, than the true God is in the History of Ahab; and Homer knew this Truth. That God uses the Malice of his Creatures to accomplish his Judgments, and we need only change one Accent in his Expression, to render it conform, if we dare say so, to the Holy Scripture. The Critics, who were terrified at the Impiety which they found in
their Verse, and not knowing this Remark of Hippias, have taken the liberty to expunge it by a sort of Pious Fraud; 'tis not in the Greek Text at present. Aristotle speaks more at large of this Passage, in his Book de Elenchus Sophisticis.

35. The same Hippias after the same manner defends this Poet in the Passage, where, after having spoken of a dry Tree, he is accused of saying, That one part of that Tree was Corrupted by the Rain.] This Criticism is not so considerable as the former. In Book XXIII. of the Iliad, Homer describes the Bounds for the Horse-Course with which Achilles honoured the Funeral of Patroclus.

'Εξεκε τεύλον ἄδον ὅ σον τῷ ὄρνι τῇ ἀφ ἀνίς
Ηππίας ἀ πεύκης, τὸ μὲ ν ἐ καλατοθέλαι εἴπεν.

A Sapless Trunk of Oak or Pine there stood,
A Cabits height, not purified by Rain.

Instead of the Negative τί, which Homer uses, the Criticks read τι, which is the Genitive of the Substantive Article τι, which; and thus they make Homer fall into a manifest Contradiction; but Hippias shews us the Impertinence of these Censures, by establishing the Negative.

36. There are a great many Places saved by the different Pointing, and this 'tis that justifies Empedocles, who was accused of contradicting himself in his Verses, where he has explained the Principles of Things.] There is an Infinity of Places in the Works of the Ancients, where a false Pointing spoils the Sense, and where consequently, we need only change the Point, to find that which is good or true. Aristotle quotes an Example, which he had taken from Empedocles Verses; but as that Example could not be Translated into our Language, in such a manner as we might discern the false Pointing, I have reserved it for Remarks. That Philosopher in a Treatise which he had Writ to prove that
that Love and Discord were the Principles of things said.

The Criticks finding this Passage badly pointed, for there was a Point very illly placed after ζωής of the second Verse, accused Empedocles of contradicting himself, and that Accusation was well grounded, for the Philosopher would have said, That which was Immortal, becomes Mortal all at once; and by a quite contrary way, that which was Simple before, becomes Compounded. We see plainly that he would say the same thing twice; nevertheless, the second Verse would say the quite contrary to the first; but the Criticks ought to take notice, that to find the true Sense, the Point ought to be transposed to πέπτω.

And that which was before Compounded, becomes Simple. Quintilian hath spoken at large of this Vice in Chap. 9. of Book VII.

37. Sometimes we have recourse to the Ambiguity, as in the Passage where Homer says, That the Night was more than two thirds past, and that there yet remains one third.] In the tenth Book of the Ilias. Ulysses says to Diomed, with whom he was going into the Trojan Camp.

Come let us on, the Night is almost gone,
The Stars are Setting, and the Morn approaches,
More than two Thirds of Night are past, and one alone Remains.
The Criticks say, That one Third of the Night could not remain, when more than two thirds were spent. Aristotle says, That the Word more than, which causes the Ambiguity, ought to be understood in another sense, and that Homer said, That the greatest part of the Night was passed, that is to say, two Thirds. 'Twould be very difficult to render this intelligible in our Language. See what the Commentators say on it, for this Criticism is not of such Importance, as to oblige us to relate all that they have said concerning it.

33. The Authority of Custom is often used to defend the Poets, who shall, for Example, call Wine that is mingled with Water, Wine.] There were Criticks ridiculous enough, to blame Homer for calling Wine mingled with Water, Wine; that he said, Boots of Tin, for Boots of Iron; that he called those who forged Iron, Workmen in Brass; and that he made Ganymede fill out Wine to the Gods, when they drank Nectar only. Aristotle says, That all these Expressions may be falved by the Metaphor, and that even without having recourse to that, we may justifie them by usage, which is the Tyrant of Languages, and gives no Reasons for its Decisions: There is another Custom that justifies certain ways of speaking, which extremely offends some of our Criticks now a-days, who are a little too nice. Homer speaks often of Cauldrons, Kettles, Blood, Fat, Intestines, &c. We see the Princes themselves affist to flea the Beasts, and to help roast them. And because our Customs and Manners are different, and that all these things are done only in our Kitchens and Butcheries, that only Cooks and Butchers concern themselves with those mean Offices, Homer is ridicul'd. But how do we know but that for which he is blamed, is entirely conform to what is found in the Holy Scriptures, than which nothing is more august and venerable, and which will suffer no Rallieries without Impiety. As that Knowing and Religious Man, the Author of the Treatise of Epick Poem, as well remarked, since the Works of Homer and Virgil, are not so full of them as the Holy Writings,
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

Writings, and which are consequently exposed to the Rallurities of Libertines and Atheists. In Homer, Agamemnon and the other Princes kill the Victims themselves, because it is the most August and Solemn act of Religion, and 'twas for this reason, that at Rome the Censors who were the Magistrates of the greatest Authority perform'd the same Office, and to shew the importance of it, they did it with a Crown on their Head, and cloathed with a Purple Robe. There is nothing then to blame Homer with, on that account, but they may say, who can endure to think, that Princes should get ready their own Victuals, and that Ulysses should brag of his being the best Cook in the World; that he knew better than any Body, how to cut up Food, serve Wine, make a Fire; and that Achilles should submit to the most ordinary Functions, in his own House? This Objection is no better than the others. Could Homer do better then to describe the Manners of those Times then, as they were? Both Holy and Profane History do equally teach us, that 'twas then the Custom to serve ones self, and that nothing was counted Shameful. And we ought the less to admire at what Homer says of the Manners of Achilles, who was a Thessalian; for Thessaly loved most, and retained longest that Ancient Simplicity, for it preserved it, after most other Countries had lost it. A Greek Author who Wrote some Treatises of Manners in the Dorick Language, writes formally, 'Tis a becoming thing in Thessaly to dress ones own Horses and Mules, to kill Oxen, to fleaze them, and cut them out, altho' in Sicily 'tis shameful, and the Duty of a Servant only. The same Criticks read some Epithets in Homer, which they complain are flat and impertinent, because they would appear ridiculous, if they were literally Translated. He calls Juno, Boopis, that is, Juno with Ox Eyes; but that Epithet signifies only fine, which hath even fine Eyes, and is a customary Word. Achilles is call'd σωφός ὄνος, swift of Foot: Is this Epithet proper for a General or a great Commander? Yes without doubt, since David takes it to himself, and thanks God, that he had made his Feet as swift.
swift as an Harts Feet; Who hath made my Feet as the Feet of an Hart. There is no Epithet in the Holy Scripture more usual for Valiant Men. In the Lamentations which David made for the Deaths of Saul and Jonathan, he calls them, Swifter than Eagles, and stronger than Lions, II Kings 1. 23. and some Valiant Men who came to David, are said to be as swift as the young Goats on the Mountains. Another great Scandal to these Censurers, are the Comparisons. Homer compares Ajax to an Afs, and Ulysses to Fat: Can any thing be more despicable or disgusting? Thus they pass their Judgments without any Examination or Formality; and those Comparisons which seem so flat and dull now, were then very fine and noble. In Homer's Time, Asses were not so despicable, as they are now; their Name was not then thought Scandalous, for Kings and Princes rode on them. So that Homer might well enough compare Ajax to one of those Animals; and none can laugh at the Comparison without Impiety, since God himself put it into Jacob's Mouth, when he Bless'd his Children; Issachar is a strong Afs couching under his Burden, &c. The other Comparison of Ulysses to Fat, was yet more Noble, since it was taken from the Sacrifices which yielded Blood and Fat, things the most Holy and Venerable in those Days; and what is most unhappy for the Criticks, is, that 'tis found in the Holy Scripture, which begins David's Praises by that Comparison, David is like Fat without Fleshe, and the rest of the Children of Israel are like Fleshe without Fat, Ecclesiastic. 17. 2. Thus David compares the United Brethren to the Oil which was poured forth on Aaron's Head, which ran down to his Beard, yea even to the Skirts of his Cloathing. The Criticks might better employ their time, then to condemn that which is conform, to that which is most perfect, and which claims the Respects and Veneration of all Mankind; and let me tell them, that till they have formed their Judgment rightly, and acquired all the Knowledge that is necessary for to turn Criticks they will never be able either to praise or blame with Justice.
39. Whenever a Word seems to signify something contrary to the Intention of the Poet, we should examine all the different Significations which the Word can have in that Passage that is in dispute.] This is a wise Rule, and 'tis for want of observing it, that the Criticks have fallen into such Absurdities as we find. In the twentieth Book of the Iliad where Homer describes the Combat of Æneas and Achilles, he says, that Æneas's Pike which had pierced the two first Folds of Achilles's Sheild, stopt at the third which was of Gold.

The Criticks take the Word Stopt, to remain fixed, and blame Homer for saying so ridiculous a Thing, for a Pike is too long to remain fix'd in the Buckler, only Darts and Arrows could do that: But Aristotle discovers the ridiculousnes of this Criticism by shewing, that the Word Stopt, had a quite contrary Signification; for it signifies, that it could go no further, and so was repelled.

40. And the shortests way to explain these Places, is to take the Word in the quite contrary Sense from what it is generally used. This Rule is of infinite more use in the Greek than the Latin; for the Greek hath a great many Words, which have not only different, but contrary Significations. There is a place in Homer which has been explained in a wrong sense, for want of following this Rule. The Conversation of Glauclus and Diomede, ends by their exchanging their Arms; Diomede gives to Glauclus his made of Steel and finely polished, and Glauclus gives to Diomede his, which were of Gold, and ten times the value of the others; 'twas Diomede who proposed that Exchange on which Homer says,

And they construe it, Jupiter took away Glauclus's Prudence.
476 Aristotle’s Art. of Poetry.

Prudence at that Moment, for making so unequal an Exchange, and giving Arms of Gold for those which were only plain Steel. This Sentiment is too mean for an Epick Poem. Homer could have spoke no otherwise if his Princes had been Merchants, and endeavoured to Cheat one another. ’Tis impossible that he should speak of Folly and Stupidity in an Action where there was nothing but what was Great and Noble. We must necessarily have recourse to this Rule of Aristotle, if we would rightly Translate this plain, and see whether the Word ἔξελετο may not have a contrary Signification from that which it usually has. Porphyry would have afforded in this Search, and told them that in this Passage ὁπάνε ἔξελετο, signifies ὁπάνε ἐμφάνεις ἐποιησε, elevated his Courage, gave him greatness of Soul. For by that Exchange Glaucon surpassed the Generosity and Liberality of his Ancestors, and followed the Orders which his Father gave him at parting.

Αἰὼν ἐξελετο, ἡ ἐκέρκον ἐμφένεις ἄλλων,
Μὴ δὲ γενόσ ἔκτερον αὐχώμεν.

Still Generous, and in Good excelling all,
That no Disgrace might on his Fathers fall.

41. It happens often as Glaucon has very well taken notice, that the Criticks are prejudiced and possessed of some things, before they read the Poets. And being persuaded, that their Opinion alone is reasonable, they condemn, without any further Examination, whatsoever is contrary to their Opinion. Nothing can be better described, than these blind Criticks, who being possessed with certain Opinions, undertake to read the Poets, and condemn all that is not agreeable to their sense. Thus Eratothenes being possessed, that Geography was very little known in Homer’s Time, accuses him of speaking at random, and that he said nothing that was true; but Strabo has sufficiently answered him, by refuting all the Errors into which this unjust Prejudice had precipitated this Critick who was
Aristotle's *Art of Poetry.*

was otherwise a very Ingenious Man; and in shewing that Homer was no less preferable to the other Poets upon the account of his skill in Geography, than for all his other Perfections. The Description of these Criticks very much resembles those of our own Time, who having it in their Head, that our Age in the only Rule of what is Fine and Good, condemn all that is not conform to it, and so fall into a thousand Absurdities.

41. Glauc. Glauc. of Teos, who wrote a Treatise of Gesture and Pronunciation, Aristotle mentions it in his Rhetorick.

43. 'Tis from this false Prejudice, that the Criticism which is made on Homer, upon the Account of Icarius Penelopes Father, was produced; for these Critics being possessed that Icarius was a Lacedemonian.] The Criticks being possessed, that Icarius Penelope's Father was a Lacedemonian, accuse Homer of being guilty of a breach of good Manners, in making Telemachus, when he went to Lacedemon to enquire after his Father to go and lodge with Menelaus, rather than with his Grandfather Icarus. To this Censure Aristotle opposes an old Tradition of the Cephalonians, who say Icarius Penelope's Father, was of their Island. But we may answer this Objection better and more agreeably to History. 'Tis certain that Icarius Penelope's Father was of Lacedemon, Oebalus the Son of Perierus King of Lacedemon had three Sons, Tyndarus, Hippocoon, and Icarus. Hippocoon expelled his two Brothers, who retired to Thestius King of Pleuron, a Town of Etolia; and assisted him in extending the Bounds of his Kingdom on those of Achelous. Thestius gave his Daughter Leda to Tyndarus, who returned into Laconia, after Hippocoon's and his Childrens Deaths, who were killed by Hercules. Icarius being possessed of some part of Acarnania by the Assistance of Thestius, Married Polycasta the Daughter of Lygæus, by whom he had Penelope, and five Sons, whose Names may be seen in Appollodorus. So that when Telemachus came
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

came to Laconia, he could not go to his Grandfathers, for he was in Arcanania; but he went to Menelaus who had Married Tyndarus's Daughter, that is the Daughter of his Great Uncle. And a certain sign that Homer followed the Tradition, is, that in the fifteenth Book of the Odyssey, when Minerva would have Telemachus go for Lacedemon, she appeared to him in a Dream, and tells him, That his Grandfather and his Uncle would oblige Penelope to Marry Eurymachus.

For this proves, that Icarus and his Children were in Arcanania, or Ithaca, and not at Lacedemon; and if there was only this Verse left as a Proof, it were sufficient to destroy all the Pretensions of the Criticks. So Timocles a famous Athenian Poet, calls Telemachus an Arcanian, in his Bacchus, and in his Satyrical Piece against Icarus.

44. When the Poet is accused of saying any thing in general that is impossible, we must examine that impossibility, either in respect to Poesie, or that which is better, or in respect to Fame.] Aristotle goes back to the Impossibilities and Aburdities which were taken notice of in the Ancient Poems, because he knew very well, that 'twas that which did most offend the Ignorant, and furnish them with Objections against his Works. He teaches us three ways how to justify them, which I shall endeavour to make plain by Examples.

44. In respect to Poesie: For we show that the probable impossible, ought to be prefer'd to the possible, which has no verisimilitude, and which would not be believed.] Poetry is a mixture of History and Fable, that is, Truth and Falsehood. The foundation is Historical, because the Poet doth not entirely neglect the Truth, the rest is Fabulous, because the naked Truth would not be surprizing enough, since the Admirable ought to excel, and especially in an Epick Poem. It follows from hence,
hence, that the impossible Verismilitude, is more proper for Epopeia, than the Possible, which being above the reach of Men, would be neither probable nor admirable: But it may be said, Why doth it not keep it self within the Bounds of the possible Probable, for otherwise it will not be a Poem. The Verismilitude would be there, but the Admirable would not; there would be Truth but no Fable, and 'twould be taken rather for an Historical Relation, then for an Epopeia, which ought to be avoided above all things. Petronius says, Non enim res gestae versibus Comprehendenda sunt, quod longe melius Historici faciunt, sed per ambages Deorumque Ministeria, & fabulorum sententiarm Tormentum precipitandus est Liber Spiritus, ut potius curnent animi. Vaticinatio appearat, quam religiosae orationis sub festibus fides. Actions are not to be treated of in Verse, the Historians will do that better, but a Poetic Spirit ought rather to run through those things which requires the Ministry of the Gods, that are Fabulous and Intricate, so that it may rather appear like the Prophecy of an Enthusiast, than the Faith of a Religious Discourse which is testified by Witnesses. Thus in respect to Poetry, that is to say, by the Nature of the Poem it self, are all the Impossibilities which are found in Homer to be salved, for we see what 'tis that Poem requires, that it goes even to the Unreasonable, provided it retains the Probable. But it may be asked, Whether the Trevits of Vulcan, which have a Motion, and go alone, be within the Bounds of Probability? And had not Julius Scaliger reason to laugh at it, and say, Tripodas fabricavit Vulcanus sponte Mobiles, quare non & lebetas fecit sponte Coquentes obsonia. Vulcan made Trevits which moved; Why did not he also make Kettles which would boil Food of themselves? I dare say, That this Criticism proceeds from the want of being rightly instructed in the Nature of Epopeia. But before we set to justifie Homer, we'll take a View of that Passage. In the nineteenth Book of the Iliad, Thetis going to Vulcan's, found that God at Work, he had made some Trevits, Under each of which he had placed Golden Wheels, that they might go of themselves to the Assembly of
If Vulcan had made ordinary Trevis, they would not have been fit for a Poem, and had not answered the Greatness, Power, and Skill of a God. It was therefore necessary that his Work should be above that of Men: And for to effect that, the Trevis were animated in a manner, and in this Homer doth not run from the Probability; for there is no Body who is not fully persuaded, that a God can do things more difficult than these, and that all Matter will obey him. What has not been said of the Statues of Dedalus? Plato writes, That they walked alone, and if they had not taken care to tie them, they would have gotten loose and run from their Matter. If a Writer in Prose can speak Hyperbolically of a Man to shew his Ingenuity, may not Homer do it much more of a God? I go still further, and say, That this Circumstance with which Homer has embellished his Poem, would have had nothing too surprizing, tho' these Trevis had been made by a Man; For what may not be done by an exact Management of Springs? Don't they make in these Days Figures which go alone, which come down Stairs, and get into a Coach? This Criticism then is ill grounded, and Homer does not deserve the Ridicule they would cast on him.

46. And 'tis thus, that Zeuxis painted his Pieces.] Zeuxis prefer'd, as Homer did, the Impossible Probable to the Possible, which had no Verisimilitude, and for this reason 'tis, that Aristotle said elsewhere, That his Pieces were without Manners; for nothing hides the Manners so much as the Sublime and the Marvelous.
47. In respect to that which is better, for we see that a thing is most excellent and marvellous in this manner, and that the Original ought always to surpass.] Thus we justifie that which appears Prodigious and Wonderful in the Characters which Homer has formed; the Ignorant condemn them, because they see nothing like them in the Works of Nature; but Homer has not wrought after these Copies, he followed the true Original, which is Nature it self, and a Spirit filled with the fruitful Ideas of the Universal Agent, brought forth those Originals, which have the same advantage over ordinary Men, as Nature her self hath over those Beings which she hath produced, for the Originals should always excel the Copies. This way we also see the excellence of certain pretended impossibilities which are condemned in the same Poet, as those Trevis of which I have spoken, which went alone, and that of all those different Figures which Vulcan graved on Achilles's Shield. The Description which Homer gives of it in the eighteenth Book of the Iliad, is one of the Prime Places of his Poem. It has been the Wonder of the most Polite and Knowing Ages, but that has not prevented some from Criticizing on it. Julius Scaliger is the first and only one who has appeared in this latter Age, but at present Hanc Tamen sequuntur. 'Tis impossible, say the Critics, to represent the Movement of all those Figures, and in condemning the Manner, they take the Liberty to condemn also the Subject which they say is trivial; and not well understood. But I hope to make it appear, that there is something really frivolous in the Censure, and that they are infinitely deceived. We'll begin with the Manner. 'Tis certain that Homer speaks of the Figures on this Buckler, as if they were alive: And some of the Ancients taking his Expressions to the strictness of the Letter, did really believe that they were so, and that they used all sorts of Motion. Eu- phratius reprehended that Sentiment by a Passage of this Description. That Poet, says he, to shew that his Figures are not animated, as some of the Ancients have pretended,
482 Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

pretended, without any necessity, by an excessive Affection for the Prophecies, took care to say that they moved and fought as living Men. The Ancients certainly founded this ridiculous Opinion on this Rule of Aristotle, for they thought that the Poet could not make his Description more Admirable and Marvellous, than in making his Figures animated, since the Originals should always excel the Copies. That Shield is the Work of a God. 'Tis the Original of which the Engraving and Painting of Men is but a Copy, and there is nothing impossible to the Gods: But they did not perceive, that by this Homer would have fallen into an extravagant Admirable, which would not have been probable. Therefore 'tis without any necessity that the same Eustathius adds. That 'tis possible all those Figures did not stick close to the Shield, but that they were off of it, and moved by Springs, in such a manner, that they appeared to have Motion, as Æschylus has seigned something like it, in his seven Captains against Thebes. The Passage of Æschylus, which Eustathius means, is certainly that where he says, That Parthenopeus carried on his Shield the Chimera which was off from it, ἕνα τοῦ Δευτερα. Without having any recourse to that Conjecture, we can show, that there is nothing more Simple and Natural, than the Description of that Shield, and there is not one Word which Homer might not have said of it, if it had been the Work of a Man. For there is a great deal of difference between the Work and the Description of it. We'll examine a little more narrowly what Homer is blamed for. Homer, say they, has put two Towns which speak different Languages. 'Tis the Latin Translation, and not Homer which says so; the Word μειράνθος is a common Epithet of Men, and which signifies only, That they have an articulate Voice. These Towns could not speak different Languages, since as the Ancients have remarked, they were Athens and Eleusina, both which spake the same Language, but tho' that Epithet should signify, which spake two Languages, there would be nothing very surprising: For Virgil said, what Homer durst not, If a Painter should put into one Painting one Town
Town of France, and another of Flanders, might not one say, that they were two Towns which spake different Languages: But to proceed, Where we hear the Harangue of two Orators. Homer says not so, but only that two Men pleaded for a Wager, which one said he had paid, and the other denied that he had received. There is nothing here can be said of the Arts, hiding that which it ought to shew, as an Ancient has very well observed, in speaking of Painting, Oitendat que occultae. Was not the same said of Nicomachus, That he had painted two Greeks, which spake one after another. Can we say otherwise of these two Arts, that tho' they are mute, yet they have a Language? Or in explaining a Painting of Raphael or Poussin, Can we prevent animating the Figures, in making them speak conformably to the Design of the Painter? But how could the Engraver represent these Young Shepherds and Lasses that Dance in a Ring, and then in Sets or Troops which were in Ambuscade? This would be very difficult if the Workman had not the liberty to make his Persons appear in different Circumstances. All the Objections against the Young Man who Sings at the same time he plays on the Harp; upon the Bull that roars whilst he is devoured by a Lion, and against Musical Conforts, are Childish; for we could never speak of Painting, if we should banish these Expressions. When Pliny says of Apelles, That he painted Clytus on Horseback, going to Battle, and demanding his Helmet of his Squire. And of Aristides, That he painted a Beggar whom we could almost understand, pene cum voce. Of Cresilochus; That he had painted Jupiter bringing forth Bacchus, and crying out like a Woman; Et miliebriter ingemiscentem. And of Nicarchus; That he had painted a Piece, in which Hercules was seen very Melancholly, for having been a Fool, Herculem trittem, Infaniae penitentia. No Body sure will condemn these ways of Expression which are so common. Pliny had said much more of Apelles, he tells us, That he painted those things which could not be painted, as Thunder, Pinxit quae pingi non posunt. And of Timanthes, That in all his Works there was something more understood,
understood, than was seen, and tho' there was all the Art imaginable, yet there was more Ingenuity than Art. Atque in omnibus ejus operibus, intelligitur plus semper, quam pingitur; & cum Ars summa sit, Ingenium tamen, ultra artem est. If we take the Pains to compare these Expressions with those of Homer, we shall find him very wise in the Description which he has given of that Shield, so that there is nothing to find fault with in the Manner. Now for the Subject. If that Shield, says one, had been made in a wiser Age, it would have been more correct, and less charged with Matter. I perceive very well, that the wiser Age is ours: I don't know what ours could do on such a subject, but we may praise it as much as we please by Conjecture. Those are happy who can see so far, but in respect to the Matter, wherewith the Buckler is charged, I say, there are two things which cause the Censurers to fall into this false Criticism: The first is, That they think that Shield was no broader than the Brims of an Hat, whereas it was large enough to cover an whole Man. The other is, That they did not know the Design of the Poet, and imagined, that that Description was only the Maggot of an unruly Wiz, which did it by Chance, and not follow Nature. If they would have taken the pains to have instructed themselves before they spake, they would have found, that Homer's Intention was to represent in that Shield, all the Universe, and the different Occupations of Men, both in War and Peace. Several of the best Criticks among the Ancients took the Pains to shew Homer's Ingenuity in that Shield; but especially a very learned Woman, called Damo, who I believe was Pythagoras's Daughter, wrote a very long and rational Comment on it. We need only see what Eustathius says, and he'll convince us that Homer is far from deserving any blame, and that on the contrary he deserves great Praise, for having executed with such Order, such Harmony, and so few Figures, so great a Design as the Representation of the Universe, and all that passed in it except Hunting, which was at that time no diversion to Princes; and Navigation which has done more hurt than
than good to Mankind; so that it has been always said, that that Description was not only the Work of a good Poet, but also of a great Philosopher who knew how, in order and probability, to mix the Grave and the Profound with all the richness of Art. This is the Subject which is look'd on as childish and frivolous, as badly managed, and illy understood. But since we speak of a Wiser Age, let us see what was done in one, which having more Conformity to ours than that of Homer, may pass as one wiser than that of the Greek Poet. Virgil has very happily made a Shield for Aeneas, as Homer did for Achilles. The Latin Poet who imitated the Greek one, took such care to accommodate those things which time had changed, and which would not be agreeable to the Palate of his Readers, that he hath not only charged his Shield with a great deal more Work, since he paints all the Actions of the Romans from Ascanius to Augustus, inclusively, but hath not avoided any of those Expressions which offend the Critics. We see here the Wolf of Romulus and Remus, who gives them her Dugs, one after another, Muliere altemos, & Corpora fingere lingua: We see also the Rape of the Sabines, and the War which immediately followed it, Snbitoque novum Consurgere bellum; we see Metius drawn by four Horses; and Tullus who draws his Entrails thro' the Forrest. We see Porsenna, who commanded the Romans to receive Tarquin and Besieged Rome. We see the Geese, who flying to the Porches of the Capitol, give notice by their Cries of the Gauls scaling it.

Atque hic auratis Volitans argentem anser
Porticiibus, Gallos in Limine adeisse canebat.

We see the Salian Dance, Hell, and the Pains of the Damned; and further off, the Place of the Blessed, where Cato presides; we see the Famous Battle of Actium, where we may distinguish the Captains: Agrippa with the Gods, and the Winds favourable. Antony leads on all the Forces of the East, Egypt, and the Bactrians; the Fight begins, the Sea is red

1 1 3

with
with Blood, Cleopatra gives the Signal for a Retreat, and call'd her Troops with a Systrum. Patrioque vocat agmina Systro. The Gods, or rather the Monsters of Egypt, fought against Neptune, Venus, Minerva, Mars and Apollo. We see Anthony's Fleet beaten, and the Nile sorrowfully opening his Bofom to receive the conquered: Cleopatra looks pale, and almost dead at the Thoughts of that Death which she had already determined; and the Wind Japix which hastens her Flight. We see the three Triumphs of Augustus; and that Prince to perform his Vow, consecrates three hundred Temples to the Gods of his Country, and the Streets echo with Shouts of Rejoycing. The Temples and the Altars are filled with Ladies offering up Sacrifices, and Augustus sitting at the Entrance of Apollo's Temple, receiving Presents and hanging them on the Pillars of the Temple, while all the conquered Nations pass by, who speak different Languages; and which are differently equipped and armed.

--- Incendunt utque, longo ordine gentes,
_Quam variæ linguis, habitu, tum vestis & armis._

Nothing can justify Homer better, or shew the Wisdom and Judgment of Virgil: He was charmed with Achilles's Shield, and therefore would give the same Ornament to his Poem, but as Homer had painted the Universe, he was sensible that nothing remained for him to do, he had no other way to take then that of Prophecy, and shew what the Descendant of his Heroe should perform, and he was not afraid to go beyond Homer, because there is nothing improbable in the Hands of a God. If the Critics say, That this is justifying of one Fault by another, I desire that they would agree among themselves. For Scaliger who was the first that condemned Homer's Shield, admires Virgil's; but suppose they should agree, 'twould be foolish to endeavour to perswade us, that what Homer and Virgil have done by the Approbarion, of all Ages is not good; and to make us think that one particular Taste should prevail over that of all other Men.
Men. I should not have troubled myself to have defended Homer, if I had not been desired to do it, for I must confess, that nothing is more ridiculous than to trouble oneself to answer to those People who shew so little reason in their Criticisms, that we can do them no greater favour, than to think that 'tis their Ignorance: But that is not always unhappy, and may sometimes hit on the Right, but to judge it always, shews as if they had a design to make the best things bad, or that they have so little sense as to take things only contrary. If any be so curious as to see the Difference between a good and a bad Piece of Work, let them view the Shield of Hercules, which is attributed to Hesiod, and compare it with that of Homer or Virgil; there is nothing more different.

Illum Hominem dices, hunc possuiffe Deum.

That one appears like the Work of a God, and the other like that of a Man.

48. Lastly in respect to Fame, for we have proved, that the Poet need only follow the common Opinion.] But 'tis necessary that the Opinion which we follow be general, and that it be not contradicted at the same time by Truths which are better explained and known; such was the Opinion which Homer followed in speaking of the Gods.

49. All that appears Absurd may be also justified by these three ways, either by the Maxim which we have already laid down, &c.] There are apparent Absurdities in Homer, which are justified by one of these four ways, which Aristotle mentions. The Wound of Venus may be put into the Number; the Tears of Mars, and such like; but the Critics have often taken those things for Absurd and Unreasonable, which in their own Nature are perfectly fine. Julius Scaliger derives what Achilles says to Thetis. That he was afraid the Flies would corrupt the Body of Patroclus. Had he been little Slave, says he, that could drive away the Flies? 1 4.
This is a notable Objection, as if there was not more Poetry and Grandeur, by bringing in Then to comfort Achilles, and promise him to perfume the Corps with some Ambrosia, that should preserve it an whole Year. By this means Homer explains the Nature of Corruption, and that of Salt which hinders it. In another place he says, That Homer is impertinent, because he feigns in the fifteenth Book of the Iliad, that Juno prays to the God Zeus, to send Jupiter to sleep, and promises him the Graces in Marriage. He believes that Natural Philosophy is terminated in this Fiction: "Fam hic, says he, nullam Physic Comenibuntur. However nothing is easier than to find some Physicks hidden under this; for by it Homer would denote the return of the Spring, when Juno, that is to say, the Earth, after laying barren all the Winter, demands very importunately, That Jupiter may be laid asleep; that is, that a quiet and calm Air may careles her, and thereby re-animate all Nature, which is languishing; and as that Tranquility, by all that is most pleasing and agreeable, Homer aptly feigned, That the Earth should give to Sleep one of the Graces in Marriage. Nothing can be more Ingenious than this Fiction, and Virgil has explained it in his Georgicks the eleventh Book.

Vere tument terra, & genitalia semina possunt. Tum pater omnipotens fecundus imbribus Aether, Conjugis in gremmium late descendit, &c.

And that that which Homer calls Sleep, Virgil calls Rej.

Si non tanta quies Iet, frigusque Caloremque Inter, & excipiet Cali indulgentia terrar.

We need only read these two places and compare them together; but altho' there was nothing hid under the table, yet it would be marvellous, for nothing can be more happily imagined. Juno would favour the Greeks, and to succeed in it, 'twas necessary to de-
receive Jupiter, and to lay him asleep; and as she knew that there was nothing a Woman could not obtain when she gave Love, she endeavours to set out all her Charms, and to make herself lovely. To the end she borrowed Venus's Girdle, whom she had first deceived; to this she adds the assistance of Sleep, which is not useless on these occasions, and promises that if he will make Jupiter Sleep, he shall marry one of the Graces; she afterwards presents herself to the God, who was charmed with her Beauty, and fell into the Snare. At the same time the Earth offers a fine green Bed, strewn with Flowers, and places it beneath their Feer, and they were wrapped up in a Golden Cloud, &c. this is what Poetry can do; and they must be very ill natur'd who condemn it. There's no Woman but would judge better of that Marriage than Scaliger, who was amazed at it; for there is none who doth not know the Necessity, and who is not persuaded that the Graces are to be found in the Arms of Sleep. "The same Critick adds, That Virgil is much wiser in the Imitation which he makes of this place in the first of the Eneids, for when Juno entreats Aethon, and promises him one of her Nymphs, she tells him, 'Tis to bring him pretty Children, whereas in Homer Juno says to Sleep; I will give you the finest of the Graces, with whom you shall be always Enamoured. This promise of Juno displeases Scaliger, yet that in Homer appears to me much more polite and gracious, than that in Virgil, there is no comparison."

"50. As for those things which seem contrary to what has been said before, we must examine them as we do objections in Logick.] There are often in the Works of the Poets some things which appear as it were contrary to those which they have said elsewhere, and which the Censorious Critics have not failed to take notice of as inexcusable Faults. Aristotle teaches us how we ought to examine those Places in order to justify them. We must examine them, says he, as we examine the Objections, made in Logick against those things which have been advanced: For to answer to them,
them, and to find the Solution, we must have recourse to these Places, and to examine, Whether

It is the same Thing.
It relates to the same End.
It is spoken in the same Manner.
It is the same Person which speaks in both Places.

Aristotle adds a fifth in the fifth Chapter of the first Book of False Reasoning.

In τὸ δὲ υπὲρ Χέσω, for a thing may differ from itself in different Seasons.

51. The Just Criticisms, to which no answer can be given, are where 'tis plain, that one Place is Unreasonable and Absurd, and that another is bad.] As Aristotle's Design, is not to justify the Poets from those Errors into which they may have fallen, but to refute the Criticisms which are made on the Places which appear faulty, although they really are not so, he tells us what those Faults are which cannot be excused. Always when the Poet, without any necessity, has recourse to Impossibilities or Absurdities, that he makes bad Characters, contradicts himself, or violates the Rules of his Art, he is inexcusable, and 'tis in vain to endeavour his Justification.

52. A Poet falls into the first Fault, where he has recourse, without necessity to that which is without reason, and such is the fault of Euripides in his Αἴγεας.] 'Tis not without reason that Aristotle condemns the Part of Αἴγεας, in the Medea of Euripides, for 'tis Absurd, and without any reason. In the third Act of that Play we see Αἴγεας, who coming from Delphos, and passing thro' Corinth to go to Trezenium, by chance meets with Medea, and discourses with her, without having any other part in the Action, or being concerned upon any necessary occasion. After the first Complements Medea enquires the reason of his Voyage, he gives her an Account, and very familiarly tells her, the Oracle,
Oracle, which he had received, which was not proper for a Princess to know; after that she tells him the History of Jason’s Infidelity, and desires an Asylum at Athens. Agave grants her Request, provided he has no hand in her running away, for he would have no Quarrel with Creon. Medea obliges him to confirm his Promise by an Oath, which he did, says he, as much on his own Account as for her; on this he leaves her, and continued his Journey. Medea and the Chorus wish him a good Journey, and there’s no more mention made of him. All this is full of Absurdities, and so much the greater, because they are committed without necessity.

53. He was guilty of the second, when he introduces a bad Character without any occasion, such is the Character of Menelaus in the Orestes of that Poet.] This Character of Menelaus is bad, because it is unequal, this has been explained at large in the Remarks on the fifteenth Chapter.

54. The Objections which are made to the Poets, may be reduced under five Heads.] This is the Conclusion of the Chapter, and as it is long and full of Matter, Aristotle took care to put at the end, a short Summary to refresh his Readers Memory.

55. And the Answers which may be made to them, may be drawn from those places we have set down, and which are in all twelve.] It seems that Aristotle had laid down twelve Solutions, and those which are more have relation to one of those twelve Principal ones, which are not very easy to reckon up. Victorius found so much difficulty in it, that he durst not undertake it. I shall be bolder than he. The Criticks can fall only on these three things.

On the Subject.
On the Means.
On the Manner.
Each of these three has Places, which are proper to it, from which we may draw the Solutions which justify it. It seems to me that there are four for the Subject.

What it is.
What it ought to be.
What it is said to be.
Or what it may be according to the most extensive Probability.

That there are five for the Means,

The Metaphor.
The Foreign Word.
The Accent.
The Pointing.
The Ambiguity.

That (to conclude) there are three for the Manner where we examine.

If the Fault be proper, or foreign.
If the thing is the same or different.
If it is always the same Character.

CHAP.
Which Imitation is most perfect, Tragedy, or Epick Poem. Why Epick Poem is compared to the Excellent Players on the Flute, and good Actors, and Tragedy to the bad. The Difference between the Ancient Comedians, and those of Aristotle's Time. Rhapsodies, their Recitations, and Songs, Ridiculous and Lascivious Gestures condemned. The Care of the first Poets to direct the Gestures, and Motions of their Actors. The indisputable Advantages of Tragedy over Epick Poem.

1. (a) TIS a very doubtful Question, to demand immediately which is the most excellent Tragedy, or Epick Poem; and truly that is the best which requires least Aid and Assistance; and without doubt such is that whose Aim is to please the nicest Spectators: This evidently thus, That that which imitates all, (b) is the least Simple, for as the Spectators cannot comprehend any thing when all is not set before their Eyes, those who represent things makes a great many Gestures and Motions to make them the more evident. Just almost as the bad Players on the Flute, who move themselves to imitate

(a) Any one may doubt, whether a Tragick or an Epick Imitation be the best.  (b) By the Addition of Scenes.
the Motion of a Quoit, or draw the end of their
Band when they play the Scylla, and what
they cannot express by their Sounds, they endeavour to
do by Gestures. This is the defect of Tragedy,
the blame the old Comedians cast on the new
ones, and because Callippedes was excessive in his
Gestures. Munusces called him the Ape. The
same Railery was used to the Comedian Tyndarus,
in so much, that on this account Tragedy will
be below Epopoeia, as these latter Actors were
inferior to the first.

2. We assert then that Epopoeia being made for
the better sort, it had no need of being upheld
by any Motion, but that Tragedy has occasion
for those Succours, since it is made for the Com-
mon People, and so is consequently inferior to
Epopoeia.

3. But first of all, what we have said against
Tragedy, is not against the Art of the Poet, but
that of the Actor. For that defect is no less com-
mon to those who recite an Epick Poem, as So-
crates, or that sing, as Mnesiheus the Opuntian;
For both of them accompany'd their imitation and
Singing, with Gestures that were extravagant e-
ough.

4. Otherwise all the Motions are not to be
blamed any more than Dances, except they
(d) be Lascivious and Effeminate, as those that
Callippedes was reproached with, and our Co-
medians now adays are blamed for, who seem

(d) They imitate Lewd Women.
Moreover Tragedy produces its effects by itself, and without these Motions, as well as Epicopeia doth; for a simple reading lets us know what it is. If it has other Advantages over Epic Poem, we must confess, that it is preferable to it, since the blame which is laid on it, is not a defect that is proper, and natural to it.

6. Tragedy has all that is found in Epic Poem, for it may also make use of Hexameter Verse, and which is of no small Consideration, it has also Musick and Decoration, which contribute to give it an Infinite Pleasure, and to render it the more sensible.

7. (e) But what is yet of more esteem is, that it hath the evidence of an Action, for both in the representation and reading, it sets all things (f) before the Eyes of the Spectator.

8. It hath moreover this great Advantage, that it is not so long, and that it comes to the end of its Imitation in less time. Now that which is well compacted, is much more agreeable, and touches us more sensibly than that which is diffused, and as it were enervate by the length of time. We may be convinced of this Truth, if we put Sophocles's Oedipus, into as many Verses as the Ilias contains.

(e) It is plain also in the Remembrances and the Works.
(f) In the Representation and in the Reading.
To conclude: There is no Epicæa which preserves the unity so well as Tragedy; and a certain Sign of it is, that we may draw the Subjects of many Tragedies from any Epick Poem whatever. And if to avoid this defect in an Heroick Poem, we should keep entirely to one Subject only, as a Tragick Poet doth, it would necessarily follow, That either the brevity of the Subject would make the Poem appear maimed and imperfect; or if we would at any rate give it its due extent, which it ordinarily has, that length would be destitute of Matter, and render the Poem flat. On the other side if the Poet should mix several Fables with his Subject: That is to say, If he should make an Imitation that was composed of many Actions and Incidents, it would no more have a perfect Unity, than the Ilias and the Odysse, which have several parts of that Nature, that have every one their Grandedeur; tho’ those two Poems are otherwise as perfect as they can be, and both of them imitate as near as possible one Action only.

If beside all these Advantages Tragedy has this also of obtaining its aim better, and giving more Pleasure, for neither Tragedy nor Epick Poem, ought to give all sorts of Pleasure, but only what is proper to them. It is certain, that Tragedy is more perfect, than Epick Poem, since it obtains its end more exactly.

That which we have said is sufficient to explain what Tragedy and Epicæa are,—their Forms and Parts, with their Number and Differences. To shew the Virtues and the Vices of those
those two Poems, and what 'tis causes them; to give an exact knowledge of all the Objections which are made to the Poets, and the means which are to be used to refute them.

REMARKS on Chap. XXVII.

1. 'Tis a very doubtful Question to demand immediately, which is the most excellent, Tragedy or Epick Poem.] Having explained all that regards Tragedy, or Epick Poetry, he gives sure Rules to defend the Poets against the Centuries of the Ill-natur'd Critics. Aristotle examines to the bottom which is the most excellent of these two Imitations, Epopeia or Tragedy. Plato prefer'd the first, and Aristotle immediately proposes all that is wont to be said in its favour; but he declares for Tragedy, in shewing all the Advantages it has of its Rival. We'll see his Reasons.

2. And truly that is the best, which requires least aid and assistance, and without doubt, such is that whose aim is to please the nicest Spectators; 'tis evident by this, that which imitates all, is the least Simple.] The Partisans of Epopeia say, That that Imitation being made for the nicest Spectators, and Tragedy for the People, this hath need of a greater number of things. For beside the being of many Actors, a Theater, Habits, Decorations, it hath occasion for Actors, who imitate very exactly the Actions of those whom they represent, since it cannot obtain its end without that. Whereas Epopeia obtains its end without any of these Assurances. Epopeia is then more simple, and consequently more perfect. Aristotle goes on to answer that Objection solidly.

3. That that which imitates all] That is to say, which imitates the most minute Motions, and the least Actions of those it represents.
4. For as the Spectators cannot comprehend any thing when it is not set before their Eyes, those who represent the things make a great many Gestures and Motions, to make them the more evident. [Twas cast on Tragedy as an Imperfection, that its Motion and Gestures were grave and exact; for 'twas a Mark, say they, that it was deficient in itself, and that it could not be understood, if it was not acted in a Day. This reasoning is false, as we shall see in what follows.

5. Just almost as the bad Players on the Flute, who move themselves to imitate the Motion of a Quoit, or draw the end of their Band to them, when they play the Scylla. [There were in Greece excellent Players on the Flute, who by the found only, could imitate perfectly all the Passions and Actions of Men: But there were also some bad ones, who not being able to arrive at those things by the found only, added Gestures, and to imitate the rouling of a Quoit, rouled themselves on the Ground: Or if they were to represent the Voracity of Scylla, who swallowed up Ships and Men, they knew no other way than to hale the end of their Band. Epopeia was compared to the first, because it obtained its end, without any other assistance than Verse; and Tragedy was compared to the latter, who joyned Motion and Gesture to their Verse, and nothing can be more just than this Comparison. All that can be said is, That the Art of Tragedy is not answerable for the Faults of the Actors, no more than the Art of playing on the Flute is for the Ignorance of those who play badly on it.

6. This is the Defect of Tragedy, and the Blame which the old Comedians cast on the new ones.] This Passage seems to me very remarkable, for it informs us, that in Aristotle's Time and before, Tragedy had suffered very much on account of its Actors, who were not so good as they had been, for they were more dissolute, as we may say, in their Gestures, and did not retain
retain the Simplicity and Gravity of the Ancients; I believe the change which was made in the Muses, render'd them more Soft and Lascivious, and contributed very much to spoil the Action; for their Manners being corrupted, the Gestures were so too, for the Motions of the Body will necessarily follow the Corruptions of the Heart.

7. And because Callipedes was excessive in his Gestures Minifcus calls him the Ape.] Minifcus, Callipedes and Pindar, were three Comedians who had a great Reputation. Minifcus was the most ancient, he blamed Callipedes for being too Antiick, and for that reason he called him the Ape; for he imitated the least thing, and carried himself so, that without stirring out of his place, he seemed to go a great way. There was a Proverb made on his Name, to signify a Man who took a deal of pains to do nothing; on this was the Raillery on Tiberius founded, in calling him Callipedes, because every Year he made great Preparations for his Voyage, suffer'd the People to make Vows for his Safe Return, but never stir'd out of Rome. Ut vulgo jam per facum Callipedes vocaretur quem curfitter, & ne Cubito quidem mensuram progresdi, proverbio Græco notatum est Suetonius Tiberius, Chap. 28. Cæcero had rail'd Varro in the same manner, before Tiberius's Time; for as Varro had promised to dedicate his Books of the Latin Tongue to Cæcero, and made no Advances in that Work, he writes to his Friend Atticus, Bienium jam praeterit, cum ille Callipedes assiduo cursu Cubitum nulium processerit. Two Years are past since that Callipedes has been running without gaining one Cubit, Book XIII. Epift. 12. This Fault of Callipedes, did not hinder him from being esteemed in his Time, he was so puff'd up with the Reputation he had, and posse'd of his own Merit, that going one Day into the Place where Agefìlas was, and perceiving that the King took no notice of him, had the Impudence to say, Ah, Sir! Don't you know me? Has no Body told you who I am? Agefìlas answer'd, Are not you a Comedian? By
the Word which Agesilauus used, it seems as if he did not only reproach him on account of his Profession, but the Fault into which he was fallen, for he ues the Word Deicelista, which signifies an Imitator, a too exact Copyist.

8. Insomuch, that on this account Tragedy will be below Epopeia, as the latter Actors were inferior to the first. Epopeia was like the first Actors, who were such of Wisdom and Gravity, and Tragedy was like the latter, who were fallen into a Vicious Affectation; but that is not the fault of Tragedy, but of the Actors.

9. We assert then, that Epopeia being made for the better sort. Tis thus that I thought that I ought to Translate ἐπισκέπτεις ἔτατες, for that is what we call properly the better sort, that is People of the best Education. This is the fence of that place in Plato, which Aristotle had in view, τ'ις in the eleventh Book of the Laws. Αἱ λεγεῖν ἑκαίν τ'ις ἔτατεν καλλιστον, ητίσ τινὶς ἔτατις, κή ἰκανον, πεπαιδευμένοις τῆς τότε. But I am persuaded, that the best Poem is that which diverts the better sort, and those who are best Educated.

10. But first of all what we had said against Tragedy, is not against the Art of the Poet, but that of the Actor. The Content of the Patrons of Epopeia is a certain Token of this Truth, for the first Comedians were not guilty of that Fault, the latter were. We must not then judge of a Tragedy by the Gestures and the Motions of the Actors, for at that rate, a Piece that would be good if it was played by a Minificus, would be bad if it were acted by a Pindar or a Callippedes. If the Excessive and Effeminate Gesture of an Actor can do damage to a Tragedy, then the Vicious Pronunciation of a Reader may also hurt an Epopeia, which cannot be thought of without an Absurdity. Tho' the Ilias be badly read, and the Oedipus of Sophocles illy plaid, yet neither of them will thereby cease to be excellent.
cellent in their kind, for the Poet is not responsible for the Defects of the Reader or Actor.

11. For that Defect is no less common to those who write an Epick Poem as Sostrates, or that Sing as Mnesithenus of Opuntum. Hipparchus the Son of Pisistratus, was the first, as they say, that brought Homer's Poems to Athens, and made a foundation for some People who should recite them publickly, with a great deal of show and pomp, during the Pan-Athenian Feasts. These People were called Homerists or Rhapsodists, either because they joined together different parts of these Poems, or because they held a Laurel branch in their Hand while they recited them. This Establishment of Hipparchus was so well received, that in a little time there was an infinite Number of the Rhapsodists; for several Towns instituted Feasts and Shows, and gave considerable Prizes to those who should succeed best in this Profession: In fine, they came so in Vogue, that there was no Assembly, Sacrifice, or Feasts, to which one of these Rhapsodists was not invited. I find that they did not stint themselves to recite Homer's Verses only, they recited also those of Hesiod, Archilochus, Mimnermus, Phocylides, and used the Iambick and Lyric Verses, as the Hexameters. But I dont remember that I have read any where else than in Aristotle, that there were two sorts of Rhapsodists, one that repeated the Verses without Singing, as Sostrates, and another that repeated them singing, as Mnesithenus of Opuntum.

12. For both of them accompany'd their Imitation and Singing, with Gestures that are extravagant enough. 'Tis certain that the same Blame which may be laid on Tragedy, may be also laid on Epopeia, and with as much reason, for the Rhapsodists had a Theatre built, and Cloaths made for that purpose, which were of divers Colours, Gold Rings, a Crown, and a Branch of Laurel; as for their Gestures they were no less extravagant than those of Callipedes and Pindar.
The famous Rhapodist Ion, on whom Plato vouchsafed to make a Dialogue, and says in express Terms, That when he recited any thing that was pitiful, he shed Tears, and when he recited any thing that was terrible, his Hair stood an end, he was entirely beside himself, and as it were Mad.

13. Otherwise all the Motions are not to be blamed, any more than Dances, except they be Lascivious and Effeminate.] This third Reason is no less solid than the rest; Tragedy cannot be blamed for making use of Gestures; for that can only be when it employs those which are not agreeable to the Majesty of the Poem; for if in the Gesture of Actors, as in Dances, there are some that have Dignity and Decency, and there are others that are Effeminate and Lascivious. For this reason the Ancient Poets took the pains to dress their Actors themselves, and to mark all the Steps of the Dances in their Pieces, that so there might not be one Motion but what was Noble, and agreeable to the Quality of the Verses which were sung, and to this end they studied with great application, the different Gestures, and all the Postures of the Statues made by the most eminent Masters of Antiquity, especially those that represented the Dances of the Ancients, on these they formed the Gestures of their Persons, and the Dances of the Chorus, this seems to me very remarkable. They learn'd Wisdom and Modesty from the Mute Statues, which were not be found in their time, when all was corrupted by Softness and Luxury.

14. And our Comedians now a days are blamed for, who seem to affect the Gestures of Debauched and Dishonest Women.] After the Poets had left off mounting the Stages; and to dress the Actors, the Comedians being left to themselves, immediately spoiled the Acting, and degenerated from that Wisdom and Simplicity, by which it had been maintained. In Aristotle's Time this Corruption was perceived very sensibly; the Acting
ing of most part of them, was Immodest and Disorderly.

15. Moreover, Tragedy produces its effect by its self, and without these Motions, as well as Epopeia doth; for a simple Reading, lets us know what it is.] 'He shew'd us in the first place that the Gestures don't proceed from the Poet, but Actor. In the second place, That they are common to Epopeia and Tragedy. And in the third place, That they are not all to be blamed. Now he gives a fourth Reason, by which he proves, That those Gestures are no more necessary for Tragedy, than they are for Epopeia, since it performs its effect without their assistance; for there is no Person, who will not be affected with a simple Reading of the Oedipus of Sophocles, provided he sees all its Beauties. 'Tis very ridiculous then to prefer Epopeia to Tragedy, under pretence that this uses Gestures and Motions, since they are not at all proper, and natural to it, and that it uses the Theatre only for the greater Pleasure of the Spectator, as Epopeia employs them, when 'tis sung in the Publick Assemblies. But it seems to me that Aristotle has not answered to the strongest Argument which he used to exalt Epopeia above Tragedy, nevertheless it may be retorted on Epopeia, and made use of to shew one of the greatest Advantages Tragedy has over it. If Epopeia is made for the better fort, and Tragedy for the Common People, Epopeia is, beyond Contradiction, the most excellent and perfect, for 'tis a sure Rule in Nature, as well as Morality, that that which serves the greater, is more perfect than that which serves the less; but Tragedy is made no less for the better fort, than Epopeia; and hath this more, 'tis made for the People; 'tis therefore without any dispute preferable to Epopeia; for that which serves all, is, more considerable than that which serves a part only. This is a demonstration to which I believe nothing can be opposed.

Kk 4 15. Tragedy
16. Tragedy has all that is found in an Epick Poem.

He now goes on ro set forth all the Advantages of Tragedy. It hath all that is in Epick Poem, but that hath not all that is in it. For this reason, he that can judge well of an Epick Poem, shall not always do to of a Tragedy: But he that can judge well of a Tragedy shall always judge well of an Epick Poem, as we have said on Chap. V.

17. For it may also make use of Hexameter Verse.

To prevent any Advantage that Epick Poem may take on pretence that its Hexameter Verse is more noble than the Iambick. Aristotle tells us, That Tragedy may also employ the same Verse, and if it has not been done, 'tis because the Iambick appeared more proper for it. He might have added, That Epick Poem could successfully use the Hexameter only, whereas Tragedy uses the Anapests and Trochees, with the Iambicks in the course of the Acts, and that it has Verses of a different Measure for the Chorus's, which give it a variety that Epick Poem has not. Our Tragedy hath only the same Verse as Epopeia, which is one of the Reasons that make it so much inferior to the Greek Tragedy, and this I think none will dispute.

18. And which is of no small Consideration, it hath Musick and Decoration.

Aristotle told us the Epopeia was sung, how comes it to pass then, that Tragedy has Musick which Epopeia has not? However specious this Objection may appear, 'tis not difficult to give an Answer to it. Epick Poem is not naturally made to be sung, but read. The Singing which was afterwards added to it, was an Invention of the Khapfodists; for when 'tis said that Homer sang his Verses, 'tis not to be thought that 'twas so regulated Musick, 'twas rather a Pronunciation with Cadencies, than a Song. 'Tis not the same with Tragedy, it hath Chorus's made on purpose to be sung, and the Poet takes...
takes no less pains for his Verse, than for his Musick, witness that little History which is made of Euripides. 'Tis said, that one Day when he taught the Musick of one of his Chorus's to the Musicians, one of them who heard him, fell a laughing; to whom Euripides said, It plainly appears Friend, that you are a Sot, and an Ignoramus, since you laugh when I sing the Mixolydian Tone. The Mixolydian Tone was very sad and made People Weep. Euripides had reason to think that that Man was a Sot and an Ignorant Fellow, since he Laugh'd at that which drew Tears from others.

19. Which contribute to give it an infinite Pleasure, and to render it the more sensible.] We can't doubt of this Truth, and 'tis easy to perceive by it, that in taking away the Chorus's of Tragedy, they have deprived us of one of the greatest Advantages, that it had over the Epic Poem; for all the Musick which can be placed in the Interludes of our Plays, and all the Dances that can be added, do in no wise produce the same effect, because they cannot be considered as parts of the Tragedy. They are strange Members which corrupt and render it monstrous.

20. But that which is yet of more esteem, is that it hath the Evidence of an Action, for it sets all things before the Eyes of the Spectator.] Epopeia is only a Recitation, but Tragedy is a Representation of the Action itself. Now 'tis certain that what we see affects much more than what we hear. Tragedy is then more perfect and excellent than Epopeia.

21. In the Representation, and in the Reading.] I think this Passage ought to be Translated thus, εἰσὶ τὰ αὑτῶν, in the Reading, ἐπὶ τὰ ἔριθρα, in the Action. That's to say, in the Representation; for this is one of the great Advantages of Tragedy, That whether it be Read or Represented, it exposeth all to the Eyes of the Reader, and Spectator: Victorius chooses rather to Translate, εἰς ἀναγνώσεις, in the Remembrances and Incidents.
Incidents, but why should Aristotle look for the Remembrances, to distinguish them from the Incidents: This is neither Natural nor Probable.

22. It hath moreover this great advantage, that it comes to the end of its Imitation in less time.] Tragedy is confined to one Course of the Sun, nay does not take that up entirely neither, when as Epopeia has no set bounds. However we must not imagine that this difference was imaginary at the beginning, its ground was the nature of those Poems; Epopeia is made to correct Manners and Habits, and Tragedy to purifie the Passions; and as these are raised at once, and the others require longer time to be imprinted on us, 'twas necessary to give a greater extent to Epopeia than Tragedy. Wherefore Tragedy is more perfect, since it arrives in less time to the end of its Imitation; but for the same reason then, one of Æsop's Fables ought to be prefer'd to a Tragedy. For its shorter, and obtains its end sooner; 'tis not the same thing: Epopeia and Tragedy are as truly Fables as those of Æsop, but they have their just Magnitude which those of Æsop have not. Now Aristotle speaks here only of those Works which make a Body of a just extent, and are the only ones that can be called fine, for as it hath been said already, Beauty consists only in the Magnitude and the Order.

23. Now that which is well compacted, is made more agreeable than that which is diffused.] To prove that the shortness of Tragedy is preferable to the length of Epopeia, he uses a general Rule which is found true in all things. That which is compact, is more agreeable, and affects more friendly, than that which is diffused; the truth of this Assertion is very natural, and we need not go far to seek the reason of it. That which is compact, teaches us at the same time, with all its parts, but that which is diffused, teaches us only by degrees and successively, any body may try this in reading a Tragedy and an Epick Poem. The first affects
Ariftotle's Art of Poetry.

24. *We may be convinced of this truth, if we put Sophocles's Oedipus into as many Verses as the Ilias contains.* This is a proof of the reason he hath mentioned; which is, that if an Epick Poem should be made of the Action of the Oedipus, in extending it by Episodies, we should undoubtedly find, that that Poem would be more flat, insipid and languishing, than the Tragedy of Sophocles; and would not strike us so vividly. The same thing would be proved if a Tragedy should be made of the Ilias, for that Action contained in the bounds of a Tragedy, would have another sort of Vivacity than it has in a long and large Poem.

25. *To Conclude there is no Epopheia which preserves the Unity so well as Tragedy.* Aristotle has often told us, That Epopheia as well as Tragedy, is the imitation of one and the same Action. From whence comes it then, that he now tells us that the Unity of Epopheia is less perfect than that of Tragedy? This is in my Opinion the explication of a Passage, which seems at first sight to have some difficulty: Tragedy hath only very short Episodies, so that all the Parts of its Action separated from one another, are so small, and so imperfect by themselves, that there is not one of them that can make an entire Action by itself alone, this is what makes the perfect Unity of Tragedy. 'Tis not so with Epick Poem, for as that is very extensive and much amplified by its Episodies, those Episodies which are but Members of the Principal Actions, are considerable enough in themselves to make a perfect and entire Action, that they should be seperated from the Body of the Poem. 'Tis true, that altogether, they compose one and the same Action; but separately,
they make many, and by that variety render the Unity of Epopeia less exact and strict than that of Tragedy, tho' it be otherwise as perfect as the Nature of the Poem will permit.

26. And a certain sign of it is, that we may draw the Subjects of many Tragedies from any Epick Poem whatever.] The foregoing Remark has sufficiently explained the reason which Aristotle gives of his Opinion, and reconciles this Passage with that of Chap. 23, where he says, That the Ilıas or Odyssey can furnish only one Subject for Tragedy, or two at most. This is true of the Ilıas or Odyssey taken in their first Fable, their first Plan, as has been said in the Remarks; but these Poems considered with all their Episodes, can furnish many Subjects for Tragedy, since every Episode is considerable and extended enough to furnish one by itself, and 'tis this length and entireness of the Episodes, which do in some manner alter the Unity of Epopeia; for 'tis certain that the Unity of any thing is more perfect in the proportion that the Parts which compose it are perfect, and as they can make an whole.

27. And if to avoid this defect in an Heroick Poem, we should keep entirely to one Subject only, as a Tragick Poet.] Aristotle is not satisfied to give the Reasons of his Opinion, but gives also the Proofs of his Reasons, and draws them from Experience and Practice. To establish then this Truth, That the Unity of Epopeia is less perfect than that of Tragedy, and to shew that it can't be otherwise, that 'tis not the Fault of the Poets but the Poem. He enquires what would happen, if a Poet should oblige himself to imitate the Unity of a Tragedy in an Epopeia.

28. It would necessarily follow, That either the brevity of the Subject would make the Poem appear maimed and imperfect, or if we would at any rate give it its due extent, which it ordinarily has, that length would be defect.
tute of Matter, and make the Poem flat.] This Opinion is very solid and convincing. Suppose a Poet would make an Epick Poem, with the Unity as exact and perfect as that of a Tragedy. What would happen? If he made his Episodes as short and as imperfect as those of a Tragedy, to the end that they might make one whole, 'twould come to pass, that instead of a Poem of the just extent, that an Epick Poem ought to have, 'twould come to pass, that instead of a Poem of the just extent, that an Epick Poem ought to have, that we should only have an Abortive, a maimed and imperfect Work; and if to obtain the length of an Epick Poem, he should engage himself to enlarge his Episodes, with mixing other Fables, that extent would be destitute of Matter, and would render the Poem flat and insipid, as Wine which is mixed with Water, that I may express all the Energy of the Term which Aristotle uses.

29. On the other side, if the Poet should mix several Fables with his Subject; that is to say, If he should make an Imitation that is composed of many Actions and Incidents, it would no more have that perfect Unity.] But you may say, That the Poet to avoid both these Inconveniences, of which we have spoken, may incorporate into his Episodes, other Incidents and Fables, which he may joyn to his Subject. This is very well, 'twill not have even then the perfect Unity of Tragedy; it will only obtain the Unity of an Epick Poem: For having given to his Episodes their just grandeur, each of them will be able to furnish a Subject for a Tragedy, so that he must necessarily fall into that Inconvenience in his Poem, which he endeavoured to avoid.

30. Than the Ilias and Odyssey which have several parts of that Nature, that have ev'ry one their extent tho' those two Poems are otherwise as perfect as they can be, and both of them imitate, as near as possible, one Action only.] Aristotle adds this to prevent his Readers from believing, that he blames Homer's Poems, which he admires in so many Places, and on which he bestows such
such great Praise; the Unity is not so perfect as in Tragedy, by reason of the extent of the Epistles; but such is the Nature of Epopæia, that it cannot by any means accommodate it self to a more exact Unity, for Reasons already mentioned. However, these Poems don’t cease to be perfect in their kind; the Unity of Epopæia would be Vicious if it was like that of Tragedy; and that of Tragedy would be the same if it approached that of Epopæia. Each of them hath its Rules and Bounds, which no Poet ought to transgress.

31. If beside all these Advantages Tragedy hath this also, of obtaining its aim better, and giving more Pleasure, for neither Tragedy nor Epick Poem ought to give all sorts of Pleasure, but only what is proper to them, it is certain that Tragedy is more perfect than Epick Poem, since it obtains its end more exactly.] Thus Aristotle concludes in favour of Tragedy: Epopæia and Tragedy endeavour to give us Pleasure, to the end that they may form our Manners and correct our Vices; to obtain this, they take a different way, and tho’ both of them receive all the Passions, or each of them have some particular ones, which reign in their Poems. Epopæia employs particularly Curiosity and Admiration, which places in us a love for the Sciences, and engage us to learn that which we are ignorant of; and Tragedy uses Terror and Compassion, which may render us Cautious of our selves, that we may endeavour to avoid falling into the same Misfortunes, which we see represented to us; and as these means are very apt, they give us Pleasure also, and consequently we must agree, That Tragedy is preferable to Epopæia, which gives very slowly that Pleasure which it ought to give. The Patrons of that Poem not being able to gain such an evident Truth, would counterbalance that Advantage, by several other Pleasures which it gives, and Tragedy does not, altho’ this be true, yet Aristotle shews, That that retrenchment is useless; because, as hath been said in another place, these Poems are
Aristotle's Art of Poetry.

are not made to give all sorts of Pleasure, but those only which are proper, and ought to arise from the Nature of their Imitation, and the end proposed we ought to judge of Poems, and all other Works by this, that Epopeia, calls not to its assistance any other Pleasures, but to fill up its void Spaces, and to make us attend with less Impatience, and more agreeably to that which it promiseth us.

32. That which we have said is sufficient to explain what Tragedy and Epopeia are.] Aristotle according to his Custom, puts at the end of his Work a Summary Recapitulation of all his Design, to let us know, that he hath performed that which he had promised, and that he is come to the end of the first Treatise, according to the Method he had laid down. In the Books which should have followed this, he treated of Comedy, Mimes, Dithyrambicks, and Nomes, that is to say, the Rules and Modes of Singing: The Playing on the Flute; and the Lyre, and of all the Passions. The loss of these Books is very great: The Beauty of this first makes us regret, that there is nothing in all Antiquity that can make it up; we find in this Book a great many things which we should otherwise in all probability have been ignorant of; and which are not only curious, but very useful. We may be sorry for the loss of what Aristotle said of Comedy; but that which deserves our grief most, is what he had wrote of the Passions and the manner of purifying them, for he treated of that matter to the bottom, as appears by the last Chapter of the eighth of his Politicks, where he says, he touches on that en passant, which he would explain here at large and in all its extent.

The END.